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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
§ 1. Introduction 
The year 2008 is in many ways a noteworthy one for the free movement of lawyers. 
Not only does it mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, but also the 
fifteenth anniversary of the Treaty of Maastricht and the introduction of European 
citizenship. Moreover, it is also the tenth anniversary of Directive 98/5/EC,1 the 
secondary legislation that marked the completion of the legal framework for the 
free movement of lawyers in the European Union, and will be the focal point of 
this book. In addition, Directive 77/249/EEC, governing the freedom of lawyers 
to provide services, has been in force for 30 years,2 while approximately 20 years 
ago lawyers were offered the opportunity of integrating into the legal profession of 
another Member State by means of Directive 89/48/EEC, the Diploma Directive,3 
which was in turn replaced in October 2005 by Directive 2005/36/EC.4 It is also 
in 2008 that the European Commission must deliver its report on the functioning 
of Directive 98/5/EC. 
On the basis of the EC Treaty, and more specifically Articles 14, 18, 39, 43 and 
49 thereof, European Union citizens have the right to move freely in the territory 
of the European Union in order to take up a professional activity in any Member 
State of their own choosing. As stated in Article 14 of the EC Treaty, an internal 
market, or economic union, is characterised by the abolition of obstacles to the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital.5 Furthermore, the European Court 
of Justice has always given a broad definition of the term ‘restriction’. In 1995, in 
the famous Gebhard case,6 the European Court of Justice ruled, based on earlier, more 
fragmented case law,7 that any national measure liable to hinder or make less attrac-
tive the exercise of one of the four freedoms mentioned in Articles 3 and 14 of the 
EC Treaty is, in principle, a restriction in the light of those articles.8 This very broad 
definition leads to the fact that nearly every national measure can be construed as a 
restriction9 to the exercise of one of the four freedoms. 
                                                  
1  Directive 98/5/EC, [1998] OJ L 77/36. 
2  Directive 77/249/EEC, [1977] OJ L 78/17. 
3  Directive 89/48/EEC, [1989] OJ L 19/16 
4  Directive 2005/36/EC, [2005] OJ L 255/22. 
5  See Belassa (1961), p. 181. 
6  Case C-55/94, Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, 
[1995] ECR 4165. For summaries of and comments on this case, see Arnull (2006), pp. 770-
771; Barnard (2007), p. 313; Chalmers (2006), pp. 703-704; Craig & de Burca (2007), p. 793; 
Ewig (1996) pp. 13-15; Farthouat & Puel (1996) pp. 18-22; Higgins & Svenningsen (1995); 
Steiner (2006), p. 449; and Weatherill (2006), pp. 319-321. 
7  See Chapter 2 below. 
8  Case C-55/94, § 37. 
9  See, for example, Chalmers (2006), pp. 697-742. 
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One of the possible restrictions a Member State can impose is the regulation of 
entrance to a profession. According to Article 3 of Directive 2005/36/EC, a regu-
lated profession is the exercise of a professional activity or group of professional 
activities, access to which, the pursuit of which, or one of the modes of pursuit of 
which, is subject, directly or indirectly, by virtue of legislative, regulatory or admin-
istrative provisions, to the possession of specific professional qualifications.10 Alter-
natively, stated in simpler terms, when a State governs the entrance to a certain 
profession, this profession is considered to be regulated.11 Clearly the restrictive effect 
of regulating a profession can be removed if rules regarding the regulation of that 
specific profession are harmonised throughout the European Union. In an ideal 
situation, this means that within the confines of the European Union a person can 
exercise any profession, providing he or she has the necessary qualifications to do 
so, anywhere in the European Union. The Member States and the Institutions of 
the European Community have been trying over the last few decades to achieve 
this goal.12 History has shown that for most regulated professions the realisation of 
such a removal of the restrictive effect of regulation is possible.13 That is mainly 
because of the nature of most professions. A doctor in Finland should have the same 
basic knowledge and skills as a doctor in Spain, and a dentist in France has received, 
in principle, the same education as a dentist in the United Kingdom. In other words, 
the exercise of most regulated professions has nothing to do with the country in 
which the person has trained and gained access to that profession. Professions that 
have a clear link to the Member State, in which they are exercised, however, such 
as notaries, are generally bound by much more stringent rules.14  
That premise is not true for lawyers. Due to the way different States have 
adopted different legal systems throughout history, the profession of lawyer seems, 
at first sight, not suitable for border crossing. At present, the European Union consists 
                                                  
10  Article 1(c) and (d) 89/48/EEC. 
11  Throughout the European Union an abundance of professions are regulated by the respective 
Member States. An overview of regulated professions can be found at: <ec.europa.eu/internal 
_market/qualifications/regprof/index.cfm?lang=en>, last accessed 1 June 2007. 
12  See Schneider (2002), p.17. 
13  It proved very difficult to come to a harmonisation of the profession of architect, however, 
and it proved impossible to gain results with regard to harmonisation of the profession of 
engineer. See Schneider (1995), p. 161. 
14  In these cases, Article 45 of the EC Treaty provides for the possibility that Member States 
might exclude free movement for professions that are connected with the exercise of state sover-
eignty. This provision extends the public service exception of Article 39(4) to the freedom of 
establishment. (Article 55 does the same for the freedom to provide services.) On the subject 
see, for example: Craig & de Burca (2007), pp. 795-796. It will be shown that in the early days 
of the European Community (i.e. until 1974) this much more stringent regime applied to the 
profession in the majority of the member states. At this point, it must also be mentioned that 
the application of this stricter regime, i.e., excluding free movement by upholding nationality 
requirements, is not static. Recently the European Commission has initiated legal proceedings 
on the basis of Article 226 EC against 16 member states that apply the Article 45 EC exception 
to the profession of notary. See Press Release IP/06/1385, 12 October 2006, via <europa.eu> 
last accessed 1 June 2007. On the basis of press release IP/07/915, it is clear that the Com-
mission is only pursuing seven of these cases. It has however (IP/07/1510) initiated new pro-
cedures in eight of the new member states, on the basis of the same issue. Both press releases 
via <europa.eu>, last accessed 11 December 2007. 
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of 27 different Member States. Even simplified to the extreme, that means that there 
are 27 different legal systems (whereas actually there are many more) within the 
European Union. In addition, the nature of legal education in the present Member 
States leads to the effect that a lawyer who is educated in a certain Member State is 
an expert in the legal system of the State where he has received his education, but 
is a layman in the workings of the legal systems of the other Member States.15 This 
provides for an inherent obstacle to the free movement of lawyers that is inde-
pendent of the will of Member States to create such a freedom. 
This has not always been the case. The profession16 of those who followed the 
studies of law in the Middle Ages at the newly established universities started out as 
a true border-crossing profession, and the persons who had gained proficiency in 
this field were true masters of the Ius Commune Europæum. Around AD 1100 young 
men from all over Continental Europe came to the Italian city of Bologna to study, 
in the first instance, the rediscovered Roman law, and from 1140 onward also 
canon law, under the guidance of Irnerius.17 These two legal systems were in that 
age the basis for the majority of the legal systems in Continental Europe, and could, 
therefore, be regarded as a true Ius Commune Europæum.18 This being the case, it 
was irrelevant where a lawyer came from or where he was going to work, because 
the majority of Continental Europe fell under the same Ius Commune Europæum.19 
This situation persisted throughout the Middle Ages until the eighteenth and in 
some cases the nineteenth century. As the concept of territorial sovereignty became 
more and more important, through the theories underlying the French Revolution 
and the ensuing tradition of legal positivism and codification, each State developed 
its own distinctive legal system and lawyers were educated in their own State.20 
This development made it paramount that the lawyer was trained in the law of his 
State and therefore marked the end of the free movement of lawyers as it had 
existed until that time. 
The modern profession of lawyer is no longer comparable to the legal pro-
fessions as they were practised in the Middle Ages.21 The profession as we know it 
today originated in the nineteenth century and was characterised by its governance 
through strict rules of access.22 Combined with the fact that lawyers were only edu-
cated in the law of their respective State, this meant that the free movement of 
lawyers as it had existed in the Middle Ages did not survive. 
In fact, this situation remained23 until the European Court of Justice ended the 
practices of the Member States of the European Community of applying nation-
                                                  
15  See Schneider (2002), p. 15. 
16  The activities that were in those times carried out by a lawyer can be traced back to classical 
times. See Forsyth (1875) and Pound (1943) C, pp. 203-228. 
17  Lokin & Zwalve (2001), pp. 110-120. See, for a very detailed overview of the reception of 
Roman Law in Europe: Mather (2001), pp. 323-362 and Wilson (1894), pp. 304-307. 
18  Ibid. 
19  For an English example, see Pound (1943) A, pp. 315-333. 
20  For a detailed account of the changes in the Dutch legal education in that period, see 
Wachelder (1992), pp. 154-166. 
21  Pound (1943) B, pp. 229-244. 
22  Schneider (1995), p. 265. 
23  Ibid. 
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ality restrictions to their legal professions.24 The Reyners case marked the beginning 
of a renewed free movement of lawyers which was initially guaranteed by the 
European Court of Justice,25 but was later addressed by the law-making Institutions 
of the European Community.26 In the 1970s and 1980s, the European Community 
adopted two Directives which led to a considerable development in the free move-
ment of lawyers. In Directive 77/249/EEC, the European Community laid down 
a strong base of mutual recognition in the field of the free provision of legal services. 
It will be shown that the Services Directive inspired a number of the core concepts 
of the Lawyers Establishment Directive (Directive 98/5/EC). At the end of the 
1980s the European Community adopted the general Diploma Directive (Directive 
89/48/EEC) which was the first legal instrument in the European Community to 
address the establishment of lawyers in other Member States. In spite of further de-
velopment in the case law, a Directive that applied specifically to the establishment 
of lawyers was adopted in 1998.27 This Directive will be the central element of this 
study.  
The developments described above indicate that the evolution of the free 
movement of lawyers within the European Community took place in a distinctive 
manner. The evolution has been characterised by a combination of what is called 
‘positive integration’ (i.e. secondary legislation) and negative integration (i.e. inte-
gration through judgments of the European Court of Justice). This two-tier devel-
opment will be the central element in the efforts to create a model that grasps all 
the modalities of the free movement of lawyers in Europe. When looking at the 
legal profession one can distinguish three different types of lawyers that cross the 
border of the Member State in which they received their education.28 First, there 
are the lawyers who wish to become fully integrated in the legal profession of the 
Member States in which they plan to establish themselves. Second, there are lawyers 
who only occasionally want to work in another Member State. Lastly, there are those 
legal professionals who would like to establish themselves in another Member State 
permanently, but who do not want to become part of the legal profession of that 
Member State, but nevertheless still want to work as lawyers. It will be shown that 
the Directives in force at the time of writing cover all three modalities of border-
crossing lawyers. In addition, the European Court of Justice has also extended rights 
to people who are not (yet) fully qualified as legal professionals. These persons will 
also be included in the model. 
                                                  
24  Case 2/74, Reyners v. Belgium, [1974] ECR 631.  
25  See, for example, Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaal-
nijverheid, [1974] ECR 1299; Case 71/76, Thieffry v. Conseil de l’Ordre des Avocats à la Cour de 
Paris, [1977] ECR 756, [1977]; Case 222/86, UNECTEF v. Heylens, [1987] ECR 4097; and 
Case 340/89, Vlassopoulou v. Ministerium für Justiz, Bundes- und Europaangelegenheiten Baden-
Württemberg, [1991] ECR 2357.  
26  Directive 77/249/EEC, [1977] OJ L 78/17; Directive 89/48/EEC, [1989] OJ L 19/16 and 
Directive 98/5/EC, [1998] OJ L 77/36. 
27  Directive 98/5/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 February 1998 to facilitate 
the practice of the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a member state other than that 
in which the qualification was obtained [1998] OJ L 77/36. 
28  House of Lords (1994), p. 25. See also: Clarcke (1996). Recently this view has also been recog-
nised by the European Court of Justice: Case 168/98, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg v. European 
Parliament and the Council of the European Union, [2000] ECR I-09131. 
5 
Apart from this inter-Community evolution, there have been (recent) develop-
ments outside the European Community which might influence the evolution of a 
free movement of lawyers in the European Community. More specifically, there 
has been an inter-governmental effort to streamline higher education in geograph-
ical Europe. This so-called ‘Bologna Process’ may also have an effect on the free 
movement of lawyers in the European Community. The reason why this develop-
ment is situated outside the European Union is because of the restricted capacity of 
the European Union with regard to (higher) education, which is limited by the 
scope of Article 149 of the EC Treaty. This Article expressly excludes the possi-
bility of harmonising the laws of the Member States with regard to education.29 
Therefore any attempt to streamline higher education in Europe would have to take 
place outside of the European Union. This extra-Community development will 
therefore also receive much attention in this study. Before the structure of this study 
is set out however, a more fundamental question needs to be answered. 
 
 
§ 2. Need for a Free Movement of Lawyers? 
The developments that lead to an automatic link between the legal profession and 
the jurisdiction in which that profession is exercised, as described in the previous 
paragraph, still seem to reflect the status quo with regard to how people approach 
the free movement of lawyers. In undertaking this study, I was often confronted 
with the question: ‘Why is a free movement of lawyers necessary? If you need a 
lawyer you hire a national lawyer.’ At first sight, this is indeed a legitimate question. 
Why would a Dutch client hire a Rechtsanwalt in the Netherlands when he can also 
hire an advocaat?  
This question can be answered in a number of different manners. First, it can be 
approached from a purely legal angle. The creation of an internal market is charac-
terised by the abolition of State measures which hinder the free movement of 
persons. There is an abundance of restrictions to the free movement of lawyers in 
the European Community. In a situation where all these restrictions were removed, 
the actual free movement, of lawyers in this case, would be left to the ‘invisible 
hand’ of the free market, where supply and demand decide whether there will be a 
market for foreign lawyers. In short, from a legal perspective, a study into the abo-
lition of restrictions to the free movement of lawyers is not concerned with the 
question of whether an actual demand for the free movement of lawyers exists. 
Although this becomes the technical answer to the question posed above, I realise 
                                                  
29  Article 149 EC was only introduced in the Treaty in 1992 with the Treaty of Maastricht, but 
it was always clear that education was not a part of the competences of the European 
Community. See Case 9/74, Donato Casagrande v. Landeshauptstadt München, [1974] ECR 773. 
It is typical that the Court states that such an exclusion does not mean that the competences 
the Community does have may not have any effect on the education policy of the Member 
States (ibid., § 6). That the ECJ is willing to keep to that premise can be seen in: Case C-
109/04, Karl Robert Kranemann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, [2005] ECR I-02421; Case C-
313/01, Christine Morgenbesser v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli avvocati di Genova, [2003] ECR I-
13467; Case C-147/03, Commission v. Austria [2005] ECR I 5969; and Case C65/03 
Commission v. Belgium [2003] ECR I 6427. 
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that this technical answer is unsatisfactory. Therefore, a more ‘comprehensive’ 
answer to this question is warranted. 
While, on the one hand, it was established that free movement of lawyers is 
problematic, on the other hand, the call for lawyers to move freely from one country 
to another and to exercise their professional activity there becomes louder and 
louder, and it seems that, although solid empirical evidence is not available, an 
actual demand for the free movement of lawyers exists. The then-president of the 
Council of Bars and Law Societies in Europe (CCBE), Gout, even goes as far as to 
assume that such a demand exists.30 Although I am not sure whether I would go as 
far in my assumption, it is true that in the last 30 years, the world has become 
much smaller and the need for transnational legal activity is steadily increasing.31 At 
the time when the European Court of Justice gave its ruling in the Reyners case, for 
example, the internet was nothing more than a military experiment, while in 2008 
it is very normal to conduct business transactions using the internet, and this might 
result in very complex transnational legal issues if something goes wrong.32 Because 
of the ongoing globalisation33 and internationalisation34 of society as a whole, in-
cluding the globalisation and internationalisation of the economy, and legal services 
as a part of that, lawyers from different jurisdictions inevitably come in contact with 
each other. Such experiences often lead to the conclusion that, although at first sight 
the professions in different jurisdictions might seem very different, the principles 
underlying the legal profession are the same throughout the world.35 
As said above, there is no clear evidence as to how large the demand for a free 
market of lawyers is, yet there is some more information on the supply-side of the 
market. The CCBE keeps track of the number of lawyers that actually move from 
one Member State to another under the regime of the Establishment Directive 98/5/ 
EC. Also under the regime of the Diploma Directive 89/48/EEC some numerical 
evidence was presented by the European Commission in its report to the European 
Parliament and the Council on the implementation of Directive 89/48/ EEC.36 In 
that piece, the European Commission states that in the period between 1991 and 
1995 a total number of 620 lawyers obtained recognition under the system of Direc-
tive 89/48/EEC, and more than 400 of them were granted immediate recognition 
                                                  
30  Gout (1998), where he states on page 3: ‘Take first the citizens of Europe. They can travel 
freely and establish themselves and work in another Member State. In so many information 
campaigns it is explained to them that their rights as consumers or (self-employed) workers are 
protected in the same way everywhere. They elect in common their representatives in the 
European Parliament. Soon they will be sharing the same currency. For them, and as far as 
they are concerned, a united Europe is a fact. And they cannot imagine that a Europe of lawyers 
is not also a fact. Whether as ordinary tourists or company managers, they expect – and rightly 
so – that they will find everywhere the service providers whom they need: their French Rechts-
anwalt, their Danish avvocato or their Luxembourg solicitor.’ 
31  Rivkin (1998), pp. 423-426. 
32  See also: WTO (1998). 
33  CCBE (s.d.) B. 
34  On possible internationalisation of the legal profession, see also: Calkoen (2000), pp. 491-503, 
J. Drolshammer (2000), pp. 713-775, Korhonen (2000), pp. 545-555, Murray & Drolshammer 
(2000), pp. 505-543 and Vagts (2000), pp. 403-413. 
35  CCBE (s.d.) C. 
36  Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the state of application of the general 
system for the recognition of higher education diplomas, 15-02-1996, COM(96) 46 Final. 
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(the vast majority being Irish lawyers recognised in the United Kingdom and vice 
versa). Approximately 340 lawyers attempted an aptitude test (at least 180 in the 
United Kingdom) and 214 out of those actually passed the test.37 More recent num-
bers with regard to lawyers taking the aptitude test are not available. With regard to 
the cross-border provision of services on the basis of Directive 77/249/EEC, no 
statistics are yet available. Since 2004 the CCBE has started to collect statistical in-
formation on lawyers established under the regime of Directive 98/5/EC.38 The 
information is however outdated, the latest information dating back to 2006, and it 
is fragmented in the sense that not all Member States have responded to the CCBE’s 
request to provide the information. A combination of the 2004, 2005 and 2006 
statistics provides the following figures: 
 
Table 1: Number of EU Lawyers in Member States 
                                                  
37  Ibid. 
38  <www.ccbe.org/en/documents/stat_en.htm>, last accessed 5 June 2007. 
Country Numbers 2004 Numbers 2005 Numbers 2006 
Austria 47 28 60 
Belgium 490 509 406 
Bulgaria – – 0 
Cyprus – 5 13 
Czech Republic – 15 46 
Denmark 14 15 22 
Estonia – 4 8 
Finland 3 4 3 
France 493 200 128 
Germany 185 206 – 
Greece 67 100 79 
Hungary – 15 40 
Ireland – 0 33 
Italy – – – 
Latvia – 1 5 
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It may be assumed that the numbers from 2006 provide the most recent informa-
tion, but I have decided also to include the 2004 and 2005 statistics since a number 
of Member States had failed to provide data in the 2006 overview, and because 
there was an inexplicable reduction in numbers in Belgium, Finland, France and 
Luxembourg (where the reduction of numbers in France by over 50 per cent is sig-
nificant).39 In addition it must be mentioned that other comments can be made 
with regard to these statistics. First, and most importantly, the numbers do not say 
anything about what activities can be exercised by these lawyers. As will be estab-
lished in this book, the activities that a lawyer exercises differ from one Member 
State to another. Legal advice, for example, is not a regulated activity in a number 
of States, and a lawyer who limits himself to giving legal advice in such a State most 
likely does not turn up in the above statistics. Moreover, it is not clear whether 
Member States treat the numbers from subsequent years as totals (i.e., whether an 
established lawyer is counted in 2004, 2005 and 2006) or as additions to earlier num-
bers, and whether lawyers who proceed to full integration in the legal profession of 
the host Member State are actually taken off the list. The numbers therefore pro-
vide nothing more than a very superficial glance at how many lawyers actually 
move from one Member State to another. 
This inaccurate and incomplete overview of the numbers of lawyers who 
actually make use of the possibility to move freely throughout the European Union 
                                                  
39  The CCBE website offers no clue as to the relationship between the two sets of numbers, 
therefore they have been included as-is. 
Lithuania – 0 3 
Luxembourg 42 30 103 
Malta – – – 
The Netherlands 32 44 47 
Poland – – 34 
Portugal 25 33 82 
Romania – – – 
Slovak Republic – 23 68 
Slovenia – 4 5 
Spain 37 74 – 
Sweden 2 5 15 
The United 
Kingdom 
150 – 230 
9 
at least proves that there is a supply of freely moving lawyers, which also indicates 
that there is a demand for these lawyers. There is no information on the geogra-
phical spread of lawyers throughout the territory of the Member States. The above 
table shows that the Member States that host the large economic centres in Europe, 
Brussels, Frankfurt and London, retain the largest numbers of lawyers established 
under their home country titles. The United Kingdom has also seen a large influx 
of lawyers as a result of the Diploma Directive 89/48/EEC. Luxembourg, as host 
of the European Court of Justice, also has an increasing number of lawyers estab-
lished under their home country’s professional title. In addition to working in the big 
cities of Europe it might be easily imaginable that the free movement of lawyers is 
attractive to those lawyers which are established in a border region of a Member 
State and who deal with these bordering countries in their daily practice. 
 
 
§ 3. Purpose of the Study 
Now it has been established that a free movement of lawyers actually exists, the rele-
vant questions for this study can be identified. First, it was indicated that the rules 
governing the development of this free movement of lawyers developed along two 
different paths. This two-tier development has blurred the exact extent of the rules 
applicable to the free movement of lawyers. Therefore, the first question must be: 
What rules are applicable to the free movement of lawyers? 
When these rules later become established, it is then possible to research the 
implementation of these rules in Member States in order to answer the second 
question: How is this free movement of lawyers realised in the Member States of 
the Community? The combined answers to the first and second questions should 
provide a view as to the extent of the free movement lawyers as it stands today. 
That premise immediately leads to the third and final question: How can the 
free movement of lawyers as it stands today be further developed and refined?  
 
 
§ 4. Approach and Structure 
In order to answer these questions, a number of different steps must be taken. First, 
in order to answer the first question, a detailed account of the evolution of free move-
ment must be given. This evolution will be described in Chapter 2 of this study. As 
was indicated above, advancement of the free movement of lawyers took place on 
two different planes. That poses a problem in the sense that a choice must be made 
between a thematic approach, i.e., dealing with the two different planes separately, 
and a more chronological approach where developments on both planes would be 
dealt with simultaneously. For an exercise that went no further than to give a mere 
description of this evolution, both approaches would suffice. The account of this 
development in this study has a more ambitious goal. Based on the evolution, a 
model will be presented that covers all modalities of the free movement of lawyers. 
Therefore a more intertwined approach must be followed. This approach will be 
largely based on chronology. The chapter will commence with a critical assessment 
of the case law of the European Court of Justice that has initiated the revival of the 
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free movement of lawyers in Europe. This line of case law will be dubbed first-
generation case law. After this, the chronological approach will be departed from, 
and a critical assessment of the three Directives that cover the free movement of 
lawyers will be given. This assessment will also include case law which deals with 
the implementation and application of the system of secondary legislation applicable 
to the free movement of lawyers. Lastly, a new generation of case law from the 
European Court of Justice is identified which then extends the results of the first 
generation case law beyond the scope of the application of the system of secondary 
legislation. In addition to this critical assessment of the last generation, attention 
will also be paid to the position of European Union citizens in the possession of 
third-country diplomas, and third-country nationals with either European Union 
or third-country diplomas. After this combined thematic/chronological assessment 
of the rules applicable to the free movement of lawyers it will be possible to draft a 
time-neutral model of rules that would apply to this freedom. The next chapter 
will also be based on that model. 
The approach followed in Chapter 2 can be classified as a rule-based approach. 
Essentially, it will be a study of how the rules regarding the free movement ought to 
look on the basis of the developments that have led to the model presented at the 
end of that chapter. Such a rule-based approach is interesting, but it does not provide 
further insight as to how these rules are applied in the Member States and therefore 
it provides no answer to the second question posed above. In order to get such an 
insight, and the answer to that question, the implementation, or application, of the 
model in the Member States must be researched. This will be done in Chapter 3. 
This chapter will research how the model is implemented and applied in fifteen 
Member States. In the beginning of the doctoral research in 2001, I envisaged deal-
ing with the implementation in all the Member States of the European Union in a 
detailed manner. When the European Union welcomed ten new Member States in 
2004, and two more in 2007, it became clear that was a goal that could no longer 
be pursued. Twelve more Member States would add an enormous volume of re-
search to the project with only limited added value.40 It can be questioned whether 
the conclusions that could be drawn from an implementation research in 27 coun-
tries would differ largely from the research in fifteen. It will be proven that this is 
not the case. Moreover, adding the twelve new Member States would also lead to 
large problems with regard to language and availability of documents. Clearly, how-
ever, these are no justifications in themselves. The exclusion of the twelve new 
Member States was merely for practical reasons. It is by no means a signal that the 
implementation in the new Member States is not interesting, but it is a subject that 
must be left for later research. As a prelude to such research I have added an epi-
logue that provides a quick glance at the implementation mechanisms of seven new 
Member States that have provided (unofficial) translations of their implementation 
mechanisms to the CCBE. 
In order to provide a meaningful overview of the implementation of the model 
in the selected Member States, the third chapter will devote separate attention to all 
                                                  
40  Which is also corroborated by the rulings of the ECJ in: Case C-193/05, Commission of the 
European Communities v. Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg, [2006] ECR I-08673; and Case C-506/ 
04, Graham J. Wilson v. Ordre des avocats du barreau de Luxembourg, [2006] ECR I-08613.  
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three modalities in which a lawyer can exercise his or her professional activities 
abroad. These modalities will not be presented in a chronological fashion but rather 
along the degree of integration in the legal profession of the host Member States. 
Most attention will be paid to the implementation of Directive 98/5/EC which 
allows lawyers to establish themselves in other Member States under their home 
country professional title. This is not only because it is the newest addition to the 
model that was presented in Chapter 2 and a concise review of its implementation 
was still lacking, but also because it will be established that this modality has effects 
on areas that were previously covered by the other two modalities, i.e., the freedom 
to provide legal services and the right to establishment as a member of the host 
Member State legal profession. 
In a prelude to this review, an assessment will be given of the legal professions 
in the fifteen Member States selected. Within this review particular attention will 
be given to the possibilities to qualify as a lawyer in that Member State and to the 
level of protection that is given to activities that are exercised by lawyers. It will be 
shown that in the fifteen Member States, on this latter criterion a threefold division 
can be made between States with a low level of protection with regard to the exer-
cise of legal activities, Member States that grant an intermediate level and Member 
States that have a high level of regulation. In addition, Member States will also be 
grouped together in categories which have similar rules with regard to the legal 
profession. The review of the implementation of the different modalities will always 
follow the order of level of protection granted.  
On the basis of this threefold division of protective attitude towards the legal 
profession, it will also be established that in Member States with low and interme-
diate levels of protection there is a ‘hidden’ category of professionals who are not 
fully qualified lawyers but who exercise activities which, in Member States offering 
a high level of protection, are reserved exclusively for lawyers. This category of 
professionals runs into problems if they seek to exercise their professional activity in 
a Member State with a high degree of regulation since they are not lawyers within 
the understanding of the latter. Their rights will be specifically addressed in the 
review of each modality.  
Chapter 3 will also address the position of third-country nationals. The approach 
is somewhat different from the other modalities, since it also takes into account a 
set of international rules governing the exercise of legal services on a world level in 
the context of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS). After a short description of the general characteristics 
of GATS with regard to legal services, there will be a study of whether third-
country nationals can benefit from GATS rules in order to extend their very limited 
rights that can be awarded to them on the basis of the model. Since the review of 
GATS falls essentially outside the model, there will be no review of the national 
implementation mechanisms, however, the rules in one country will be presented 
as a ‘best practice’. 
With regard to the third question, it can be observed that one of the major 
shortcomings to the free movement of lawyers as it has developed over the last 30 
years is the fact that it only applies to fully qualified lawyers. That does not only 
mean, as will be established in Chapter 3, that those professionals who are not law-
yers cannot benefit from the system. However, the system does not affect the rules 
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that Member States impose on the qualification track for the legal profession in 
their State. That problem is the subject of Chapter 4 of this study. In that chapter, 
research is extended to the rules which are applicable to the qualification track for 
the legal profession in the different Member States.41 In that sense it will be necessary 
to extent the scope of the research beyond the law of the European Union, since it 
will be established that the European Union has only very limited powers in this area. 
It will therefore prove necessary to assess the recent developments in the ‘Bologna 
Process’, the intergovernmental effort to create a European Area of Higher Educa-
tion. In this sense specific attention will be paid to the Lisbon Recognition Conven-
tion, a Council of Europe Treaty that now forms an integral part of the ‘Bologna 
Process’. Whether this process offers any added value in order to further the devel-
opment of the free movement of lawyers in Europe will be assessed. In that sense, 
how the new generation case law that will be identified in Chapter 2 affects the 
qualification process as such and the application of the ‘Bologna Process’ to that 
process will also be reviewed. After that assessment the emphasis of Chapter 4 will 
shift from a critical assessment of the lex lata to the de lege ferenda. It will consider 
whether a possible solution to problems encountered in the qualification track can 
be solved by creating a new form of legal education that does not focus on the 
national law of the Member State but on the general principles of law (including 
European Law) to an extent that it can serve as a basis for the qualification track for 
the legal profession in more than one Member State, thus creating more flexibility 
for free movement in the qualification track. In this respect it will prove necessary 
to give an overview and an assessment of the qualification track for the legal pro-
fession in the United States of America. In addition how such new legal education 
should be realised and who would have to realise it will also be examined. In the 
epilogue some recent effects of the ‘Bologna Process’ will be addressed.  
The fifth and final chapter of this book will draw conclusions with regard to the 
creation of the model for the free movement of lawyers, the implementation of 
that model in the Member States and the extension of that model into the quali-
fication track to the legal profession in force in the different Member States. Based 
on those conclusions recommendations will be made in order to further complete 
and refine the free movement of lawyers in the future. 
 
                                                  
41  Duration of both university and professional education differs enormously throughout the 
European Union. See Schneider (2002), pp. 33-35. See also: Lonbay (1992), pp. 75-93. 
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Chapter 2 
Development of the Free Movement 
of Lawyers 1958-2008 
§ 1. Introduction 
It is apparent from the previous chapter that the free movement of lawyers in Europe 
was de facto non-existent from the nineteenth century. For the legal profession, the 
focus on national law after the period of codification meant that access to that pro-
fession was reserved only for those who were educated in, and had the nationality 
of, the State where they sought to become a lawyer. 
This is how the situation remained after the EEC Treaty entered into force in 
1958. The EEC Treaty provided for a framework of secondary legislation to be 
drawn up under Article 57 (now Article 47) that allowed for the mutual recognition 
of qualifications including (or at least not excluding) the profession of lawyers before 
the end of the transitional period that ended in 1969. Although some activities42 
were undertaken based on that article in the field of craft and industry, no action 
was taken in the field of the legal profession. It was not until the European Court 
of Justice took the initiative that a renewed basis for the free movement of lawyers 
was created within the European Union. This observation also underlines a key 
characteristic of the development of free movement of lawyers, namely that it 
develops along a two-tier structure. On the one hand, the development takes place 
along the lines of secondary legislation, and on the other hand through case law of 
the European Court of Justice.  
Because of this two-tiered structure, presenting the development of the free 
movement of lawyers is not a straightforward task. Two different approaches can be 
followed. On the one hand, there is a pure chronological approach, describing events 
as they happened. On the other hand, a more thematic approach can be followed, 
treating developments in case law separate from the developments in secondary 
legislation. The potential danger of the first approach is that a description can turn 
into an endless quagmire that, although chronological, at the same time is hard to 
understand. The downside of the thematic approach, however, is that the sense of 
time is lost and it is sometimes difficult, if not impossible, to explain certain devel-
opments out of their chronological context. 
That being true, I chose to combine the two approaches. This chapter is devoted 
to a critical description of the past 50 years of the free movement of lawyers. The 
chapter starts by explaining the developments in the case law that led to the creation 
of a free movement of lawyers; this line of case law is dubbed first-generation case 
law. Next, the development of the three important pieces of secondary legislation 
                                                  
42  These ‘transitional Directives’ – Directive 64/427/EEC, 67/43/EEC and 68/653/EEC – were 
eventually consolidated by Directive 99/42/EC, [1999] OJ L 201/77, and later replaced by the 
new Diploma Directive, Directive 2005/36/EC [2005] OJ L 255/22. See also: Schneider & 
Claessens (2005), p. 136. 
14 
will be described, including the case law that was based on the Directives. Lastly, 
the case law that deals with applying established principles outside the scope of the 
Directives will be reviewed.  
 
 
§ 2. First Generation Case Law: Creating a Free 
Movement of Lawyers 
Where it was next to impossible for lawyers to move freely between States in order 
to exercise their profession in another State before the EEC, their situation was 
equally bleak in the early days of the Community. As mentioned above, there was 
a provision in the Treaty that provided for a legal base to develop secondary legis-
lation for the mutual recognition of qualifications in the area of the self-employed 
before the end of the transitional period in 1969.43 When that period expired no 
activity had been undertaken44 with regard to the legal profession. Therefore, law-
yers remained in the same situation as before the EEC had been established, where 
all countries required, directly or indirectly, the State’s nationality for the profession 
of lawyer45 (based on the so-called public-service exception, then laid down in 
Article 55 of the Treaty). The legal profession was at that time still almost exclu-
sively focused at national law. It was not until 1974 that the European Court of 
Justice took the opportunity to kick-start the free movement of lawyers in Europe 
in two revolutionary cases. 
 
                                                  
43  Since the liberal profession of lawyer was, and to a certain extent still is, executed in a self-
employed manner, the applicable freedoms have always been the freedom of establishment and 
the freedom of services rather than the free movement of workers, even where this distinction 
is now regarded as ‘anachronistic’. See Chalmers (2006), pp. 699-701. This anachronism is 
illustrated by the Kranemann case (C-109/04, Karl Robert Kranemann v. Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen, [2005] ECR I-02421) where at least a trainee lawyer was considered to be a worker 
in the sense of Article 39 EC. The International Labour Organisation describes liberal pro-
fessions as: ‘Those services supplied by professional workers, often self-employed, such as doctors, 
lawyers, accountants, architects, etc.’ See <www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ILO-Thesaurus/english/ 
tr4621. htm>, last accessed 7 June 2007. 
44  The reason that these Directives were not adopted in time is probably twofold. First, the 
legislative system as a whole became very slow after the Luxembourg Accords (see Craig & de 
Burca (2007), p. 8), and second, it can be deduced from the complete silence on the subject of 
abolishing restrictions in the field of freedom of establishment, that both the Commission and 
the Member States were reluctant to open up regulated professions to non-nationals coming 
from other Member States. 
45  Schneider (1995), p. 267. See also: Groeben (1991), pp. 986-990. 
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§ 2.1 Opening the gates: Reyners1 and Van Binsbergen2 
Jean Reyners was a Dutch national, who was born and resided in Belgium. He also 
chose to study law there. When he had completed all his studies, he applied to the 
Belgian Bar in order to become a practising lawyer, under the Belgian title of avocat 
or advocaat. The Belgian Bar denied his application solely on the basis that Mr Reyners 
had Dutch rather than Belgian nationality. Mr Reyners challenged the legislation 
on which the decision was based before the Conseil d’Etat. The Conseil referred several 
questions on the case under Article 234 of the Treaty (then Article 177) to the 
ECJ. The Conseil d’Etat asked whether Reyners could, in the absence of secondary 
legislation, rely on Article 43 directly and whether Belgium could rely on the 
public service exception to maintain a nationality requirement for lawyers.3  
In an answer to these questions the Court actually created the free movement 
of lawyers. It stated that, after the expiry of the transitional period, Article 43 (then 
Article 52) could be relied upon directly.4 In answering this first question the Court 
already showed that it was willing to give a controversial ruling since it was more 
than obvious from the wording of the Treaty that Article 43 was never meant to be 
directly effective and that, according to the words of the Treaty, the Article needed 
the support of a system of secondary legislation.5 
This revolutionary attitude of the Court was underlined by its answer to the 
second question. Here, the Court stated that the legal profession is not directly linked 
to the actual exercise of State sovereignty and can therefore not be caught under 
the public service exception of Article 45.6 Member States may therefore not up-
hold the nationality requirement for lawyers, and must facilitate the establishment 
of a lawyer who is fully qualified in that State (in this case Belgium), but who does 
not possess the nationality of that State. 
The Van Binsbergen case, which was ruled upon the same year, was remarkably 
similar to Reyners since it dealt with almost the same questions, albeit that in this 
case a domicile requirement was at stake rather than a nationality requirement,7 and 
                                                  
1  Case 2/74, Reyners v. Belgium, [1974] ECR 631. For summaries of this case, see Arnull (2006), 
pp. 765-766; Bermann (1993), pp. 585-586 and 590-591; Craig & de Burca (2007), pp. 795; 
Curtin (1994), pp. 458-462; Manschot (1975), pp. 136-147; Pollard & Ross (1994), pp. 485-
486; Rasmussen (1989) pp. 126-127 and Steiner (2006), p. 447. 
2  Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid, [1974] 
ECR 1299. For summaries of this case, see Arnull (2006), pp. 784-786; Barnard (2007), 
p. 356; Chalmers (2006), pp. 744-745; Craig & de Burca (2007), p. 792-793 and 815; Curtin 
(1994) p. 485, and Manschot (1975), pp. 136-147. 
3  Direct effect as a matter of principle had already been established a good ten years earlier in the 
landmark Van Gend & Loos case (Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der 
Belastingen [1963] ECR 1). 
4  Case 2/74 [1974] ECR 631 §§ 30 and 32. 
5  See further: Craig & de Burca (2007), pp. 276-277. 
6  Case 2/74 [1974] ECR 631, §§ 49-50 and 54-55. See, for a similar exception for workers in 
Article 39(4) EC Treaty, Case 149/79, Commission v. Belgium [1980] ECR 3881. For a further 
application of article 45 EC Treaty after Reyners see Case C-42/92, Thijssen v. Controledienst 
voor de Verzekeringen, [1993] ECR I-4047. 
7  In that sense the case can be seen as a prelude to the cases dealing with indirect discrimination, 
which are dealt with below. 
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that the case dealt with the freedom to provide services rather than the freedom of 
establishment. 
Van Binsbergen had a legal dispute in the Netherlands. During the course of 
that dispute his legal advisor, Kortman, moved from the Netherlands to Belgium. 
When Van Binsbergen wanted to appeal against the original decision, the Centrale 
Raad van Beroep stated that Kortman could no longer be Van Binsbergen's lawyer 
since a provision under Dutch Law8 stated that in order to be a legal counsel in the 
Netherlands one had to be established in the Netherlands as well. Kortman and 
Van Binsbergen protested and indicated that this provision was contrary to Article 
49 (then Article 59) of the Treaty. The Centrale Raad asked the ECJ, under the 
preliminary reference procedure of what is now Article 234 EC (then Article 177), 
whether or not Articles 49 and 50 were directly effective and could thus be relied 
upon by a national of a Member State before the national courts. 
The European Court of Justice repeated its argument from the Reyners case 
stating that the Member States had foregone their chance to create Directives in the 
allotted time (the Treaty also required a system of directives governing the free 
provision of services to be set up before the end of the transitional period) and that 
direct application of the Treaty articles, in this case Article 49, would come in its 
place.9 With regard to the residence requirement, the Court stated that upholding 
such a requirement would deprive Article 49 of all its useful effect, and that such a 
requirement could also not be saved by the public service exception laid down in 
Article 55 of the Treaty.10  
The ECJ further established in this case that the only way in which the freedom 
to provide services could be restricted by a Member State was if it was justified in 
the general interest of that State.11 General interest meant in this case, according to 
the ECJ,12 the rules governing organisation, ability, professional ethics, professional 
rules, control and liability. These rules can only be used if they are applied for all 
individuals who want to provide the service concerned in that specific Member 
State (so also the Member State’s own nationals), and if these rules are necessary to 
avoid the provider of services from circumventing these rules by merely changing 
his place of establishment to another Member State.13  
The Van Binsbergen case, which was determined five years before the landmark 
Cassis de Dijon case,14 marked only the beginning of the development of a rule of 
reason in the field of free movement of (legal) services in the European Com-
munity. The rule of reason concept in the free movement of services was further 
developed by the ECJ in Webb,15 where the ECJ elaborated on the ‘objective justi-
                                                  
8  Article 48 of the Beroepswet (wet van 2 februari 1955 houdende nieuwe regeling van de 
organisatie van de Centrale Raad van Beroep en raden van beroep). 
9  Case 33/74 [1974] ECR 1299, §§ 20-22 and 24-26. 
10  Case 33/74 [1974] ECR 1299, §11. 
11  From: Schneider (1995), page 47. 
12  Case 33/74 [1974] ECR 1299, §12. 
13  Case 33/74 [1974] ECR 1299, §§ 12 and 13. 
14  Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, [1979] ECR 649. 
For a summary of this case see Craig & de Burca (2007), pp. 677-679. 
15  Case 279/80, Criminal Proceedings against Webb [1981] ECR 3305. For similar (preceding) cases 
see Cases 110-111/78, Ministère public and ‘Chambre syndicale des agents artistiques et impresarii de 
Belgique’ ASBL v. Willy van Wesemael and others, [1979] ECR 32. 
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fication’ that was mentioned in Van Binsbergen. In 1990, the ECJ ruled in the Säger 
case,16 in no uncertain terms, that any restriction, even one which was non-dis-
criminatory, that was liable to hinder the provision of services, should be abolished. 
For some time it remained unclear whether the ruling in Säger was confined to the 
freedom of services17 or whether it also applied to the freedom of establishment. It 
was not until the Kraus case and the Gebhard case (both described in more detail 
below) that this question was answered in the affirmative. 
The line of case law that was initiated by Reyners and Van Binsbergen was further 
developed by the ECJ and gradually turned to include non-discriminatory restric-
tions, whereas in any event Reyners and to a lesser extent Van Binsbergen dealt with 
typical (in)directly discriminatory restrictions.18 The first indication that the Euro-
pean Court of Justice was willing to move to even lesser discriminatory restrictions 
imposed by Member States was illustrated by the question that was asked in the 
Thieffry case,19 namely whether a Member State may refuse access to its legal pro-
fession on the basis of the fact that the lawyer concerned did not possess a diploma 
that was required by that Member State.  
§ 2.2 Towards Non-Discriminatory Restrictions: Thieffry 
Mr Thieffry was a Belgian national who held a Belgian Law diploma (in fact he 
was a Doctor of Laws) and who had, sometime before this case was dealt with by 
the ECJ, practised as an advocate in Brussels. Subsequently his Belgian diploma was 
recognised by a French University and he obtained the Certificat d’Aptitude à la 
Profession d’Avocat20 in France. He applied for admission to the training stage at the 
Paris Bar, whereupon which he was refused admission solely on the basis that he held 
no degree in French Law. Although there was no secondary legislation on the mutual 
recognition of legal diplomas, the ECJ held that refusing to recognise a foreign legal 
diploma, where this diploma was recognised as equivalent to the national diploma 
by a university, could constitute a breach of Article 43. The ECJ stated that a Mem-
ber State may not refuse the recognition of a diploma because of the fact that the 
Directives for recognition of diplomas in that profession had not yet been adopted. 
                                                  
16  Case C-76/90, Manfred Säger v. Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd., [1991] ECR I-4421. See also: Case 275/ 
92, Her Majesty's Customs and Excise v. Gerhart Schindler and Jörg Schindler, [1994] ECR I-1039. 
17  See Schneider (1995), p. 43. See also: Schneider & Claessens (2005), p. 125. 
18  As the ECJ put it in §§ 25-26 of Van Binsbergen: ‘25. The provisions of that article abolish all 
discrimination against the person providing the service by reason of his nationality or the fact 
that he is established in a Member State other than that in which the service is to be provided. 
 26. Therefore, at least as regards the specific requirement of nationality or residence, Articles 
59 and 60 [now Articles 49 and 50 – S.C.] impose a well-defined obligation, the fulfilment of 
which by Member States cannot be delayed or jeopardised by the absence of provisions which 
were to be adopted in pursuance of powers conferred under Articles 63 and 66 [now Articles 
52 and 55 – S.C.].’ 
19  Case 71/76, Thieffry v. Conseil de l’Ordre des Avocats à la Cour de Paris [1977] ECR 756. For 
summaries of this case, see Arnull (2006), p. 811; Barnard (2007), p. 320; Bermann (1993) 
pp. 591-593; Craig & de Burca (2007), p. 798; Curtin (1994), pp. 464-467; Pollard & Ross 
(1994), pp. 486-487; Steiner (2006), p. 460 and Weatherill (2006), pp. 446-447. 
20  This is a recognition of his qualifications as equivalent to a degree in French Law. From Craig 
& de Burca (2007), page 798. 
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Allowing such refusal would deny the lawyer concerned the practical benefit of the 
freedom of establishment.21  
At first reading, this may seem just as revolutionary a ruling as the one given in 
the Reyners case, but from both the facts and from the ruling itself, it becomes clear 
that what the ECJ did was just complete a chain of events which was already very 
near to completion. From the facts of the case it is clear that Mr Thieffry was 
perfectly able to practise in France, since he was awarded a French certificate stating 
that his qualifications were equivalent to a French Law degree. So in this case the 
established equality between the qualifications had reduced the question of whether 
or not Mr Thieffry would need a French Law degree to an absolute technicality. 
The ruling itself clarified that Member States were allowed to ensure that prospec-
tive candidates have qualifications that are the equivalent of those required from 
national lawyers. So when it comes down to the technicality of having a particular 
diploma, the ECJ is willing to overlook that technicality and allow such a person to 
have his qualifications recognised in another Member State.  
What is controversial in this case is the fact that the ECJ completely overlooked 
(perhaps on purpose) that Thieffry was denied access to the legal profession on the 
basis that he did not possess a French law degree, i.e., on the basis of academic 
qualifications. Recognition of academic qualifications fell (although Article 149 EC 
was not yet introduced in the Treaty) exclusively within the sovereignty of the 
Member States. The exact implication of this distinction (or the lack of distinction 
as is displayed by this case) will be discussed in Chapter 4 of this book. So even if 
the Thieffry case is not as revolutionary as it had first seemed, it again shows that the 
ECJ was not impressed by the lack of activity in the field of secondary legislation, 
and that it was not going to sit back and wait for secondary legislation to be enacted. 
The ECJ maintained this line of reasoning throughout the years, emphasising that 
Article 43 precluded national authorities from refusing applications for recognition in 
an arbitrary fashion.22 The ruling of the ECJ in Thieffry was confirmed in Heylens. 23 
§ 2.3 Towards Non-Discriminatory Restrictions: Klopp24 
Where the restriction in Reyners was identified as discriminatory, this was more 
difficult to establish in the Thieffry case. The Klopp case, although still qualified as a 
case regarding indirect discrimination, moved even more towards non-discrimi-
natory restrictions. Klopp was dually qualified in Germany and France and sought 
                                                  
21  Case 71/76 [1977] ECR 765, § 17: ‘17. Consequently, if the freedom of establishment provided 
for by Article 52 [now Article 43, S.C.] can be ensured in a Member State either under the 
provisions of the laws and regulations in force, or by the virtue of the practices of the public 
service or of professional bodies, a person subject to Community law cannot be denied the prac-
tical benefit of that freedom solely by virtue of the fact that, for a particular profession, the direc-
tives provided for by Article 57 of the Treaty [now Article 47, S.C.] have not yet been adopted.’ 
22  See Craig & de Burca (2007), p. 799. For an application of the line of reasoning of the ECJ in 
the national sphere, see Platteau (1997), pp. 575-578. 
23  Case 222/86, UNECTEF v. Heylens, [1987] ECR 4097. For summaries of this case, see 
Barnard (2007), p. 268; Craig & de Burca (2007), p. 799; Pollard & Ross (1994), pp. 487-495; 
Steiner (2006), pp. 133-134. 
24  Case 107/83, Ordre des Avocats au Barreau de Paris v. Klopp [1984] ECR 2971. 
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to establish himself in France while remaining established in Germany. The French 
authorities denied his request based on the French rule of unicité du cabinet, which 
meant that a lawyer established in France could only have one place where he 
conducted business. The ECJ ruled that double establishment lay at the core of the 
freedom of establishment and that therefore France was barred from applying the 
prohibition on double establishment as by maintaining this rule lawyers would be 
prevented from moving from one Member State to another. The ECJ was further 
of the opinion that allowing double establishment in different Member States did 
not impose a restriction on the application of the national professional rules in France. 
Theoretically, the ruling in Klopp leads to a situation of reverse discrimination. A 
foreign lawyer who is doubly qualified would be subject to a less strict regime than 
a French lawyer who was only qualified as a French lawyer. In order to counter 
this problem of reverse discrimination many Member States have removed their rules 
regarding unicité du cabinet.25  
It was not until 1989 that the ECJ was confronted with the first case that could be 
really qualified as an indistinctly applicable restriction. The Vlassopoulou case26 would 
prove to be groundbreaking, and that assertion remains relevant even to this date, as 
it continues to serve as the standard in dealing with restrictions that flow from pro-
fessional qualifications and the recognition thereof. The modern-day relevance of 
the case will be discussed later in this chapter. 
§ 2.4 Non-Discriminatory Restrictions: Vlassopoulou 
Mrs Vlassopoulou was a Greek national who obtained her law degree in Athens and 
was thereupon admitted to the Athens Bar. Subsequently, she acquired a doctorate 
in law from a University in Germany. She worked as a legal advisor (Rechtsberater) 
in a German law firm. Much of her professional practice was in the field of German 
law and was concentrated in the town of Mannheim in Germany. Therefore, she 
applied for admission to the Mannheim Bar and she sought an authorisation to 
practise in the Mannheim courts. Both applications were rejected by the German 
authorities on the ground that she lacked the necessary qualifications, which included 
the passing of the First and Second German State Examinations. This requirement 
was indistinctly applicable in nature, since German candidates also have to fulfil this 
requirement. Moreover, this restriction was also not indirectly discriminatory with 
regards to nationality and/or residence. This was therefore the first time that the 
ECJ would27 answer the question of the admissibility of non-discriminatory restric-
tions. The German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) asked the ECJ whether 
                                                  
25  Schneider & Claessens (2005), p. 127. 
26  Case 340/89, Vlassopoulou v. Ministerium für Justiz, Bundes- und Europaangelegenheiten Baden-
Württemberg, [1991] ECR 2357. For summaries of this case see Arnull (2006), pp. 811-812; 
Barnard (2007), pp. 320-321; Chalmers (2006), pp. 716-718; Craig & de Burca (2007), p. 800; 
Curtin (1994), pp. 471-475; Fierstra (1992), pp. 640-649; Lonbay (1991), pp. 507-520; Nach-
baur (1991), pp. 470-472; Stein (1992), pp. 625-636; Steiner (2006), p. 462; and Weatherill 
(2006), pp. 455-456. 
27  The ECJ had earlier carefully circumvented the problem of non-discriminatory restrictions. 
See for example: Case 182/83, Robert Fearon v. Irish Land Commission [1984] ECR 3677 and 
Case 221/85 Commission v. Belgium (Clinical Biology Services) [1987] ECR 719. 
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or not it was possible to refuse Mrs Vlassopoulou access to the Mannheim Bar 
solely for this reason. The ECJ answered that even non-discriminatory restrictions 
could constitute a breach of Article 43 of the Treaty. The Court went on by stating 
that with regard to the specific facts of this case, such a breach could occur if the 
Member State in question failed to take into account experience and knowledge 
gained by the candidate through other means. According to the Court, a Member 
State that is confronted with a request from a person to access a profession that is 
protected by a diploma, is obliged to carry out a comparison between the knowl-
edge and abilities required for the diploma and the knowledge and the abilities that 
the candidate has obtained. A Member State may not bluntly refuse access by 
stating that the person does not have the required diploma.28 The case shows that 
even in a system where there are no provisions for the recognition of equality of 
diplomas (in contrast to all the described cases before), as was the case in Germany, 
where access to the legal profession depended on the successful completion of the 
two German State Exams, the competent authorities of the Member States are 
nonetheless obliged to carry out such a comparison when they are asked to do so. 
According to the ECJ it is not enough to compare the different diplomas (or other 
qualifications involved) but Member States are also, when it is established that 
qualifications are not equivalent, obliged to take into account any professional 
experience or practical training acquired in the host Member State. They must see 
if that experience or training is enough to eliminate the discrepancies between the 
professional qualifications of the host and home Member State. If that is the case, 
the Member State will have to recognise the equivalence of the professional quali-
fications and allow the candidate into the profession concerned. 
After this case, the ECJ had created a self-supporting system of the establishment 
of lawyers, or at least a system that has created a possibility for lawyers to ascertain 
whether or not their qualifications are the equivalent of those in another Member 
State. The ECJ went from stating that Article 43 did not need secondary legislation 
to be effective and that Article 45 did not apply to lawyers, to declaring that lawyers 
from other Member States have a right to have the equivalence of their professional 
qualifications scrutinised, even where such a system does not exist in the particular 
Member State. This line of case law shows that the ECJ was able to create a system 
for the free movement of lawyers in spite of the complete absence of secondary legis-
lation for the legal profession. By the time the ECJ determined the Vlassopoulou case a 
                                                  
28  Case 340/89 [1991] ECR 2357, §§ 15 and 16: ‘15. It must be stated in this regard that, even if 
applied without any discrimination on the basis of nationality, national requirements con-
cerning qualifications may have the effect of hindering nationals of the other Member States in 
the exercise of their right of establishments guaranteed to them by Article 52 [now Article 43, 
S.C.] of the EEC Treaty. That could be the case if the national rules in question took no 
account of the knowledge and qualifications already acquired by the person concerned in 
another Member State. 16. Consequently, a Member State which receives a request to admit a 
person to a profession to which access, under national law, depends upon the possession of a 
diploma or professional qualification must take into consideration the diplomas, certificates and 
other evidence of qualifications which the person concerned has acquired in order to exercise 
the same profession in another Member State by making a comparison between the specialised 
knowledge and abilities certified by those diplomas and the knowledge and qualifications 
required by the national rules.’ 
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system of secondary legislation for the lawyer had entered into force.29 That system 
provided for a similar approach towards the recognition of diplomas. Undoubtedly, 
the ECJ was influenced by this secondary legislation when deciding the case. The 
development of secondary legislation will be described later on in this chapter.  
After Vlassopoulou a specific corpus of case law existed for a specific non-dis-
criminatory restriction of the freedom of establishment, namely the lack of correct 
qualifications. In its case law the ECJ developed a more general rule for the freedom 
of establishment, one that closely mimicked the rules developed in the free move-
ment of goods and the freedom to provide services, which was discussed earlier in 
this chapter. 
§ 2.5 Towards a Rule of Reason in the Freedom of 
Establishment: Kraus30 
Dieter Kraus was a German national who had studied law in Germany, and who 
was a fully qualified German lawyer. He had obtained a Master of Laws (LL.M.) 
degree after he followed a postgraduate course in Scotland. At that time, Germany 
required official authorisation of academic qualifications. This meant that Kraus had 
to apply to the German authorities to have his title officially recognised in order to 
use it. The use of titles without prior official authorisation was regarded as a criminal 
offence. Kraus was of the opinion that this rule was overly restrictive and therefore 
he notified the authorities of the fact that he had obtained the LL.M. title, but refused 
to ask for an official authorisation of that title. The authority declared that official 
recognition was still absolutely necessary and that penalties would be imposed if 
Kraus were to use his title without prior official authorisation. Kraus appealed against 
this decision and in the subsequent proceedings, prejudicial questions were asked. 
The ruling of the ECJ in this case resembled one of its earlier, celebrated rulings, 
namely that of the Cassis de Dijon case.31 The ECJ proclaimed that national measures 
which are liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of the freedom of 
establishment are only allowed when they can be objectively justified. The ECJ also 
stated that this objective justification includes a proportionality test. In this case the 
latter meant that the authorisation procedure may only be employed in order to 
verify whether the title was properly awarded. In addition, the ECJ ruled that the 
verification process needed to be readily accessible and that verification should not 
come at excessive administrative costs.32  
This case provided for a genuine breakthrough. As a result of the very generalised 
language adopted by the ECJ, Kraus can be used in a variety of situations. The ECJ 
stated that every national measure that is liable to hinder or make less attractive the 
freedom of establishment must be objectively justified. This was the first time in 
                                                  
29  The implementation period for Directive 89/48/EEC ended in January 1991, while the ECJ 
ruled on Vlassopoulou in May 1991. 
30  Case C-19/92, Kraus v. Land Baden-Württemberg [1993] ECR I-1663. See, for summaries: 
Arnull (2006), pp. 761-762; Barnard (2007), pp. 273-274; Chalmers (2006), pp. 217-218; 
Roth (1993), pp. 1251-1258; and Smith (1994), pp. 643-662. 
31  Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, [1979] ECR 649. 
32  See also: Schneider & Claessens (2005), p. 129. 
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the context of the freedom of establishment that the ECJ laid down a rule in such 
broad terms. In previous cases the ECJ had dealt with specific restrictions (such as 
recognition of diplomas in Vlassopoulou) but never with restrictions in general. The 
ruling in Kraus therefore went far beyond the facts of the case, and the interests of the 
parties. Kraus did not stand on its own. As was described above, the ruling mirrors 
that of Cassis de Dijon in the field of free movement of goods. The free movement 
of services saw an early development of a rule of reason in the Van Binsbergen case 
(determined five years before Cassis de Dijon) which was later developed in cases 
like Säger and Webb. It was not until 1995 that the ECJ gave a ruling that would 
bring about the creation of one general rule for restrictions regarding all four free-
doms. This ruling was given in the Gebhard case.33  
§ 2.6 Completing the System: Gebhard 
Reinhard Gebhard was a German lawyer who was working in Italy. He was prose-
cuted by the Milan Bar Association because he had used the title avvocato on the 
letterheads sent from his Milan-based office without any authorisation from the 
Milan Bar Association, and also because he had opened that office in Milan. Italian 
law authorised lawyers from other Member States to work on a temporary basis in 
Italy but it prohibited their permanent establishment for those purposes. Mr Gebhard 
argued that the Italian law was contrary to the Lawyer’s Services Directive34 
(Directive 77/249/EEC, which will be dealt with in the next paragraph) because 
the prohibitions of the Milan Bar Association constituted, in his view an obstacle to 
his freedom to provide services. The Italian Court asked for an ECJ ruling on two 
separate points; first, it wanted to know whether the opening of an office was com-
patible with the Lawyer’s Services Directive, and secondly which criteria had to be 
used in order to determine whether a certain activity was deemed as temporary or 
permanent. Advocate-General Léger agreed with Mr Gebhard. In his conclusion 
he stated that the prohibitions of the Milan Bar Association, i.e., the prohibition to 
open an office in another Member State and the prohibition to use the professional 
title of the host Member State, were contrary to Directive 77/249/EEC. He further 
stated that the difference between establishment and the provision of services should 
be derived from the lawyer’s principal centre of activity and from the length of 
time spent in the host Member State. 
The ECJ ruled that it was inherent in the provision of services that they are to 
be performed on a temporary basis.35 However, this does not preclude the lawyer 
from providing these services within a certain infrastructure, i.e., an office, at his 
                                                  
33  Case C-55/94, Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, 
[1995] ECR 4165. For summaries of this case, see Arnull (2006), p. 762; Barnard (2007), 
p. 274; Chalmers (2006), p. 703-704; Craig & de Burca, pp. 801-802; Denys (1996), pp. 34-
37; Ewig, (1996), pp. 13-15; Farthouat & Puel (1996); Huglo (1996), pp. 741-746; Jarvis M 
(1996), pp. 247-255; Lonbay (1996) A, pp. 1073-1087; Steiner (2006), p. 455 and Ysewyn 
(1997), pp. 24-29.  
34  It is remarkable to see that no mention was made of Directive 89/48/EEC which was not imple-
mented at that time in Italy, but which could have served in providing a solution in this case. 
35  Case 55/94, § 26. 
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disposal.36 The ECJ ruled that the activities Mr Gebhard exercised fell under the 
freedom of establishment and not under the freedom to provide services, because 
they were professional activities exercised on a stable and continuing basis.37 
With regard to the second question, the ECJ determined the criteria which 
national laws must fulfil in order to constitute an objective justification to a limitation 
to the freedom of establishment. The ECJ set out four criteria. National rules which 
are liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of the fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by the Treaty (whereby the ECJ does not distinguish between the differ-
ent freedoms) must fulfil four criteria: they must be applied in a non-discriminatory 
manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; 
they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; 
and they must not go beyond what is necessary.38 
Gebhard therefore extrapolated the rule of reason that was developed in the 
realm of the free movement of goods and services through the Cassis de Dijon and 
the Van Binsbergen cases, and which was later, through Kraus, also adopted for the 
freedom of establishment, to the rule of reason that is independent of the individual 
freedoms, stating that any restriction on any of the four freedoms should be objec-
tively justified. Gebhard can therefore be seen as the capstone of the line of case law 
dealing with the free movement of lawyers. 
When a person who seeks to exercise his right of free movement encounters a 
national measure in another Member State that is liable to hinder, or make less 
attractive, his exercise of those free movement rights, the first step is to research 
whether secondary legislation (which will be described in the next paragraph) applies 
to his situation. When his situation is covered by secondary legislation, this legis-
lation (or its implementation) prevails over the system laid down in case law. What 
is problematic in this context, is establishing the exact leeway that a Member State 
has in imposing rules prescribed in that legislation. In almost every instance, case 
law of the ECJ will be required in order to clearly define the margin of leeway 
awarded to the Member State in question. 
Secondly, if it has been established that the case falls, either completely or 
partly,39 outside the scope of application of secondary legislation applicable in that 
sector, the solution must be sought in the case law of the ECJ. The ECJ first 
developed specific rules for specific restrictions with the result that different systems 
in case law apply for different restrictions.40 Restrictions with regard to the recog-
nition of diplomas may, for instance, be solved under the Vlassopoulou doctrine.  
Only in the third instance, and indeed as a capstone, the general system laid down 
in Gebhard is applied. Where no secondary legislation applies, and where no specific 
system is laid down in the case law, a national measure that is liable to hindering, or 
make less attractive, the exercise of one of the freedoms may be objectively justified 
by applying the four-stage test that was laid down in Gebhard. 
                                                  
36  Case 55/94, § 27. 
37  Case 55/94, § 28. 
38  Case 55/94, § 37. 
39  See cases C-164/94, Aranitis v. Land Berlin, [1996] ECR I-135 and C-234/97, Teresa Fernández 
de Bobadilla v. Museo Nacional del Prado, Comité de Empresa del Museo Nacional del Prado, Ministerio 
Fiscal, [1999] ECR I-4773. For the latter case, see Wasmeier (1999), pp. 746-750. 
40  See Chalmers (2006), pp. 707-722. 
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Gebhard was decided under similar conditions as Vlassoupoulou, namely with 
preparations for a new piece of secondary legislation affecting the free movement of 
lawyers well underway. At this point in the chapter it is therefore necessary to switch 
to an assessment of the developments that occurred in secondary legislation, including 
applicable case law, and the changes occurring in the next generation case law. 
 
 
§ 3. Development of Secondary Legislation Affecting the 
Free Movement of Lawyers 
The original EEC Treaty provided for a system of secondary legislation to be drawn 
up in order to implement the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services. This procedure of adopting secondary legislation should have been com-
pleted before the end of the transitional period in 1969. Only very limited activity 
was undertaken during this transitional period, however. The adoption of the Coun-
cil General Programmes in order to abolish restrictions on the freedom of establishment 
occurred in 1961.41 Although no activity had been deployed in the field of lawyers 
(as was concluded in the Reyners case) or for any liberal profession for that matter, 
the European Community did deploy some activities in the 1960s. In this period 
some ‘transitional directives’ were adopted which governed the recognition of pro-
fessional experience in a number of sectors such as commerce, industry and small 
crafts industries. In the late 1990s, these ‘transitional’ directives were consolidated in 
Directive 99/42/EC,42 which in itself is now replaced by Directive 2005/36/EC.43 
With regard to the free movement of lawyers, no activity was undertaken during the 
transitional period (apart from one attempt, described below) and therefore it was 
the ECJ that had to create a free movement of lawyers by means of its rulings. 
There are three pieces of secondary legislation that are of importance for the 
development of the free movement of lawyers. These will be dealt with in chrono-
logical order in this paragraph. 
§ 3.1 Vertical Harmonisation and the Services Directive 
It is not difficult to imagine what kind of restrictions can be imposed on people who 
seek to establish themselves in another Member State. As was described above, the 
Reyners case has already dealt with nationality requirements. Other restrictions can 
be easily imagined, for example, language requirements.44 By far the most restrictive 
rules that can be maintained by Member States are those concerned with professional 
qualifications. If a Member State has the right to decide that certain professions may 
only be exercised when the migrant possesses a diploma that was awarded in that 
Member State, it can be virtually impossible for people from other Member States 
to enter that profession. It was precisely in this area that the legislative institutions 
employed their first efforts to create secondary legislation. After the previous non-
                                                  
41  OJ Spec. Ed., Second Series, IX. 
42  See Schneider & Claessens (2005), p. 136. 
43  Directive 2005/36/EC [2005] OJ L 255/22. 
44  On language requirements as a restriction, see Schneider & Claessens (2005), pp. 132-136. 
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activity in opening up regulated ‘liberal’ professions, the Institutions of the European 
Community issued, between 1975 and 1985, a number of Directives which were 
meant to lay down minimum harmonisation of education and the mutual recogni-
tion of diplomas for certain regulated professions. These professions were: doctors,45 
nurses,46 dentists,47 veterinarians,48 midwifes49 and pharmacists.50 For architects, a 
Directive was issued on the recognition of diplomas yet no minimum harmonisation 
of education was laid down.51 It was completely impossible to create harmonisation 
measures for professional engineers or for lawyers. Through this vertical approach 
the Institutions tried to liberalise the free movement in these regulated professions. 
In principle the approach had to be successful since adopting common standards for 
education would take the sting out of mutual recognition and open the professions 
to those who had not enjoyed the national qualification process previously. How-
ever, problems remained in that negotiating minimum educational standards (and 
mutual recognition) proved to be a cumbersome and an enormously time-consuming 
task that eventually proved impossible for certain professions, like the profession of 
lawyer.52  
When reviewing this development, a number of observations can be made with 
regard to the freedom of establishment for lawyers. Firstly, no directives were issued 
exclusively for this profession. Thus, the only evidence of the existence of the free-
dom of lawyers to establish in another Member State remained linked to the ruling 
of the ECJ in the Reyners case.53 Secondly, because directives had been issued for 
some other professions, it could have been deduced that the Member States were 
perhaps willing to open all regulated professions in principle, but that they deemed 
it impossible to achieve in practice. Although the institutions failed to issue directives 
for the co-ordination of legal education and the recognition of legal diplomas, 
some action was taken in the area of trans-border activities for professional lawyers. 
In 1977 a directive was issued which regulated the trans-border provision of services 
by lawyers within the European Community.54 This directive would prove to be 
the fertile soil on which the later establishment directive could be built. 
The idea of issuing a directive that would regulate the freedom to provide services 
was not new. On the contrary, the original proposal for Directive 77/249/EEC, 
facilitating the effective exercise by lawyers of their freedom to provide services (legal 
                                                  
45  Directive 75/362/EEC of 16 June 1975 (recognition) and Directive 75/363/EEC of 16 June 
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bases are Articles 47 and 55), was already issued in 1969. At the time it was rejected 
because Germany and Luxembourg were of the opinion that the legal profession 
was subject to the exception laid down in Article 45 of the Treaty. It was only after 
Reyners and Van Binsbergen that the possibility arose to adopt a Directive in order to 
facilitate the effective exercise by lawyers of the freedom to provide services.55  
Although the Services Directive was adopted in the era of vertical harmonisation, 
it differs from the vertical approach on some essential points. The essence of the 
vertical approach was the mutual recognition of the qualifications of the individuals 
exercising that profession and was made ‘harmless’ by laying down minimum criteria 
for education. It showed that this was impossible for for the profession of a lawyer. 
Even if all parties involved, Institutions, Member States and professional organisa-
tions, had been willing to create such a system for lawyers, it would have been next 
to impossible, since lawyers are educated in their national legal systems and in 
consequence know little of the legal systems of their neighbouring Member States.  
The Services Directive therefore seems to be fairly similar to the Architects 
Directive, which was also adopted without an accompanying Directive laying down 
minimum educational standards. However, they differ in that the Architects Directive 
allows establishment, whereas the Lawyer’s Services Directive is limited to services. 
The first article of the Directive states that it shall apply to all lawyers in the Member 
States. A lawyer in the sense of the Directive is a person who is allowed, on the 
basis of national law, to bear one of the professional titles listed in that article. The 
article also gives the right to Member States to exclude certain activities which are, 
in that particular Member State, not exercised by lawyers. For example, activities 
which are exercised in the Netherlands by a notaris (notary) may be exercised in the 
United Kingdom by a solicitor. That same solicitor may, however, not exercise such 
activities when providing services in the Netherlands, since a Dutch advocaat (lawyer) 
may not exercise such activities either. 
According to Article 2, Member States have to recognise a lawyer as any person 
who is entitled to bear the professional titles listed in the second paragraph of Article 
1. The question of which professional title should be used by a lawyer providing 
services in another Member State is solved by Article 3 of the Directive. That 
article states that lawyers who provide services in another Member State are obliged 
to use their own professional title, also known as the ‘home title’. That means that if 
a German lawyer provides services in the Netherlands he must indicate that he is a 
Rechtsanwalt. 
Moreover, a lawyer providing services in another Member State is obliged to 
indicate either the professional organisation through which he or she is authorised to 
practise, or the court of law before which he or she is entitled to practise according to 
the laws of that Member State. Therefore, if the above-mentioned German lawyer is 
a member of the Mannheim Bar and is providing services in the Nertherlands, he will 
have to indicate that he is a Rechtsanwalt authorised to practise by the Mannheim Bar. 
The core of the Directive can be found in Article 4. That Article lays down the 
conditions under which services may be provided in another Member State. The 
first paragraph of Article 4 states that where the services provided by the lawyer 
consist of representing a client in legal proceedings or before public authorities, that 
                                                  
55  See also: Schneider (1995), p. 271. 
27 
lawyer must abide by all the conditions laid down in the host Member State for 
lawyers established in that State, except of course, all the conditions which require 
residence and/or registration with a professional organisation in the host State.  
The second paragraph of the Article states that a lawyer who provides services 
of the kind laid down in the first paragraph of the Article must observe the rules of 
professional conduct of the host Member State without prejudice to his obligations 
in the Member State in which he is established, i.e., his home Member State. Hence 
it becomes clear that a lawyer who provides services in another Member State will 
have to abide by two sets of rules; the rules of professional conduct of the host Member 
State and the rules of professional conduct set by his home Member State. This 
phenomenon is often referred to as the Kumulationsprinzip.56 Clearly this principle 
leads to quite some difficulties when the host Member State’s rules of conduct do 
not coincide with rules of the home Member State. Although the Directive offers 
no direct solution for this problem, it is now generally believed that when there is a 
conflict, the rules of the host Member State prevail.57  
 Article 5 of the Directive provides for a further elaboration of the rules for 
representing a client in legal proceedings if a Member State so desires. According to 
Article 5, the elaboration can consist of an introduction, in accordance with local 
rules or customs, to the presiding judge, and, where appropriate, to the President of 
the relevant Bar in the host Member State. A host Member State may also require 
the lawyer who provides the services to work in conjunction with a lawyer who is 
a member of the legal profession in the host Member State and who practises before 
the judicial authority in question and would therefore, if necessary, be answerable 
to that authority. 
Where activities exercised by the lawyer do not constitute representation of a client 
in court, paragraph 4 of Article 4 states that a lawyer exercising those activities shall 
be subject to the rules of professional conduct in the home Member State, without 
prejudice to respecting the rules, whatever their source, governing such subjects in 
the host Member State. The paragraph states further that visiting lawyers must be 
especially respectful toward the rules of the host Member State on incompatibility 
of the exercise of the activities of a lawyer with the exercise of other activities in the 
host Member State, professional secrecy, relations with other lawyers, the prohibition 
on the same lawyer acting for parties with mutually conflicting interests, and publicity.  
The Article states that these latter rules only apply to those lawyers not established 
in the host Member State who are capable of observing them, and to which extent 
their observance is objectively justified to ensure the proper exercise of a lawyer’s 
activities, the standing of the profession and respect for the rules concerning incom-
patibility, in the host Member State. From this rather cryptic sentence, one could 
deduce that the rules of professional conduct in the host Member State only have 
to be observed, at least in so far as activities outside trials are concerned, when they 
do not lead to an unjustified restriction to the freedom to provide services.58 
Article 7 of the Directive lays down the rules applying to disciplinary measures. The 
first paragraph of this Article states that the competent authority in a host Member 
State may require the lawyer who seeks to provide the services to prove his legal 
                                                  
56  Van Camp (1989), p. 38. 
57  Ibid., p. 40. 
58  Schneider (1995), p. 272. 
28 
qualifications which were obtained in the home Member State. The second para-
graph states that a lawyer who provides services is, in the event of non-compliance 
with the obligations laid down in Article 4 of the Directive, subject to the rules laid 
down in the host Member State. The competent authority in the host Member State 
has the right to obtain information about the person providing the services, without 
violating the confidential nature of that information. Moreover it shall notify the 
competent authority of the home Member State of any decision taken. 
What is most striking about the Services Directive is that there seems to be com-
plete mutual recognition of lawyers who provide services in other Member States. 
Apart from some specific peculiarities of the British legal system, there are no limi-
tations on professional activity, and a lawyer providing services in another Member 
State may apparently exercise all the professional activies of a home lawyer, albeit 
under a rather complicated regime of applicable professional rules. The Services 
Directive is remarkably liberal for its time, and it questions the necessity of the 
blood, sweat and tears which went into the creation of the minimum educational 
standards Directives in the vertical approach. Partly, this is explained by the fact that 
the Services Directive would only apply to lawyers providing occasional services in 
another Member State. However, as has already been mentioned above, it also did 
good service to those who wanted to be established as a lawyer in another Member 
State at a time when there was no (European) legal framework for them to do so.  
The Services Directive attracted some criticism as well. Legal scholars argued 
that the field of trans-national consultation, which was not regulated and therefore 
very liberal, was now subject to the rules laid down in the Directive, and that the 
Directive was actually more of a step back than a step forward to the freedom of 
lawyers to provide services.59 I find it hard to understand this particular critique, 
since Member States that employed less stringent regimes for activities that in other 
countries were part of the lawyer’s legal monopoly, like legal advice, would still 
allow persons not being lawyers to exercise this activity. Aside from this, it could 
also be argued that the Directive is not complete in that, for example, there is a 
total lack of regulation in the field of fees. 
In the 30 years of its existence, the Lawyer’s Services Directive has generated 
surprisingly little case law. The most important case in this respect is Commission v. 
Germany.60 This case dealt with the German implementation of Article 5 of Directive 
77/249/EEC. 
The German authorities had implemented this Article in a manner by which a 
foreign lawyer was at all times required to work together with a German lawyer, 
who would also act as the primary lawyer dealing with the case. Foreign lawyers were 
even obliged to follow this requirement/structure in cases where representation by 
a lawyer was not mandatory. In addition, the German authorities required extensive 
proof of this compulsory cooperation and required that the German lawyer assigned 
to the lawyer providing services would be the lead counsel in the case. The Euro-
pean Commission thought that this implementation went beyond the scope of Article 
5 of the Directive and brought the case, by means of the procedure laid down in 
Article 226 of the EC Treaty, to the European Court of Justice, which agreed with 
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the Commission. The European Court of Justice ruled that a foreign lawyer should 
be allowed to work alone if representation by a lawyer was not mandatory in the 
particular circumstances in the host Member State. In cases where such representation 
was mandatory, the foreign and the national lawyer working together should them-
selves determine their relationship, and that it could not be laid down in a law that 
the national lawyer should always have the primary role in the case. The ruling of 
the European Court of Justice was confirmed in the case of Commission v. France.61 
The European Court of Justice clearly did some important work here in order 
to safeguard the free provision of services for lawyers. Had the Court not intervened, 
then the Member States would have had the opportunity to reduce the freedom of 
services for lawyers almost completely. The role of a lawyer in providing represen-
tation for a client abroad would be marginal if he was forced to work with a national 
lawyer even in situations where the national law did not prescribe compulsory legal 
representation. The importance of this case clearly stretches beyond Directive 
77/249/EEC. The Lawyers Establishment Directive contains a similar provision on 
working in conjunction with a national lawyer. Although there are no limitations 
on this provision included in the text of the Directive, it is self-evident that the limits 
imposed by the Court on the cooperation provision in the Services Directive also 
apply to the similar cooperation provision in the Lawyers Establishment Directive. 
Other cases under the Lawyers Services Directive have been scarce. It is worth 
mentioning the Gebhard case, which had been classed as a first-generation case, where 
the Court also ruled that setting up of an office or other infrastructure can fall within 
the freedom to provide services, and the demarcation between services (which is 
governed by Directive 77/249/EEC) and establishment (governed by Directives 
89/48/EEC and 98/5/EC) is made on time difference alone.62 The last case which 
requires some attention is the AMOK case63 which dealt with a subject that was 
not as such regulated by the Directive, namely the restitution of fees. The Court 
stated that the Directive warrants that a calculation of restitution of fees is made on 
the rules in force in the host Member State, and that the restitution of fee for a 
lawyer is limited to what a home State lawyer would have received. According to 
the Court, it is a violation of the Directive if the Member State does not allow res-
titution of legal fees for a lawyer who is, according the rules of the Member State, 
cooperating with the lawyer who provides services in that Member State. The ratio 
behind this dictum is clear, because if a person soliciting for a lawyer is not able to 
claim restitution of the fees of the cooperating lawyer, it is unlikely that such a 
person would opt for the services of a foreign lawyer over a domestic lawyer. This 
German rule therefore directly infringed the full enjoyment of the provision of 
services as safeguarded by the Directive. Therefore the Court held this rule to be in 
violation of the Directive. 
The next Directive that needs to be reviewed is the so-called Diploma Directive, 
which was the result of a dramatic change in the approach towards the recognition 
of diplomas. 
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§ 3.2 The Horizontal Approach: The Diploma Directive 
89/48/EEC64 and Directive 2005/36/EC65 
Directive 89/48/EEC did not emerge completely without warning. As early as 1974 
the Council expressed the will, in a non-binding resolution,66 to abolish the scheme 
of very detailed directives for all the different professions. According to the Council, 
the future system should be based on more lenient criteria and the future directives 
should abstain, as much as possible, from detailed requirements.67 In the early 1980s 
this opinion was so well established within the Council that the adoption of the last 
two directives in the vertical harmonisation scheme, the aforementioned directives 
on pharmacists and architects, was a very long and difficult process.68  
This line of reasoning was prolonged in 1984 when the European Council de-
cided in Fontainebleu that a new, more general approach towards the recognition 
of higher-education diplomas was necessary, also because the admission of new 
Member States would inevitably lead to the alternation of existing and possible future 
directives in the vertical harmonisation scheme, which would be a time-consuming 
process.69 This view led to the adoption, on 21 December 1988, of Directive 89/48/ 
EEC, created on the basis of what were then Articles 49, 57(1) and 66 (now Articles 
40, 47(1) and 55), providing for a general system for the recognition of higher-
education diplomas awarded on completion of professional education and training 
of at least three years duration. 
The Diploma Directive completely departed from the old system. The Directive 
started from the premise that qualifications giving access to a certain regulated pro-
fession, dubbed ‘diploma’ in the terminology of the Directive, would be mutually 
recognised. This meant that if a person was allowed to exercise a regulated profession 
in one Member State, he would consequently also be allowed to exercise the corre-
sponding profession in any other Member State in the European Community. Only 
in circumstances where it was established that there was a considerable difference 
between the regulated profession of the Member State where a person obtained his 
qualifications and the profession in the Member State he sought to go to, could the 
latter State require compensatory measures in order to cover for this difference. 
Article 1 of the Directive gives detailed definitions of education considered to 
correspond to a diploma in the sense of the Directive. The most important require-
ment is that the diploma be awarded after the completion of a post-secondary course 
of at least three years’ duration, or of an equivalent duration part-time, at a university 
or a higher education establishment. In addition, there is a requirement that the 
bearer of the diploma must have completed the professional training required in 
addition to the post-secondary course. A limitation of the scope of the Directive can 
be found in Article 2, which states that the Directive only applies to those nationals 
of the European Community who seek access to a regulated profession. Moreover, 
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the Article states that regulated professions subject to a directive from the vertical 
harmonisation scheme will remain governed by that directive and not by Directive 
89/48/EEC. Since the adoption of the new Diploma Directive, the sectoral Directives 
have been revoked and their acquis is now governed by Directive 2005/36/EC. 
Article 3 of the Directive states that the mere lack of a diploma of the Member 
State in which the pursuit of a regulated profession is sought is not enough to reject 
an application for pursuit of that profession by a national from another Member 
State. This is the case where the applicant holds the diploma required by another 
Member State for the taking up of the profession in question. However, if the 
applicant has pursued the profession in question full-time for two years during the 
past ten years in another Member State that does not regulate the profession, and if 
the applicant possesses evidence that he had been awarded a formal qualification,70 
recognition cannot be refused. 
While Article 3 is beneficial to individuals seeking entrance to a regulated pro-
fession in another Member State, Article 4 ensures that Member States can take appro-
priate compensatory measures in order to make sure that the quality of the regulated 
profession does not deteriorate with the application of the Directive. In order to en-
sure quality, the Article allows Member States to require either additional professional 
experience (where the education in the home Member State is shorter than in the 
host Member State), or require applicants to take an aptitude test or to complete an 
adaptation period (with a maximum duration of three years). These latter options 
are open to the Member States where the substance which is dealt with in the 
education and the professional training differs substantially in the two Member States 
concerned, or where the regulated profession covers more fields in the host Member 
State than in the home Member State.  
In principle the applicant is free to choose between the aptitude test and the 
adaptation period, where so required. Only when precise knowledge of the law of 
the Member State concerned is required the host Member State may prescribe either 
the aptitude test or the adaptation period.71 Having said this, it must be kept in 
mind that the application of a compensatory measure is secondary to an individual 
review of the applicant’s knowledge and experience, as was also laid down by the 
ECJ in the Vlassopoulou case. Only when it has been decided on the basis of that 
comparison that the candidate has too little knowledge of the legal system of the 
Member State in question, a compensatory measure may be imposed. With regard 
to the lawyer, as it is dealt with in this book, all Member States have opted for an 
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aptitude test. Denmark had originally chosen the adaptation period but it changed 
its view under the influence of the choices taken by the other Member States.72 
Article 10 of Directive 89/48/EEC allows Member States to extend the limitation 
of choice beyond the professions requiring precise knowledge of the law of the host 
Member State. In order to impose such a limitation, prior approval of the Commis-
sion must be sought. No such permission has been given since the coming into force 
of the Directive. 
Article 5 of the Directive gives applicants the possibility to undergo professional 
education and training that had not been followed in the home Member State, with 
the assistance of a qualified member of the profession in the host State. Although the 
article does not say so, it seems that this additional professional education would be 
aimed at circumventing compensatory measures provided for in Article 4 of the 
Directive. 
Article 6 of the Directive gives Member States the right to require proof of 
good character. Member States must accept as sufficient proof official documents 
provided by the competent authorities in the home Member State. Where a Member 
State does not produce these documents, they can be replaced by a declaration on 
oath or a solemn declaration. Where the national oath or declaration is unsuitable for 
use by foreigners the competent authorities of the host Member State shall provide 
a suitable equivalent. 
Article 7 clarifies the question of which professional title a national of another 
Member State should use when he is allowed into the regulated profession of his 
choice in the host Member State. The Article makes clear that where a national is 
allowed into such a profession, he or she is also allowed to use the professional title 
that is reserved for that profession in the host Member State. In Member States where 
the right to use a certain professional title is dependent on the membership of a pro-
fessional organisation, the national who is allowed entrance to the regulated professions 
shall also have a right to become a member of that professional organisation. 
Even at first glance it is clear that the Diploma Directive is significantly different 
when compared with the other Directives, both the Vertical Directives and the 
Lawyer’s Services Directive adopted previously. It contains no detailed rules on mini-
mum educational standards, but still ensures mutual recognition (albeit under certain 
conditions). When compared with the Services Directive, the Diploma Directive 
offers something new for lawyers, namely complete and full integration into the host 
Member State’s legal profession, including the use of the professional title of the 
host Member State. This was not possible under the Services Directive since it re-
quires the use of the host country professional title. However, this possibility came at 
a price. From the nature of the legal profession, and legal education, and with 
different legal systems in place in each Member State, it is likely that there are sub-
stantial differences between the professions in the home Member State and the host 
State, so that the requirement of compensatory measures by the host State is more 
often than not warranted. Where the competent authority of a Member State decides 
that an aptitude test is necessary, the actual, substantive, recognition of diplomas is 
left to the discretion of the Member State. In the case of lawyers each Member 
State can decide for itself how much knowledge a candidate must have in order to 
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obtain access to the regulated profession. It must be mentioned that this discretion 
is limited by the principle of proportionality. Nevertheless, an aptitude test can be a 
difficult hurdle to pass.73 The ECJ had the opportunity to rule on the extent of the 
aptitude test in Commission v. Italy.74 The Italian legislation governing the implemen-
tation of the Diploma Directive75 contained two problems that were to be addressed 
in this case. First of all, the legislation required that the lawyers established in Italy 
on passing an aptitude test had to be permanently resident there. Such a residence 
requirement was contrary to the very principle of the freedom of establishment and 
had already been provided for in Klopp (discussed above). Therefore, the Court had 
little difficulty in ruling that this part of the Italian implementation was contrary to 
the Directive. The second complaint of the Commission was more difficult. The 
rules with regard to the aptitude test laid down in the Italian implementation mecha-
nism were very general. The Commission stated that in practice these general rules 
were abused and lawyers seeking integration in the Italian legal profession by way 
of an aptitude test were discriminated against since they were obliged to take a test 
which was more demanding than the exam Italian lawyers had to sit in order to 
become a member of the Italian legal profession. The Court was not convinced by 
the evidence put forward by the Commission so it stopped short of ruling that the 
Italian aptitude test was discriminatory. The Court did, however, rule that the Italian 
implementation of the Diploma Directive was too vague and created a situation of 
legal uncertainty. Subsequently, the implementation mechanism has been changed.76 
Whereas the Court did not rule on the actual extent of the aptitude test as a result 
of insufficient evidence, it can be deduced from the case that the outermost border 
of an aptitude test lies with the test national lawyers must take. In individual cases 
even a less intensive aptitude test can be in violation of the Directive. To this date, 
the corpus of the ECJ’s case law lacks rulings on this specific issue. There are, how-
ever, three other cases which illustrate well the opinion of the ECJ with regard to 
the possibility of Member States applying compensatory measures.  
The first case worth mentioning in this respect is the Beutenmüller case,77 which 
was concerned with the demarcation between Directive 89/48/EEC and 92/51/EEC 
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(the second General-System Directive, see below). Ms Beutenmüller was an Austrian 
national who worked as a teacher in Germany. She had gained her professional quali-
fications in Austria and was seeking entrance to the teaching profession in Germany 
because she would thus receive a higher salary. She was denied entrance because of 
the fact that her Austrian Diploma, which was awarded after two years of higher 
education, did not fulfil the definition of a diploma under Directive 89/48/EEC. 
Directive 92/51/EEC was not implemented in Baden-Württemberg at that time. 
The Court made use of an exception in Directive 89/48/EEC that provided for a 
situation where the time required for a diploma changed in the Member State of 
origin. This is exactly what had happened. Austria now required three years of higher 
education before awarding a diploma for a teacher. The Court therefore allowed Ms 
Beutenmüller to rely on Directive 89/48/EEC (and Directive 92/51/EEC for that 
matter) directly. It showed that the Court was willing to allow persons to rely on 
the rights contained in the Directive if it was established that the Member State in 
question had not implemented the Directive correctly. Moreover, the Court reiterated 
that when it was established that a Member State had incorrectly implemented a 
Directive, it could not rely on possible derogations laid down in the Directive. Baden-
Württemberg argued that Ms Beutenmüller’s diploma fell under Directive 92/51/EEC 
because of a derogation contained in Article 3 of the Directive. 
The ruling of the ECJ in Beutenmüller immediately raises the question of whether 
this sanction by the Court placed upon a Member State for not correctly imple-
menting a Directive also applied to the compensatory measures laid down in the 
Diploma Directive, i.e. in the case of lawyers, the aptitude test. The Court strongly 
reaffirmed this view in two cases concerning Greece. In the Peros case78 the Court 
ruled, with remarkable clarity, that a person seeking entry to the engineering pro-
fession could rely on Article 3 of the Diploma Directive (guaranteeing mutual recog-
nition) where a Member State had not implemented the Directive in its national 
law (with regard to that profession). The Court added that the right to rely on the 
Directive directly cannot be made dependent on the recognition of qualifications by 
the competent authority of the host Member State. In the Aslanidou case79 (concerning 
an occupational therapist) the Court repeated this ruling, including also the Second 
General System Directive, underlining that only those compensatory measures may 
be applied that were in force in national law, i.e. correctly implemented, at the date 
of application for mutual recognition. 
It is clear that this string of case law has some potential for lawyers. If a lawyer 
can establish that Directive 89/48/EEC is not correctly implemented for lawyers (or 
the new Directive 2005/36/EC for that matter) such a lawyer may be integrated in 
the legal profession of the host Member State by relying on the Directive directly, 
without the Member State in question being able to apply compensatory measures, 
such as an aptitude test. 
Although the adoption of Directive 89/48/EEC was heralded as a great achieve-
ment at the time, developments in the recognition of diplomas did not stop with 
the Directive. A number of years after the adoption of Directive 89/48/EEC it 
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35 
became clear that it was the first of three Directives which would cover the recogni-
tion of professional qualifications. This system has been named ‘the General System’.  
A second General System Directive, 92/51/EEC was adopted in 1992.80 This 
Directive was aimed at creating a system for the recognition of qualifications for 
regulated professions that had qualification tracks of less then three years’ duration. 
It also covers vocational training certificates. The system of Directive 92/51/EEC is 
identical to the system of Directive 89/48/EEC, described above. People who seek 
integration in a profession that is caught under Directive 92/51/EEC benefit from 
the general rule of mutual recognition laid down in that Directive. Where substan-
tial differences exist between the qualifications concerned, the host Member States 
may impose compensatory measures. A third General System Directive was adopted 
in 1999.81 Directive 99/42/EC did not create new rules, but merely consolidated the 
transitional directives that had been issued in the 1960s. It was already established 
that these directives dealt with the recognition of professional experience in a variety 
of sectors such as commerce and industry. 
A second consolidation operation was undertaken in 2001. Directive 2001/19/ 
EC82 was adopted in the light of the SLIM (Simpler Legislation for the Internal 
Market) strategy. It affected the three General Systems Directives to a small extent (the 
Vlassopoulou ruling was incorporated in Directive 89/48/EEC among other smaller 
adaptations) but had a major impact on the systems of the vertical directives.  
A major adaptation to the diploma recognition system was achieved in 2005 when 
a completely new directive was adopted which replaced all the vertical directives 
and the three General System directives. Ever since the famous Lisbon summit, the 
European Commission had been preparing a new directive for the recognition of 
professional qualifications,83 an effort that was confirmed by the European Council in 
Stockholm: ‘The Commission intends to present for the 2002 Spring Council [...] 
specific proposals for a more uniform, transparent, and flexible regime of recognition 
of qualifications and periods of study.’84 Together with a number of policy docu-
ments on the issue85 the European Commission came forth with a proposal for a 
new Directive in 2002.86 The main objective was to ‘create a clear, secure and quick 
system for the recognition of professional qualifications in the field of regulated 
professions’.87 In its proposal, the Commission seeks to achieve this simplification 
procedure by consolidating all the fifteen existing Directives (the three General System 
Directives and the twelve sectoral Directives) into one single directive covering all 
                                                  
80  [1992] OJ L 209/25 
81  Directive 99/42/EC [1999] OJ L 201/77. 
82  Directive 2001/19/EC [2001] OJ L 206/1. 
83  Directive 89/48/EEC had already undergone a considerable overhaul in the context of the 
SLIM (Simpler Legislation in the Internal Market) initiative by Directive 2001/19/EC, which 
among other amendments, saw the codification of the Vlassopoulou doctrine in Article 4 of 
Directive 89/48/EEC. 
84  Conclusions of the Stockholm European Council, 23 and 24 March 2001, point 15. 
85  High Level Task Force on Skills and Mobility, Final Report, 14 December 2001, p. 20; Com-
mission’s Action Plan for Skills and Mobility, point 15; Commission Communication on An 
Internal Market Strategy for Services, COM (2000) 888 and the Commission’s White Paper 
on European Governance, COM(2001) 428. 
86  COM (2002) 119 final. 
87  Explanatory Memorandum COM (2002)119, p. 3. 
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aspects of recognition of professional qualifications. Much of this consolidation and 
simplification will take place in the field of the twelve sectoral Directives. Addi-
tionally, there are some very important changes that take place in the scope of the 
application of the General Systems Directives.  
The new Directive makes a number of changes to the system as it was laid down 
in Directive 89/48/EEC and the two other General System Directives. Firstly, the 
scope of the application of the new Directive is considerably broader than Directive 
89/48/EEC and 92/51/EEC. Every regulated profession or regulated professional 
activity that is not caught by Parts II and III of the new Directive (professions tradi-
tionally governed by the third General System Directive and the Sectoral Directives 
respectively) is now caught by Article 10 of the new Directive. Problems encountered 
in the Beutenmüller case, i.e., cases that fell in between the Directives, will not occur 
anymore under the new system. The new system recognises the differences in levels 
of professional qualifications by introducing five levels to different qualifications in 
Article 11 of the new Directive. Recognition of professional qualifications in a host 
Member State is dependent on the level of qualification that is required in the 
home Member State. According to Article 13 of the new Directive, recognition of 
professional qualifications is required when the level of qualification in the home 
Member State is equal to the level immediately prior to the level required in the host 
Member State. Articles 13 and 14 further clarify the requirements for recognition 
of professional qualifications. In general it must be said that the outlines of the 
system in Article 3 and 4 of Directive 89/48/EEC (and 92/51/EEC for that matter) 
are still visible in the new system but there are some developments that make it 
actually more difficult to have one’s professional qualification recognised. Similar to 
the system under Article 3 and 4 of Directive 89/48/EEC, Article 13 begins with the 
general rule that professional qualifications from another Member State will be recog-
nised only if certain criteria are fulfilled. These criteria are that the person concerned 
is authorised to exercise the corresponding regulated profession in his home Member 
State and he must be able to prove this authorisation with evidence of professional 
qualification (or an attestation of competence) issued by the competent authority of 
the home Member State. In addition, the proof must also show that the qualifica-
tion process in the home Member State is at least equivalent to the level (as iden-
tified in Article 11 of the Directive) directly prior to the level required in the host 
Member State.88 
Just as under the system of Directive 89/48/EEC, the new Directive also has 
the possibility for the host Member State to require compensatory measures from 
candidates who seek to be integrated in the regulated profession. In comparison 
with the old system deviations become immediately apparent. The system of compen-
satory measures is laid down in Article 14 of the Directive. The new system begins 
by stating that Article 13 of the Directive (the general rule laying down the prin-
cipal rule of recognition of professional qualifications) does not preclude a Member 
State from requiring compensatory measures in the form of an adaptation period or 
an aptitude test. The first obvious difference from the old system is that the possibility 
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to compensate time differences by means of proof of professional qualification is no 
longer part of the system of compensatory measures. Article 14 continues to state 
that the compensatory measures may be required in three separate events. First of all, 
such compensatory measures may be required in the event where the training of the 
candidate is at least one year shorter than the training required in the host Member 
State. It must be noted that this was the original reason for requiring professional 
experience as a compensatory measure. In this sense, the Directive is stricter than 
the old system, since now a Member State may ask for more invasive compensatory 
measures such as an aptitude test or an adaptation period.  
The other two instances in which the host Member State may ask for compen-
satory measures are similar to the old system, i.e., where the training enjoyed covers 
matters that are substantially different from the requirements in the host Member 
State or where the profession in the host State contains one or more professional 
activities which do not exist in the corresponding profession of the home Member 
State, and that the difference consists in specific training which is required in the host 
State and which covers substantially different matters than those covered in the 
training in the home Member State. Similar to the old system, the host Member State 
must let the candidate choose between an aptitude test and an adaptation period. The 
rule in the old system which states that the host Member State can enforce a choice in 
professions that require a precise knowledge of the national law and where the pro-
fessional activity concerns advice or assistance relating to national law is maintained.89 
Furthermore, the exception for other professions as to the choice of compensatory 
measures has been given a prominent position in Article 14 (whereas it used to be 
placed in Article 10 of the old Directive, separately from the general procedure 
which was laid down in Article 4). Article 14 further mentions the exact definition of 
substantial differences, a definition that was lacking from the old Directive 89/48/EEC. 
According to paragraph 4 of Article 14 ‘substantially different matter’ means the 
matter of which knowledge is essential for pursuing the profession and with regard 
to which the training received by the candidate shows important differences in 
terms of duration or content from the training required by the host Member State. 
Lastly, the new Article 14 states that compensatory measures shall be applied with 
due regard to the principle of proportionality. More particularly, it must first be 
ascertained whether substantial differences that were encountered can be recovered in-
stead by knowledge acquired during the candidate’s professional experience. This 
paragraph is intriguing as it seeks to implement the Vlassopoulou doctrine, which 
was also implemented in the old Directive (at least after adaptation by the SLIM 
Directive) but this was the first time it was formulated as part of the proportionality 
principle. It would be interesting to know whether the proportionality principle 
applies in full to the application of compensatory measures, or only as far as the 
Vlassopoulou principle. The explanatory memorandum does not offer any clarity in 
this matter.90 Moreover, and perhaps more seriously, there seems to be an inadvertent 
mistake with regard to the application of the Vlassopoulou principle to compensate 
for time differences between the professional qualifications in the host and home 
Member States. In the old system this used to fall under the regime of Article 4(1) 
                                                  
89  Although the Commission sought to abolish it. 
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(a) which provided for professional experience to compensate for time differences in 
the professional education. This was abolished in the new system, and the reference 
to the Vlassopoulou principle was taken over literally from the old system (where it 
only referred to the system of aptitude tests and adaptation periods) and it only refers 
to taking into account professional experience in order to cover for substantial differ-
ences (and not differences in time). Compensation for time differences must therefore 
be applied with the principle of proportionality in mind, yet without the specific 
reference to the Vlassopoulou principle. This seems to be an inadvertent mistake which 
can be easily countered, but taken to the letter it is not definitive that Member States 
have to apply the Vlassoupoulou principle in order to avoid application of compen-
satory measures. 
The Directive also has a new feature. Article 15 provides for a method whereby 
compensatory measures can be avoided. The Article provides for a form of self-
regulation. If a certain regulated profession can come to a common platform (i.e., a 
set of criteria in order to counter substantial differences) for at least two-thirds of 
the Member States (including all Member States that regulate the profession) such a 
common platform can be notified to the Commission. If a candidate then fulfils the 
criteria laid down in the common platform the Member State concerned shall not 
implement compensatory measures. It will be interesting to keep track of any 
efforts to create such a common platform for the legal professions reviewed in this 
book, but as of yet no move has been made to start such a process. 
There is a last noteworthy element to the new system of mutual recognition of 
professional qualifications. Unlike Directive 89/48/EEC, Directive 2005/36/EC has 
a specific reference to language requirements. Article 53 states: ‘Persons benefiting 
from the recognition of professional qualifications shall have a knowledge of lan-
guages necessary for practising the profession in the host Member State.’91 This is a 
very strict reference to language restrictions that leaves, potentially, enormous lee-
way for Member States to impose language requirements. The Commission, in its 
explanatory memorandum to the original proposal, made a specific reference to the 
principle of proportionality.92 Time will tell how stringently Member States will 
adhere to this requirement, which could ultimately be a considerable hindrance to 
the free movement of professionals. It will not affect the situation of lawyers, how-
ever – language proficiency was already implicitly part of their integration since the 
aptitude tests are conducted, both in written form and orally, in the language of the 
host Member State. 
Focussing on the lawyer’s profession, it is safe to say that little or nothing has 
changed from the regime of Directive 89/48/EEC. Under the new Directive 2005/ 
36/EC, it is neither easier nor is it considerably more difficult for a lawyer to inte-
grate into the legal profession of the host Member State. More often than not, such a 
lawyer will be obliged by the Member State to take an aptitude test. In my opinion 
the explicit reference to knowledge of languages will have little or no impact on 
lawyers since the language requirement was already implicitly imposed under the 
old system by the fact that aptitude tests, which for lawyers generally have both an 
oral and a written part, take place in the language of the host Member State.  
                                                  
91  Article 53 Directive 2005/36/EC. 
92  COM (2002) 119 def. 
39 
§ 3.3 The Lawyers Establishment Directive 98/5/EC93 
As was indicated in Chapter 1, there are three types of lawyers who seek to pursue 
activities outside their home Member State. It was observed that the two Directives 
covered in the previous paragraphs catered for the two extremes, i.e., lawyers who 
want to provide services and lawyers who want to fully integrate in the legal pro-
fession of the host Member State. The third type of migration, i.e., establishment 
without integration, was left without a clear foundation in secondary legislation. 
Lawyers who sought this form of establishment, perhaps best illustrated by Mr Gebhard 
whose situation was described above, were for a long time forced to use the figure 
of installation limitée, using the Services Directive and profiting from the ambiguity 
that was maintained (perhaps on purpose) by the European Court of Justice until it 
ruled in the Gebhard case. At the time the ECJ determined the Gebhard case work 
was ongoing on a Directive that would cover this situation. This Directive, which 
would become Directive 98/5/EC, will be discussed below. 
§ 3.3.1 The CCBE Draft 
Already in 1975 the Commission invited the Council of the Bars and Law Societies 
of the European Communities (hereinafter the CCBE) to consider a means by which 
the freedom of establishment of lawyers could be realised. The CCBE took seven-
teen years to come up with a draft that was finally presented at a CCBE meeting in 
1992. The fact that the draft was after all that time presented at all has been called 
the Miracle of Lisbon. The reason it took the CCBE seventeen years to come up 
with a draft was because the delegations of the Member States to the CCBE were 
divided over how to realise such a right of establishment for lawyers. In a very interest-
ing piece in the Irish Student Law Review, Hagan unearths the political machinations 
that lay behind the years and years of negotiation in the CCBE.94 Based on inter-
views of CCBE and Commission officials, Hagan tells a tale of a CCBE that is deeply 
divided over this issue, where on the one hand the Luxembourg delegation wanted 
no part in developing any form of establishment other than full integration in the 
host profession, and on the other hand the Spanish delegation proposed automatic 
recognition and full right of establishment for any lawyer. Both views were too 
extreme for the majority of the delegation. The central positions in the discussion 
were voiced by a British-led faction which proposed a right of establishment under 
home country professional title without an obligation to register with the professional 
authority of the host Member State, and a French-led faction which proposed im-
mediate integration in the host country profession, with an obligation to register 
with the competent authority in the host Member State. 
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The eventual draft95 proposed a compromise, stating that lawyers would be 
allowed to establish themselves under their home country title on the precondition 
that they would register with the competent authority of the host Member State. 
There would be no obligation for a lawyer established under his home country pro-
fessional title to integrate fully in the legal profession of the host Member State, 
unless he should choose to do so. If he should choose to do so, the regime of the 
Diploma Directive, 89/48/EEC, including the possible application of the aptitude 
test would apply to him.96 Obviously experience and knowledge gathered while 
working under the home country professional title would be taken into account 
when deciding whether the application of compensatory measures under Directive 
89/48/EEC was necessary.97 Establishment under home title would take place after 
registration, and a lawyer would be registered if he could prove that he was registered 
as a lawyer in his home Member State.98 When established under his home title, a 
lawyer would be allowed to exercise all professional activities which a host country 
lawyer would be able to do, except for preparing certain deeds and representing 
clients in court, where a duty to cooperate with a host Member State lawyer was 
upheld.99 This requirement is akin to the duty to cooperate as it was observed in 
the Services Directive.100  
When established under his home country professional title, a lawyer is subject to 
the professional rules of the host Member State as long as they do not interfere with the 
CCBE code of conduct.101 With regard to disciplinary proceedings the draft provides 
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23 October 1993. For the text of the CCBE Draft see House of Lords (1994), pp. 34-40. 
96  Article 4 of the CCBE Draft. Article 7 regulates the use of professional titles. The first section 
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98  Article 5 of the CCBE Draft. 
99  Article 6 of the CCBE Draft. 
100  It may be clear that such obligatory cooperation must abide by the rules laid down by the Euro-
pean Court of Justice in relation to the cooperation requirement in Directive 77/249/EEC, most 
notably the restriction of that cooperation requirement in Case 427/85, Commission v. Germany, 
[1988] ECR 1123, which was dealt with earlier in this chapter. 
101  Article 8 of the CCBE Draft. For the text of the Code of Conduct, see Advocatenblad [1989] 
15 pp. 435-441. For a description of the code and its application in different national systems 
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for a complex system involving close cooperation between the competent authority 
of the home Member State and the competent authority of the host Member State, 
whereby both authorities may initiate proceedings, share all information pertaining 
to proceedings, and the home Member State may request the formation of a mixed 
panel.102 
The Draft also deals with practice in association, proposing that a lawyer who is 
a member of an association may establish himself in another Member State alone, 
or as member of the association even where the host Member State does not allow 
practice in association. Membership of an association, however, cannot be used to 
circumvent the professional rules of the host Member State.103 The competent 
authority of the host Member State must facilitate the creation of an association com-
posed of lawyers established under their respective home country title and lawyers 
established under their host country professional title. On the other hand, the host 
Member State may refuse practice in association by a lawyer if the decisions within 
the association are taken by persons who are not lawyers. 
It is clear that the Draft of the CCBE deals with the third type of lawyer iden-
tified earlier. The Draft creates a system that is perfectly complemented by the two 
legal instruments that have been described above. Establishment under home title is 
made quite simple by the Draft. A mere proof of registration with the Bar of the 
home Member State suffices for one to become established in the host Member 
State. In light of previous developments in the field of freedom of movement of 
lawyers this seems revolutionary. The establishment of foreign lawyers as such is 
not the only controversial point the CCBE addresses in its Draft. Another difficult 
subject is the establishment of lawyers who are members of an association. The 
CCBE proposal is quite progressive in the sense that it allows lawyers established 
under their home title to establish themselves in an association, regardless of the 
rules on practice in an association in the host Member State. The only limitation 
on practice in association is put by the CCBE on practice in association with lawyers 
from the host Member State (national or integrated), or practice in an association 
with professionals who are not lawyers, but have decision making power in the 
association. In that case, the competent authorities of the host Member State can im-
pose rules on, or completely prohibit the practice in association. The CCBE Draft pro-
vided the basis for a Commission proposal for a new Lawyers Establishment Directive. 
§ 3.3.2 The Commission Proposal104 
On 30 March 1995 the Commission submitted a ‘proposal for a European Parlia-
ment and Council Directive to facilitate practice of the profession of lawyer on a 
permanent basis in a Member State other than that in which the qualification was 
obtained’. The legal bases for this envisaged Directive were Articles 40, 47(1) and 
47(2) of the EC Treaty. In general, it can be said that the proposal breathed the 
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same atmosphere as the CCBE Draft, i.e., it allowed persons who are established as 
lawyers to establish themselves under their home title in another Member State based 
on nothing more than written proof that they are entitled to practise as a lawyer in 
their home Member State.105  
There were, however, two major issues in the proposal that were radically differ-
ent from the CCBE Draft. First, there is the length of the period of establishment 
under home title. Whereas the Draft gave a permanent right to a lawyer for establish-
ment under home title, Article 2 of the Commission’s proposal stated that a lawyer 
will only be allowed to practise for a period of five years under his home country 
professional title. After that, if the lawyer wished to stay longer, he had to integrate 
in the legal profession of the host Member State by means of Article 10 of the 
proposal. It is in that Article that the second novelty lies. Whereas the CCBE draft 
merely referred to the mechanism of Directive 89/48/EEC for integration, the 
Commission’s proposal includes a way to avoid the aptitude test of the Diploma 
Directive.106 Article 10 of the proposal stated that if a lawyer established under his 
home title in the host Member State has effectively pursued for an unbroken period of 
at least three years an activity involving the law of the host Member State, he or 
she shall be exempted from any aptitude test required under Directive 89/48/EEC. 
The lawyer himself would be responsible for proving that he has effectively pursued 
these activities for at least three years. If the lawyer has had professional experience 
in the host Member State for at least three years, but was not involved with the law 
of the host Member State then, according to Article 10, the aptitude test needed under 
the system of Directive 89/48/EEC will be limited to the law of procedure and the 
rules of professional conduct of the host Member State. The Article stated further 
that, while examining the application of a lawyer’s who is established under his home 
country title, the host Member State shall take into account any attendance of lectures 
or seminars on the law of the host Member State. Furthermore, the Article states that 
if a lawyer formerly established under his home title becomes fully integrated in the 
legal profession of the host Member State he may use the professional title of both 
his home and his host Member State.107 
Aside from these major changes to the CCBE Draft, the proposal also contained 
more moderate adaptations. Unlike the CCBE Draft, the Commission’s proposal 
made a positive reference to the scope of activities by stating that the lawyer may 
exercise the same professional activities (including advice on host State law) as a host 
State lawyer. The proposal included the same limitations, the most important being 
the requirement to cooperate with a host State lawyer while representing clients in 
court. The proposal formulates this however, as a facultative restriction to be im-
posed by the host State.108 With regard to practice in association, the Commission’s 
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proposal states that if the host Member State has no practice in association for its 
own lawyers, it may refuse practice in association altogether. If, however, practice 
in association is allowed, then the rules of the home Member State of the lawyer 
prevail, unless the application of host Member State rules is objectively justified in 
cases where home and host Member State rules are incompatible.109 With regard to 
disciplinary proceedings the possibility of a mixed panel is dropped and there is a 
provision stating that if a lawyer, due to disciplinary proceedings, loses his right to 
practise in the home Member State, this will be automatically extended to the host 
Member State. 
The major changes to the temporal limit on the establishment under home title 
make the result of the proposal fundamentally different from the original CCBE 
Draft. Where the Draft recognised the third type of lawyer as an independent type 
with a permanent right of residence under home title, the Commission’s proposal 
treated establishment under home title as a preparatory stage for full integration in 
the host Member State’s profession. The reason for this change was explained by 
the Commission. The then Director-General of the Directorate-General in question110 
explained in a letter to the Select Committee of the House of Lords111 that the 
Commission had opted for a strict interpretation of Article 43 (then Article 52) in 
particular of the phrase: ‘under the same conditions as nationals of the host Member 
State’, because a more liberal interpretation of the Article seemed inappropriate to 
the Commission. In the next sentence of the letter, the Director-General declared 
that the right laid down in Article 2 of the Commission’s proposal is at least a step 
towards full establishment. This comes close to the opinion of the Luxembourg 
delegation to the CCBE, which stated that establishment could only be achieved 
under the same conditions as nationals of the host Member State, i.e., as a member of 
the host Member State’s professional title.112 In other words, together with the 
Luxembourg delegation to the CCBE, the Commission was of the opinion that 
Article 43 (then 52) of the EC Treaty did not sanction a possibility for lawyers to 
establish themselves under their home country professional title, at least not as an 
independent category. By imposing a time limit on the establishment under home 
title, and offering an alternative route into integration in the host Member State’s 
legal profession, the Commission sought to circumvent this potential problem. The 
only thing that remains unclear is why the Commission chose a period of five 
years.113 That seems to have been a spontaneous decision, since the Commission did 
not justify the length of the period at all. Moreover, although the proposal offered 
an alternative to the aptitude test after three years, it did not specify what was to 
happen after the termination of the five-year period. Clearly the Commission must 
have been of the opinion that every lawyer who was established under his home 
country title would, at the end of the five years, take the short route into establish-
ment under host country professional title. 
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It may be obvious that the Commission’s proposal met with fierce criticism from 
commentators. Lonbay, for example, writes in his article in the European Law Review114 
that: ‘The proposal as it stands arguably does not “facilitate” mobility but hinders it, 
because of the restrictive five year rule found in Article 2’.115 Vaughan argues in his 
memorandum, which he submitted to the House of Lords Select Committee on 
the European Communities that the Commission’s proposal infringes Community 
law because it does not make it easier for persons to take up and pursue cross-border 
activities.116 Both writers doubt the legal basis of the Directive. They argue that, in 
order for this Directive to be implemented, the national laws of some of the Member 
States need adaptation and therefore the second sentence of Article 47(2) (then 57(2)) 
must be invoked.117 This provision, at the time, provided for a consultation proce-
dure and unanimous voting in the Council. Lonbay states that it can easily be imagined 
why the Commission wanted to avoid this procedure.118  
Schneider stated that, aside from the five-year limitation on the establishment 
under home title in Article 2 of the proposal, the rules governing the integration of 
the lawyer in the legal system of the Member State laid down in Article 10 of the 
proposal also infringe Community law. She states it as follows: ‘Es ist jedoch nicht nur 
die Fünfjahresfrist, die unverständlich und nach meiner Meinung vertragswidrig ist, 
auch die unterschiedlichen Verfahren gemäß Art. 10 des Richtlinienentwurfs lassen 
erhebliche Zweifel an ihrer Zulässigkeit und Praktibilität entstehen.’119 Schneider’s 
main point of criticism with Article 10 of the proposal comes down to the fact that 
in order to become integrated in the legal profession of the host Member State the 
lawyer, who is established under his home title, must have effectively pursued, for 
an unbroken period of at least three years an activity involving the law of the host 
Member State, including Community law. The Article defines ‘effective pursuit for 
an unbroken period’ as the actual exercise of the activity without any interruption 
other than that resulting from everyday life. It is strange that the Commission requests 
the lawyers to work in the legal system of the host Member State for an unbroken 
period of three years as the European Court of Justice explicitly rejected the require-
ment of permanent presence of the lawyer in the host Member State in Klopp120 
which dealt with double establishment of lawyers. Moreover, Schneider states that 
Article 10 as a whole creates confusion. The wording of Article 10(3) in particular 
implies that the aptitude test of Directive 89/48/EEC can only be taken during the 
five-year period of establishment under home title. This cannot be the case, of course, 
because the system of Directive 89/48/EEC implies that anyone can take an aptitude 
test (if the Member State has chosen for this option) at any time without being 
obliged to establish themselves for a certain period of time prior to taking the aptitude 
test. Schneider states further that a too strict of an adherence to the five-year limit on 
                                                  
114  Lonbay (1996) B, pp. 50-58. 
115  Ibid., p. 58. 
116  House of Lords (1994), p. 80. 
117  See also: Case C-168/98, Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg v. European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union, [2000] ECR I-09131. 
118  Lonbay (1996) B, p. 58. 
119  Schneider (1995), p. 285. 
120  Case 107/83, Ordre des avocats au barreau de Paris v. Onno Klopp, [1984] ECR 2971. It must be 
mentioned here that the proposal did not require permanent residence as such but merely to 
qualify for the exemption of the aptitude test. 
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establishment under home title may constitute a breach of Article 43 (then Article 52) 
of the Treaty.121 
The House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities states that 
it does not agree with the Commission on that the establishment under home title 
should be seen as a phase which must lead to the full integration of the lawyer in 
the legal profession of the host Member State. Moreover, the Select Committee is 
of the opinion that the five-year limitation on the establishment under home title is 
not at all justified. It states that it believes that the requirement of full integration in 
the legal profession of the host Member State is not in conformity with Article 43 
(then Article 52) of the EC Treaty, because the passage: ‘[...] under the conditions 
laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country where such establishment 
is effected [...]’ does not justify an obligatory integration of the lawyer who is estab-
lished under his home title, in the legal profession of the host Member State after 
that lawyer has practised for five years under his home title.  
The Select Committee also states that the present proposal cannot fall under the 
legal basis of Article 47 (then Article 57) because the Directive does not make it 
easier for lawyers to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons. With all 
these observations in mind, the House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities recommended that the Commission’s proposal should be amended 
on the two principal points which differed from the CCBE Draft, namely the five-
year limit on the establishment under home title and the full integration of the lawyer 
in the legal profession of the host Member State.122 Not all comments of the writers 
cited above were negative. All applauded the Commission’s efforts at regulating the 
position of employed lawyers123 and the problem of joint practices.124 
In addition to this critique from the outside world, there were two developments 
from inside the European Community that would determine the fate of the Com-
mission’s proposal. First of all the Council requested the opinion of the Economic 
and Social Committee. In its opinion125 the Committee stated that although it agrees 
with the underlying principle of Article 2, namely the establishment under home 
title as a preparatory stage for the complete integration of the lawyer in the legal system 
of the host Member State, is sees no justification for a five-year time limit. With 
this statement the Committee makes matters even more complicated. The Com-
mission had at least tried to quantify its opinion that the establishment under home 
country professional title should only serve as a preparatory stage for full integration 
by imposing a time limit. The opinion of the Committee would render it useless to 
maintain that underlying view since without any limitation establishment under 
home title became de facto permanent. In addition to this rather unhelpful comment, 
the Committee also proposed that lawyers established under their home country title 
should not be able to give advice on host country law (therewith making it virtually 
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124  For further articles on the Commission proposal, see Denys (1995), pp. 143-151; Gout (1995), 
pp. 1285-1294; de Waard (1995), p. 59; Wackie Eysten (1995) A, pp. 631-632 and Wackie 
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impossible to fulfil the requirements for integration in the host Member State’s pro-
fession without an aptitude test) and to include in the competent authority’s assessment 
of lawyers who sought integration in the host profession without an aptitude test that 
their language capabilities in the language of the host Member State were sufficient. 
Apart from the critique on the five-year limitation, the Committee clearly called 
for a more restrictive right of residence. 
A second development that proved detrimental for the Commission’s proposal 
was the ruling of the ECJ in the Gebhard case. After that ruling, in which the ECJ 
finally gave a clear distinction between establishment and services, it became clear 
that a right of establishment that was limited in time would not constitute establish-
ment but would instead be considered as services. That being so, the legal base of the 
proposed Directive would be wrong since it referred to the Treaty articles relating 
to establishment. Moreover, it could be argued that although the objective justifica-
tion test for restricting free movement laid down by the Court in Gebhard would 
not be directly applied to rules laid down in a piece of secondary legislation. The 
rules laid down in the proposal would not survive the application of the objective 
justification test.  
All this taken together, it was evident that the Commission’s proposal could not 
be upheld as it stood and it was therefore for the European Parliament to propose 
extensive amendments. 
§ 3.3.3 The Opinion of the European Parliament126 
On 19 June 1996, the European Parliament issued an opinion in the Official Journal 
of the European Communities in which it approved the Commission’s proposal on 
the condition that the amendments given by the European Parliament were taken 
into account by the Commission. The opinion of the European Parliament is charac-
terised by three rather substantial amendments of the original Commission’s proposal. 
First, and most importantly, the European Parliament removed every reference to 
the five-year temporal limit on the establishment under home country professional 
title.127 If the amendment proposed by the European Parliament would have been 
accepted it would have meant that the major point of critique on the Commission’s 
proposal would have been taken away, while on the other hand it was again much 
                                                  
126  [1996] OJ C198/85. For another description of the Opinion of the European Parliament see 
Ricour & Vatier (1996), pp. 1235-1238. 
127  It is interesting to note that the European Parliament has left the underlying ideas of the 
Commission intact. The recitals still utter the view of the Commission that the establishment 
under home title is still meant as a preparatory stage to the full integration of the lawyer into 
the legal profession of the host Member State.  
 From the third amendment of the European Parliament it becomes clear that the Parliament 
does recognise the right of lawyers to become permanently established in a host Member State, 
while they remain able to make use of their home title. What the European Parliament 
construes with these amendments is quite similar to the opinion of the Economic and Social 
Committee. Without reference to a time limit, but leaving the underlying views of the Com-
mission intact, the European Parliament creates an establishment of lawyers under home title 
that should eventually lead to a full integration of the lawyer in the legal profession of the host 
Member State. Since there is no time limit placed on this establishment under home title it 
actually becomes, albeit de facto, a permanent right of establishment under home title. 
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more in conformity with the original CCBE Draft. By leaving the reference that in-
dicated establishment under home title was a preparatory stage to full integration in 
the host Member State’s profession in the recitals, the European Parliament had the 
potential violation of Article 43 also covered, which was also incidentally Luxem-
bourg’s concern with the CCBE Draft. 
The second major amendment to the Commission’s proposal was concerned with 
the full integration of the lawyer established under his home country title in the 
legal profession of the host Member State. With regard to the Commission’s pro-
posal it was observed that the requirement of working for a constant unbroken 
period of three years in the host Member State might be contrary to the explanation 
of the freedom of establishment given by the ECJ in Klopp. The European Parlia-
ment tried to eliminate this potential violation by altering the requirement to ‘having 
pursued the profession in the host Member State, involving host state law, regularly 
for a period of at least three years’. The European Parliament quantified the term 
by stating that ‘effective and regular pursuit’ meant the actual exercise of the activity 
without any interruption other than that resulting from the events of everyday life. 
It is at least doubtful that, if the original wording of the Commission was contrary 
to the Court’s ruling in Klopp, the illegality is taken away by the wording of the 
European Parliament. The European Parliament also changed the approach towards 
lawyers who seek integration after less than three years activity in the law of the 
host Member State. Where the Commission required these lawyers to take a limited 
aptitude test under the system of Directive 89/48/EEC the European Parliament 
proposed that such a lawyer should be subject to an interview by the competent 
authority taking into account all the knowledge and experience the applicant had 
with the law of the host Member State and based on all the cases and documents 
provided by the applicant.128 Furthermore, a lawyer established under his home 
Member State title may at any point ask to take an aptitude test under the regime 
of Directive 89/48/EEC.129 
In addition to these major adaptations, less extensive amendments were proposed. 
The European Parliament suggested a specific reference to the public service exception, 
by way of including a certificate of honour in the documents which were necessary 
for registration under home country professional title, a possibility to be exempted 
under the host country social security scheme, and an elaborate equal treatment 
provision for salaried lawyers. With regard to joint practice the European Parliament 
reinforced the possibility of the host Member State blocking lawyers from practising 
jointly or opening a branch or agency where the capital is held, the name of the group 
is used or the decisions in the group are taken (wholly or in part) by professionals who 
are not lawyers in the sense of the Directive. Mainly the requirement concerning 
the use of the name considerably diminishes the effect of the proposed Directive on the 
rules governing Multi-Disciplinary Partnerships (MDPs) in the Member States, where 
the rule in the Commission’s proposal only affected those MDPs where the decisions  
where actually taken by non-lawyers. 
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and experience in the law of the host Member State because of including the Vlassopoulou 
principle in the Directive. 
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It was evident that, after the extensive nature of the proposed amendments by 
the European Parliament, the Court’s ruling in Gebhard and the reception of the 
Commission’s proposal in the literature, the Commission had to generate/fashion a 
new proposal. 
§ 3.3.4 The Amended Commission Proposal 
On 24 September 1996 the European Commission submitted an amended proposal to 
both the Council and the European Parliament.130 Concerning the major amendments 
proposed by the European Parliament the Commission had changed its proposal to be 
in conformity with them. The reference to a time limit placed on the establishment 
under home title was removed, albeit in the recitals there is a reference to a temporary 
right of establishment, but this seems to be a slip of the pen.131 The Commission 
has essentially accepted the amendments of the European Parliament in connection 
with integration in the host Member State where the candidate has been active for 
less then three years in the law of the host Member State and regarding to the 
additional possibilities for Member States to limit the activity of MDPs in their 
territory. Minor adaptations, such as the reference to the public service exception and 
the certificate of honour, along with the possible exemption of host Member State 
social security schemes, were not approved by the Commission, the first two because 
of superfluity, the latter because of an alleged conflict with the provisions of Regulation 
1408/71/EEC. 
The amended Commission proposal was welcomed in the Member States. The 
Select Committee on European Legislation of the House of Commons stated in its 
third report of the 1996-1997 session that it welcomed the amendments and that the 
government was content that the new text was a significant improvement over the 
original draft, and that it was much closer to the intentions that the CCBE wanted 
to lay down in this Directive.132 After the Commission had brought its proposal in 
conformity with the view of the European Parliament and with the pertaining view 
that came forth from literature, the time was ripe for the Council to formulate its 
common position on the Commission proposal. 
§ 3.3.5 The Council’s Common Position 
On 24 July 1997 the Council gave its common position with a view to the proposal 
for a European Parliament and Council Directive to facilitate the practice of the 
lawyer’s profession on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in which 
                                                  
130  [1996] OJ C 355/19. 
131  With regard to the recitals, the Commission has followed the proposed amendments of the 
European Parliament almost everywhere. Only in recital 14 the Commission has omitted to 
leave out the word ‘temporarily’, which the European Parliament proposed. The text of the 
amended Commission proposal reads as follows: ‘Whereas the purpose pursued by the Directive 
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132  House of Commons (1996).  
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the lawyer’s qualifications were obtained.133 In connection with the major subjects 
the Council follows the text as proposed in the Commission’s new proposal. The 
text of the Common Position therefore includes a right to establishment under home 
title that is not limited in time. What is different is that, unlike the Commission, the 
Council makes a full and explicit choice for a right of establishment under home 
title without any forced link between the establishment and the integration in the host 
Member State profession.134 Apparently, the Council is of the opinion that Article 
43 of the Treaty also sanctions this kind of establishment.135 As for integration in the 
host Member State’s profession and the rules governing joint practice, the Council 
followed the Commission’s proposal.  
Moreover, the Council made some new additions to the proposed Directive. 
With reference to the pursued professional activities the Council made two additions. 
Firstly, it stated that the lawyer who exercises his or her professional activity is 
obliged to take into account the host Member State’s rules of procedure. It is not 
clear why the Council added this obligation which, in the light of Article 6 of the 
proposal (applicable professional rules) seems to be superfluous. The Council stated 
in its statement of reasons that this provision is meant to ensure the ‘smooth opera-
tion of justice’.136 In the eleventh recital it is also stated that these specific rules may 
not frustrate the integration of lawyers from other Member States if they fulfil the 
criteria laid down by the specific rules laid down in Article 5(3). That meant that a 
Member State may not reserve access to its Supreme Court excusively for its own 
national lawyers, but that it may lay down specific rules and that it has to allow access 
to any lawyer, national or non-national, who fulfils these criteria. When addressing 
disciplinary proceedings the Council also added the requirement that the competent 
authorities of the host and home Member States shall cooperate at times when dis-
ciplinary proceedings are initiated against a lawyer in his home Member State. The 
Council introduced this new subparagraph because it wanted to ensure, according 
to its statement of reasons,137 that the supply of information between the competent 
authorities of the host and home Member States on the initiation of disciplinary pro-
ceedings was two-way, whereas the Commission’s proposal only required coopera-
tion if the proceedings were started in the host Member State. 
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Common Position also state that establishment under home title must eventually lead to full 
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§ 3.3.6 The Final Result: Directive 98/5/EC 
As was to be expected the European Parliament was satisfied with the common 
position of the Council and it saw no need to initiate the conciliation procedure that 
is provided for in Article 251 of the Treaty. The European Parliament adopted the 
text of the common position of the Council in its decision of 19 November 1997. On 
15 December 1997 the Council officially adopted the final text of the Directive. The 
Directive was signed by the President of the European Parliament at that time, J.M. 
Gil-Robles, and the then President of the Council, J. Cunningham, on 16 February 
1998. Directive 98/5/EC was published in Official Journal no. 77 of 1998 on 14 
March 1998.138 
 As observed above, the recitals of the Directive still reflect the underlying view 
of the Commission that the establishment of the lawyer under his home title must 
eventually lead to the full integration of the lawyer in the legal profession of the 
host Member State.139 On the other hand, the recitals have lost every reference to 
the fact that the establishment under home title should be of a temporary nature. This 
is because the Council was of the opinion that there is a need for establishment under 
home title that has no connection with the full integration of the lawyer in the legal 
profession of the host Member State, and that, therefore, the establishment under 
home title should be seen as an independent form of establishment.140 
Article 1 lays down the purpose of the Directive, namely to facilitate the practice 
of the profession of the lawyer on a permanent basis in a self-employed or salaried 
capacity in a Member State other than that in which the professional qualification 
was obtained. The Article states further that the Directive is applicable to anyone 
allowed to practise in his home Member State under one of the professional titles 
listed in Section 2a of Article 1. Section 4 of the Article states that the Directive only 
applies to the establishment of lawyers, and not to the provision of services, which 
is governed by Directive 77/249/EEC. 
Article 2 of the Directive concerns the general right for lawyers to establish them-
selves on a permanent basis in any of the Member States under their home title in 
order to pursue the professional activities that are further specified under Article 5 
of the Directive. Integration of the lawyer into the legal profession of the host Member 
State shall be subject to the rules laid down in Article 10 of the Directive. 
Articles 3 and 4 lay down the requirements which have to be fulfilled by the 
lawyer in order to become established in another Member State other than the one 
in which he obtained his qualification. Article 3 states that, in order to become estab-
lished, the lawyer must register with the competent authority of the host Member 
State. That competent authority shall register that lawyer if he can produce a certificate 
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from the home competent authority certifying that he is registered with the them.141 
The competent authority of the host Member State may require that no more than 
three months have elapsed since the certificate was issued, and shall further inform 
the competent authority of the home Member State of the lawyer concerned that it 
has registered that lawyer. Article 3 further states some specific rules relating to the 
special nature of the profession of the lawyer in the common law countries within 
the European Union, namely the United Kingdom and Ireland.  
Article 4 states that the lawyer who wants to practise in another Member State 
other than the one in which he obtained his professional qualifications must do so 
under his home country professional title. The lawyer is obliged to avoid any confusion 
with the professional title used in the host Member State. The competent authority 
in the host Member State may require that the lawyer, who is established under his 
home title, gives an indication of the professional body of which he is a member in 
his home Member State or the judicial authority before which he is allowed to 
practise according to the laws of the home Member State. The competent authority 
of the host Member State may further require the lawyer to include a reference to 
his registration with the competent authority in that State. 
Article 5 of the Directive lays down the areas of activities in which a lawyer, 
established under his home title, may practise. Section 1 of the Article states that a 
lawyer established under his home title is allowed to carry out the same professional 
activities as a lawyer who is practising under the professional title of the host Member 
State. That lawyer may give advice on the law of his home Member State, on Com-
munity law, on international law and on the law of the host Member State. The 
lawyer, established under his home title, shall comply in any event with the proce-
dural rules applicable in the national courts of the host Member State. Section 2 of 
the Article states that a Member State may exclude a lawyer, established under his 
home title, from exercising certain specialist activities (such as preparing deeds) if these 
activities are reserved for a profession other than that of the lawyer in the lawyer’s 
home Member State. This provision clearly did not have to be formulated in a two-
way manner. Where such activities are reserved in the host Member State for pro-
fessions other than that of lawyer, the lawyer established under his home country 
professional title is also not allowed to pursue these activities based on Section 1 of 
the Article. Section 3 of the Article states that, where activities pursued include the 
defence or representation of a client in legal proceedings, the host Member State 
may require the lawyer, established under his home title, to cooperate with a lawyer 
who is established under the professional title of the host Member State if the host 
Member State reserves such activities for lawyers established under the professional 
title of the host Member State. This requirement may be subject to the limits laid 
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down by the European Court of Justice in Commission v. Germany, which dealt with 
the fact that Germany required cooperation between a German lawyer and a visiting 
lawyer even in cases where representation by a lawyer was not compulsory.142 The 
second subparagraph of Section 3 states further that the host Member State may, in 
order to secure the smooth operation of justice, lay down specific rules for access to 
its Supreme Court, such as the use of specialist lawyers. The eleventh recital of the 
Directive makes it clear that the specialist nature of such a lawyer may not be con-
nected to his nationality, because the recital implicitly says that a foreign lawyer 
may also gain access to the Supreme Court if he fulfils the criteria.  
Article 6 of the Directive lays down with which rules of professional conduct the 
lawyer, who is established under his home title, must observe. Section 1 states that 
lawyers who are established under their home title are subject to the host Member 
State’s rules of professional conduct, notwithstanding those rules to which they are 
subject in their home Member State.143 Section 2 of the Article states that the lawyers 
established under their home title shall be adequately represented in the professional 
associations of the host Member State. The section provides that such representation 
shall involve at least the right to vote in elections of those associations’ governing 
bodies. The third section states that a lawyer must have professional indemnity insur-
ance, whether it be in the host Member State or in his home Member State. 
Article 7 states the manner in which disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer 
established under his home title in another Member State should be carried out. The 
first section of the Article states that if the lawyer who is established under his home 
title fails to fulfil his obligations under the law of the host Member State, the rules 
of procedure, penalties and remedies provided for in the host Member State shall apply. 
The remaining sections of the Article provide for an elaborate cooperation between 
the competent authority of the home Member State and the competent authority of 
the host Member State. Cooperation is also required if the competent authorities of 
the home Member State decide to open disciplinary proceedings. Section 4 states 
that a decision of the competent authority of the host Member State may also have 
repercussions for the lawyer concerned in his home Member State. Section 5 states 
that if the competent authority of the home Member State revokes, permanently or 
temporarily, the authorisation of the lawyer to practise in his home Member State, 
this shall automatically lead to a prohibition against the lawyer practising under his 
home title in the host Member State. 
Article 8 of the Directive states that a lawyer established under his home title may 
practise as a salaried lawyer to the same extent that the host Member State permits 
for lawyers established under the professional title of the host Member State. 
Article 9 states that a decision not to effect registration as meant in Article 3 of the 
Directive, a decision to cancel such a registration and decisions imposing disciplinary 
measures shall be accompanied with a statement of reasons. Moreover, a remedy before 
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Member State. 
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a court or tribunal against such a decision shall be available in accordance with the 
national law of the host Member State. 
Article 10 provides for three different ways in which a lawyer can become fully 
integrated in the legal profession of the host Member State. The first method is the 
simplest one. Section 2 of the Article states that a lawyer may, at any point in time, take 
an aptitude test under the system of Directive 89/48/EEC if the competent authority 
of the host Member State deems it necessary in order to become fully integrated in 
the legal profession of the host Member State. Subsequently that lawyer may practise 
under the professional title of the host Member State. Section 1 states the second 
method in which a lawyer established under his home title can become fully inte-
grated in the legal profession of the host Member State. That section states that if a 
lawyer has effectively and regularly (meaning: the actual exercise of the activity without 
interruption other than that resulting from everyday life) pursued professional activi-
ties involving the law of the host Member State, including Community law, for a 
period of at least three years, he or she shall be granted access to the legal profession 
of the host Member State. Subsequently that lawyer has the right to practise under 
the professional title of the host Member State without being required to take an 
aptitude test under the system of Directive 89/48/EEC. In order to gain such access 
the lawyer concerned shall provide the host Member State’s competent authority with 
all the relevant information, notably on the number and nature of the matters he or 
she has dealt with. The competent authority of the host Member State has the right 
to verify the information and may to that end require the lawyer to provide, orally 
or in writing, clarification of, or details on, the information provided. If the com-
petent authority decides to deny the lawyer access to the legal profession of the host 
Member State, that decision must be reasoned and subject to appeal in the national 
courts or tribunals of the host Member State.  
The third method through with one can gain access to the legal profession of 
the host Member State is laid down in Section 3 of Article 10. The section concerns 
lawyers who have effectively and regularly pursued professional activities in the host 
Member State for at least three years, but for a lesser period than three years with 
regard to the law of the host Member State, including Community law. Such a 
lawyer may obtain admission to the legal profession of the host Member State from 
the competent authority of that Member State, without having to take the aptitude 
test under the system of Directive 89/48/EEC. In deciding whether or not to give 
the lawyer concerned access to the legal profession of the host Member State, the 
competent authority of that State shall take into account the effective and regular 
professional activities pursued by the lawyer concerned. In addition, it shall also 
take into account all the knowledge and professional experience gained with respect 
to the law of the host Member State and any attendance made at lectures or seminars 
on the law of the host Member State, including the rules regulating professional 
practice and conduct. This is clearly a codification of the principle laid down by the 
European Court of Justice in the Vlassopoulou case.144 It may also be noted that this 
principle is also codified in Directive 89/48/EEC, and that the third method of in-
tegration to a certain extent overlaps with the first method, since under the system 
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of Directive 89/48/EEC the competent authority is also obliged to determine whether 
or not the taking of an aptitude test is deemed necessary. The lawyer concerned shall 
provide the competent authority of the host Member State with all the relevant in-
formation and documentation, notably on the cases he or she has dealt with. Assess-
ment of the lawyer’s effective and regular activity in the host Member State and assess-
ment of his capacity to continue the activity he has pursued there shall take place 
by means of an interview with the competent authority of the host Member State 
in order to verify the regular and effective nature of the activity. If the competent 
authority of the host Member State decides not to grant access to the legal profes-
sion of the host Member State, such a decision shall be reasoned and it shall be 
subject to appeal in the national courts of the host Member State. Section 4 of the 
Article states that the competent authority of the host Member State may also deny 
lawyers the benefits of the provision of the Article if it considers that this would be 
against public policy, in particular because of disciplinary proceedings, complaints 
or incidents of any kind. Again, such a decision shall be reasoned and it shall be 
subject to appeal in the national courts of the host Member State. Section 6 states 
that a lawyer who gains access to the legal profession of the host Member State shall 
be entitled to use his home title alongside the professional title of the host Member 
State. 
Article 11 governs the rules concerning the joint practice of lawyers. The intro-
duction states that lawyers who are established under home title may practise jointly if 
the lawyers practising under the professional title of the host Member State are allowed 
to do so, albeit subject to the rules laid down in this Article. Section 1 of the Article 
states that joint practice of lawyers established under their home title is allowed. In 
the case where the fundamental rules of the home Member State governing groupings 
are incompatible with the rules governing the same subject in the host Member 
State, the rules of the host Member State shall prevail, as long as their application is 
justified by the public interest in protecting clients and third parties.145 Section 2 states 
that the host Member State shall make it possible for two or more lawyers who are 
established under their home title, to practise in a form of joint practice. If the host 
Member State provides more forms of joint practice for the lawyers established 
under the professional title of the host Member State, that the host Member State 
must also provide these forms to lawyers who are established under their home 
title. The manner in which lawyers practise jointly shall be subject to the laws of 
the host Member State. Section 3 states that Member States must also take measures 
to permit different mixed forms of joint practice: lawyers who are established under 
their home title but who come from different Member States, and lawyers established 
under their home country title practising jointly with lawyers established under the 
professional title of the host Member State. Section 4 states that a lawyer established 
under his home title and who wants to work in a grouping, must provide the com-
petent authority of the host Member State with all the relevant information concern-
ing that grouping. Section 5 gives the right to Member States to refuse lawyers 
who are established under their home title, to practise in a grouping in which some 
of the members are not lawyers, insofar as it prohibits lawyers who are established 
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under the professional title of that Member State from practising in groupings in 
which some members are not lawyers. The section states further that a grouping is 
deemed to include persons who are not lawyers if; the capital of the grouping is held 
entirely or partly by non-lawyers, the name under which it practises is used by non-
lawyers, or if the decision-making power in that grouping is exercised, de iure or de 
facto, by persons who are not lawyers in the sense of Article 1(2) of the Directive. 
Furthermore, the section states that if the fundamental rules governing a grouping 
in the home Member State are incompatible with the rules in force in the host 
Member State or with the rules of Section 5, the host Member State may refuse to 
permit the lawyer concerned to open a branch or agency of the grouping in the 
host Member State. This prohibition may be imposed without the restrictions laid 
down in Section 1 of the Article.  
Article 12 states that a lawyer may, while established under their home title in 
another Member State, employ the name of any grouping to which he belongs in 
his home Member State. The host Member State may require that, besides the name 
of the grouping, also its legal form and/or the names of the members practising in 
the host Member State is/are mentioned. 
Article 13 provides for close cooperation between the competent authorities of the 
host and home Member State in order to facilitate the application of the Directive. 
The Article states further that the competent authorities must preserve the confiden-
tiality of the information exchanged. 
Article 14 states that Member States shall designate, by 14 March 2000 at the latest, 
the authority which shall be competent to receive the applications and take the de-
cisions referred to in this Directive. The Member State shall inform the Commission 
and the other Member States of such a designation. Article 15 states that the Com-
mission shall, at the latest ten years after the entry into force of this Directive, i.e., 
14 March 2008, report to the European Parliament and the Council on the pro-
gress of the implementation of the Directive. The Commission may, in such a report, 
propose changes to the system as it exists up to that point. Article 16 states that the 
Directive must be implemented in the legal systems of the Member States by 14 
March 2000 at the latest. The second section of the Article states that the Member 
States shall inform the Commission of any changes in their domestic law through 
which they adopt the matters covered by this Directive. Article 17 states that the 
Directive enters into force on 14 March 1998, the date of its publication in the 
Official Journal of the European Communities. Finally, Article 18 states that the 
Directive is addressed to the Member States. 
Even after the Directive had come into force, the freedom of movement of 
lawyers under their home title was still not guaranteed because Luxembourg had filed 
a complaint of nullity regarding the Directive. So before it is possible to draw any 
conclusions from the new Directive, it is necessary to deal with the nullity claim of 
Luxembourg. 
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§ 3.3.7 Case Law Regarding the Lawyers Establishment Directive 
With regard to the Lawyers Establishment Directive, five cases are worth mention-
ing. First of all, on 4 May 1998, not even two months146 after the entry into force 
of Directive 98/5/EC, the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg filed an appeal for nullity 
on the basis of Article 230 of the EC Treaty. The European Court of Justice dealt 
with this question in Luxembourg v. Parliament and Council.147 Luxembourg based its 
appeal against the Directive on three different arguments. 
The first argument was concerned with the violation of Article 43 of the Treaty 
(at the time of the appeal still Article 52). Luxembourg argued that the right of 
lawyers to establish themselves under their home title could lead to reverse discrim-
ination, i.e., that Luxembourg lawyers would be left in a less beneficial position than 
lawyers who exercised their right under the Directive. According to Luxembourg, 
this is the case because persons who want to become lawyers in Luxembourg have 
to follow professional education, whereas lawyers who establish themselves under the 
regime of Directive 98/5/EC do not have to do anything additional in the sense of 
professional education, to comply with Luxembourg law. In addition to that, Luxem-
bourg argued that because Directive 98/5/EC takes away all rules with regard to 
professional education in the host Member State, the distinction between the freedom 
of movement of services and the freedom of establishment is blurred. According to 
Luxembourg this is the case because the exercise of the legal profession in another 
Member State without regulations regarding professional education (as is the case 
under the regime of Directive 89/48/EEC,148 where the host Member State controls 
the content of the aptitude test to be taken by the lawyer concerned) falls under the 
exercise of the freedom of movement of services. This argument seems to voice, albeit 
not expressly, the concern also voiced by the Luxembourg delegation to the CCBE 
and the Commission in its original proposal, namely that Article 43 does not support 
this form of establishment since it is carried out under different conditions than 
those applicable to nationals of the host Member State. 
The European Court of Justice did not agree with these arguments. In para-
graph 24 of the judgment, the Court states that there is no reverse discrimination 
because it has to be assumed that the professional situation of a foreign lawyer who 
is established under his home title cannot be compared with the situation of a 
national lawyer. According to the Court, this difference is ensured/created because 
a national lawyer may exercise, ipso facto, all activities that a lawyer is allowed to 
exercise in that Member State. This is in contrast with Article 5 of Directive 98/5/ 
EC, which allows the competent authority of the host Member State to limit the 
activities of the lawyer established under his home country title. Additionally, the 
Court argued that lawyers who are established under their home title are obliged to 
avoid any confusion between themselves and national lawyers. Due to these differ-
ences, the Court stated that there was no place for an appeal based on equal treatment. 
Basically, the Court went further with this ruling than the Parliament and the Council. 
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These were, in their respective opinion and common position, of the opinion that 
eventually establishment under home title would lead to full integration in the legal 
profession of the host Member State, albeit only to cover the eventuality that Article 
43 would not cover establishment under other conditions than those applicable to 
nationals of the host Member State. The Court’s ruling implies that establishment 
under home title is sanctioned by Article 43 of the Treaty. 
The second part of Luxembourg’s first argument was concerned with the fact that, 
due to the application of Directive 98/5/EC, every possibility for quality control is 
lost. According to Luxembourg, this loss of quality control leads to an infringement 
of consumer protection principles that Member States try to achieve by means of 
rules for qualification and education. The lack of quality control therefore also leads 
to an infringement of the general interest. 
The Court reacted to these accusations in a way that was fully in accordance 
with the views of the defendants and the intervening parties in this case. The Court 
reviewed a number of articles in the Directive that are concerned with quality control. 
The Court again stated that Articles 4 and 5 lay down the rules obliging lawyers to 
avoid confusion when being established under their home title. Moreover, the host 
Member State may limit the activities that a lawyer, established under his home title, 
may concern himself with while being established in the host Member State if this is 
justified under the applicable articles of the Directive. In addition the European Court 
of Justice underlined Article 6 of the Directive, that lawyers who are established under 
their home title are not only subject to the rules of conduct of their home Member 
State but also to the rules of conduct of the host Member State. Moreover, lawyers 
who are established under their home title are obliged to hold professional indemnity 
insurance. The Court also made reference to Article 7 of the Directive, which provides 
for an extensive cooperation procedure between the competent authorities of the 
host and home Member State in the case of disciplinary proceedings. The Court 
was of the opinion that the aforementioned guarantees are sufficient in order to 
conclude that there is no infringement of principles of consumer protection.  
The second argument that Luxembourg brought forward was of a more technical 
nature. Luxembourg argued that Article 47(2) of the EC Treaty prescribes that in 
this case the voting in Council should have been based on unanimity instead of 
applied qualified majority. Article 47(2) prescribes that this alternative voting method 
must be used when dealing with Directives whose application leads, in at least one 
of the Member States, to a change in the principles for education and the access of 
natural persons to certain professions in the laws of the Member State. According to 
Luxembourg, this situation is applicable because Articles 2, 5 and 11 of the Directive 
change the existing principles in the laws of different Member States. Luxembourg 
argued that there is a change in principles for education since the Directive allows 
persons to establish themselves as lawyers without previous education in the host 
Member State, or without previous recognition of equality of diplomas. Luxembourg 
also argued that the principles for access are violated because it is possible, under the 
regime of the Directive, for every lawyer to establish himself under his home country 
professional title in any Member State without being obliged to educate himself in 
the law of the host State. Lastly, Luxembourg stated that the Directive violates the 
principle that every lawyer in Luxembourg is tested on his knowledge of Luxembourg 
law. This situation leads to a violation of consumer protection. 
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The European Court of Justice did not agree with this line of reasoning. Accord-
ing to the Court, Directive 98/5/EC creates a mechanism of mutual recognition of 
professional titles for migrating lawyers that is a supplement to the system under Direc-
tive 89/48/EEC, according to which lawyers may exercise their profession without 
limitations in the host Member State. The Court therefore concluded that Directive 
98/5/EC did not deal with new matters, and that therefore there is no violation of 
national law principles, since national laws should be completely adapted to the rules 
and contents of Directive 89/48/EEC. With regard to Luxembourg’s complaint 
concerning Article 11 of Directive 98/5/EC, the Court held that rules pertaining 
to group practise of lawyers did not lead to a requirement of access but to a modality 
of the exercise of the profession. The Court therefore dismissed the argument. It 
must be observed that what the Court implied with the first argument, that establish-
ment under home title was an independent form of establishment, is weakened by 
the ruling on the second argument, which stated that establishment under home title 
is complementary to full integration in the host Member State’s profession. It seems 
that the Court did not want to give a clear ruling on this matter. 
The third, and last, argument that Luxembourg brought forward to support its 
appeal of nullity was an alleged violation of Article 253 of the EC Treaty. This article 
requires that all legislative acts of the Institutions must be duly motivated. According 
to Luxembourg, this Article was violated because the Council and the European 
Parliament have not explicitly indicated why lawyers are not required to have their 
credentials recognised by the competent authority of the host Member State, and 
why lawyers are entitled to deal with the law of the host Member State, as of the 
first day of their establishment in that host State. Luxembourg also argued that the 
right of a lawyer to integrate in the legal profession of the host Member State after a 
certain period of time is contrary to the possibility of unlimited establishment under 
home title. With this last argument it seems that Luxembourg wanted to lure the 
Court into dealing with the problems regarding a possible violation of Article 43 of 
the EC Treaty. The Court merely reviewed the recitals of the Directive and concluded 
on the basis of established case law149 that the Directive is duly motivated and there-
fore argument given by Luxembourg was also dismissed. That meant that the Luxem-
bourg’s appeal was unfounded in arguments of law, and therefore its appeal for 
nullity was dismissed.  
In itself, this case is not very spectacular. The European Court of Justice quickly, 
and rather simply, dismissed Luxembourg’s arguments. Maybe it was a bit too quick. 
On some points, it seems that the European Court of Justice contradicted itself. In 
reaction to Luxembourg's first argument the Court stated that lawyers who were 
established under their home country professional title were not in the same situation 
as lawyers who worked under the professional title of the host Member State (whether 
national or integrated lawyers). With this statement the Court recognised that the 
tripartite system of the freedom of movement of lawyers (Directive 77/249/EEC, 
Directive 89/48/EEC and Directive 98/5/EC) also led to a tripartite division of the 
profession of lawyers, namely lawyers who occasionally provide services in another 
Member State, lawyers who establish themselves in another Member State and who 
become fully integrated in the legal profession of the host Member State, and lawyers 
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who establish themselves under their home country title, and who, therefore become 
not fully integrated in the legal profession of the host State. This is an important 
factor since this was the first time that the European Court of Justice was so clear 
about the exact relation between the different forms of the legal professions in the 
Member States. It is, therefore, a pity that the European Court of Justice blurred a 
great deal of this clarity when delivering its judgment for Luxembourg’s second 
argument. In reaction to that argument, the Court stated that Directive 98/5/EC is 
supplementary to the system laid down in Directive 89/48/EEC. With that statement, 
the Court suggested that both forms of establishment are very closely linked.  
In my opinion, the Court has manoeuvred itself into in a precarious position. If 
the Court had maintained the line of argument it gave when answering Luxembourg’s 
first argument in respect of the second argument, then the Court would have had to 
state that there was a new system for the establishment of lawyers. Such a new system 
would have made it highly likely that existing principles of national laws were to be 
changed and therefore the exception of 47(2) would have been applicable, i.e., 
unanimity would have been required in the Council (and subsequently Luxembourg 
would have voted against). It appears, from the arguments given above, that estab-
lishment under home title is very closely linked to full integration in the legal pro-
fession of the host Member State. The reasoning of the Court as to why Article 47(2) 
is not applicable is not a good example of convincing reasoning. The Court found it 
sufficient to note that Directive 98/5/EC is supplementary to Directive 89/48/EEC, 
and that therefore the exception of Article 47(2) did not apply. Similarly, it is a pity 
that the Court did not take the opportunity to clarify the distinction between estab-
lishment and services.  
All this taken together means that if the Court had given a less evasive ruling, 
Luxembourg would have won on at least one argument and the Lawyers Establish-
ment Directive would have been nullified. The Court apparently did not want to 
do so and therewith rescued the Directive and in turn the development of the free 
movement of lawyers. 
After the implementation period of the Directive had expired in 2000, the Court 
had the opportunity in two instances to rule on failure of implementation. As will 
be shown more elaborately in the next chapter, many countries failed to implement 
the Directive on time, but only in the case of France150 and Ireland151 did it come 
to legal proceedings. France did not contradict the Commission’s view that it had 
violated the Treaty by not implementing the Directive, nor did France offer any 
explanation or justification as to why it was late with its implementation. In Ireland 
implementation was late due to technicalities relating to the Irish legislative process. 
The Court was, however, not impressed and convicted both countries of violating the 
Treaty due to late implementation of the Directive. In themselves the cases are 
uneventful, marginal even, since they do not add anything to the development or 
offer any better understanding for the application of the Directive.  
The last two cases are much more interesting in their connection to the Directive 
since they deal with its application by Member States. Unsurprisingly, both cases 
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stem from Luxembourg, one being a Treaty violation procedure152 and the other 
being a prejudicial procedure.153 As will be shown in the next chapter, Luxembourg’s 
resistance to the Lawyers Establishment Directive was not limited to its adoption. It 
will be shown that the implementation of the Directive in Luxembourg was not 
only late, but also rather difficult. At this point it suffices to say that Luxembourg, 
among other countries, required lawyers established under their home title to pro-
duce proof of their registration in their home Member State annually, required a lan-
guage proficiency test for lawyers seeking establishment under home title, and refused 
lawyers established under their home country professional title to act as professional 
domicile in Luxembourg. None of these requirements and limitations are expressly 
sanctioned in the Directive. Therefore the Court had to rule on the legality of these 
requirements.  
In the case of Commission v. Luxembourg, all these issues were addressed. The 
ruling of the ECJ largely followed the opinion of Advocate-General Stix-Hackl in 
this case. In her conclusion, the Advocate-General stated, based on a review of the 
recitals of the Directive, that Article 3 of the Directive fully harmonises the rules on 
registration of lawyers under their home country professional title. She also argued 
that the case-law concerning language requirements was not applicable to the situation 
of lawyers establishing themselves under home country professional title. The ECJ 
duplicated the opinion of the Advocate-General and stated that Article 3 leads to 
full harmonisation of the rules regarding registration under home country title. This 
meant that no further conditions may be imposed on the registration under home 
country professional title, even where such additional conditions were objectively 
justified on the basis of the conditions laid down in Gebhard.154 Consequently, as the 
ECJ indicated, language requirements and the annual proof of registration in the 
home Member State, were not in conformity with the Directive and therefore illegal. 
The approach towards the alleged violation of Article 5 of the Directive (professional 
activities) is marginally different from the approach that was used for Article 3. Both 
the Advocate-General and the ECJ stated that the exceptions to the exercise of a 
professional activity (laid down in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 5 of the Directive) 
are exhaustive and that other limitations on professionals are not allowed. There is no 
mention however of the extent of the harmonisation of Article 5, at least not in any 
explicit sense. Based on the formulation by the ECJ, it may be readily assumed that 
the ruling has a similar effect to the statement that Article 5 leads to full harmonisation, 
since the ECJ stated that no other exceptions to professional activities may be im-
posed other than those laid down in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 5 of the Directive. 
That statement leads me to the conclusion that Article 5 of the Directive leads to 
full harmonisation of the rules on professional activity of lawyers established under 
their home country professional title. This means that all limitations encountered in 
the review of implementations that cannot be covered by the exceptions of Article 
5(2) and (3) of the Directive are illegal on the basis of this ruling. 
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The Wilson case largely overlaps with Commission v. Luxembourg. Graham Wilson 
was a United Kingdom national who belonged to the profession of barristers. He 
sought registration under his home country professional title in Luxembourg. As 
was laid down in the Luxembourg implementation, Mr Wilson was requested to 
take a language proficiency test. When he arrived for this test accompanied with a 
Luxembourg avocat the latter was not permitted to attend the test. Mr Wilson there-
fore refused to take the test altogether. His request regarding his registration under his 
home title was subsequently denied. Mr. Wilson was informed that he could challenge 
the decision before the Conseil Disciplinaire et Administratif (the disciplinary council of 
the Luxembourg Bar Association). Mr Wilson challenged the decision but the Conseil 
denied jurisdiction. Mr Wilson brought his case before the Cour Administrative, which 
subsequently referred prejudicial questions to the ECJ. 
The prejudicial questions touched upon two different subjects. On the one 
hand, the Cour Administrative asked whether a language proficiency test was allowed 
under the system of Article 3 of Directive 98/5/EC. In this sense, the Wilson case 
coincides with Commission v. Luxembourg. It is not surprising that the ECJ follows 
exactly the same line of reasoning as it did in Commission v. Luxembourg. The ECJ 
repeated that Article 3 of Directive 98/5/EC leads to full harmonisation in the field 
of registration under home country professional title. An additional language profi-
ciency test is not allowed. Commission v. Luxembourg did not cover the second line 
of questioning of the Cour Administrative. Therefore, the ECJ devoted more attention 
to those questions. The Cour Administrative asked whether an appeal procedure such 
as the one before the Conseil Disciplinaire et Administratif was sanctioned by the rules 
laid down in Article 9 of the Directive. The Directive provides for a judicial remedy 
against decisions taken by the competent authority of the host Member State. The 
court began by stating that the terms ‘court or tribunal’, as per Article 9 of the 
Directive are terms defined by Community law. The ECJ then proceeded to state 
that the Conseil does not fulfil the criteria laid down by Community law, more im-
portantly the criteria of independence and impartiality, since the Conseil is composed 
of Luxembourg avocats. The ECJ reasoned that a negative decision regarding regis-
tration under home country professional title can only be challenged before a council 
that is made up of other avocats who would also be potential competitors to the lawyer 
who seeks establishment under home country professional title. The ECJ therefore 
concluded that the judicial remedy offered by the Luxembourg authorities is not in 
conformity with Article 9 of the Directive. 
To this date these are the only cases concerned with the application of Directive 
98/5/EC. The ECJ also provided some clarity on the extent of the harmonisation 
of Articles 3 and 5 of the Directive. It must be made clear that, with regard to Article 
9, the Court has said nothing about the extent of the harmonisation, and rather men-
tioned that the application of that Article in Luxembourg did not live up to the 
standards laid down in the Directive and in Community law in general. Questions 
remain whether the cases can shed some light on the extent of harmonisation of 
the rest of the Directive. Because of the limitations on subject matter in both cases 
the ECJ did not have the opportunity to assess the level of harmonisation of the 
Directive as a whole. As for Articles 3 and 5, the ECJ reached the conclusion that the 
Directive fully harmonises the rules on registration under home country professional 
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title and the rules on professional activities that may be exercised by a lawyer which 
are exercised under his home country professional title. 
In connection with the Directive, it may be assumed that Articles 3 and 5, together 
with Article 2, form the central core of the Directive. These articles actually imple-
ment the right for lawyers to establish themselves in other Member States and to 
exercise professional activities in the host Member State. It may be assumed that all 
the other articles, which support the key articles in the Directive (such as professional 
rules, disciplinary proceedings etc.) will not lead to a lesser extent of harmonisation 
than the articles which form the ‘core’. This is corroborated by the fact that the 
wording, or rather the drafting technique, of the other articles in the Directive do 
not differ from Articles 3 and 5. If the ECJ reached the conclusion that Articles 3 and 
5 of the Directive lead to full harmonisation, it must be assumed that the Directive 
as a whole was intended to fully harmonise the subject matter.  
§ 3.3.8 Appreciation of the Directive 
It is clear that the Lawyers Establishment Directive (98/5/EC) is a capstone to the 
secondary legislation governing the free movement of lawyers. As was established, 
three different types of lawyer can be distinguished, but with earlier secondary legis-
lation only the two extremes of the spectrum are covered. On the one hand, there is 
the short term provision of services by lawyers in another Member State in Directive 
77/249/EEC, and on the other hand, the full integration in the legal profession of 
the host Member State on the basis of Directive 89/48/EEC. Lawyers who wanted a 
lesser form of integration were therefore pressed between an aptitude test that extends 
beyond its purpose and the (ab)use of the Services Directive in the context of installation 
limitée. Despite early hesitations by the Commission, the Directive recognises the 
third type of lawyer as a separate category that deserves its own set of rules.  
The rules laid down in the Lawyers Establishment Directive excel in simplicity. 
No technical and endless enumerations of educational requirements that were observed 
in the Directives adopted in the Vertical Approach are found. Like the Services 
Directive and the Diploma Directive, the Lawyers Establishment Directive is firmly 
rooted in the principle of mutual recognition. But where the mutual recognition was 
deemed harmless in the Services Directive because of the short duration of the 
activities, and was rendered useless155 in the Diploma Directive, because of the forced 
aptitude test that was fully in the competence of the Member States, the Lawyers 
Establishment Directive lets lawyers benefit fully from this principle. Brought back 
to its bare essentials, the Lawyers Establishment Directive allows lawyers from other 
Member States to exercise the profession of the host Member State, subject to the 
professional rules of the host Member State and under the professional title of the 
home Member State. In addition to that, the Directive also provides an interesting 
alternative to those lawyers who seek to integrate in the legal profession of the host 
Member State, since the Directive allows for integration without having to take an 
aptitude test. The only area where the Directive failed to live up to the expectations 
of the CCBE Draft is in the case of joint practice. Where the CCBE proposed joint 
practice under home country professional rules even in Member States where this 
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was prohibited with only a small exception for certain MDPs, the joint practice 
rules in the Lawyers Establishment Directive are reduced to a mere equal treatment 
provision with the possibility of applying home Member State rules and with an 
almost complete equal treatment provision for MDPs. 
In conclusion, one can say that Directive 98/5/EC is an important new piece of 
legislation in various capacities. First, it acknowledges and regulates the legal position 
of a new category of lawyers that did not formally exist until the adoption of this 
Directive, namely lawyers who want to establish themselves permanently in another 
Member State without becoming fully integrated in the legal profession of the host 
Member State. Secondly, the Directive opens possibilities for another category of law-
yers, namely those who want to become established in another Member State, and 
who want to integrate fully in the legal profession of that Member State. Those lawyers 
might circumvent the more stringent rules of the secondary legislation that govern 
their legal position. Thirdly, and lastly, the Directive regulates, and introduces, a num-
ber of subjects which had not been specifically regulated before, namely the right of 
establishment for salaried lawyers and rules governing lawyers who practice jointly. 
 
 
§ 4. New Generation Case Law: Beyond the Directives 
After having described the development of the free movement of lawyers in the 
case law and the developments in secondary legislation which have affected this free-
dom, the question arises as to how these two mechanisms interact. It became clear 
from the Gebhard ruling that the system of objective justification only applies where 
the subject matter is not covered by secondary legislation, and rather specific case law, 
as the one described in the previous paragraph is required in order to ascertain the 
scope of the provisions laid down in the Directive concerned.156 Over the years the 
European Court of Justice has ruled on a number of cases that have explored the 
interaction between the two systems and the exact demarcation between them. 
These cases will be described in this paragraph and have all dealt with the demarcation 
between the Diploma Directive and the system of case law described earlier in this 
chapter. What was to happen if the candidate concerned did not have a diploma? What 
if the activity exercised could not be regarded as a regulated professional activity? 
These problems were addressed in a line of case law which could have enormous 
potential for furthering the free movement of lawyers in Europe. 
With regard to the choice of system to be applied to a situation where there is no 
diploma in the sense of the Diploma Directive, the Burbaud case157 provides clarity. 
This case concerned Ms Burbaud, a French national who wanted to become a hospital 
administrator in France. Ms Burbaud was a former Portuguese national. She studied 
                                                  
156  Sometimes the Court even avoids the subject. See Case C-153/02, Valentina Neri v. European 
School of Economics (ESE Insight World Education System Ltd), [2003] ECR I-13555. This case 
revolved around the question whether Italy could refuse to recognise a diploma of an English 
University when the person in question had followed courses in an Italian seat of that University, 
where the diploma would be recognised if she had studied in England. The Court avoided the 
question of diploma recognition by ruling that such a practice was an unjustified hindrance to 
the freedom of establishment of the school concerned. 
157  Case C-285/01, Isabel Burbaud v. Ministère de l’Emploi et de la Solidarité, [2003] ECR I-08219. 
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law in Portugal and was a fully qualified hospital administrator in Portugal (which 
involved passing a comparative entrance exam). As is the case with many professions 
in the public sector in France, the profession of the hospital administrator in France 
is only accessible for those who have completed training in a state-run school, in 
this case the École Nationale de la Santé Publique (ENSP). Completion at the ENSP is 
an automatic guarantee for a job as a hospital administrator. Access to the ENSP is 
subject to a comparative exam, a so-called concours. Ms Burbaud was denied access 
to the profession on the basis that she did not complete the ENSP. Ms Burbaud 
challenged this decision and the French administrative judge referred questions to 
the European Court of Justice. The questions posed by the French court dealt with 
two situations. First, the court asked whether or not the completion of a state-run 
school in order to obtain a position in the public sector, in this case the ENSP could 
be regarded as a diploma in the sense of Directive 89/48/EEC. Secondly, the court 
asked whether a Member State could require a person to fulfil certain criteria, in this 
case the comparative entry exam for the ENSP, in order to gain access to a certain 
profession, which in this case was the profession of hospital administrator. 
In connection to the first question, the Court decided that the completion of 
the ENSP did lead to the awarding of a diploma in the sense of the Diploma Directive. 
Recognition of equivalence of foreign diplomas should, according to the Court, be 
based on the Diploma Directive. It is noteworthy that France argued that the 
Diploma Directive was not applicable to professions in the public sector, although 
it recognised that the public service exception did not apply.158 This argument was 
dismissed by the Court on the basis of previous case law, stating that the notion of a 
‘regulated profession’ was a Community concept, and that the profession concerned 
was regarded as a regulated profession since it was regulated by French law.159  
The second question referred to the Court was more complicated. Ms Burbaud 
argued that by maintaining the requirement for a compulsory entrance exam there 
would be a violation of Article 3 of the Diploma Directive. Consequently, in her 
view prescribing an entrance exam should not be allowed. The French government 
argued that the compulsory entrance exam fell outside the scope of the Diploma 
Directive altogether and that, in any case, it was a requirement that was indistinctly 
applied to both French nationals and nationals of other Member States. The Court 
agreed with the French reasoning in the sense that it ruled that the entrance exam 
to the ENSP did not fall within the scope of the Diploma Directive. But the Court 
further stated that the requirement for a compulsory entrance exam where there is no 
possibility to gain credit for previous experience and knowledge (compare Vlassopoulou) 
constitutes a hindrance to the free movement of workers as guaranteed by Article 39 
EC. The Court continued to state that the hindrance concerned could not be objec-
tively justified (compare Gebhard) because the system allows for French nationals to 
circumvent the entrance exam when they gained prior experience. The compulsory 
entrance exam for the ENSP therefore constitutes a violation of the free movement 
of persons. Although the Burbaud case cannot be regarded as being ‘revolutionary’ 
as such, it at least makes clear that the Court is willing to fall back on principles laid 
                                                  
158  Case C-285/01, § 40. 
159  Case C-285/01, § 43. 
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down in case law for situations which are not covered by the Diploma Directive, 
and that these situations are not for the discretion of the Member State. 
Another ruling of the Court that is of importance for the demarcation of the 
material scope of application of the Diploma Directive is the case of Aranitis.160 Mr 
Aranitis was a Greek national who was trained as a geologist in Greece. For over ten 
years he exercised his profession there, and then he moved to Germany. In Germany 
he sought employment as a geologist. He was allowed by the German authorities to 
use his Greek title with an accompanying German translation. Aranitis found out 
that employers were exclusively looking for people with the German diploma, Diplom 
Geologe, without there being a provision in German law protecting the access to this 
profession or requiring the possession of this diploma. Aranitis requested the German 
authorities to recognise his qualifications on the basis of the Diploma Directive, 
which the authorities refused. The reasoning behind this denial lay in the fact that 
the profession of the geologist was not a regulated profession in Germany and there-
fore the Diploma Directive did not apply. The Court agreed with this line of reasoning 
and stated that where access to a profession is not governed by any domestic legis-
lation the Diploma Directive is not applicable and there was no opportunity for 
Aranitis to obtain the German diploma. The Court also mentioned that in this situation 
the general non-discrimination provisions in the Treaty and the case law of the Court, 
notably the Court’s ruling in Vlassopoulou, apply. Although helpful, this reminder 
was of little use for Aranitis, who was still a victim of the laws of supply and demand 
on the market for geologists in Germany. 
A similar problem arose in Fernandez de Bobadilla.161 Ms Fernandez de Bobadilla 
was trained as an art restorer and held diplomas from US and United Kingdom 
universities. She had worked at the Prado museum in Madrid on the basis of a tem-
porary contract. The Prado is an autonomous State agency attached to the Spanish 
Ministry of Culture. In a collective labour contract that was imposed by the Prado 
on its employees, it was stipulated that for an indefinite contract for the position of 
restorer it was required that the candidate had a degree as art restorer from a Spanish 
educational institution or had a degree from another country that was recognised 
by the Spanish authorities. Ms Fernandez de Bobadilla’s request for a tenured position 
was denied on the basis that she did not fulfil the requirements laid down in the 
collective labour agreement. The profession of the art restorer was not regulated 
under Spanish law. The Court did not give a clear ruling on the question of whether 
laying down entry requirements in a collective labour contract of a government in-
stitution led to the regulation of that profession. If the national court decided that 
this is the case, the Diploma Directive should be applied. If, however, the national 
judge ruled that the profession was not regulated it should apply the general conditions 
for diploma recognition laid down in Vlassopoulou. 
By far the most interesting ruling in this respect came from the Court in the 
Morgenbesser case.162 Doctrinally, this case can be seen as belonging to cases like 
Aranitis and Fernandez de Bobadilla, which in hindsight, can be seen as Morgenbesser’s 
                                                  
160  C-164/94 Aranitis v. Land Berlin, [1996] ECR I-135. 
161  C-234/97, Teresa Fernández de Bobadilla v. Museo Nacional del Prado, Comité de Empresa del 
Museo Nacional del Prado, Ministerio Fiscal, [1999] ECR I-4773. 
162  Case C-313/01, Christine Morgenbesser v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli avvocati di Genova, [2003] 
ECR I-13467. See also: Baas (2003), p. 973 and Timm & Kempter (2005), pp. 2826-2828. 
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predecessors. Ms Morgenbesser, a French national, had studied law in France and 
obtained her degree there. After obtaining her degree, a maîtrise en droit, she started 
working at a Parisian law firm without qualifying as an avocat. After eight months, 
she moved to Italy and found a similar job with a law firm in Genoa. One and a half 
year later, she filed a request with the Genoa Bar Association to be registered on the 
register of practicanti, the register for lawyers who are in the process of qualifying to 
become an avvocato.  
The Genoan Bar association refused, and so did the National Bar Association, 
on the ground of the fourth criterion of Article 17 of the law on the profession of 
avvocato, which requires candidates to have a law degree conferred by an Italian 
university.163 In reaction to these decisions, Ms Morgenbesser tried to have her French 
university diploma recognised in Italy.164 The University of Genoa was willing to 
recognise her Maitrîse on the condition that Ms Morgenbesser was to follow a two-
year course in Italian law, pass thirteen exams and write a dissertation. Ms Morgen-
besser politely declined and appealed to the Tribunale amministrativo regionale della 
Liguria. The case eventually arrived at the Consiglio di Stato. Ms Morgenbesser had 
in the meantime applied for cassation of the National Bar Association’s decision. It 
was the Corta suprema di cassazione which, in the end, filed the preliminary questions 
to the European Court of Justice.165 
The Italian Supreme Court of Cassation asked the European Court of Justice 
whether a diploma conferred by a university in another Member State must be auto-
matically valid for registration in a register of persons who follow a period of practical 
training in order to enter into the legal profession of another Member State on the 
basis of the rules regarding free movement of services and freedom of establish-
ment.166 The European Court of Justice reformulated the question and stated that 
the Supreme Court on the whole wanted to know whether a person who had a law 
degree from another Member State could be refused entry into a register of persons 
who follow practical training in order to enter in the legal profession of the Member 
State concerned on the sole ground that the individual did not have a law degree 
that was conferred, ratified or regarded as equal by a university from the Member 
State concerned.167 
The European Court of Justice ruled that the status of practicanti could not be seen 
as a separate profession since being a practicanti is a necessary step in order to qualify 
as an avvocato. Morgenbesser’s situation therefore did not fall under the regime of 
Directive 89/48/EEC. The Court could have stopped there, since that was the ex-
tent of the question posed by the Italian court. However, it continued and ruled that 
even in the event where an activity was not caught by Directive 89/48/EEC (or 
any of the other Directives) the general rules covering the recognition of diplomas, 
as laid down in established case law of the European Court of Justice, should apply. 
The Court then went on to refer to the Vlassopoulou judgment in which it was 
stated that a Member State impairs the free movement of persons in an unjustified 
                                                  
163  Case C-313/01, §§ 25-27. 
164  This is a situation that generally falls outside European law. See, however, Chapter 4 below. 
165  Case C-313/01, §§ 28-31. 
166  The Supreme Court bases its question on Articles 10, 12, 14, 39, 43, 49 and 149EC, since Ms 
Morgenbesser appealed on the basis of these articles. See case C-313/01, § 31-32. 
167  Case C-313/01, § 33. 
67 
manner if it fails to take in account knowledge gained in another Member State 
(irrespective of whether the situation concerned the free movement of workers or 
the freedom of establishment).168 The Court came to the conclusion that the Genoan 
Bar Association could not refuse to enter Ms Morgenbesser into the register of 
practicanti for the sole reason that she had no diploma conferred, ratified or recognised 
by an Italian university, and that her knowledge gained in France (proven by her 
maîtrise) should be taken into account. The Court furthermore reiterated that when 
deciding upon the equivalence of diplomas the national authority could only look 
at the level of the qualification, except for diplomas concerning national law, whilst 
the national authority is allowed to compare taking into account established differ-
ences between the legal systems concerned. 
It might be questioned why the Court did not rule that the activities of a practicanti 
constitute a regulated professional activity in the light of Directive 89/48/EEC. It 
seems obvious that Italy as a Member State applies rules that control the entry to 
the level of practicanti while training for the profession of avvocato. It should there-
fore not have been very difficult to rule that the professional activities exercised by a 
practicanti could be seen as a regulated professional activity. The Court could then 
have determined the case by referring to Articles 3 and 4 of the Directive,169 and 
avoided the question of whether the system for the recognition of diplomas also 
applied to persons who were not considered as a produit fini as the Court had done 
in Neri.170 The reason the Court could not deal with the question in the light of a 
regulated profession, or a regulated professional activity, was not so much because 
of the fact that the level of practicanti could not be seen as a regulated professional 
activity,171 but more as a result of Morgenbesser’s status in France. Ms Morgen-
besser did not have credentials that could be regarded as a diploma in the light of 
Article 1 of Directive 89/48/EEC. Morgenbesser only obtained her maîtrise en droit, 
which did not give her access to the training for an avocat, since she did not pass the 
entrance exam for this CRFPA. So even when the level of practicanti was seen as a 
‘semi produit fini’ then Directive 89/48/EEC could still not be applied since she did not 
qualify to participate in that similar level of training (stagiaire) in her home Member 
                                                  
168  Doctrinally, the basis of the system lies in Gebhard (Case C-55/94). In that case the Court 
ruled that any hindrance to the free movement of person should be objectively justified. In this 
niche, objective justification could be obtained by adhering to the Vlassopoulou doctrine.  
169  It could even be argued that in that case the situation of Peros and Aslanidou would have applied, 
since Italy had not implemented an aptitude test for practicanti. Morgenbesser could then have 
integrated without Italy being allowed to impose compensatory measures. 
170  Case C-153/02, Valentina Neri v. European School of Economics (ESE Insight World Education System 
Ltd.), [2003] ECR I-13555. This case revolved around the question whether Italy could refuse to 
recognise a diploma of an English University when the person in question had followed courses 
in an Italian establishment of that University, where the diploma would be recognised if she had 
studied in England. The Court avoided the question of diploma recognition by ruling that such a 
practice was an unjustified hindrance to the freedom of establishment of the school concerned. 
171  The Court even implicitly acknowledged that a regulated professional activity was at stake 
(Morgenbesser, §§ 50-51) and only denied explicitly that the level of practicanti was a regulated 
profession. 
68 
State, France.172 The Court was therefore forced to deal with the question of 
recognition of diplomas outside the scope of Directive 89/48/EEC.  
As stated above the Court referred to, and applied, the Vlassopoulou ruling to the 
problem posed by Ms Morgenbesser. The application of the Vlassopoulou doctrine to 
situations that did not fall, or did not fall completely, under the system of diploma 
recognition laid down in secondary legislation is not new. In the cases of Aranitis, 
Fernandez de Bobadilla and Burbaud, the Court reached the same conclusion. Having 
said that, the case of Morgenbesser does have revolutionary potential. That potential 
does not lie in the application of the Vlassopoulou doctrine as such, but more in the 
situation of the facts to which the doctrine was applied. In Morgenbesser, the Court 
first applied the Vlassopoulou doctrine to a situation that was concerned with a person 
who was not fully qualified to exercise a regulated profession in any of the Member 
States, including her home Member State, where she was not even qualified to enter 
the vocational training for the profession of the avocat.173 Ms Morgenbesser could 
therefore not be regarded as a produit fini in the context of Directive 89/48/EEC. 
This is different from the cases described above which had all dealt with persons 
qualified to exercise a certain profession. Moreover the Court applied the ruling to 
a situation where the applicant wanted to enter a higher level in another Member 
State than the level which she had achieved in her home Member State. 
In its judgment the Court never referred to the special circumstances of this 
specific case (i.e., the system of registers for practicanti) which ultimately brought the 
Court to this decision. It must therefore be assumed that the principle decision in 
Morgenbesser, i.e., the application of the Vlassopoulou doctrine to non-produits fini, is 
a rule that can be generally applied. It can furthermore be assumed that a person who 
is in the process of qualifying for a legal profession in one Member State can move 
to another Member State and continue the process of qualification in that Member 
State. The host Member State may not impose its criteria for entering that qualification 
process ipso facto but must take into account any knowledge and experience that the 
candidate already gained in the qualification process in the other Member State, even 
where the candidate seeks entry in a level of the qualification process that he has 
not reached in his home Member State. If the ruling in Morgenbesser is applied to 
this extent, the Court encroaches upon academic recognition on the basis of Article 
149 EC, an area where the European Union has no legislative power.174 
Apart from a circumstance in Germany which will be considered below, there 
is little information on the application of the Morgenbesser ruling in the Member 
                                                  
172  Morgenbesser § 54. In this respect Morgenbesser can be distinguished from Lubina, discussed below, 
since Ms Lubina did qualify for a position of advocaat-stagiaire in the Netherlands with her 
‘meester’ title. 
173  In that sense the ruling of Morgenbesser even stretches beyond Vlassopoulou, since Ms Morgen-
besser was able to use the Vlassopoulou comparison in a situation where she sought access to a 
stage of the qualification for a regulated profession that she was not entitled to enter in her home 
Member State because of the fact that she did not fulfil the criteria for entering that stage. 
174  On the difference between recognition of academic and professional qualifications, see Van der 
Mei (2001), pp. 453-454. Traditionally the European Community has no competence with 
regard to harmonisation of purely academic qualifications. Problems do however occur when 
academic qualifications coincide with professional qualifications, as is the case, for example, in 
Spain, where access to the legal profession can be obtained with an academic degree alone. 
69 
States.175 The CCBE issued a position paper concerning this case in 2004 which 
offers no more than the judgment itself.176 Recently, the Verwaltungsgericht Düsseldorf 
was awarded the opportunity to rule on a similar case to Morgenbesser, which is 
known as the Lubina case.177 Ms Lubina had German nationality. She completed two 
university courses in the Netherlands (Law and Cultural Sciences) and she obtained 
a ‘Master in European Studies’ from the Humboldt University in Berlin. Her Dutch 
law degree, ‘meester in de rechten’, has the so-called civil effect, which means that she 
is allowed to start working as an advocaat-stagiaire. In that sense an immediate distinction 
with Morgenbesser can be made, since Ms Morgenbesser did not have adequate quali-
fications to start as a stagiaire in France. Lubina sought admittance to the Referendar-
dienst (comparable to the practicanti in Italy, the stagiaire in France and the advocaat-
stagiaire in the Netherlands). Her application was denied on two grounds. Firstly the 
Oberlandesgericht (which decides on applications) in Düsseldorf stated that she did not 
have the necessary qualifications to enter the Referendardienst (a similar position the 
Italian authorities had taken in the Morgenbesser case), more specifically she did not 
pass the First German State Examination, which is a necessary requirement for enter-
ing the Referendardienst. Secondly, the Oberlandesgericht stated that the ‘profession’ of 
Referendar did not fall under the free movement of persons (more specifically the free 
movement of workers) since it was regarded as a part of the education of a prospective 
lawyer, rather than a professional activity.178 The latter reason was rendered useless 
already during the Lubina proceedings because the European Court of Justice ruled 
in the Kranemann case,179 without any reservation, that people who were a Referendar 
fell under the free movement of workers.180 So the only reason which remained was 
that Ms Lubina lacked the necessary requirements to enter the Referendardienst.  
Eventually the case was settled without there being an official judgment. The Ver-
waltungsgericht ordered that the Oberlandesgericht take a new decision on Ms Lubina’s 
accession to the Referendardienst. It is noteworthy, however, that the Verwaltungsgericht 
supported this decision with a combination of reasons which did not come together 
completely. The Verwaltungsgericht stated firstly that, based on the Kranemann judg-
ment, the profession of the Referendar fell under the free movement of workers and 
is therefore regarded as a regulated profession. It must be noted that the latter 
statement (with regard to the status of regulated profession) is a statement of the Ver-
waltungsgericht which is in no way corroborated by the Kranemann ruling which did 
not even address the question of regulated professions. Oddly enough the Verwaltungs-
gericht then proceeded by ‘solving’ the case, using the Morgenbesser judgment where 
the Court ruled that ‘practicanti’ was not a regulated profession.181 If the profession 
of Referendar was a regulated profession according to the Verwaltungsgericht it should 
                                                  
175  See also: Hodgson (2005). 
176  CCBE (s.d.) E.  
177  Katja Lubina/Präsidentin des Oberlandsegericht Düsseldorf, Aktenzeichen 10 K 7279/04. 
178  Here once more the controversy between academic and professional qualifications surfaces.  
179  Case C-109/04, Karl Robert Kranemann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, [2005] ECR I-02421. See 
for summaries of this case: Barnard (2007), pp. 278-279; Chalmers (2006), pp. 711-712; 
Comijs (2005), pp. 150-153 and Pina (2006), pp. 394-402. 
180  Provided, of course, that there is border crossing element in the case, which was the case in 
the Kranemann case. 
181  Although they hinted in the direction of the level of ‘practicanti’ being a regulated professional 
activity. 
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have solved the problem according to Directive 89/48/EEC and not according to 
the Morgenbesser judgment.  
Now the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf must make a decision on the additional re-
quirements (if any) which Ms Lubina must fulfil before she can be allowed entrance 
into the Referendardienst. In other words, the Oberlandesgericht must now exercise a 
Vlassopoulou comparison in order to ascertain what requirements need to be fulfilled. 
Further litigation following this decision is not unthinkable.182  
Apparently the Oberlandesgericht was inspired by a forthcoming legal change in 
Germany. In January 2007 a new provision (paragraph 112a) of the Deutschen Richter-
gesetzes (German Judges Law) entered into force.183 The Deutschen Richtergesetzes mainly 
covers the profession of the judge in Germany, but it also contains the requirements 
necessary for entering the Refendariat since there is only one German professional 
education for all the legal professions. The new paragraph 112a of the Deutschen 
Richtergesetzes seems a straightforward implementation of the Vlassopoulou comparison 
as mentioned in the Morgenbesser ruling. The paragraph states that any national of 
other Member States of the European Union who has a university diploma that 
gives him access to the professional training of the legal professions under Article 1 
of Directive 98/5/EC may have his diploma checked by the German authorities in 
order to obtain a decision on equivalence. This description makes it immediately clear 
that whilst Ms Lubina could have profited from paragraph 112a of the Deutschen 
Richtergesetzes, Ms Morgenbesser could not have done so were she to seek entrance 
as a Referendar in Germany, because she did not qualify for professional training in 
France. So even in Germany the Morgenbesser ruling is still relevant to protect those 
who fall outside the scope of application of paragraph 112a of the Deutschen Richter-
gesetzes.184 Paragraph 112a further states that, where it is decided that the university 
diploma is not equivalent to the entrance requirements in Germany, the candidate 
concerned may take an aptitude test in order to obtain entry in the profession of the 
Referendar. This aptitude test will cover civil law, penal law, administrative law and 
procedural law. Clearly, in the majority of cases equivalence will not be achieved as 
such and an aptitude test may be necessary. On the other hand, the adaptation of 
the Deutschen Richtergesetzes is a favourable action from the German authorities (even 
where it falls short of the Morgenbesser ruling) as it provides Ms Lubina and her 
peers with much needed legal certainty regarding entrance in the qualification stages 
of the legal profession. Similar legislation has not been observed in other jurisdictions, 
but in those circumstances prospective lawyers may fall back on the Morgenbesser ruling.  
From my perspective, even in the wake of the German legal reform, it would 
be a good development if further proceedings were started, and ideally, a referral to 
the European Court of Justice could be obtained. The Lubina case may provide the 
Court with a set of facts that could lead to the decision that ‘vertical differentiation’ 
within regulated professions is possible, i.e., by ruling that separate parts of the quali-
                                                  
182  The OLG Düsseldorf responded in 2006 with a list of compensatory requirements that Ms 
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183  Deutsches Richtergesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 19. April 1972 (BGBl. I S. 
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Morgenbesser’s situation was a regulated professional activity, because of the difference of levels. 
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fication process for a regulated profession could be construed as a regulated pro-
fessional activity to which the system of Directive 89/48/EEC applies. This would 
be a valuable addition to the Morgenbesser case, where the Court could not reach this 
decision because of the fact that Ms Morgenbesser did not qualify for the position 
of stagiaire in France. 
Recent case law has shown that the Court is willing to accept differentiation 
within regulated professions.185 This form of differentiation could be classified as 
‘horizontal differentiation’ since it allows differentiation in different regulated profes-
sions and to allow persons (at their own request) only into a part of a certain profession. 
Vertical differentiation, i.e., differentiation in the different stages of the qualification 
process and application of the system of recognition of diplomas to these different 
stages would greatly benefit the development of the free movement of lawyers. 
With the application of the system of the Directive, people in the process of quali-
fying for a legal profession would then enjoy even more protection than under the 
situation in Morgenbesser. 
In addition to the encroachment on academic recognition in Morgenbesser, the 
Court gave another ruling that is important in this field, namely the Commission v. 
Austria case.186 This case was concerned with Austrian laws which allowed students 
who had finished Austrian secondary education to enter studies in medicine without 
any further requirements. Students from outside Austria, on the other hand, were 
required to fulfil the criteria laid down in their home Member State to enter the 
study of medicine there. The Commission stated that this was an unjustified discrimi-
nation between Austrian students and students from other Member States. Austria 
argued that this practice, which was in conformity with the Lisbon Recognition 
Convention,187 concerned academic recognition and fell out of the scope of the Com-
munity Treaty. The European Court of Justice disagreed with this approach and 
treated the alleged violation under the regime of Article 12 EC, as discrimination 
on grounds of nationality.188 The Court concluded that the Austrian practice is a 
discrimination based on nationality. In a strict sense, the ruling should end there since 
Article 12 EC does not provide for any grounds of justification. Nevertheless, the 
ECJ (and surprisingly also Advocate-General Jacobs) applied an objective justifica-
tion test that is of uncertain origin, to say the least.189 In that test the justifications 
                                                  
185  Case 330/03 Colegio de Ingenieros de Caminos, Canales y Puertos, [2006] ECR I-00801. See Barnard 
(2007), pp. 325-326. In this case the Court accepted that instead of applying compensatory 
measures laid down in Article 4 of the Diploma Directive, the competent authority can also allow 
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Barnard (2007), pp. 302-303; Hilpold (2005), pp. 647-652; Hilpold (2006), pp. 333-336 and 
Rieder (2006), pp. 1711-1726. 
187  See below. 
188  The ECJ does so with reference to another (almost simultaneous) case, Case C-65/03, 
Commission v. Belgium [2003] ECR I 6427, where the ECJ decided that the subject matter 
concerned (which was the same in the Belgium case) fell within the scope of Community law 
since it dealt with the access to higher education, rather then academic recognition. See also 
below on Gravier.  
189  Jacobs refers to ‘the free movement of persons’ in general, and specifically refers to Articles 39 and 
46 in particular. It must be noted at this point that the students concerned cannot and do not 
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brought forward by the Austrian government (homogeneity of the Austrian education 
system, abuse of Community law and the Lisbon Recognition Convention) were 
set aside by the European Court of Justice. The ECJ subsequently found that the 
Austrian rules were in violation of Articles 12, 149 and 150 of the EC Treaty. 
Although the implications of the Commission v. Belgium and Commission v. Austria 
cannot be announced with certainty, the potential for another revolution is cer-
tainly lingering. The Court has in essence brought academic recognition (or more 
specifically the recognition of secondary education qualifications) under the scope of 
Community law. Moreover, the Court failed to give information on how Member 
States should deal with this recognition (whereas that information was given in the 
Morgenbesser case). At this point in time, every discriminatory measure affecting the 
equality of secondary education qualifications must be seen as a violation of Article 
149. It is clear that the Court overstepped the boundaries of Article 149 EC even 
more bluntly than it had in Morgenbesser. To that extent it may also be observed 
that the new paragraph 112a of the Deutschen Richtergesetzes provides a sample of 
academic recognition that is ‘Europeanised’.  
 
 
§ 5. The Outside World: Third-Country Diplomas and 
Third-Country Nationals 
The final aspect of the free movement of lawyers that needs to be addressed in this 
chapter is the interaction of the rules governing the free movement of lawyers in 
Europe with the world outside the European Union. In this respect two main cate-
gories can be identified. First, a situation can arise where a Union citizen has obtained 
his or her professional qualifications in a third State. Secondly, situations can be 
found which concern third-country nationals in possession of either European Union 
qualifications or third-country qualifications and who seek to benefit from the rules 
governing the free movement of lawyers. These eventualities will be described in 
this paragraph. 
The first eventuality, where a Union citizen has obtained his professional quali-
fications in a third Member State, is relatively easily solved by the system of secondary 
legislation. This situation is covered in both Directive 89/48/EEC (Article 1) and in 
the new Diploma Directive 2005/36/EC (Article 3(3)). Article 3(3) of Directive 
2005/36/EEC states that qualifications obtained by a Union national are covered 
by the Directive if a Member State has recognised these qualifications as being the 
equivalent to qualifications in that Member State on the basis of their own rules, and 
if the candidate has three years’ professional experience in the profession of that 
Member State. When these criteria are fulfilled the Union national in question enjoys 
the full application of Directive 2005/36/EC.  
Both Directives 77/249/EEC and 98/5/EC do not contain any provisions specific 
to those Union nationals who have obtained their professional qualifications in a 
                                                  
classify as workers, nor can they be seen as persons who are ‘established’ (which would make 
Article 46 applicable). The foundations of the objective justification test that was applied in Com-
mission v. Austria (and which was absent in the Commission v. Belgium case) remain uncertain. One 
might even argue that students remain in a closed system, i.e., Article 7(1) of Directive 2004/38. 
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third country. At first sight this could mean that these lawyers may not benefit from 
the provisions of the Directives. If, however, they obtain a recognition of their pro-
fessional qualifications in a Member State (based on the rules in force in that State) 
they may benefit from the Directives since they fulfil both criteria necessary for 
application of the Directives (i.e., they are Union nationals and they are allowed to 
practise under one of the professional titles mentioned in the Directives). It is note-
worthy that in this circumstance the lawyer concerned can circumvent the additional 
requirement of the Diploma Directive 2005/36/EC that requires an additional pro-
fessional experience of three years.  
Case law in this field is scarce and is mainly concerned with the sectoral Direc-
tives (which are now also covered by Directive 2005/36/EC). An example is the 
Haim case.190 Haim was an Italian national who obtained a Turkish dentistry diploma. 
This diploma was subsequently recognised in Germany and Belgium. Haim worked 
in Belgium as a dentist in a social security scheme, whereas in Germany he had a 
private practice. When Haim sought to work in a social security scheme in Germany 
his application was denied on the grounds that he did not fulfil the requirement of 
completing a two-year preparatory training period. According to Haim, this was in 
violation of the Dentist Directive (one of the vertical harmonisation Directives). 
The Court ruled that the Directive did not apply, since Haim had a Turkish diploma, 
and that the German authorities were therefore entitled to enforce the training period. 
However, the Court continued by stating that Germany was not entitled to enforce 
the training period before examining whether the experience already gained by Haim 
corresponded to that which is required by the training period. This is an applica-
tion of the Court’s ruling in Vlassopoulou. 
Another relevant ruling can be found in the Hocsman case.191 Hocsman was an 
Argentine national who acquired Spanish nationality, and subsequently French 
nationality. Hocsman had a university degree in medicine and trained in Spain to 
become a urologist. After he obtained Spanish nationality he was allowed to practise 
urology in Spain. When Hocsman moved to France he worked as an assistant or 
associate specialising in urology in various hospitals there, but his request to be regis-
tered was refused by the relevant minister, stating that he was not allowed to practise 
medicine in France because his Argentinean diploma was not recognised there. The 
Doctors Directive did not provide for recognition of third-country qualifications. The 
Court ruled, this time explicitly referring to Vlassopoulou (and Haim), that in a situation 
not regulated by a directive on mutual recognition of diplomas, a Community national 
applies for authorisation to practise a profession, the access to which depends, under 
national law, on the possession of a diploma or professional qualification, or on 
periods of practical experience, the competent authorities of the Member State 
concerned must take into consideration all the diplomas, certificates and other evi-
dence of formal qualifications of the person concerned and his relevant experience, 
by comparing the specialised knowledge and abilities certified by those diplomas 
                                                  
190  Case C-319/92, Haim v. Kassenärtzliche Vereinigung Nordrhein, [1994] ECR I-425. See also: 
Barnard (2007), p. 330 
191  Case C-238/98, Hocsman v. Minister de l’Emploi de la Solidarité, [2000] ECR I-6663. See on 
Hocsman: Barnard (2007), p. 330; Chalmers (2006), p. 718 and Prinssen (2001), pp. 184-186. 
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and that experience with the knowledge and qualifications required by the national 
rules.192 
The position of third-country nationals, whether with Community or third-
country qualifications, is more problematic. All the Directives refer specifically to 
nationals of Member States, thus excluding third-country nationals from the scope 
of the Directives. Moreover, regimes imposed on third-country nationals can be 
restrictive and are, to a great extent, left to the discretion of the Member States. An 
important case in this respect is that of Gül.193 Gül was a Cypriot national194 who 
was married to a British national and was living in Germany. He derived his right 
to stay in Germany from being the spouse of a worker. He requested his Turkish 
diploma to be recognised in Germany. The German authorities refused the recog-
nition, stating that third-country nationals cannot hold a licence to practise and can 
only obtain a temporary permit. The Court ruled in clear terms that Article 11 of 
Regulation 1612/68 (now repealed by Directive 2004/38/EC)195 requires that 
spouses of workers should have the same access to work as nationals of the Member 
State. This implies that Gül would have to be placed in a similar position as a 
German who held Turkish qualifications. Whether this leads to the conclusion that 
third-country family members of Community nationals have a right to the Diploma 
Directives196 must be doubted.197 In the light of Haim and Hocsman, Gül could not 
have relied on the Doctors Directive but only on the Vlassopoulou case, since his 
original qualifications were obtained in a third country, a situation where Commu-
nity nationals also cannot rely on the sectoral Directives. Had Gül been active in a 
profession that would be covered by Directive 2005/36/EC he would have been 
subject to the German rules on the recognition of Turkish diplomas.  
A new development in the secondary legislation is also very important in this 
respect. This is the Long Term Residence Directive, 2003/109/EC.198 This Direc-
tive creates the possibility for third-country nationals to gain the status of ‘Long 
Term Resident’, which provides them with certain benefits within the European 
Union. In Article 11 of this Directive, it is stated that a third-country national who 
has obtained Long Term Resident status has a right to equal treatment with regard 
to the recognition of diplomas according to the rules in force in that Member 
State. This means that if a third-country national with Long Term Resident status 
has a third-country diploma, the national rules will apply to him; if he has a third-
country diploma that is recognised in another Member State the Diploma Directive 
will apply (or the Haim and Hocsman rulings in the case of a sectoral profession) 
and, if he has a diploma from a Member State, the Diploma Directive will apply. 
With regard to Directives 77/249/EEC and 98/5/EC, the Long Term Residents 
Directive does not offer any solutions. Keeping in mind that both Directives require 
beneficiaries to be Union nationals, it seems that these Directives will not apply to 
third-country nationals. 
                                                  
192  Case C-238/98, § 40. 
193  Case 131/85, Emir Gül v.Regierungspräsident Düsseldorf, [1986] ECR 1573 
194  At the time Cyprus was not a Member State. 
195  But application of Article 24 (23 out)of that Directive leads to the same conclusion. 
196  As is concluded by Wapenaar in: Wapenaar (1997), p. 116. 
197  Schneider & Claessens (2005), p. 148. 
198  Directive 2003/109/EC OJ L16/44. 
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§ 6. Conclusions 
This chapter has shown that in the past 50 years enormous changes have taken 
place in the developments relating to the free of movement of lawyers. Before the 
development began in 1974, free movement of lawyers was non-existent, since 
Member States required lawyers to have the nationality of the Member State in 
which they practised. It was the European Court of Justice that encouraged and 
fostered at least the possibility of freedom of movement for lawyers when it ruled 
in the Reyners case that Member States could no longer enforce the nationality 
requirement for lawyers. In subsequent case law, extensively described above, the 
European Court of Justice created a self-supporting system that facilitated lawyers’ 
movement from one Member State to another by assigning certain rights regarding 
the mutual recognition of their professional qualifications and their free movement 
rights in general. In a parallel development which started in 1977, secondary legislation 
was adopted facilitating various modalities of this freedom. It has been established 
that the applicable Directives cover all the modalities of the free movement of 
lawyers that have been observed, i.e., provision of services and establishment of lawyers 
with or without integration in the legal profession of the host Member State. More 
recent case law of the European Court of Justice has dealt with the application and 
extent of the harmonisation of the Directives and with the application of the system 
laid down in the case law to categories of persons who were originally not caught by 
the Directives, such as third-country nationals and people who are not fully qualified 
to exercise a regulated profession in the home Member State. 
This chapter has presented these developments largely in chronological order. 
When approached from a different angle it should be possible to devise a model that 
represents the current state of affairs with regard to the different possibilities for the 
different modalities of the free movement of lawyers. When presented in a graphical 
format that same model would look like the flowchart on the next page. In the 
next chapter the application and the implications of this model in fifteen Member 
States will be researched. Since it is the most recent addition to the model in the 
sense of secondary legislation, major attention will be paid to the implementation 
and application of Directive 98/5/EC. Research is also applied to the level of 
effectiveness in practice of the different routes presented in the model. On the basis 
of that, propositions for improvement and refinement of the model will be made.  
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Figure 1: Free movement of lawyers in the European Union 
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Chapter 3 
Applying the Model: 
Free Movement of Lawyers in Practice 
§ 1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter a model for the free movement of lawyers was created 
based on the different rules laid down in the applicable secondary legislation and the 
case law of the European Court of Justice. Inevitably, this model is created based 
on a top-down approach, i.e., a model based on how the rules should be, according 
to the Institutions of the European Union. Stopping at this stage would mean, 
however, that one cannot give an overview of the reality of the free movement of 
lawyers in Europe, but merely give an overview of how the free movement of 
lawyers ought to look. It is therefore necessary to descend to the level of the Member 
States and look at the actual application and implementation of the rules on the free 
movement of lawyers.  
This review of the application and implementation will take shape in this chapter. 
In order to properly review the application and implementation of the model de-
scribed above, it is necessary to create a reliable image of the legal profession in the 
different Member States. In the first chapter it was already described that due to the 
differences in the historical backgrounds, the level of regulation, and indeed the 
characteristics of the different legal professions, there are differences in these pro-
fessions from Member State to Member State. This makes it not only difficult to 
compare the application of the different rules in the different Member States, but it 
will be shown that it can have a detrimental effect on the application of the model to 
certain categories of persons that exercise professional activities which are generally 
associated with the legal professions. In order to paint a reliable picture of the appli-
cation and the implementation of the model described above, this study will review 
fifteen out of the 27 Member States of the European Union, namely the fifteen pre-
2004 Member States. Firstly, these States have been chosen on account of their 
involvement in the adoption of Directive 98/5/EC, which will play a large role in 
this chapter. Secondly, the information necessary for this exercise was more readily 
available, and the language barrier was surmountable. Moreover, I believe that, based 
on the results presented in this chapter, an analysis that included the remaining 
Member States would not generate a different result.  
In order to provide a clear picture on the application and implementation of the 
rules on the free movement of lawyers, the chapter will start with a description of 
the legal professions in the selected Member States, classifying them into different 
clusters of States that have similar rules. Following this, the author will provide an 
overview of the problems concerning the free movement of services, that will also 
take into account the new Directive on the provision of services. The next part 
will give an overview of the implementation of Directive 98/5/EC in the selected 
Member States, after which the implications of the new Diploma Directive will be 
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reviewed. The chapter also includes a general review of the application and imple-
mentation of the rules applicable to third-country nationals, including the influence 
of WTO rules, or more specifically GATS rules on these persons. 
 
 
§ 2. The Legal Professions in the Member States 
As will be shown in the remainder of this chapter, one of the most important factors 
in assessing the application and implementation of the rules of free movement of 
lawyers is the level of regulation that is imposed on the profession of the lawyer in 
the different Member States. Therefore, this paragraph will give an overview of the 
legal professions in the different Member States. In this paragraph it will be researched 
how one can qualify domestically for the legal profession concerned. In addition, a 
general characterisation of the legal profession will be given that will focus on the 
degree of regulation. The order in which the countries are presented in this para-
graph is based on the level of regulation that the Member States impose on the exer-
cise of legal professional activities, or put differently, the size of the legal monopoly 
that lawyers in the Member State concerned enjoy. In addition to this, Member 
States will be presented in clusters of countries having similar characteristics. The 
overview starts with the countries that have a low degree of regulation, namely 
Sweden and Finland. For reasons of proximity Denmark is also included in this over-
view, although Denmark has a higher degree of regulation than Sweden and Finland. 
Subsequently, the Member States with a higher, or intermediate, degree of regu-
lation will be analysed. These countries are presented in two clusters, namely the 
two Member States with a common law background, the United Kingdom and 
Ireland in one cluster, and the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg in a second 
cluster. Luxembourg is included in this cluster since all three Benelux countries 
have, albeit for other reasons, an atypical approach to the legal profession. There-
fore, they are dealt with together, although based purely on the degree of regula-
tion Luxembourg would belong to the next group. After that, the Member States 
with a high degree of regulation will be reviewed. These countries are once again 
dealt with in two separate clusters. Firstly, the Member States that follow the French 
model of regulation; France, Italy, Spain and Portugal, and secondly the States that 
follow the German model of regulation; Germany, Austria and Greece. At the end 
of the paragraph some observations will be made. 
§ 2.1 The Legal Profession in Scandinavian and Nordic 
Countries 
Due to their closely intertwined history, the Scandinavian and Nordic countries 
included in this review are dealt with in one paragraph. Based on their approach 
towards the regulation of the legal profession this is only partly justified. It will be 
shown that Sweden and Finland have a very relaxed attitude towards the legal pro-
fession and the exercise of legal activity, whereas Denmark has a much more strict 
approach. However, since it was problematic to put Denmark in any of the other 
clusters the Danish legal profession will be dealt with in this cluster. 
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Qualification as an Advokat/Asianajaja 
Sweden 
In Sweden there is one legal profession which is called advokat. The profession is 
regulated in the Rättegångsbalken, which is the Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure. 
The requirements for becoming an advokat are laid down in Chapter 8 of the 
Rättegångsbalken and are further elaborated in § 3 and § 4 of the Charter of the Sveriges 
Advokatsmfundet.1 Section 2 of Chapter 8 lists the criteria required for becoming an 
advokat in Sweden. First of all, a prospective advokat must be a citizen of Sweden, a 
Member State of the European Union or a Member State of the European Eco-
nomic Area.2 The same section states that where there is a lack of European Union 
citizenship, legal residence in one of these territories will be deemed sufficient to 
enter into the Swedish legal profession.3 In addition to the citizenship and residence re-
quirements, Section 2 of Chapter 8 of the Rättegångsbalken requires prospective advokats 
to pass the proficiency tests prescribed for judicial service.4 A prospective Swedish 
advokat must qualify to work as a judge or as another member of the judicial services 
before he or she is eligible to work as an advokat in Sweden. The Swedish proficiency 
tests prescribed for the judicial service are deemed to be fulfilled when the pro-
spective advokat has obtained his jur. Kand. (equivalent to an LL.B.) from a Swedish 
university. The university education should be followed by a period of practical 
and theoretical training that is required for working as an advocate.5  
This requirement is detailed further in paragraph 3(4) of the Stadgar för Sveriges 
Advokatsamfundet.6 The paragraph states that the training mentioned in the Rättegångs-
balken shall consist of at least five years of training in the practice of law, three years 
of which must be performed as an assistant to an advokat or as an employee of a 
legal aid office. In addition to that experience the prospective advokat must also take 
preparatory courses in the ethics and professional techniques of an advokat.7 Further 
requirements are that the prospective advokat needs to gain a reputation for integrity 
and that he is otherwise considered suitable to practise as an advokat.8 According to 
the Charter of the Advokatsamfundet, this last requirement has specifically to do with 
the financial situation of the prospective advokat and shall not be fulfilled if the pro-
spective advokat is declared bankrupt or is under trusteeship.9 Other incompatibili-
ties include being a legally qualified judge, a court official, a public prosecutor or an 
enforcement officer. In addition, people employed by the State or a municipality or 
who are employed by another individual who is not a lawyer may not be admitted 
to the Bar.10 The last incompatibility can be waived by the Advokatsamfundet and 
does not apply for people who work in a public advocates office.11 12 
                                                  
1  See <www.advokatsamfundet.se>, last accessed 31 October 2002. 
2  Chapter 8 section 2(1) Rättegångsbalken. 
3  Chapter 8 section 2(2) Rättegångsbalken. 
4  Chapter 8 section 2(3) Rättegångsbalken. 
5  Chapter 8 section 2(4) Rättegångsbalken. 
6  The Charter of the Swedish Bar Association. 
7  § 3(4) Stadgar för Sveriges Advokatsamfund. 
8  Chapter 8 section 2(5) and 2(6) Rättegångsbalken. 
9  § 3 (10) Stadgar för Sveriges Advokatsamfund. See also Chapter 8 section 2 Rättegångsbalken. 
10  Chapter 8 section 2 Rättegångsbalken. 
11  Chapter 8 section 2 Rättegångsbalken. 
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In addition to these requirements prospective advokats will have to take an exam-
ination. In May 2001, the Advokatsamfundet decided to introduce a Bar examination.13 
The Advokatsamfundet laid down the rules of this examination, which has been en-
forced since 1 January 2004.14 As of 2006, there were 4415 lawyers in Sweden.15 
 
Finland 
The single legal profession in Finland, that of advokat or asianajaja,16 is very similar 
to the legal profession of its neighbour Sweden.17 The profession of advokat or 
asianajaja is regulated in the Lag om advokater or the Laki Asianajajista,18 which also 
states that there shall be an advokatforbundet or asianajajaliito.19 The Advocates Act, 
together with the by-laws of the Finnish Bar Association lay down the rules regard-
ing entry into the legal profession in Finland. Section 3(1) of the Advocates Act 
regulates the access of a prospective advokat or asianajaja into the regulated profes-
sion in Finland. The section states that anyone who is a national of either Finland 
or a Member State of the European Economic Area20 and who has reached the age 
of 25 years may be accepted as an advokat or asianajaja when he fulfils the additional 
criteria.21 These additional criteria are threefold. First of all a prospective advokat or 
asianajaja must be known to be honest and to have characteristics and a way of life 
that is suitable for an advokat or asianajaja. Second, a candidate must have passed the 
academic requirements – a masters degree (LL.M.) in law22 – that entitles him to 
hold a judicial office in Finland. He must also have acquired the skills required for 
practice as an advokat or asianajaja,23 and to have acquired the practical experience 
stipulated in the by-laws of the Finnish Bar Association.24 Lastly, the prospective 
advokat or asianajaja may not be bankrupt, or his legal capacity may not be com-
promised in any other way.25 In addition to these requirements, the Advocates Act 
                                                  
12  These public advocates offices are active in legal aid schemes, see § 3(12) Stadgar för Sveriges 
Advokatsamfund. 
13  Sveriges Advokatsamfund inför Advokatexamen in: <www.advokatsamfundet.se>, last accessed 
31 October 2002. 
14  Regler om obligatorisk advokatexamen för inträde I Sveriges advokatsamfund, see <www. 
advokatsamfundet.se>, last accessed 20 November 2006. 
15  <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 11 June 2007. 
16  There are two official languages in Finland, both Swedish and Finnish. 
17  Adamson (1998), p. 14. 
18  Advocates Act. 
19  Bar Association. 
20  This part of the Advocates Act was created in 1993, at a time when Finland was not yet a 
Member State of the EU.  
21  Section 3(1) Advocates Act. 
22  See Advocates, <www.advonet.fi>, last accessed 10 December 2002. 
23  According to the website of the Finnish Bar Association, this also includes a Bar examination. 
See Advocates, <www.advonet.fi>, last accessed 10 December 2002. See also section 4a of the 
by-laws of the Finnish Bar Association (Helsinki 24 April 1959/191, last amended 2000/671).  
24  According to Section 4 of the by-laws of the Finnish Bar Association (Helsinki 24 April 1959/ 
191, last amended 2000/671) states that this professional experience consist of practice for at 
least four years in the field of judicial administration or comparable duties requiring legal edu-
cation, but in any case for at least two years as an advocate’s assistant or public legal counsellor 
or independent legal practitioner or in other tasks handling a comparable amount of matters of 
advocacy.  
25  Section 3(1) Advocates Act. 
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lays down some additional criteria with respect to the access to the regulated legal 
profession in Finland. A person who holds a State or municipal office or who is in 
other services based on an employment relation in the public sector cannot be an 
advokat or asianajaja.26 Additionally, anybody who is engaged in a gainful employment 
in a manner that is presumed to be detrimental to his independence as an advokat or 
asianajaja is not allowed to access the legal profession.27 
 
Denmark 
In Denmark there is a single legal profession of advokat that has been regulated since 
1638.28 Since 1919,29 the profession of advokat is regulated in the Lov om rettens pleje 
(Retsplejenloven).30 This law also lays down that the profession of advokat shall be 
governed by an association called the Advokatsamfundet.31 32 The entry into the pro-
fession of advokat is regulated in Chapter 12 of the Retsplejenloven. Paragraph 119 
section 1 states that the Minister of Justice grants candidates a licence that gives them 
the status of advokat. The second section of the paragraph lists the criteria required 
for this licence.33 First of all, the section states that the candidate must be of full age 
and that he must not have been placed under legal guardianship.34 Second, a can-
didate may not be under a bankruptcy regime and he may not have filed a notice 
suspending payments.35 Third, the candidate must have obtained a law degree36 
from either the University of Copenhagen or the University of Aarhus.37 The last 
requirement that needs to be fulfilled is that the candidate must have worked in the 
legal profession for at least three years.38 The rules pertaining to this training period 
of three years are laid down further in sections 3 to 5 of Paragraph 119. In general, 
it can be said that the training period must involve the normal activities of a lawyer, 
and it can be exercised as a clerk of an advokat, as an employee of the courts, the 
prosecution, or the police.39 Two out of the three years may be completed with 
other professions, subject to individual scrutiny of the Minister of Justice.40 Lastly 
the Minister of Justice can grant a licence to anyone who has a comparable level of 
training to those lawyers who have fulfilled the three-years training (for example, 
academic staff of a university).41 Denmark was one of the few countries where one 
could become a lawyer after training alone, i.e. without having to sit a Bar examination 
after the vocational training. This situation, however, has changed. In section 6 of 
                                                  
26  Unless the Finnish Bar Association grants a waiver. Section 3(3) Advocate Act. 
27  Section 3(3) Advocate Act. 
28  Torbøl & Worsøe (1993), p. 101. 
29  Torbøl & Worsøe (1993), p. 102. See also: Henssler & Prütting (s.d.) A and M. Kilian (1999) 
A, pp. 29-30.  
30  Administration of Justice Act. 
31  Society of Advocates. 
32  §§ 143-145a Retsplejenloven. 
33  § 119 (1) and (2) Retsplejenloven. 
34  § 119 (2) Retsplejenloven: ‘er myndig og ikke er under vaergemål...’.  
35  § 119 (2) Retsplejenloven: ‘ikke har anmeldt betalingsstandning og ikke er under konkurs’. 
36  § 119 (2) Retsplejenloven: ‘har bestået juridisk kandidateksamen...’. 
37  Torbøl & Worsøe (1993), p. 105. 
38  § 119 (2) Retsplejenloven: ‘I mindst 3 år har vaeret I praktisk juridisk virksomhed jf. Stk. 3-5’. 
39  § 119 (3) Retsplejenloven. See also: Torbøl & Worsøe (1993), p. 105. 
40  § 119 (4) Retsplejenloven. See also: Torbøl & Worsøe (1993), p. 105.  
41  § 119 (5) Retsplejenloven. See also: Torbøl & Worsøe (1993), p. 105. 
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Paragraph 119 it is now laid down that candidates must also pass a Bar examination. 
The details of this examination are presented in a ministerial directive.42  
In addition to these requirements, there are some additional requirements laid 
down in Paragraph 121 of the Retsplejenloven.43 First of all, the Minister of Justice 
can refuse to issue a licence to a person who fulfils the criteria of Paragraph 119 when 
this person has been convicted of a criminal offence and where there is a direct risk 
of abuse of access to the profession of the lawyer. The Minister may also refuse the 
licence where the nature of the offence committed denies the person concerned the 
respect and trust that is necessary for the exercise of the profession of the lawyer.44 
A licence to practise can also be denied to a person who has shown conduct in the 
past that would lead the Minister to believe that he or she would practise law in an 
irresponsible manner.45 Lastly, the Minister of Justice can deny a practice licence to 
those persons who have a debt to the State of more than 50,000 krone.46,47 Deci-
sions of the Minister of Justice to deny a practice licence can be challenged before 
the landsretten.48 An advokat is allowed to start his own practice only when he has 
worked for another lawyer for at least a year.49 
 
Professional Profile of an Advokat/Asanajaja 
Sweden 
In Sweden the only protection that the Rättegångsbalken offers for advokats is the 
regulation of the professional title use. Aside from that, Sweden does not recognise 
any monopoly with regard to activities for advokats.50 Anybody who is not found 
unfit by a court to do so may give legal advice or represent a client in court.51 This 
means that fulfilling the formal requirements to become a lawyer is more a choice 
than a necessity. In other Member States the qualification as a lawyer is a necessary 
requirement in order to be active in the field of legal advice and to represent clients 
in court. In Sweden, this necessity does not exist. Therefore, the choice to become 
a lawyer in Sweden is much more to do with an assurance of quality. With the 
decision to become part of a regulated profession, one chooses to be bound by a set 
of rules that one has to follow. What is peculiar in this sense is that the profession is 
regulated by law, whereas professions which do not exercise a legal monopoly are 
more often regulated by the members of the profession themselves.52 With regard 
to the exercise of the activities it may be said that, apart from the incompatibilities 
                                                  
42  Bekendtgørelse om obligatorisk efteruddansele som betingelse for at få beskikkelse som advokat. 
Bekendtgørelse nr. 1129 af 13 december 1996. 
43  § 121 Retsplejenloven. 
44  § 121 (1) Retsplejenloven. See also: Torbøl & Worsøe (1993), p. 106. 
45  § 121 (2) Retsplejenloven. See also: Torbøl & Worsøe (1993), p. 106. 
46  To the equivalent of a little over € 6500. 
47  § 121 (3) Retsplejenloven. 
48  § 121 (4) Retsplejenloven. 
49  § 123 Retsplejenloven. 
50  Killian (s.d.) A. 
51  Letter of the Sveriges Advokatsamfund to the author, dated 23 May 2000. 
52  With regard to the application of Directive 98/5/EC it must be mentioned that only lawyers 
from Sweden who are allowed to use the title advokat are entitled to the benefits of the Directive. 
For an example with regard to Finland (which has similar rules), see Hickman (2004). 
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mentioned in the previous paragraph, the only limitation lies in the fact that Swedish 
rules on advertising, joint practice and multi-disciplinary partnerships are very strict. 
The Swedish Code of Conduct for lawyers states that they may in no way advertise 
to procure clients or hire someone to do so on their behalf.53 With regard to joint 
practice and multidisciplinary partnerships, the Rättegångsbalken states that a lawyer 
may only collaborate or be employed with another lawyer, but other forms of joint 
practice and multidisciplinary partnerships are not open for a Swedish advokat.54 In 
Sweden there are approximately 4400 lawyers in a population of 9 million.55 
 
Finland 
Similar to Sweden there is no legal monopoly on the activities of lawyers in Finland. 
Therefore, there are very few rules concerned with professional activity included in 
the Advocates Act. Comparably to Sweden, the choice to become an advokat or 
asianajaja in Finland has nothing to do with gaining access to a certain type of pro-
fessional activity.56 This activity can also be exercised without becoming a member 
of the regulated profession. The choice of regulated profession is more largely con-
cerned with guaranteeing a certain quality to prospective clients.57 In connection 
with professional activities, Section 5 of the Advocates Act states that an advokat or 
asianajaja shall honestly and conscientiously fulfil the tasks entrusted to him and 
adhere to the proper practice of an advocate in all his activities.58 This rather cryptic 
sentence is accompanied by an elaborate Code of Conduct, which was drawn up 
by the Finnish Bar Association.59 In addition to this very general rule on professional 
activities, Section 5 of the Advocates Act lays down a number of more specified 
rules connected to professional activities. It designates a prohibition for advokats or 
asianajajas to work together with any person who is not a lawyer, unless the Finnish 
Bar Association grants a waiver.60 An advocate is also obliged to keep his funds sepa-
rated from any funds or assets of his clients.61 There are separate rules pertaining to 
the obligation of advokats or asianajajas to serve as counsel or advocates in a court of 
law.62 At this point there are 1750 advokats63 in a population of approximately 5.2 
                                                  
53  §§ 5-8 of the Swedish Code of Conduct. 
54  Sections 2 and 4 of Chapter 8 Rättegångsbalken. 
55  Via <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 20 November 2006 (see also <www.advokatsamfundet. 
se>) and <www.cia.gov>, last accessed 20 November 2006. Kilian (s.d.) A mentions a number 
of 3600 in 2002. That means that a significant growth has taken place in the profession in 
Sweden. 
56  Which leads to the same problems as in Sweden with regard to the application of Directive 
98/5/EC. See Hickman (2004). 
57  Which could also explain the emphasis that is put on the requirement of general eligibility 
(e.g., honour and character) for prospective lawyers in the Swedish and Finnish systems.  
58  Section 5(1) Advocates Act. 
59  Rules of proper professional conduct for advocates (9.6.1972), <www.advonet.fi>, last accessed 
10 December 2002. 
60  Section 5(2) Advocates Act. The section also contains detailed rules on the legal form of a 
cooperation between two or more lawyers, which is of little interest to this book. 
61  Section 5(4) Advocates Act. 
62  Section 5(5) Advocates Act. No further reference is found in the relevant legislation with regard 
to this rule. The exact meaning of this rule remains uncertain. 
63  <www.advonet.fi>, last accessed 20 November 2006; the CCBE mentions a number of 1761. 
See <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 11 November 2007. 
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million.64 Similar to Sweden, this low rate probably provides a distorted view of 
the exact provision of legal services since any person can provide legal services as a 
result of the absence of a legal monopoly on the exercise of legal activities.  
 
Denmark 
Of the three professions reviewed in this paragraph, only the legal profession in 
Denmark has a legal monopoly. The Retsplejenloven mentions nothing about the 
actual activities that an advokat can pursue and merely states some of the activities 
that cannot be exercised by an advokat. These activities include being employed at 
one of the courts, for the prosecution or at the police.65 Aside from these incom-
patibilities, an advokat performs all the tasks that a lawyer normally performs. These 
tasks include advising clients, providing representation in court and preparing 
formal documents.66 With regard to the provision of advice to clients it can be said 
that advokats have some type of a monopoly. The ‘Pettifogger Act’ states that only 
certain categories of people are allowed to give legal advice. Among these categories 
are advokats, lawyers from other Member States, accountants, and architects.67 Law-
yers are not allowed to solicit clients.68 Any advokat has the right to represent clients 
in court. In fact, advokats hold a monopoly on the representation of clients in court. 
This monopoly is not absolute, since in Denmark a party may, in principle, conduct 
his own case or let his case be conducted by a close relative or an employee. A court 
can always impose representation by an advokat in these cases.69 The Retsplejenloven 
lays down extra criteria to represent a client in a higher court. It states that a right 
to represent a client before a higher court may only be obtained after the advokat 
concerned has completed two test cases before that court.70 For the preparation of 
formal documents, it must be said that the same rules which were applied to sup-
plying advice, apply here. This means that anyone who may give legal advice can 
also prepare formal documents.71 With regard to practise in associations, it can be 
said that lawyers may associate amongst themselves, even in the form of a limited 
liability company,72 but it is not allowed for lawyers to take part in any multi-
disciplinary associations.73 At this moment the total number of advokats is approx-
imately 463574 in a population of almost 5.5 million,75 or one lawyer for every 
1186 people. 
                                                  
64  CIA World Factbook, <www.cia.gov>, last accessed 9 December 2002. 
65  § 122 Retsplejenloven. See also: Torbøl & Worsøe (1993), p. 106. 
66  Torbøl & Worsøe (1993), pp. 108-111. 
67  Ibid. pp. 108-109. 
68  Ibid. 
69  Ibid. p. 110. 
70  Chapter 13 Retsplejenloven. 
71  Torbøl & Worsøe (1993), p. 111. 
72  § 124 Retsplejenloven. 
73  Torbøl & Worsøe (1993), p. 107. 
74  See <www.advokatsamfundet.dk>, last accessed 17 November 2006. 
75  CIA World Fact Book, <www.cia.gov>, last accessed 17 November 2006. 
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§ 2.2 The Legal Profession in the United Kingdom 
and Ireland 
There is no such thing as ‘the’ legal profession of the United Kingdom. First of all the 
United Kingdom is divided into three different legal systems; England and Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland. Secondly, the legal profession is shared by two very 
different professions, namely solicitors and barristers, the latter called advocates in 
Scotland.76 In total there are six different legal professions within the jurisdiction of 
the United Kingdom. The legal professions in Ireland are also typical common law 
legal professions that closely resemble the legal professions in the different juris-
dictions in the United Kingdom. This resemblance is due to the fact that Ireland was 
a part of the United Kingdom until 1921. The legal professions in both countries 
developed along the same lines. The legal profession in Ireland is also divided between 
solicitors and barristers.  
 
Qualification as a solicitor 
England and Wales 
In order to qualify as a solicitor in England and Wales one does not necessarily need a 
law degree from a university, although it remains the most common way to enter 
the qualification process. If the candidate concerned does not have a law degree he 
must complete a Common Professional Examination.77 After that, the prospective 
solicitor needs vocational training and a period of commonly two years78 as a trainee 
to a fully qualified solicitor.79 The first part of the vocational training, the Legal 
Practice Course, can take either one year of full-time studies, or two years of part-
time studies.80 The LPC is centralised, i.e., the same for everyone, for law graduates 
and non-lawyers.81 There do not seem to be any hard and fast rules for the trainee-
ship, apart from the fact that any trainee solicitor is obliged to take the Professional 
Skills Course.82 The Law Society is putting effort into regulating the training 
period,83 but as of yet there a no binding standards to which a trainee solicitor is 
assessed.84 After this process, the prospective solicitor can apply to the Law Society 
for a practice certificate after which he becomes a fully-fledged solicitor. 
 
                                                  
76  Adamson (1998), p. 27 
77  Cownie & Bradney (1996), p. 140. If one does not have a University degree in law one needs 
to take a Common Professional Examination. See <www.lawsociety.org.uk.>, last accessed 30 
October 2006. 
78  See Law Society (2001) A, p. 3. 
79  Cownie & Bradney (1996), p. 141. 
80  <www.lawsociety.org.uk>, last accessed 30 October 2006. 
81  See Law Society (2001) A, p. 3. 
82  Law Society (2001) A, p. 34. 
83  See Law Society (2001) B; Law Society (2003); Law Society (2005) C; See also: Law Society 
(2004) and Law Society (2005) B. Moreover a number of consultant’s reports have also been 
written on this subject. These reports are available on <www.lawsociety.org.uk>, last accessed 
30 October 2006.  
84  Law Society (2005) C. 
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Scotland 
The profession of the solicitor in Scotland differs from that in England and Wales. In 
contrast to England and Wales, Scottish solicitors are required to have a university 
degree, more specifically a degree in Law (LL.B.) from one of the five Scottish uni-
versities.85 The only way to avoid this requirement is to sit the Law Society Exam-
inations. Before taking this examination as a pre-Diploma trainee prospective students 
must find employment with a qualified solicitor for a duration of at least three years 
in which the areas of conveyance, court work and either trusts and executries or the 
work of a local authority, must be covered.86 After the academic qualification is com-
pleted, all prospective solicitors need to obtain a Diploma in Legal Practice which is 
awarded after a vocational training of a 26-week duration.87 Following the degree 
and the diploma, students are required to serve a two-year post-Diploma training 
contract with a practising solicitor in Scotland.88 The Scottish Law Society has already 
adapted its rules for the traineeship. As of 2001, trainees are required to complete 
logbooks which are monitored by the Law Society. In addition, from 2002, trainees 
are obliged to follow a two-week Professional Competence Course, and from 2003 
the first cohort of prospective Scottish solicitors took the Test of Professional Com-
petence before they were admitted as solicitors to the Law Society of Scotland.89 
 
Northern Ireland 
In Northern Ireland the solicitor’s profession is open for graduates and non-graduates. 
It must be noted that those who do not have a law degree must give proof to the 
Law Society that they have attained a satisfactory level in a number of subjects.90 
Queen’s University Belfast offers a course that covers these subjects. Mature, non-
graduate students may provide proof to satisfy the Law Society that they are suit-
able for the profession.91 All prospective students must gain a place at the Institute 
of Professional Legal Studies, by means of an entrance examination. After that, the 
student begins his period as an apprentice. Part of that period will be spent in office 
under a Master, which the student must find himself, while another part will be spent 
at the Institute for Professional Legal Studies.92 Normally the apprenticeship takes 
two years, but it may exceed four years for those who wish to qualify without a 
degree.93 If the student passes all examinations and has convinced the society that 
he has received proper training, he can enrol as a solicitor of the Supreme Court of 
Judicature in Northern Ireland. Once enrolled, the solicitor may apply for a practice 
certificate. In the first three years of their qualification, solicitors are obliged to 
                                                  
85  Law Society of Scotland (s.d.) C. 
86  Ibid. 
87  Ibid. In October 2000 the Diploma in Legal Practice was revised in order to match the new 
training regime. See Law Society of Scotland (s.d.) B.  
88  Ibid. 
89  See Law Society of Scotland (s.d.) B. 
90  These subjects are: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Land Law, Law of Tort, Equity, Law of 
Evidence, Law of Contract and European Law. A Law degree must also cover these subjects. See 
Law Society of Northern Ireland (s.d.), Notes 1 and 2(a). 
91  Ibid. Note 3. 
92  Ibid. Note on Apprenticeship. 
93  Ibid. 
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work in employment. If they attend the Law Society's Continuing Legal Education 
programme, the required period of employment is shortened to two years.94 
 
Republic of Ireland 
Similar to the solicitor’s profession in the United Kingdom there is not one single 
way to qualify as a solicitor in the Republic of Ireland, and a law degree from a 
university is not essential. The Solicitors Act governs the entrance to the profession 
of the solicitor. In good common law tradition, previous versions of laws remain in 
force, in so far as they had not been changed by later versions. In Ireland, there are 
four different versions of the Solicitors Act, the basic Act from 1954 and amend-
ments of 1960, 1994 and 2002.95 Qualification was laid down in Articles 24 to 45 
of the Solicitors Act 1954 but the Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994 changed the 
rules considerably. The provisions of the latter law will be dealt with in this para-
graph. In order to qualify as a solicitor one needs to fulfil the criteria laid down by 
Article 40 of the Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994. Article 40 of that Act states that a 
person may become a solicitor in Ireland if the following requirements are fulfilled. 
He must be at least 21 years of age96 and be bound by the indentures of apprentice-
ship for the appropriate term.97 Moreover, he must have followed the courses and 
passed the examinations prescribed,98 complied with the prescribed requirements in 
order to serve under indentures of apprenticeship,99 and have satisfied the Society 
that he is a fit and proper person to be admitted as a solicitor.100 If the Society refuses 
to admit him as a solicitor, the person concerned shall have a legal remedy.101 
These requirements are elaborated upon in the following articles of the Solicitors 
(Amendment) Act 1994. Article 41 lays down several requirements for the access to 
apprenticeship. According to the article, a person can be admitted to the apprentice-
ship if he has attained the age of seventeen years,102 followed the prescribed courses103 
and passed the necessary examinations.104 Furthermore, he must have obtained the 
written consent of the Society105 and fulfilled any other requirement prescribed by 
the Society for admission to the apprenticeship.106 Further requirements with regard 
to the terms of indentures are laid down in Article 42 of the Solicitors (Amendment) 
Act 1994. Article 42 states that the term of indentures shall be no longer than two 
years.107 It must be noted that the article implies that law clerks can also be eligible 
for apprenticeship. A law clerk in the sense of this article is a person who can prove 
                                                  
94  Ibid. 
95  Solicitors Act 1954; Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1960; Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994 and 
Solicitors (Amendment) Act 2002, via <www.irishstatutebook.ie>, last accessed 11 July 2005. 
96  Article 40 Section 24(1)(a) Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994. 
97  Article 40 Section 24(1)(b) Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994. 
98  Article 40 Section 24 (1)(c) Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994. 
99  Article 40 Section 24(1)(d) Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994. 
100  Article 40 Section 24(1)(e) Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994. 
101  Article 40 Section 24(2) Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994. 
102  Article 41 Section 25(a) Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994. 
103  Article 41 Section 25(b) Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994. 
104  Article 41 Section 25(c) Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994.  
105  Article 41 Section 25(d) Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994. 
106  Article 41 Section 25(e) Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994. 
107  Article 42 Section 26(1) Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994. 
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that he has been a bona fide clerk to a practising solicitor for at least a continuous 
period of five years,108 that he has busied himself with activities that satisfy the Society 
to be of a sufficiently responsible nature,109 and that he has diligently served as such 
a clerk.110 Article 43 concerns the proof that must be given in order to benefit from 
the rules laid down in the previous articles.111  
A further important provision in the Solicitors (Amendment) Act is Article 49 
which amends the original Section 40. The Article governs the education that a 
prospective solicitor must have followed in order to qualify for an apprenticeship, 
and ultimately for the solicitor’s profession. Similar to the position in the United 
Kingdom, a law degree from a university is not a strict requirement for becoming a 
solicitor in Ireland. Those who are not exempted by means of Articles 50 and 51 
(university graduates and barristers, respectively) must pass the Law Society’s pre-
liminary examination.112 Law clerks can also be exempted from the preliminary 
examination.113 In order to enter into apprenticeship every prospective solicitor 
must take, and pass, the Final Examination–First Part.114 After having passed this 
examination, the prospective solicitor may enter in apprenticeship but not before he 
has passed the first Professional Practice Course (PPC I).115 During his apprentice-
ship the prospective solicitor must attend, and pass, the second Professional Practice 
Course (PPC II).116 At the end of the apprenticeship, the prospective solicitor must 
take and pass the Final Examination–Second Part, after which he can be registered 
as a solicitor. All these courses and examinations are supervised by the Law Society, 
based on Article 49 of the Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994.117 Before a person who 
has obtained all the necessary qualifications may practise as a solicitor, he needs to 
obtain a practising certificate.118 
 
Professional Profile of a Solicitor 
England and Wales 
In England and Wales solicitors can work in private practice (either as a partner or 
as a salaried solicitor) or as a salaried lawyer in a business or government institution.119 
As of 31 July 2005 there were 126,145 solicitors on the Roll, of which 100,938 held 
a practice certificate.120 Of practising lawyers, 61.9 per cent are involved in private 
practice, 18.1 per cent work in areas other than private practice.121 According to 
the CCBE, this number had risen to 135,514 in 2006.122 Solicitors are not allowed 
                                                  
108  Article 42 Section 26(3)(a) Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994. 
109  Article 42 Section 26(3)(b) Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994. 
110  Article 42 Section 26(3)(c) Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994. 
111  Article 43 Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994. 
112  Article 49 Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994. 
113  Law Society of Ireland (s.d.) A. 
114  Ibid. 
115  Ibid.  
116  Ibid. 
117  Article 49 Section 40 Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994. 
118  Article 54 Section 47 Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994. 
119  Law Society (2005) A. 
120  Ibid. 
121  Law Society (s.d.) A. 
122  Via <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 11 June 2007.  
89 
to practise in multi-disciplinary practices. That means that they are not allowed to 
form a partnership with a member of another profession,123 but the rules have been 
somewhat relaxed over recent years.124 There is no statutory monopoly for a solicitor 
and apart from the preparation of certain documents none of his activities are legally 
protected,125 although a solicitor is the only one who can instruct a barrister. Tradi-
tionally, solicitors were barred from representing clients in court, since that activity 
was reserved for barristers. Historically, the dichotomy between solicitors and 
barristers, although only on a superficial level, has been rather simple: solicitors deal 
with clients and provide legal advice, while barristers are instructed by solicitors to 
present a case in court. This dichotomy was always oversimplified,126 but under the 
Access to Justice Act 1999 it is simply incorrect. Section 36 of the Access to Justice 
Act 1999, which reformed the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, gave solicitors 
the right to appear in all courts, albeit after additional training. According to the 
Lord Chancellor: ‘All barristers and solicitors, including those in employment, should 
obtain full statutory rights on admission or call to the Bar or on admission to the 
Roll of Solicitors.’127 This means that in effect the distinction between the two 
professions is merely one of form, and no longer one of substance, at least not where 
the solicitor is concerned. 
 
Scotland 
For Scotland it can be said that Scottish solicitors perform the same tasks as English 
and Welsh solicitors. It is possible for solicitors to appear in Court when they are 
qualified as solicitor-advocates.128 Similar to England and Wales there is no statutory 
monopoly for Scottish solicitors, although there is some protection for the preparation 
of documents.129 As of 2007 there were around 10,000 solicitors in Scotland.130 
 
Northern Ireland 
The work that solicitors do in Northern Ireland is similar to the work performed 
by their English counterparts, although in Northern Ireland materials there is no 
reference to the Access to Justice Act of 1999. This does not mean, however, that 
solicitors do not have audience rights. Solicitors in Northern Ireland have audience 
rights in certain lower courts, comparable to those in England and Wales.131 As of 
2007, there were 1850 solicitors with a licence in Northern Ireland.132 
 
                                                  
123  Bailey & Gunn (1996), p. 138. 
124  Ibid., p. 139. 
125  Lawrenson (1993), p. 325. 
126  See Bailey & Gunn (1996), p. 133 
127  Law Society (s.d.) B. See also: Lord High Chancellor (1998), paragraph 2.27, page 19. 
128  The existence of ‘solicitor-advocates’ is hinted at in: Law Society of Scotland (s.d.) A, pp. 20-22. 
Solicitors can become solicitor-advocates by means of Section 25A of the Solicitors (Scotland) 
Act 1980, and not, as in England and Wales, by means of the Access to Justice Act 1999.  
129  Secretariat of the Law Society of Scotland (1993), p. 350. 
130  <www.lawscot.org.uk/about/scots_law/>, last accessed 18 October 2007. 
131  Doherty (1993), p. 358. 
132  See <www.lawsoc-ni.org/council.htm>, last accessed 25 October 2007. 
90 
Republic of Ireland 
In the Republic of Ireland, comparable to the situation in England and Wales, the 
traditional division between the two professions has been blurred by the fact that 
solicitors in Ireland have gained a general right of audience,133 without barristers 
gaining any territory on the traditional turf of the solicitor. As in the United King-
dom, this imposes pressure on the barrister’s profession. With complete audience 
rights for solicitors, both solicitors and barristers share the same legal monopoly, 
namely the representation of clients in court.134 Although both solicitors and bar-
risters (via solicitors) have an important role with regard to giving legal advice, this 
advisory function does not seem to be part of the legal monopoly of solicitors and 
barristers. In addition to the audience rights in court, solicitors (and barristers)135 also 
enjoy monopoly rights for the preparation of documents in relation to real property.136 
As of 2007, there were about 10,000 practising solicitors in Ireland.137 
 
Qualification as a Barrister 
England and Wales 
In England and Wales barristers are obliged to have a degree, although it is not 
essential to have a degree in law. Graduates who do not have a law degree have to 
take the one-year ‘Common Professional Examination’ in order to cover the required 
legal subjects.138 After the academic stage, but before the prospective barrister starts 
his vocational training, he or she must join one of the four Inns of Court.139 The 
objective of the vocational training is to complete the ‘Bar Vocational Course’, a 
highly competitive course that is only available to a limited number of people.140 
After the vocational training, the prospective barrister proceeds to a one-year pupillage, 
a training period that can be compared with the traineeship for solicitors.141 During 
the pupillage, a prospective barrister is required to learn how to practise on his 
own, and more importantly, to establish contacts with solicitors who have to instruct 
him. In addition, he must follow mandatory courses on advocacy and management. 
The barrister can then gain a place in chambers, set up a practice of his own or be 
employed by institutions like the armed forces or the Government. It must be made 
clear that working in chambers is not the same as practising in partnership, since 
that is forbidden for barristers. The chamber must be seen as a facilitating entity that 
supports a number of individually practising barristers.142  
 
                                                  
133  Hartnett (1993), p. 187. 
134  Ibid., p. 186. It must be noted that nothing precludes a person to defend his or her own case 
before a court. 
135  Ibid., p. 187. 
136  Section 53 Solicitors Act 1954. 
137  See <www.lawsociety.ie/Annual%20Reports/ar06.pdf>, last accessed 25 October 2007.  
138  Slapper & Kelly (1997), p. 333; Lonbay (s.d.) B and Bar Council (1998), p. 5. 
139  Bar Council (1998), p. 5. 
140  Ibid., p. 7. 
141  Ibid., p. 9. 
142  Bailey & Gunn (1996), pp. 153-154. 
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Scotland 
In Scotland, there is no barrister’s profession, but rather a profession of the advocate. 
In order to become an advocate the prospective student needs to follow a rather 
complicated route comprised of four stages.143 The first stage involves the student’s 
admittance as an Intrant to the Faculty of Advocates, this is called the Matriculation 
process. Only those who have a degree in Scottish law shall be admitted as Intrants, 
when they have the correct references and present a petition to the Court.144 A fee 
must also be paid. It seems that this process resembles, at least in function, the ‘call 
to the Bar’ in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, which involves joining one of 
the Inns of Court. The second stage is the completion of the educational demands 
of the Faculty. This involves passing the Law examinations of the Faculty and com-
pleting the Diploma in Legal Practice at a Scottish university.145 The third stage 
involves professional training. The training consists, first, of a period of training in a 
solicitor’s office for 21 months, second, a period of nine and a half months serving 
as a pupil to a member of the Bar, approved by the Dean of the Bar (called devilling, 
pupils are called devils), and third, passing the Faculty examinations in evidence, 
practice and procedure. During the training in the solicitor’s office the trainee is paid 
an appropriate salary, while during devilling the Intrant is paid nothing and must 
abstain from activities that are deemed ‘inappropriate’ by the Dean.146 The fourth 
stage involves being accepted as an advocate after completion of the first three 
requirements.147 
 
Northern Ireland 
In Northern Ireland, similar to England and Wales, the starting years as a practising 
barrister are full of financial insecurity and hardship.148 In order to qualify as a bar-
rister, students must hold a recognised law degree and must be admitted to the 
Institute of Professional Legal Studies in Northern Ireland in order to gain their 
Certificate in Professional Legal Studies, which is awarded after a one-year postgraduate 
vocational training.149 Before prospective barristers commence their vocational 
training they have to spend four weeks working in a Citizens Advice Bureau or 
Law Centre and a week work-shadowing a practising solicitor. After the vocational 
training they have to undergo a twelve-month pupillage, in which they can only 
accept work on their own account in the second six months of their pupillage.150 A 
prospective barrister must be a member of the Inns of Court as well.151 After all the 
requirements are met, the student will be awarded the title of Barrister-at-Law. 
 
                                                  
143  Faculty of Advocates (s.d.), p. 7. 
144  An advocate must carry the seven lamps of advocacy; honesty, courage, industry, wit, eloquence, 
judgement and fellowship. See Faculty of Advocates (s.d.), p. 4. 
145  Faculty of Advocates (s.d.), p. 7. 
146  Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
147  Ibid., p. 8. 
148  Institute of Professional Legal Studies (s.d). 
149  Ibid.; See also: Bar Council (s.d.) B. 
150  Institute of Professional Legal Studies (s.d.). 
151  Bar Council & Bar Library of Northern Ireland (s.d.) B.  
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Republic of Ireland 
In the Republic of Ireland, the barrister’s profession is governed by common law, 
unlike the profession of the solicitor which is governed by statute.152 Similar to the 
profession of the solicitor, however, it is not strictly necessary for a barrister to have 
a university degree in law. Qualifying as a barrister is comprised of three different 
stages.153 The first stage is the academic stage, which is fulfilled by either com-
pleting a law degree, accepted by the King’s Inn or by the King’s Inn Diploma in 
Legal Studies obtained after a two-year part-time course.154 After completing the 
academic stage, the prospective barrister can enter the vocational stage of the quali-
fication process after passing an entry examination. The vocational stage consists of 
a year-long degree course that ultimately leads to the degree of Barrister-at-Law at 
the King’s Inn. After the prospective barrister has passed the exams that lead to the 
degree, he or she is then called to the Bar.155 The call to the Bar is where the barrister 
registers with the Law Library and it certainly does not mean that the qualification 
process has ended. Before a barrister is allowed to practise on his own, he is obliged 
to spend a year as a pupil under a practising barrister, the so-called ‘divelling’. The 
divelling period also involves following a course, and following guidance of the 
Master (who must be Dublin-based). The divelling is unpaid.156 After the year of 
divelling is complete, the barrister may start a practice of his own, albeit within the 
Law Library where all barristers of the Republic of Ireland are seated.  
 
Professional Profile of a Barrister/Advocate 
England and Wales 
In England and Wales the barrister was originally the lawyer who appeared as 
advocate in court, although as we have seen above this does not hold true anymore 
after the introduction of the Access to Justice Act 1999. The number of barristers 
in practice is considerably lower than the number of solicitors. In 2006, there were 
12,034 practising barristers.157 Other than these shared audience rights, the barrister 
has no legal monopoly on other legal activities. 
 
Scotland  
With regard to the activities of an advocate in Scotland, it can be stated that these 
do not differ from those of the barristers in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
The primary duty of an advocate is to present cases in court. Similar to England and 
Wales, this traditional monopoly must be shared with other professions, such as the 
profession of the solicitor. In addition to that, advocates can also be employed in 
different branches of government.158 Similarly to England, Wales and Northern Irel-
and, the harsh qualification process, which seems even harder than the qualification 
of barristers in England and Wales, does not automatically lead to the certainty of a 
                                                  
152  Hartnett (1993), p. 175. 
153  The Bar Council (s.d.) A. See also the helpful scheme on <www.kingsinn.ie>, under ‘education’ 
and ‘prospective students’, last accessed 22 August 2005. 
154  Ibid. 
155  Ibid. 
156  Ibid. 
157  Via <www.barcouncil.org.uk>, last accessed 11 June 2007. 
158  Faculty of Advocates (s.d.), p. 4. 
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considerable income. Akin to England and Wales, advocates work in so-called 
‘stables’ where they share the office infrastructure and resources but they are still 
self-employed and therefore completely dependent on their own income.159 In 
2006, there were 758 advocates in Scotland.160 
 
Northern Ireland 
The barrister’s profession in Northern Ireland is similar to the profession of the 
barrister in England and Wales. The primary task of the 580 barristers161 is similar 
to their English counterparts. Their main task is to give legal advice (although there 
is no legal monopoly on legal advice) and to litigate. In principle, this occurs through 
instructions via the solicitors, but in recent years it has been possible for a number 
of professional bodies to gain direct access to a barrister.162 
 
Republic of Ireland 
In the Republic of Ireland the situation is quite similar. Traditionally, barristers had 
a legal monopoly of representing clients in court but now this right must be shared 
with the solicitors in Ireland.163 There are no further monopolies for barristers in 
Ireland. In 2005 (the most recent figure available) there were 1539 barristers.164 
§ 2.3 The Legal Profession in the Benelux 
The next three countries in this review have less in common with each other than 
the countries described in the previous subparagraphs. In fact the only resemblance 
between the three countries is that they are more or less exceptions to the other 
categories. The Netherlands is an exception since the organisation of the legal pro-
fession leans towards the common law and Scandinavian/Nordic traditions that were 
observed above, although it remains based in the civil law tradition. Belgium and 
Luxembourg are both solidly founded in the civil law tradition but have different 
attitudes towards the legal profession due to the activity of the European Institutions 
in those jurisdictions. 
 
Qualification as an Advocaat/Avocat 
The Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, just as in any other legal system that is founded in civil law, there 
are a number of protected legal and quasi-legal professions.165 The most important 
of those, and the subject of this paragraph, is the profession of the advocaat, which is 
in essence the profession of the lawyer. In addition to the profession of the advocaat 
                                                  
159  See <www.advocates.org.uk>, last accessed 19 November 2001.  
160  Via <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 11 June 2007. 
161  As of October 2006, see The Bar Council & Bar Library of Northern Ireland (s.d.) D. 586, 
according to the CCBE see <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 11 June 2007. 
162  The Bar Council & Bar Library of Northern Ireland (s.d.) A. 
163  Hartnett (1993), p. 186. It must be noted that nothing precludes a person from defending his 
or her own case before a court. 
164  See <www.barcouncil.ie>, last accessed 25 October 2007. 
165  See Hoegen Dijkhoef (1993), pp. 225-229. 
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there are also the professions of procureur,166 who assist advocaten from other consti-
tuencies, notarissen (notaries) who deal with the preparation and validation of official 
documents and deurwaarders (bailiffs) who function as process-servers. In addition to 
these regulated professions, there are a number of legal and quasi-legal professions 
that are not legally protected. These are the professions of the belastingadviseur (tax 
adviser), rechtskundig adviseur (legal advisor), and octrooigemachtigde (patent lawyer). 
Different from other legal professions that have their origin in civil law, the Dutch 
legal profession is highly centralised.167 Since 1952 there has been a centralised body 
called the Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten (hereinafter the Orde) that is placed above 
the nineteen Bar Associations that govern the legal profession in each of the nineteen 
legal constituencies in the Netherlands.168 The rules that govern the legal profession 
are laid down in a separate law, namely the Advocatenwet.169 
The requirements for becoming an advocaat are laid down in the Advocatenwet and 
are elaborated upon in several regulations of the Orde. Article 2 of the Advocatenwet 
lays down the basic requirements for becoming an advocaat. The Article states that 
the profession of the advocaat is accessible for those who have acquired a degree of 
Doctor or Master in Law. A university education can lead to this degree if the educa-
tion consists of, among other things, examinations in private law (including proce-
dural law), criminal law (including procedural law), and one of the following courses; 
constitutional law, administrative law (including procedural law) or tax law.170 Of 
all the countries reviewed, the Netherlands is the only country that lays down the 
minimal contents of a degree leading to the title of doctor or master in law (Ger-
many has a similar system).171 If a candidate fulfils this criterion and can produce a 
certificate of correct behaviour,172 he will be sworn in by a judge of the district 
court of the legal constituency where he holds office.173 When a lawyer is sworn in 
as an advocaat he is still not a fully-fledged advocaat in the sense of being able to start 
his own practice. Therefore, membership to the Bar could be seen as probationary 
at this stage. In order to be able to start his own practice, an advocaat has to complete 
three years of vocational training under the guidance of an experienced advocaat, 
called his patroon.174 During this training period, an advocaat, then referred to as a 
                                                  
166  Because every advocaat in the Netherlands is, in principle, automatically sworn in as a procureur, this 
profession is no longer viewed as a separate profession. See Adamson (1998), pp. 22-23. In the 
light of the implementation of Directive 98/5/EC, however, the distinction between the two 
professions has led to some serious doubts as to whether the Dutch implementation is in accord-
ance with European Law. 
167  Adamson (1998), pp. 22-23. 
168  Ibid. 
169  Law of 23 June 1952, houdende instelling van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten alsmede 
regelen betreffende orde en discipline voor de advocaten en procureurs (Advocatenwet), last 
adaptation Stb. 2002, 441. 
170  Article 2(1) Advocatenwet. 
171  This is the so-called civiel effect. When universities create a new curriculum they have to convince 
the Orde that it fulfils the requirements of Article 2 of the Advocatenwet before they can grant 
the title of Master of Law or Doctor of Law to persons who have completed such a curriculum. 
The discussion about the civiel effect is very relevant at this point in time since Dutch universities 
are reforming their curricula to fit in the Bachelor-Master system of the Bologna Declaration. 
172  Article 2(2) Advocatenwet. 
173  Article 3 Advocatenwet. 
174  Article 9b Advocatenwet. 
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stagiaire, is obliged to work in the office of his patroon. The stagiare assists his patroon 
in dealing with cases but in the later stages of the three-year period the stagiaire will 
enjoy an increasing amount of independence from his patroon. Moreover, a stagiaire 
is obliged to take part in an education programme that is managed by the Orde.175 
In the course of his education, the stagiaire will be obliged to take nine examina-
tions.176 These will mount up to an equivalent of the Bar exam in some of the 
other Member States. If a stagiaire has passed all these examinations, he will receive 
a certificate stating that he has passed these examinations and that therefore his pro-
bationary membership of the Bar will be transformed into a definitive membership.177 
 
Belgium 
The legal professions in Belgium are firmly rooted in the civil law system. In Belgium 
there are a number of legal professions. Aside from the most important profession 
of the avocat there are also the professions of notaires (notaries) and hussier (bailiff).178 
In the past times there was also the avoué but this profession was abolished in 1970 
with the implementation of the 1967 Gerechtelijk Wetboek (Judicial Code).179 All the 
monopolies that the avoués had with regard to pleading were transferred to the pro-
fession of the avocat. Other than the profession in the Netherlands, which evolved 
considerably in the last years and now forms some intermediate position between the 
civil law tradition and the common law/Scandinavian/Nordic tradition, the Belgian 
profession remains firmly rooted in the civil law tradition. This tradition is reflected 
in the fact that the profession of the avocat remains a true ‘free’ profession charac-
terised by a high degree of decentralisation. Nowadays, the Bars for the different legal 
constituencies in Belgium still have a degree of autonomy and only very recently 
initiatives were deployed to achieve a degree of centralisation in the profession, 
which further resulted in the foundation of a central Flemish Bar and a central Walloon 
bar. The latter also represents the German-speaking Bar of Eupen. In addition there 
is also a Bar representing the selected number of avocats who appear exclusively before 
the Cour de Cassation. This leads to 31 Bar Associations; fourteen Walloon Bars 
(one of them in Brussels), fourteen Flemish Bars (one of them in Brussels); one 
Walloon Bar Association; one Flemish Bar Association and one more Association 
in Brussels representing the avocats who have access rights to the Cour de Cassation.180 
In the past there was also a national order of avocats.181 The major part of the 
autonomy lies with the 28 regional Bars, and not with the central authorities as is 
the case in the Netherlands.  
The road to qualification as an avocat is laid down in Book III of the Gerechtelijk 
Wetboek (Judicial Code). Article 428 of the Gerechtelijk Wetboek lists the basic 
requirements for becoming an avocat. First, one must be a Belgian national, or a 
                                                  
175  Article 9c Advocatenwet. See also: Stageverordening 1988 via <www.advocatenorde.nl>, last 
accessed 23 February 2003. 
176  See Article 14 of the Stageverordening 1988 and the Examenreglement Beroepsopleiding via <www. 
advocatenorde.nl>, last accessed 15 February 2003. 
177  Article 8(3) Advocatenwet. 
178  See Philippe & Roberts (1993), pp. 69-70. See also: Adamson (1998), p. 12. 
179  See Philippe & Roberts (1993), p. 69. 
180  See <www.barreauxdebruxelles.be>, last accessed 27 April 2004. 
181  Some of whose regulations are still in force. See <www.advocaat.be>, last accessed 28 April 2004. 
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national from one of the Member States of the European Union. Furthermore, one 
must have a licenciaat182 or a doctorate in Belgian law, to have taken the oath and be 
listed on the tableau183 or on the list of stagiaires184. The licenciaat is a diploma in law 
that is autonomously awarded by the Belgian universities, and there is no State 
control to the extent found in the Netherlands.185 Persons who have not studied 
law in Belgium can acquire a licenciaat by equivalence. In this case, a Belgian uni-
versity will examine the equivalence between a university diploma from another 
country and the licenciaat. The oath that is mentioned in Article 428 is specified 
further in Article 429 of the Gerechtelijk Wetboek. That article states that the oath 
shall be taken in a public session of the Hof van Beroep (Court of Appeal) in the 
capital of the jurisdiction of the specific bar where the prospective avocat seeks 
entrance, on recommendation of an avocat who has been on the tableau for more 
than ten years. The oath must be taken in the presence of the Battônnier (the chair 
of that respective Bar) and on request of the Openbaar Ministerie (Ministry of 
Justice).186 After the prospective avocat has taken the oath, he is not yet eligible to 
become an avocat. Before a prospective avocat can be listed on the tableau, he first 
must take a stage that takes three years. Besides working under a patron for three 
years, the prospective avocat or stagiaire must also follow courses and take examina-
tions in order to acquire his Certificate d’Aptitude à Exercer la Profession d’Avocat, his 
professional certificate, or CAPA.187 For this purpose, the prospective avocats are 
listed on a list of stagiaires. Only after successful completion of their stage, which 
also involves charity or pro deo work188 can they be listed as avocats on the tableau of 
the respective bar where they are registered. 
 
Luxembourg 
Similar to Belgium, the legal profession of the avocat in Luxembourg is strongly 
rooted in the civil law tradition, characterised by a high degree of protection and 
decentralisation. The legal profession in Luxembourg is very small, consisting only 
of two Bars; the main bar in Luxembourg City and a much smaller one in the city 
of Diekirch.189 Although the two Bars are completely independent, they share a 
single administrative and the disciplinary council.190 In addition to the profession of 
the avocat Luxembourg also knows the legal professions of notaire and hussier. 
Similar to Belgium, the profession of avoué no longer exists and is merged with the 
                                                  
182 ‘Licence’ is the diploma that is awarded after five years of law studies. 
183  ‘Tableau’ is the list of all the lawyers in that legal jurisdiction. 
184  Stagiaires are trainee lawyers. 
185  See Philippe & Roberts (1993), p. 71. 
186  The oath is as follows: ‘Ik zweer getrouwheid aan de Koning, gehoorzaamheid aan de Grondwet en 
aan de wetten van het Belgische volk, dat ik niet zal afwijken van de eerbied aan het gerecht en de 
openbare overheid verschuldigd, en geen zaak zal aanraden of verdedigen die ik naar eer en geweten niet 
geloof rechtvaardig te zijn.’ This oath roughly translates as: ‘I swear loyalty to the King, obedience 
to the Constitution and to the laws of the Belgian people, not to fail in the respect due to the 
courts and public authorities and not to counsel or defend any cause save that which I sincerely 
and conscientiously believe to be just.’ Translation from: Philippe, & Roberts (1993), p. 72. 
187  Philippe & Roberts (1993), p.74. 
188  Ibid., p. 75 
189  Brucher (1993), p. 212. 
190  See <www.barreau.lu>, last accessed 27 November 2006. 
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profession of the avocat.191 The avocat in Luxembourg is governed by a separate law, 
which in this paragraph is referred to as the Avocat law.192 
The requirements for becoming an avocat in Luxembourg are laid down in the 
Avocat law, more specifically in Articles 5 and 6 of that law. Article 5 firstly states 
that the profession of the avocat may only be exercised if the person concerned is 
listed on the tableau of one of the Bar Associations of the Grand-Duchy of Luxem-
bourg. Article 6 of the Avocat law lays down the criteria necessary for becoming 
enlisted on one of the tableaux in Luxembourg. First of all, it states that the con-
ditions for being accepted for a stage need to be fulfilled.193 The fact that the stage 
does not need to be completed yet stems from the fact that the tableaux are divided 
into three separate lists.194 The conditions for being accepted to the stage are more 
elaborate than appears from Article 6 of the Avocat law. First of all, an applicant 
needs to have a law degree.195 Since the University of Luxembourg did not offer 
law degrees until recently, that requirement posed a small problem. Those who 
sought entrance into the Luxembourg legal profession and who could be of foreign 
or of Luxembourg origin needed to obtain a law degree in another country. Addi-
tionally, they then needed to have their law degree recognised by the Luxembourg 
authorities. The preconditions for recognition are laid down by Luxembourg law.196 
The main precondition is that the law degree conferred must be in accordance with 
the general characteristics of the Luxembourg legal system. In essence this means 
that the law degree needs to be obtained in a civil law jurisdiction. In general, 
Belgian and French law degrees offer no problems with regard to homologation.197 
After it is established that the prospective avocat has an eligible law degree, he will 
then be allowed to commence the stage. Prior to this, the candidate lawyer will be 
                                                  
191  See <www.barreau.lu>, last accessed 27 November 2006. 
192  Loi du 10 août 1991 sur la profession d’avocat, Memorial Journal Officiel du Grand-Duché de 
Luxembourg, Recueil de Legislation, A-No 58, 27 août 1991, p. 1110. 
193  Article 6(1b) Avocat law. 
194  ‘Liste I’ comprising lawyers who have completed their stage and professional examination 
(avocat-inscrit); ‘Liste II’ comprising lawyers who are still in the process of completing their stage 
(avocat-stagiaire) and ‘Liste III’ comprising those lawyers who have been accepted as honorary 
members. See Brucher (1993), pp. 212-213. This is also reflected in Article 8(3) Avocat law. 
195  Brucher (1993), p. 215. 
196  Loi du 18 juin 1969 sur l’enseignement supérieur et homologation des titres et grades étrangers 
d’enseignement supérieur. Memorial Journal Officiel du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, Recueil 
de Legislation A-No 27, 21 juin 1969, page 796. This law is executed specifically for the legal 
profession in: Règlement grand-ducal du 18 décembre 1970 fixant les critères d’homologation 
des titres et grades étranges en droit, Memorial Journal Officiel du Grand-Duché de Luxem-
bourg, Recueil de Legislation A-No 70, 23 décembre 1970, page 1441. Articles 3 and 4 of 
that Règlement lay down the criteria for the foreign law degree as follows: 
 Article 3 Le diplôme final étranger présenté à l’homologation doit conférer un grade d’enseignement 
juridique supérieur reconnu par le pays d’origine pour ses propres nationaux ou donner, dans ce pays 
d’origine, accès à la profession d’avocat ou au stage préparatoire à celle-ci. 
 Article 4 Le diplôme présenté à l’homologation doit sanctionner un cycle complet d’études de droit d’au 
moins quatre années ou huit semestres ou douze trimestres. L’enseignements doit avoir porté au moins sur 
les matières suivantes: le droit civil, le droit commercial, le droit pénal, le droit judicaire, le droit inter-
national privé ou le droit international public, le droit administratif. L’enseignement du droit civil doit avoir 
été au moins de deux ans, soit quatre semestres, ou six trimestres. Le droit enseigné doit correspondre dans 
ses conceptions fondamentales aux principes généraux du système juridique luxembourgois.  
197  Brucher (1993), p. 215. 
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presented to the Cour de Cassation by the Bâtonnier in order to take the oath.198 
Once the candidate lawyer has taken the oath he will be listed on ‘Liste II’ of the 
tableau. 
The organisation of the stage is also laid down by law.199 The Luxembourg stage 
encompasses a characteristic that is unique and is a consequence of the fact that 
Luxembourg had no university conferring law degrees. Graduates entering the legal 
profession in Luxembourg will have no specific knowledge of Luxembourg law. In 
order to counter that problem, every candidate lawyer is obliged to follow a cours 
complémentaires (complementary course) in Luxembourg law at the University of 
Luxembourg.200 In that course specific Luxembourg topics and rules are followed.201 
All the subjects must be passed.202 The complementary course lasts for three months. 
After the candidate lawyer has passed the complementary course he is then eligible 
to commence his stage.203 The stage lasts three years and consists of a theoretical and 
a practical part under the supervision of an older avocat, where the practical part is 
divided between a stage as a lawyer and a stage as a magistrate.204 The stage is com-
pleted by an overall exam which consists of a written and an oral part.205 After the 
avocat-stagiaire has successfully completed this exam, he will be included in ‘Liste I’ 
of the tableau, and is then an avocat-inscrit.206 
In addition to the stage the Avocat law names two further criteria that need to be 
fulfilled in order to become an avocat. First, one must be a Luxembourg national or 
                                                  
198  The oath is mentioned in Article 6(2) of the Avocat law: ‘Je jure fidélité au Grand-Duc, obeisance 
à la Constitution et aux lois de l’Etat; de ne pas m’encarter du respect dû aux tribuneaux; de ne conseiller 
ou defender aucune cause que je ne croirais pas juste en mon âme et conscience.’  
199  Règlement grand-ducal du 21 janvier 1978 portant organisation du stage judiciaire et règlement 
l’accès au notariat, Memorial, Journal Officiel du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, Recueil de 
Législation, A-No 3, 27 janvier 1978, page 40. 
200  Article 3 Règlement grand-ducal du 21 janvier 1978 portant organisation du stage judiciaire et 
règlement l’accès au notariat, Memorial, Journal Officiel du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, 
Recueil de Législation, A-No 3, 27 janvier 1978, page 40. 
201  Constitutional law, civil law, commercial law, procedural law (civil/commercial), penal law, 
procedural law (penal) and law of the organisation of justice. 
202  Article 5 Règlement grand-ducal du 21 janvier 1978 portant organisation du stage judiciaire et 
règlement l’accès au notariat, Memorial, Journal Officiel du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, 
Recueil de Législation, A-No 3, 27 janvier 1978, page 40. 
203  Article 10 of the Règlement grand-ducal du 21 janvier 1978 portant organisation du stage judi-
ciaire et règlement l’accès au notariat, Memorial, Journal Officiel du Grand-Duché de Luxem-
bourg, Recueil de Législation, A-No 3, 27 janvier 1978, page 40, states that: ‘Pour être admis au 
stage, il faut: soit présenter le certificat de formation complémentaire prévu par les articles 5 et 8, soit 
presenter le diplôme de docteur en droit delivré par un jury luxembourgeois conformément à la loi du 5 août 
1939 sur la collation des grades.’ That law of 1939 is replaced by the 1969 law mentioned above. 
204  Articles 12 and 13 Règlement grand-ducal du 21 janvier 1978 portant organisation du stage judi-
ciaire et règlement l’accès au notariat, Memorial, Journal Officiel du Grand-Duché de Luxem-
bourg, Recueil de Législation, A-No 3, 27 janvier 1978, page 40. 
205  Articles 18 and 19 Règlement grand-ducal du 21 janvier 1978 portant organisation du stage judi-
ciaire et règlement l’accès au notariat, Memorial, Journal Officiel du Grand-Duché de Luxem-
bourg, Recueil de Législation, A-No 3, 27 janvier 1978, page 40. 
206  Article 6(1b) provides for an exemption to the stage. Lawyers who have finished their stage in 
their home country can become a member of the Luxembourg bar if they have at least five 
years of practical experience. 
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hold the nationality of one of the Member States of the European Union.207 Also, a 
candidate lawyer must present a guarantee of honour.208  
 
Professional Profile of an Advocaat/Avocat 
The Netherlands 
In the Netherlands there is a rather limited professional monopoly for lawyers. 
There is no monopoly for giving legal advice209 and just a limited monopoly for 
representing clients in court.210 As in other civil law countries, the preparation of 
deeds and other formal documents is the territory of the notaris, or the notary.211 
The Netherlands does not have a prohibition with regard to lawyers working to-
gether, quite to the contrary. The Netherlands has always been, as is the case with 
the United Kingdom, a Member State in which large law firms thrive.212 It is only 
in recent years that some other Member States, such as Germany, have developed 
large law firms. Also with respect to associations with lawyers from other Member 
States and other professions, the so-called multi-disciplinary partnerships, the rules 
are quite relaxed.213 The Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten has issued a Verordening in 
which the professions that are allowed to practise in association with lawyers are 
listed.214 In 2006 there were 14,251 advocaten in the Netherlands.215 In a population 
of about 16.5 million people,216 there is a ratio of one lawyer for every 1158 people. 
Similar to the Scandinavian countries, the low proportion of lawyers is probably 
explained by the fact that there is no legal monopoly for giving legal advice and 
only a moderate monopoly with regard to representing clients in court.217 
 
Belgium 
The monopoly rights of an avocat in Belgium are similar to those of other civil law 
jurisdictions in Europe. There is, however, no legal monopoly for giving legal advice 
and the preparation and validation of documents is the domain of the notary and not 
that of the avocat. The legal monopolies of the Belgian avocat are laid down in more 
detail than, for example, in the Netherlands. Chapter II of Book III of the Gerech-
telijk Wetboek lays down the rights and duties of lawyers. Article 439 states that 
lawyers have the right to plead before the Courts (excluding the Hof van Cassatie 
                                                  
207  Article 6(1c) Avocat law. 
208  Article 6(1a) Avocat law. 
209  See Hoegen Dijkhoef (1993), p. 245. 
210  This trial monopoly mainly extends over civil and criminal cases and the Tax Chamber of the 
Supreme Court, in all other cases advocaten do not have a trial monopoly. See See Hoegen 
Dijkhoef (1993), p. 246. 
211  See Hoegen Dijkhoef (1993), p. 247. 
212  Adamson (1998), pp. 23-24. 
213  Adamson (1998), p. 23. 
214  Samenwerkingsverordening 1993. The interpretation of this Verordening has led to serious 
questions with regard to European competition law in the famous Wouters case (Case C-309/99, 
J.C.J. Wouters, J.W. Savelbergh, Price Waterhouse Belastingadviseurs BV v. Algemene Raad van de 
Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, [2002] ECR I-01577) On Wouters, see also: Duncan (2001), 
pp. 537-559 and Vossestein (2002), pp. 841-863. 
215  See <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 20 November 2006. 
216  See CIA World Fact Book, <www.cia.gov>, last accessed 20 November 2006. 
217  See Hoegen Dijkhoef (1993), p. 245. 
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(Supreme Court)).218 Article 440 of the Gerechtelijk Wetboek makes this right to 
plead before the Courts exclusive for avocats.219 The remainder of the articles are 
devoted to the duties of an avocat. Article 441 Gerechtelijk Wetboek, for example, 
states that avocats must wear the clothing prescribed by the King.220 Other duties 
include the duty to replace judges and public prosecutors when called upon,221 the 
duty to pay fees to the Bar,222 the duty to defend the truth and the law,223 the duty 
to refrain from attacking the monarchy, the Constitution or laws of the Belgian 
people224 and to perform pro deo duties.225  
In keeping with the civil law tradition, it is not commonplace for Belgian 
lawyers to work in association. Lawyers are prohibited from working in a salaried 
practice.226 Working in association is allowed, although it must be stressed that law-
yers may only function as associates in a law firm and not as employees.227 Although 
MDPs were always prohibited,228 the Orde van de Vlaamse Balies (Flemish Bar Asso-
ciation) has established a regulation that at least opens the door for avocats to 
participate in MDPs.229 
There are 14,592 avocats in Belgium.230 In the total population of 10.3 million231 
this represents a ratio of one lawyer for every 705 persons. This is a high rate when 
compared with the other Member States reviewed. The higher rate is perhaps 
explained by the fact that the legal monopolies for avocats are more extensive for 
representation of clients in court, than, for example, in the Netherlands and the 
Scandinavian and Nordic countries, which have more limited statutory monopolies 
for lawyers. 
 
Luxembourg 
Similar to Belgium, and in accordance with its civil law tradition, the legal monopolies 
for an avocat in Luxembourg are laid down in the Avocat law. Avocats are not allowed 
to exercise other regulated legal professions, nor are they allowed to work in salaried 
practice.232 Article 2 of the Avocat law regulates the activities especially reserved for 
                                                  
218  Article 439 Gerechtelijk Wetboek.  
219  Article 440 Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
220  Article 441 Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
221  Article 442 Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
222  Article 443 Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
223  In which they need to refrain from attacking the honour of any person unless it is absolutely 
necessary, Article 444 Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
224  Article 445 Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
225  Articles 446 and 446bis Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
226  See Philippe & Roberts (1993), p. 86. 
227 Ibid. 
228 Ibid. 
229  Reglement inzake beroepsmatige samenwerking met niet-advocaten, 22 January 2003. Via <www. 
advocaat.be>, last accessed 24 May 2004. The reglement did not prohibit MDPs as such, but 
the articles explicitly prohibiting certain MDPs were quashed by the Hof van Cassatie (Supreme 
Court) in its judgment of 25-09-2003, NJW nr. 43, 8 October 2003. This judgment was based 
on the infamous Wouters case which dealt with the regulation on cooperation with non-lawyers 
from the Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten. 
230  See <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 21 November 2006. 
231  See <www.cia.gov>, last accessed 21 November 2006. 
232  Article 1 Avocat law. 
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avocats. First of all, Article 2 states that avocats have the sole right to represent clients 
before a court and the sole right to exercise all the activities that are linked to such 
representation.233 Unprecedented in the Member States reviewed until now is the 
fact that Article 2 of the Avocat law also regulates the provision of legal advice. 
Paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the Avocat law states that no-one but a lawyer can give 
legal advice. This creates an enormous legal monopoly for lawyers, and further-
more proceeds to explain the high lawyer to person ratio that exists in Luxem-
bourg.234 Paragraph 3 of Article 2 clarifies that the prohibition on giving legal advice 
for non-lawyers is not absolute. The paragraph names a few situations where the 
provision of legal advice by non-lawyers is acceptable. These exceptions focus mainly 
on advice for educational reasons; advice given on a non-profit basis and advice by 
in-house lawyers, and so forth.235 Article 3 of the Avocat law reconfirms that point 
of view by stating that the Avocat law does not hinder dealing with legal matters on 
an educational basis or for the benefit of documentation.236 The protection of the 
title, the right to wear a robe, and the liberal characteristics of the profession and 
the conditions of honour required for the profession can be found further on in the 
Avocat law.237 Article 34 of the Avocat law regulates practice in association. Avocats 
are allowed to practise in association among themselves. Nothing is mentioned with 
regard to MDPs, which could lead to the conclusion that avocats are not allowed to 
function in MDPs.238  
In a population of 450,000 people, there are about 800 lawyers in Luxembourg, 
a quarter of whom are lawyers of foreign origin.239 This makes a lawyer-to-person 
ratio of one lawyer for every 562 people, which needless to say, is extremely high. 
This can be explained by the fact that the European Court of Justice is established 
in Luxembourg’s capital, and by reference to the strict civil law basis on which the 
legal profession is based. 
§ 2.4 The Legal Professions in France, Italy, Spain and 
Portugal 
The review of the professions in Belgium and Luxembourg provides for an almost 
seamless transition to the review of the other legal professions from jurisdictions 
that have their origin in the civil law tradition. These jurisdictions represent one of 
the two remaining clusters of countries that are both characterised by a higher degree 
of regulation for the legal profession. The other cluster is the legal professions in 
Germany, Austria and Greece which will be dealt with in the next paragraph. 
 
                                                  
233  Article 2(1) Avocat law. 
234  Article 2(2) Avocat law. 
235  Article 2(3) Avocat law. 
236  Article 3 Avocat law.  
237  Articles 31-40 Avocat law. 
238  Article 34 Avocat law. This thesis is also underlined by the fact that avocats may not work in 
salaried practice. 
239  See <www.barreau.lu>, last accessed 27 November 2006. The CCBE mentions a number of 
1261 avocats. According to the same statistic, 103 lawyers are established under their home 
country professional title in Luxembourg. Via <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 11 June 2007. 
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Qualifications as an Avocat/Avvocato/Abogado/Advogado 
France 
The current profession of the avocat in France is an assembly of a number of older 
professions, both traditional and non-traditional legal professions. In 1971, a number 
of legal professions were created. The professions of the avocat and avoué had existed 
since the Middle Ages, while the profession of conseil juridique was newly created. In 
1991, these three professions were brought together into one, the profession of 
avocat. A remnant of the profession of the avoué still exists before the highest courts 
in France, namely the Cour de Cassation and the Conseil d’État. Aside from these 
professions, the classical civil-law profession of the notaire also remains independent 
in France. The focus of this chapter will be on the profession of the avocat as it has 
been since 1991.240 The legal profession in France is governed by an abundance of 
laws, decrees and lower governmental rules.241 The requirements for becoming an 
avocat in France are scattered throughout the numerous legal provisions. This para-
graph will describe the road to qualification in chronological order and will therefore 
meander through the different legal provisions.242 The first condition for becoming 
an avocat in France is one traditional in civil law jurisdictions, namely the condition 
of nationality. Under the influence of particular developments in France243 this 
condition of nationality is very broad. One needs to have either French nationality, 
the nationality of one of the Member States of the European Union, the nationality 
of one of the Member States of the European Economic Area or the nationality of 
one of the territorial units that have an agreement with France on this matter.244 
After it has been established that the prospective avocat has the adequate nationality 
it must then be examined whether he or she has the correct education in order to 
become an avocat. In order to become an avocat one must have a university diploma 
in law, a maîtrise de droit or a diploma that is deemed to be the equivalent with such 
a maîtrise.245 The diplomas that are deemed equivalent are laid down in subordinate 
legislation.246 
After a prospective avocat has finished his university education or an education 
that is deemed equivalent, he must then start his professional education. In other 
Member States this professional education normally consists of a combination of 
education which is sometimes followed by a concluding examination, and a stage. 
This is also the case in France, but here the approach is more ‘scholastic’ than in 
                                                  
240  For the development of the profession of avocat, see Adamson (1998). 
241  The most important of these rules are: Loi no. 71-1130 du 31 décembre 1971 portant réforme de 
certaines professions judiciaires et juridiques, JO de la République Française, 5 janvier 1972, 131; 
Loi no 90-1259 du 31 décembre 1990 rélative à l’exercice sous forme de sociétés des professions 
libérales soumises à un statut législatif ou règlementaire ou dont le titre est protégé, JO de la 
République Française, 5 janvier 1991, 220; Décret no 91-1197 du 27 novembre 1991 modifié 
organisant la profession d’avocat, JO de la République Française, 28 novembre 1991, 15502. 
There is an abundance of further rules but they will be dealt with where appropriate. 
242  On the basis of an overview published by the Conseil National de Barreaux. See <www.cnb. 
avocat.fr.>, last accessed 16 August 2004. The order has somewhat changed in 2005. 
243  Membership of the European Community and the independence of France’s former colonies. 
244  Article 11 § 1(1) of the Loi du 31 décembre 1971. 
245  Article 11 § 1(2) of the Loi du 31 décembre 1971. 
246 Article 1 of the Arrêté du 25 novembre 1998 fixant la liste des titres ou diplômes reconnus 
comme équivalents à la maîtrise en droit pour l’exercice de la profession d’avocat.  
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other Member States. After the completion of university education, a prospective 
avocat must sit an exam in order to be accepted to what is called a Centre régional de 
formation professionelle d’avocats (CRFPA).247 The criteria for the exam are laid down 
in lower regulation.248 In some circumstances, prospective avocats can be exempted 
from sitting the entry exam.249 Courses at the CRFPA last for one year. The courses 
will focus mainly on the practical side of the avocat’s profession. Students are taught, 
among other things, how to write legal documents, how to plead and so forth.250 
Following a year of study in the CRFPA, the prospective avocat will have to pass an 
examination in order to obtain the certificat d’aptitude à la profession d’avocat or CAPA.251 
As soon as the prospective avocat has obtained the CAPA he may apply to the 
Council of the Bar of his choice in order to commence his ‘in-house’ professional 
training. The Bars in France enjoy a large amount of autonomy, and the unicité du 
cabinet prevents a lawyer from being established at more than one Bar at the same 
time.252 The Council of the Bar shall allow the prospective avocat admission to the 
Bar after having checked that the candidate fulfils all the necessary requirements in 
order to be sworn in as an avocat.253 If the Council is convinced that the requirements 
are fulfilled, the candidate is enlisted on the stage list after he has taken the oath.254 
After the candidate is sworn in as avocat, he will commence his stage which is of 
two years’ duration.255 During that stage the avocat will work using his title but under 
the supervision of a patron.256 After the avocat has successfully completed his stage, he 
will be inscribed on the Tableau.257 He is then a fully-fledged avocat. 
 
Italy 
The legal profession in Italy used to consist of two separate professions, namely 
avvocato and procuratore.258 Access to the profession of the avvocato was only possible 
after having worked as a procuratore for six years.259 This system was recently abol-
ished260 leaving only the profession of the avvocato.261 This abolition was achieved 
                                                  
247  Articles 51 to 54 of the décret du 27 novembre 1991. 
248  Arrêté du 29 janvier 1998 fixant le programme et les modalités de l’examen d’accès au centre 
régional de formation profesionelle d’avocats. 
249  Arrêté du 17 février 1993 modifié fixant la liste des diplômes universitaires à finalité profes-
sionelle permettant d’être dispensé de tout ou partie de l’examen d’accès au centre régional de 
formation professionelle d’avocats. See also: Arrêté du 22 juin 1998 fixant la liste des diplômes 
universitaires en sciences juridiques ou politiques permettant d’être dispensé de tout ou partie 
de l’examen d’accès au centre régional de formation professionelle d’avocats. 
250  Articles 56 to 61 of the décret du 27 novembre 1991. 
251  Articles 68 to 71 of the décret du 27 novembre 1991. 
252  Article 101 of the décret du 27 novembre 1991. 
253  Article 72 of the décret du 27 novembre 1991. 
254  Article 3(2) of the loi du 31 décembre 1971: ‘Je jure, comme avocat, d’exercer mes fonctions avec 
dignité, conscience, indépendance, probité et humanité’. The rules with regard to inscription on the 
stage-list are laid down in Articles 72 to 76 of the décret du 27 novembre 1991. 
255  Articles 77 to 83 of the décret du 27 novembre 1991. 
256  Ibid. 
257  Articles 93 to 96 of the décret du 27 novembre 1991. 
258  See Davoni (1993), p. 198. 
259  Ibid., p. 199. 
260  Legge 24 febbraio 1997, n. 27 ‘Soppressione dell’albo dei procuratori legali e norme in materia 
di esercizio della professione forense’, Gazzetta Ufficiale, n. 48 del 27 febbraio 1997. 
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quite easily as there were no additional entry requirements for the profession of 
avvocato when one had qualified as a procuratore. This is due to the fact that entry 
into the profession of avvocato was achieved after six years by virtue of seniority 
alone.262 Similar to the situation found in France, the legal profession in Italy is highly 
decentralised. There is a national Bar Association, the Consiglio Nazionale Forense, 
that has certain powers in connection with the legal professions, but it is none-
theless mainly responsible for the supervision of the 160 regional Bar associations, 
the Consiglio dell’ordine.263 Another similarity with France is that the law governing 
the legal profession has been amended quite a few times, with the original text of 
the law remaining intact. This has at times led to confusing situations. A law dating 
from 1933 governs the legal profession in Italy.264 This law has been modified a 
number of times, most notably in 1997 when the distinctions between the profes-
sions of procuratore and avvocato were abolished.265 The 1933 legislation, which will 
be referred to as the Avvocato law from here on, still lists the criteria required for 
becoming a procuratore.266 The law abolishing the dichotomy between the professions 
of procuratore and avvocato states that anywhere where the Avvocato law mentions the 
term procuratore it should be read as avvocato.267 It can therefore be concluded safely 
that Article 17 of the Avvocato law lists the criteria for becoming an avvocato. First, 
Article 17 states that a person who seeks to become an avvocato must have Italian 
nationality.268, 269 In addition, a person who seeks entry to the legal profession must 
have legal capacity270 and must be of ‘honourable and spotless’ conduct.271 The fourth 
requirement for becoming an avvocato in Italy is the possesion of a law degree.272 
                                                  
261  Besides the profession of notario, which will not be dealt with in this study. 
262  See Davoni (1993), p. 199. 
263  Ibid., p. 195. 
264  Regio Decreto Legge 27 novembre 1933, n. 1578, ‘Ordinamento delle professioni di avvocato e 
di procuratore’, Gazzetta Ufficiale, n. 281, 5 dicembre 1933, Serie Generale; Convertito in 
legge, con modificazioni, dalla Legge 22 gennaio 1934, n. 36.  
265  Legge 24 febbraio 1997, n. 27 ‘Soppressione dell’albo dei procuratori legali e norme in materia 
di esercizio della professione forense’, Gazzetta Ufficiale, n. 48 del 27 febbraio 1997.  
266  Article 17 Avvocato law. 
267  Legge 24 febbraio 1997, n. 27 ‘Soppressione dell’albo dei procuratori legali e norme in materia 
di esercizio della professione forense’, Gazzetta Ufficiale, n. 48 del 27 febbraio 1997.  
268  Article 17(1) Avvocato law.  
269  It may be obvious that, after the Reyners case (Case 2/74, Reyners v. Belgium, [1974] ECR 631) 
a nationality requirement for the profession of avvocato can no longer be upheld. It must there-
fore be concluded that the requirement ‘having Italian nationality’ must be read as ‘having the 
nationality of one of the Member States of the European Union’. See also: Davoni (1993), 
p. 196. This premise was confirmed in Italian legislation: Legge n. 146, ‘Disposizioni per 
l’adempimento di obblighi derivati dall’appartenenza dell’Italia alla Comunità europea, legge 
comunitaria 1993’. See § 15 of A-G Stix-Hackl’s opinion in Case C-313/01, Christine Valia 
Morgenbesser v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli avvocati di Genova. In 1998 a law was adopted that also 
suppresses the requirement of nationality for non-EU nationals. See Article 35 of the Legge 6 
marzo 1998, n. 40, ‘Disciplina dell’immigrazione e norme sulla condizione dello straniero’, 
Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 59 del 12 marzo 1998 Supplemento Ordinario–n. 40. See also: <elixir. bham. 
ac.uk/Country%20information/Italy/lawyers_frameset.htm>, last accessed 9 November 2004. 
270  ‘Godere il pieno esercizio dei diritti civile’, Article 17(2) Avvocato law. 
271  ‘Essere di condotta specchiatissima ed illibata’, Article 17(3) Avvocato law. 
272  ‘Essere in possesso della laurea in giurisprudenza conferita o conformata in una università del 
regno’, Article 17(4) Avvocato law. Traditionally this law degree took four years to complete. See 
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According to the Avvocato law, these four criteria must be fulfilled for entry to the 
second phase of the professional education, namely the practical training that will 
eventually lead to the successful completion of the Bar Exam. To this end, the 
prospective lawyers will be registered in a separate list as practicanti.273 
In recent years, however, an additional criterion has been added to these four 
criteria to enter into the second phase of professional training as a practicanto. In 
1997, the Italian legislature introduced a new possible stage of theoretical training 
for prospective lawyers.274 These scuole di specializzazione per le professione legali are 
post-graduate institutions that provide a theoretical training before a lawyer com-
mences practical training. Initially this training was to last for a period of two years275 
but after the reform of university education and the prolongation of the law degree 
from four to five (three plus two) years, the duration of the course at the scuole di 
specializzazione per le professione legali was shortened to one year.276 Similar to the 
CRFPA in France, entry into these specialised schools is subject to passing a com-
petitive entry exam.277 The number of places at the specialised schools is determined 
by Ministerial Decree, but will not be lower than 10 per cent of the total number 
of law graduates.278 Attending this scuole is not obligatory. 
If the prospective lawyer has chosen to follow courses at the scuole he can, after 
the successful completion of the year-long training there by means submitting a 
dissertation,279 file a request to his local Bar Association to be entered on the list of 
practicanti and to start the practical phase of his education to become an avvocato. 
                                                  
Davoni (1993), p. 196. Recently, in 1999, reforms inspired by the Bologna declaration have lead 
to a two-cycle law degree where the first cycle takes three years and the second cycle, which 
must be completed for entry into the legal profession, takes up two years. The total time for a 
law degree therefore is five years. See Henssler (s.d.). See also: Italian Ministry for Education, 
University and Research (2003). Article 17(4) reads as if a law degree from an Italian University is 
a necessary requirement. This is no longer the case, however. The Decreto Legislativo that 
implements Directive 89/48/EEC, Decreto Legislativo 27 gennaio 1992, n. 115, Attuazione 
della direttiva n. 89/48/CEE relative ad un sistema generale di riconoscimento dei diplomi di 
instruzione superiore che sanzionano formazioni professionali di durata minima di tre anni, 
Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 40 del 18 febbraio 1992, abolishes the requirements for having an Italian law 
degree and completing a stage in Italy.  
273  Article 17 Avvocato law. 
274  Decreto Legislativo 17 novembre 1997, n. 398, Modifica alla disciplina del concorso per uditore 
giudiziario e norme sulle scuole di specializzazione per le professione legali, a norma dell’articolo 
17, commi 113 e 114 della legge 15 maggio 1997, n. 12, Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 269 del 18 
novembre 1997. 
275  Article 16 Decreto Legislativo 17 novembre 1997, n. 398. 
276  Henssler (s.d). See also: <elixir.bham.ac.uk/Country%20information/Italy/frameset.htm>, last 
accessed 11 November 2004. The rationale behind this shortening is that the theoretical phase 
of the training of an avvocato would last no longer than six years (at the minimum, as many 
people take more time than the five years prescribed for university education). 
277  Article 16(5) Decreto Legislativo 17 novembre 1997, n. 398 
278  Ibid. For example, the number of places for the specialised schools for the academic year 2004-
2005 was fixed at 5030 places. See Ministero dell’instruzione dell’universita ‘e della ricerca, 
Decreto 29 giugno 2004, programmazione degli accessi alle scuole di specializzazione per le 
professioni legali, per l’anno accademico 2004-2005, Gazzetta Ufficiale, n. 165, 16 July 2004.  
279  Article 8 Decreto Ministeriale 21 dicembre 1999, n. 537, Regolamento recante norme per 
l’instituzione e l’organizzazione delle scuole de specializzazione per le professioni legali, Gazzetta 
Ufficiale, n. 24, 31 gennaio 2000, Serie Generale.  
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This practical training is once again mentioned in Article 17 of the Avvocato law,280 
and states that the practical training may be done in a number of guises, but it 
mostly takes place in the office of an avvocato.281 Traditionally this practical training 
took two years yet, after one year of training, a prospective lawyer could ask the 
Bar Association for permission to deal with certain cases on a more autonomous 
basis. After the introduction of the scuole specializzazione per le professione legali, the 
requirement for practice was reduced to one year for those who followed the 
scuole.282 If the prospective lawyer can produce a certificate indicating that he has 
fulfilled the requirements of the practical period he may sit the Bar exam.283 When 
the lawyer has passed this Bar exam, which consists of both written and oral parts 
on a number of subjects,284 he may seek to be included on the list of avvocati.285 
There are two more conditions in Article 17 that need to be fulfilled in order to 
become an avvocato. Subsection 7 states that an avvocato must reside in Italy, while 
subsection 8 states that a lawyer must be a member of the fascist party. While it 
may be obvious that the last criterion has become obsolete, that is not so obvious 
for the residence criterion. Clearly, on the basis of well-established case law,286 a 
residence requirement as such is contrary to European Community law. This residence 
requirement was one of the problems287 that was dealt with in proceedings under 
Article 226 EC against Italy before the European Court of Justice.288 In her opinion 
of 3 May 2001, Advocate-General Stix-Hackl stated that, although the residence 
requirement was, at the time of her opinion, due to be repealed, it was contrary to 
European law.289 The Court agreed with her.290 The repeal of the residence require-
ment was foreseen in a proposal for a law.291 In Article 5 of this proposal, the 
residence requirement as such was transformed into a requirement of professional 
residence.292 It seems that at this point in time the proposal has not been trans-
formed into a law, so the infringement of European Law remains. 
 
                                                  
280  Article 17(5) Avvocato law.  
281  Decreto Presidente Repubblica 10 aprile 1990, n. 101, Regolamento relativo alla pratica forense 
per l’ammissione all’esame di procuratore legale, Gazzetta Ufficiale, n. 102, 4 maggio 1990, 
Serie Generale. 
282  See <elixir.bham.ac.uk/Country%20information/Italy/lawyers_frameset.htm>, last accessed 11 
November 2004. No reference to legal instruments is present on the cited web-site. The author 
has not been able to retrieve a source for this reduction from any of the legal instruments at his 
disposal. 
283  Article 22 Avvocato law. See also: Davoni (1993), p. 198. 
284  Article 17(6); 20 Avvocato law. 
285  Article 24-26 Avvocato law. 
286  Case 107/83, Ordre des Avocats au Barreau de Paris v. Klopp [1984] ECR 2971. 
287  The remainder wil be dealt with in the next paragraph. 
288  Case C-145/99, Commission of the European Community v. Italian Republic, ECR[2002] I-
02235.  
289  § 33 of A-G Stix-Hackl’s opinion in Case C-145/99. Italy argued that it was no longer enforced, 
since the Bar Association had mentioned in an advice (6/1994) that it would no longer be 
enforced. 
290  § 31 Case C-145/99. 
291  Progetto di Legge N.- 5211, Nuove disposizioni sulla professione di avvocato. 
292  Ibid., Article 5. 
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Spain 
The legal profession in Spain has a unique position in comparison with the legal 
professions examined up to this point. The representation of clients in court is not 
reserved for the legal profession of the abogado, but is rather reserved for the 
procurador.293 Spain is therefore the only country observed until now that has retained 
the traditional dichotomy between the profession of advocate and that of procurator. 
In the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France and Italy this dichotomy has 
been abolished. Unlike France and Italy, where there is an abundance of laws and 
other governmental-level regulations regarding the legal profession, the rules gov-
erning the legal profession in Spain are quite clear. There are two main instruments 
that govern the legal profession. First, there is the Estatuto General de la Abogacía 
Española294 (hereinafter referred to as the Abogado law). Another important law for 
the profession of the abogado, specifically where it concerns the relationship with the 
profession of procurador, is the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial.295 As stated above, the 
National Bar Association (hereinafter the Consejo General) seems to have more 
responsibilities than its counterparts in France and Italy. Spain has a system of qual-
ification that is fundamentally different from what is commonplace in the rest of the 
Member States. In the Member States already observed, a general system of quali-
fication can be distilled, although certain differences remain. In general, qualification 
as a lawyer starts with an academic diploma, followed by a period of theoretical and 
practical training, which is concluded with a Bar Exam. Only after this period is a 
lawyer fully qualified. This is not the case in Spain. Qualification in Spain as an 
abogado is extremely simple. One only needs to have a law degree.296 When the law 
degree is completed, after a minimum of five years, one can request to be registered 
with a Colegio. Once this registration is complete, one is a qualified abogado.297 
Registration with a Colegio is laid down in the Abogado law.298 Article 11 states that 
registration with a Colegio is obligatory, except where the law provides otherwise. 
The Article states further that a lawyer can register with only one Colegio, where he 
will exercise the majority of his activity and where he is deemed to have his 
professional residence.299 In order to be registered with a Colegio one needs to fulfil 
a number of criteria. These criteria are listed in Article 12 of the Abogado law. First 
a prospective abogado must have Spanish nationality or one of the nationalities of 
the Member States of the European Union or the European Economic Area. 
Secondly, a prospective abogado must be of legal age and must not be incapacitated 
in respect of performing legal acts. Thirdly, as already indicated, a prospective 
abogado must possess a Spanish degree in law, or a foreign degree that is deemed 
                                                  
293  See Calderón (1993), p. 280. 
294  Estatuto General de la Abogacía Española, Real Decreto 658/2001 de 22 de junio, BOE no. 
164 de 10 de julio de 2001. 
295  Ley Orgánica 6/1985, de 1 de julio, del Poder Judicial (ultima actualización 15/01/2004) BOE, 
de 2 de julio de 1985. 
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Article 542 Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial. 
297  Ibid. 
298  Articles 11–20 Abogado law. 
299  The traditional civil law unicité du cabinet. Article 11 Abogado law. 
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equivalent to the Spanish law degree. Fourthly, one must fulfil the entry require-
ments of the Colegio concerned.300 
As stated above, the relative ease with which one can become an abogado in 
Spain forces the Spanish authorities to distinguish between abogados who actually 
exercise the profession and those who do not. For the former, the Abogado law lists 
a number of additional criteria. First of all, an abogado proposing to practise must 
not have been the subject of a criminal conviction that disqualified him from the 
profession of the abogado. Secondly, there may not be any other incapacities or pro-
hibitions that apply to the prospective abogado that prevent him from joining the 
profession. Thirdly, those who have gained access to the legal profession in another 
Member State may establish themselves if they fulfil the criteria laid down by law, 
as long as they do not exercise activities that fall under the public service exception. 
Lastly, a prospective abogado must enter into a number of social security schemes.301 
The extensive prohibitions and incompatibilities with regard to the profession of 
lawyer are also laid down in the Abogado law.302 When the criteria for entrance to the 
Colegio are fulfilled, the lawyer must make an oath or a promise, after which he is a 
member of the Colegio and therefore an abogado.303 
 
Portugal 
The legal profession in Portugal bears some resemblance to the legal profession in 
Spain. Similar to most southern European systems, the Portuguese system can be 
characterised by a nature is rooted in civil law. Similar to Spain, the traditional dicho-
tomy between the advocate and procurator survives in Portugal in the professions 
of the advogado and solicitador. The division of activities between the two professions 
is, however, not as clear cut as in Spain, and the professional activity of a solicitador 
differs somewhat from that of a Spanish procurador. The dichotomy between the two 
professions is not similar to the dichotomy between the profession of solicitor and 
barrister in the common law countries but lies more along the line of a traditional 
division between the continental professions of ‘advocate’ and ‘procurator’.304 The 
solicitador performs acts that are similar to those of a ‘procurator’ (i.e., preparatory 
and administrative acts)305 but can also represent clients in court in cases where appeal 
is not possible due to the fact that there is only a very small claim, and where the 
law does not prescribe representation by a lawyer. Yet in the majority of cases solici-
tadores collaborate with advogados.306 One of the general characteristics of the legal 
profession in a civil law system is the fact that it is a very independent profession. 
This is illustrated in that lawyers traditionally work in a single-person practice and 
that the governing organisations are often decentralised and have a high degree of 
autonomy. This is not the case in Portugal. Similar to the Netherlands, there is one 
national Bar Association, the Ordem dos Advogados that is governed by law, the 
                                                  
300  Article 12(1) Abogado law. 
301  Article 12(2) Abogado law. 
302  Articles 14, 21-26 Abogado law. 
303  Article 16 Abogado law. 
304  Coelho Ribeiro & de Lourdes Lopes Dias (1993), p. 272. 
305  See Adamson (1998), p. 24; Killian (s.d.) C. 
306  Coelho Ribeiro & de Lourdes Lopes Dias (1993), p. 272. 
109 
Estatuto da Ordem dos Advogados.307 The Ordem covers the entire territory of Por-
tugal, yet it has some district administrative centres that are directly subordinate to 
the Ordem.308 The organisation of the profession is more centralised than in other 
jurisdictions. 
As opposed to the case of Spain, the general way of qualifying for the legal 
profession of the advogado in Portugal does not differ substantially from its civil law 
counterparts in the rest of Europe. A person seeking to become an advogado must 
complete a two-tier system comprising of university education and practical training. 
In order to exercise the profession of the advogado the prospective lawyer must com-
plete a traineeship, or estagio.309 In order to register for the estagio the prospective 
lawyer must have completed university education in law either at a Portuguese 
university or a foreign university. In the latter case, the diploma received must be 
fully recognised in Portugal.310 There are two State Universities in Portugal where 
a law degree can be obtained.311 For both of the two State Universities there is an 
entry requirement based on the results of secondary education.312 Education at the 
State University is essentially free.313 In addition, there are 23 private universities 
where a law degree can be obtained. These private universities generally have no entry 
requirements but do charge substantial fees.314 This division between universities 
also leads to a dichotomy in the labour market, where alumni of the two State 
Universities have a much better position than those who have obtained their degree 
from a private university.315 In general the estagio will last for two years, and is 
divided into two different phases.316 The first phase lasts for at least six months and 
is aimed at acquiring technical and deontological experience. This first phase takes 
the form of intensive theoretical education (three to four hours of lectures per 
day),317 which will be concluded with a test.318 When the prospective lawyer passes 
this test, he or she may proceed to the second phase of the estagio.319 The second 
phase of the estagio is aimed at gaining practical knowledge by means of taking part 
in the actual exercise of the profession and deepening the technical and deonto-
logical knowledge.320 Participation in the second part of the estagio is generally un-
paid.321 The second phase of the estagio is concluded with an individual evaluation 
of the estagio and completion (and passing) of a national Bar examination.322 Both 
                                                  
307  Lei no. 15/2005 de 26 de Janeiro de 2005. – Aprova o Estatuto da Ordem dos Advogados e 
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the contents of the estagio and the Bar exam are laid down by the General Council 
of the Ordem dos Advogados.323 
The activities that a prospective lawyer may carry out during his estagio are also 
laid down in the Advogado law. Article 189 of the Advogado law states that during 
the estagio a prospective lawyer, under the guidance of his patrono, may exercise the 
activities of a solicitador by representing clients in lower courts, both in criminal and 
in other fields, and give legal advice.324 A prospective lawyer may also carry out 
other activities of an advogado as long as he is accompanied by his patrono.325 At the 
beginning of his estagio, a prospective lawyer will register with the Ordem dos Advo-
gados in the district centre of his professional domicile.326 The professional domicile 
of a prospective lawyer is derived from the professional domicile of his patrono.327 
After successful completion of the estagio, the preparatory registration with the 
Ordem dos Advogados will be transformed into full registration.328 
Apart from the criteria mentioned above, there a number of other reasons why 
a person may not be able to register with the Ordem dos Advogados. These criteria 
are listed in Article 181 of the Advogado law and include; the lack of moral quality 
to exercise the profession, legal incapacity, the occurrence of incompatibilities and 
dismissal due to disciplinary reasons.329 When a lawyer fulfils the conditions of regis-
tration, he will be allowed to register and he will receive a document that functions 
as a proof of his registration.330 Whereas the route through the estagio is the most 
common way of becoming an advogado in Portugal, there are several exceptions to 
the estagio that are found in the Advogado law.331 These ‘shortcuts’ are available to 
holders of a doctorate in Legal Science who have actually taught and magistrates 
who have professional experience equal to or longer than the period of the estagio.332 
In addition to these persons who seem to be capable of becoming fully-fledged 
advogados after they register, there is a more limited registration available for jurists 
with recognised merits, masters and other holders of other doctorates in Law. These 
persons may register without the estagio after the successful completion of an apti-
tude test.333 This aptitude test deals mainly with deontology.334 Persons registered 
with the Ordem dos Advogados via this method are only allowed to give legal advice 
and are therefore not allowed to represent clients in court.335 
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Professional Profile of an Avocat/Avvocato/Abogado/Advogado 
France 
Characteristically for the civil law tradition, in France there are a considerable number 
of rules pertaining to the legal profession. As stated above, the three different pro-
fessions of the avocat, avoué and conseil juridique have been merged into one modern 
profession of the avocat. Later on in this subparagraph it will be indicated that the origin 
of different avocats can still be traced back to former days. Similar to Luxembourg, 
as another traditional civil law profession, the legal profession in France characterises 
itself through extensive legal monopolies for professional activity. Although not as 
explicit as in Luxembourg, it becomes clear when combining a number of legal 
provisions that avocats have a monopoly of representing and defending clients, and 
with regard to giving legal advice.336, 337 Also similar to Luxembourg, the legal pro-
fession in France suffers from extensive incompatibility requirements.338 For example, 
an avocat is not allowed to exercise any commercial activities. Unlike the situation 
in Luxembourg, an avocat may work in a salaried practice.339 
Although the profession of the conseil juridique was merged with the profession 
of the avocat in the 1990s, one can still see traces of the different professions in the 
modern avocat. As is the case in most civil law traditions, the profession of the lawyer 
is mainly a solitary one. In France, however, an interesting division can be observed. 
On the one hand, there are avocats in the true sense of the word. These avocats will 
often practise on their own or in small associations. Avocats who stem from the 
profession of conseil juridique, on the other hand, are observed to be concentrating 
in a much larger association; their association is the largest law firm in France.340 
There is no mention of MDPs, so it might be assumed that these are, as is the case 
in Luxembourg, not allowed.341 In a population of 62.5 million people342 there are 
45,686 avocats343 which leads to a ratio of one lawyer for every 1368 people. This low 
ratio is suprising, as in a civil law country one would expect a higher ratio. Possibly 
the low ratio can be explained by the fact that it is quite difficult to qualify as an 
avocat in France. 
 
Italy 
Similar to the other Member States which adhere to a civil law system, the rules in 
Italy offer a lot of protection for the profession of the avvocato, but this protection 
comes at a price. The Avvocato law includes a long list of professions that may not be 
exercised in combination with the profession of avvocato.344 With regard to the legal 
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monopolies for professional activities, a lot of uncertainty exists.345 Because of the 
fact that the Italian legal profession was divided between two separate professions 
for a number of decades, namely that of avvocato and procuratore, the legal monopoly 
for the modern avvocato is not entirely clear. Moreover, the Italian system distin-
guishes between judicial and extra-judicial activities for which different rules apply.346 
No hard and fast rules are laid down in the Avvocato law and legal monopolies can 
only be construed based on case law of the Supreme Court of Cassation. What 
becomes clear from this case law is that it is unlawful for a person who is not listed 
on a register of avvocati to engage in activities that can be regarded as judicial activities 
(e.g., the representation of clients in court).347 Case law with regard to extra-
judicial activities (i.e., giving legal advice) is much less explicit but several decisions 
of the Supreme Court seem to suggest that an exclusive right for extra-judicial 
activities also exists for avvocati.348 Traditionally, an Italian avvocato practises on his 
own in a general practice.349 Avvocati are not allowed to form corporations but are 
allowed to form professional partnerships, limited to members of the same Bar.350 
In 2001, together with the implementation of Directive 98/5/EC, rules were laid 
down for practice in association.351 These rules are very detailed and govern prac-
tically every aspect of practice in association.352 Associations are, for example, obliged 
to register with the Bar Association. By far the most important provision with 
regard to practice in association is laid down in Article 21 of the Decreto Legislativo, 
which states that all the partners in the association must hold the title of avvocato.353 
From that provision, in combination with the incompatibilities laid down in Article 
3 of the Avvocato law, it can be concluded that practice in Multi-Disciplinary Partner-
ships for lawyers is not allowed. 
In 1998, there were 83,000 avvocati in Italy.354 In a population of 58 million, this 
represents a ratio of one lawyer for 700 persons, a ratio that is among the highest in 
the European Union. This is probably due to the high degree of regulation in the 
Italian legal profession, stemming from the profession’s civil law characteristics. By 
2006 the number of avvocati had increased to 121,380.355 With a population that 
remained stable,356 this further increased the ratio to one lawyer for every 477 people. 
Interestingly enough, the members of the legal profession are not equally distributed 
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across Italy. In 1992, four regions in Italy accounted for almost half of the then 
53,000 avvocati.357 
 
Spain 
As stated above, the legal profession in Spain can be characterised as a civil law 
profession. In general, this characterisation means that, on the one hand, the legal 
profession is protected by an elaborate legal monopoly, and on the other hand, there 
are a large number of incompatibilities. Both elements are found in Spain albeit on a 
moderate scale. Although a very broad legal monopoly exists,358 there are a number 
of professions that exert pressure on this legal monopoly. Firstly, there is the profes-
sion of the procurador. According to the Ley Organica del Poder Judicial, a procurador is 
exclusively responsible for the relationship between the client and the courts.359 A 
client (and his abogado) must therefore solicit a procurador in order to pursue legal pro-
ceedings. In addition to the profession of procurador there a number of quasi-legal 
professions that strain the legal monopoly laid down for abogados.360 The professions 
concerned are the professions of graduados sociales, asesores fiscales and gestores adminis-
trativos.361 These professions, which are basically specialists advising in their specific 
fields, mainly infringe on the legal monopoly of the abogados with regard to legal 
advice. While advising the public on their specific fields, the above-named professions 
often give a form of legal advice, an activity reserved for abogados.362 On the other 
hand, there are a number of incompatibilities in the Abogado law.363 For example, an 
abogado cannot be a procurador, graduado social, agente de negocios or gesto administrativo at 
the same time.364 An abogado also cannot be employed as a State official.365 These 
and other incapacities resemble those in force in other civil law jurisdictions but do 
not seem to be as strict. It seems that salaried practice,366 practice in association367 and 
multi-disciplinary partnerships,368 albeit more or less limited, are allowed in Spain. 
In 2006 there were 151,542 abogados registered in Spain.369 Of these, 37,399 were 
registered as abogado but did not exercise professional activities,370 leaving the remain-
ing 114,143 as practising abogados. In a population of little over 40.3 million,371 this 
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leads to one lawyer for every 350 persons, which again is an extremely high ratio. 
Adamson372 tries to explain this enormous number of lawyers by stating the relative 
ease with which one can become an abogado in Spain.373 Yet, the figure used for this 
ratio omits the abogados who are merely registered and do not exercise professional 
activity. Lawyers who register as an abogado because it is no more than a formality 
and never really exercise the profession do not count in the ratio. I am therefore of 
the opinion that the ‘ease’ explanation does not really explain the high ratio of abo-
gados. Perhaps a better explanation can be found in the legal monopoly of abogados. 
 
Portugal 
The rules pertaining to professional activities in Portugal are somewhat scattered. 
Title I of the Advogado law deals with the exercise of the profession of the advogado, 
but refers to a more specific law in that title.374 That specific law is the Lei dos actos 
próprios dos Advogados.375 Moreover, the Advogado law states that practice of the legal 
profession in association shall be governed by a separate law.376 This has been effectu-
ated in the Novo Regime Juridico das Sociedades de Advogados.377 Generally, it can be said 
that advogados enjoy a large legal monopoly with regard to all activities concerning 
representation of clients in court and the provision of legal advice.378 Based on the 
Lei dos actos próprios dos Advogados379 it seems that advogados must share this legal 
monopoly with the profession of solicitador.380 The sharing of activities is however 
largely limited for solicitadores since subsection 11 of Article 1 of the Lei dos actos 
próprios dos Advogados states that the representation of clients in court and the provi-
sion of legal advice by solicitadores is limited by the procedural laws and the governing 
statute of the profession of solicitadore.381 As stated above, with regard to qualification, 
the right of provision of legal advice can also be granted to other categories of people, 
namely lawyers with recognised merit and academic staff in Law faculties.382 
It goes beyond the ambit of this paragraph to give a detailed overview of all the 
incompatibilities and impediments laid down in the Advogado law. It suffices to say 
at this point that the governing principles of the profession of advogado are auton-
omy, independence and responsibility.383 A long list of incompatibilities and impedi-
ments is included to elaborate on these general principles.384 Practice in association 
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is governed by a separate piece of legislation, namely Decreto-Lei 229/2004 de 10 de 
Dezembro. This does not mean, however, that the Advogado law says nothing about 
practice in association. On the contrary, the general principles regarding practice in 
association are laid down in the Advogado law,385 which states that advogados are 
allowed to practise in association with each other, either as associates or as partners.386 
While practising in association, advogados are bound to the deontological rules and 
the rules laid down in Decreto-Lei 229/2004 de 10 de Dezembro.387 Yet most impor-
tant for the purpose of this study is the general principle laid down in subparagraph 
3 of Article 203 of the Advogado law which states that association with other pro-
fessions other than that of the advogado is prohibited.388 Therefore, multi-disciplinary 
practices are not allowed in Portugal.389 According to data of the CCBE there are 
12,617 advogados in Portugal.390 In a population of 10.5 million,391 this represents 
one lawyer for every 832 persons, which, like Italy and Spain, is on the high end of 
the spectrum.  
§ 2.5 The Legal Professions in Germany, Austria and Greece 
The remaining jurisdictions that are to be reviewed – Germany, Austria and Greece – 
are also characterised by a high degree of regulation. This regulation is concerned 
with a higher level of state control than in the ‘traditional’ civil law jurisdictions. The 
professions considered in this paragraph have traditionally been single professions, 
with no division between advocates and ‘procurators’. It might be obvious for Ger-
many and Austria to be dealt with in the same paragraph, but Greece might seem a 
more unlikely candidate. However, the legal developments in Greece have been based 
on a more German approach, so that a review of the Greek legal profession seems 
most appropriate in this paragraph. 
 
Qualification as a Rechtsanwalt/Dikigoros 
Germany 
The main legal profession in Germany is the profession of the Rechtsanwalt.392 In 
addition to the Rechtsanwalt, there is also the profession of the Notar, which sees a 
number of variations throughout Germany.393 Next to these two ‘classic’ legal pro-
fessions there are also three other professions that are characterised by a high degree of 
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specialisation. These professions are that of the Patentanwalt (patent attorney), Steuer-
berater (tax adviser) and the Wirtschaftsprüfer (auditor).394 
As is the case in almost all of the continental Member States, a career as a Rechts-
anwalt is initiated at a university. However, unlike the other continental Member 
States, the assessment of what is actually learned at university is not done by the 
university itself which provides a culminated degree, but rather by the State.395 After 
three and a half years of studies at university, students have to sit the Erste Juristische 
Staatsprüfung (first State Examination) which can cover anything learned at univer-
sity.396 After the first State Examination the prospective Rechtsanwalt, then referred 
to as Refendar, will have to engage in a period of preparation (called Vorbereitungs-
dienst or Refedariat), in which the Referendar receives training in a number of Courts 
and with numerous lawyers.397 The Refedariat lasts for two years, after which a Zweite 
Juristische Staatsprüfung (second State Examination) will take place.398 After the two 
State Examinations, the prospective lawyer is qualified as an Einheitsjurist (unitary 
jurist), a qualification which grants him access to all the regulated legal professions 
in Germany; therefore not only access to the profession of the Rechtsanwalt, but also 
to the profession of the Notary, State Prosecutor or even the Judge.399 
Germany, therefore, has a system that has only one educational trail for all the 
regulated legal professions. It is, thus, clear that the education leading to the qualifi-
cation of Einheitsjurist is not focussed on a single profession. Although the profes-
sion of the judge takes up most of the weight in the Refendariat, most of those who 
follow the Refendariat become Rechtsanwälte because there are not enough jobs in 
the other professions.400 This leads to an unwanted situation, namely the fact that a 
large number of people end up in a certain profession, but that the education they 
are obliged to follow focuses mainly on another profession, namely that of judge. It 
was for this reason that both in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat proposals were sub-
mitted to change the law in such a manner that the education for Rechtsanwälte 
would be in better accordance with their actual profession, i.e., to remove the focus 
in the Refendariat from the profession of judge and focus it on the profession of the 
Rechtsanwalt.401  
Both proposals stated that education for lawyers was outdated and in need of 
reform. The Bundesrat recommends a schism in the first State examination. The bill 
proposed that all the compulsory courses at university should be assessed by means of 
a State examination, while the non-compulsory courses will be assessed at university 
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399  Bundesrat, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Deutschen Richtergesetzes und der 
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400  Deutscher Anwalt Verein, in a letter to the author dated 15 May 2000. 
401  Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf einer Gesetzes zur Reform der Juristenausbildung, Drucksache 
14/7176, 17 October 2001; and Bundesrat, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Deutschen 
Richtergesetzes und der Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung, Drucksache 671/01, 30 August 2001. 
See Riedel (2001). 
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level.402 With regard to the Refendariat, the Bundesrat argued that the first period (of 
one year) should remain unchanged, namely divided into four compulsory trainee-
ships.403 With regard to the year-long second period, the Bundesrat proposed to 
have it filled in at Länder-level, so that every Land can determine the contents of the 
second year. In addition, the Bundesrat proposed that a prospective Rechtsanwalt 
should be educated with a registered Rechtsanwalt for at least a twelve-month period.  
The bill of the Bundestag confirmed the proposals concerning the first State 
examination, namely the fact that universities should assess the voluntary subjects 
taught at university and that that assessment should make up half of the result of the 
first State Examination. The bill of the Bundestag is more rigorous to that extent, as 
it lays down that the traineeship at a Rechtsanwalt’s office should last twelve months. 
So, under the bill of the Bundestag, every Referendar will have to spend twelve months 
in a Rechtsanwalt’s office, while under the bill of the Bundesrat only Referendare who 
want to become Rechtsanwälte have to fulfil this requirement (i.e., via a combina-
tion of the compulsory and voluntary traineeships). In addition, the Bundestag pro-
posal also states that Einheitsjuristen can only become judges if they have worked in 
a different profession for at least two years, since only then do they have the ex-
perience that is necessary to become a judge. Clearly these bills modernise German 
legal education and the education for regulated professions, however, the German 
structure of the two State examinations and the unitary education will be retained. 
In 2002, the fate of both proposals was decided. The bill of the Bundesrat was 
rejected,404 while the bill of the Bundestag entered into force on 1 July 2003.405 
 
Austria 
In Austria the legal profession also uses the title of Rechtsanwalt. The rules that govern 
access to the profession of the Rechtsanwalt are laid down in the Rechtsanwaltsordnung 
(hereinafter RAO), more specifically in paragraph 1.406 First, the paragraph407 states 
that those who seek access to the profession of the Rechtsanwalt must have Austrian 
nationality. Section 3 of paragraph 1 states that nationals of Member States of the 
European Union will be regarded as Austrian nationals. In addition to the nationality 
requirement, the paragraph states that Rechtsanwälte must be entitled to practise. 
This entitlement flows from a number of additional requirements, also listed in the 
paragraph.  
The first of those additional requirements is that the prospective Rechtsanwalt has 
gained either a doctorate in law or the title of magister in law.408 This university 
education takes between four and six years.409 After the university education, the 
prospective Rechstanwalt (now called Rechtsanwaltanwärter) must complete a period 
                                                  
402  Bundesrat, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Deutschen Richtergesetzes und der 
Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung, Drucksache 671/01, 30 August 2001. 
403  Paragraph 5b DRiG.  
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tag.de>, last accessed 7 November 2006. 
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tag.de>, last accessed 7 November 2006. 
406  Rechtsanwaltsordnung, RGBL 96/1868, most recent change BGB I 71/1999. 
407  § 1(2) RAO. 
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409  Lonbay (s.d.) A. 
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of training with a Court and another Rechtsanwalt.410 This training period lasts for 
five years.411 During the training period, the Rechtsanwaltanwärter is obliged to follow 
education for at least 36 half days at the Anwaltsakademie.412 Then, the Rechtsanwalt-
anwärter is obliged to sit the Rechtsanwaltsprüfung, an examination that allows access 
to the profession of the Rechtsanwalt.413 After all this has been completed and after 
the Rechtsanwalt has taken out professional indemnity insurance, he can finally estab-
lish himself as a Rechtsanwalt. Overall, it takes about nine to eleven years before a 
person can qualify as an Austrian Rechtsanwalt. I think that it is mainly this very long 
educational trail, combined with financial hardship in at least the starting years414 of 
the profession,415 that leads to the low numbers of Rechtsanwälte in Austria. 
 
Greece 
In many ways Greece holds a unique position when compared with the other 
Member States considered in this book. In the first place, in respect of the fourteen 
other Member States before the enlargement round of 1 May 2004, Greece is geo-
graphically isolated. At least until the accession of Bulgaria, the country did not 
share any land borders with other Member States. The closest Member State is Italy 
which is found across the Adreatic Sea. Also with regard to its legal system, Greece 
holds a special place as it fills an intermediate position between the German and the 
civil law systems.416 The Greek legal profession of Δικηγόρος (hereinafter Dikigoros) 
has as a noteworthy feature that officially a Dikigoros is an unpaid civil servant who 
is employed by the government. This designation has been made redundant by a 
ruling of the Greek Council of State, declaring that the profession of the Dikigoros 
is mainly a free profession but still has public features since it is associated with the 
system of justice.417  
A single law, the Kodex Dikigoron, governs the legal profession in Greece.418 The 
Kodex governs qualifications as a Dikigoros as well as the rules governing the legal 
profession, although these are worked out in separate deontological codes issued by 
the regional Bars.419 Qualification as a Dikigoros starts with a law degree. A law degree 
can be obtained from one of the three Law Faculties (Athens, Thessaloniki and 
Komotini, in order of prestige and standard of entrance requirements).420 Entering 
a Law Faculty is rather difficult in Greece, as many students wish to follow a legal 
education. Everyone who finishes secondary education may take the entrance exam-
ination for the Greek universities. Entrance exams differ with regard to subject (Law 
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is in the same group as Archaeology, History, Greek, Languages etc.). The highest 
possible mark for the entrance exam is 20, and the three Law Faculties require a 
minimal mark of 18 or 19 in order to be eligible for admittance.421 This demon-
strates that it is extremely difficult to enter one of the Law Faculties. The same has 
been observed with regard to Portugal, where private universities cater to the stu-
dents who do not make it into one of the State Faculties. However, that option is 
not available in Greece, since private universities are forbidden. Many Greek students 
therefore seek legal education abroad.422 The studies in a Law Faculty last for a mini-
mum of four years and are concluded with an examination that is supervised by the 
Law Faculties without State involvement.423 After concluding the law degree, the 
prospective lawyer has six months to register for vocational training. In order to 
register, the candidate must have a law degree and a declaration of a Dikigoros who 
is willing to train him.424 The vocational training lasts for a period of eighteen 
months and consists of practical training under the supervision of a Dikigoros and of 
a more theoretical part in the form of training courses and seminars that are organised 
by the Bar where the lawyer is registered.425 During the training course, a prospec-
tive lawyer may represent clients before a court. In criminal matters and petty civil 
cases he may practise on his own, in all other cases he has to work in cooperation 
with the Dikigoros who supervises his training. A trainee lawyer must at least represent 
clients in a minimum of 30 cases during the eighteen-month training period.426 
Although subject to the same professional and deontological rules as a Dikigoros, a 
trainee lawyer will receive only small compensation for his work, paid by the Dikigoros 
who supervises his training.427 
The vocational training is concluded by a Bar examination that is organised by 
the Court of Appeal in the district of the Bar where the trainee lawyer is registered. 
The exam consists of both oral and written examinations in the field of civil law 
(including procedural law), criminal law (including procedural law), commercial law 
and rules concerning the profession.428 After the prospective lawyer has successfully 
completed the Bar examination (which he may re-sit twice) he is admitted to the 
Bar where he is registered as a trainee lawyer.429 In the first four years as a newly 
established Dikigoros he may practise before lower courts, then before the Court of 
Appeal, and after another five years he may also practise before the Supreme Court. 
A remark must be made with regard to nationality. In an article Kommatas 
states that a person who seeks to establish himself as a Dikigoros must have Greek 
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nationality.430 Although he already envisaged at the time of writing (which was in 
1993) that this requirement would become redundant after the implementation of 
the Diploma Directive, it may be clear that such a nationality requirement was no 
longer sustainable after the Reyners judgment. This also applies to Greece, where the 
lawyer is officially an unpaid civil servant, since the Supreme Court decided already 
in the 1970s and 1980s that a Dikigoros exercised a liberal profession. The public 
service exception that was invoked in the Reyners case cannot, therefore, be applied 
for the Greek situation, except for special situations that will be addressed later on 
in this chapter. The other remarkable requirement in the process of becoming a 
lawyer in Greece is concerned with the maximum age, which can become prob-
lematic if applied to lawyers who seek to integrate based on the Diploma Directive 
or on the basis of the establishment Directive. Possible problems in this respect will 
be dealt with later in this chapter.  
 
Professional Profile of a Rechtsanwalt/Dikigoros 
Germany 
The Rechtsanwalt in Germany enjoys an extensive legal monopoly.431 This monopoly 
includes representing clients in court and giving legal advice. This monopoly can 
be distilled from the legal provisions in both the BRAO which provides for the 
reservation of all legal activities for Rechtsanwälte432 and the Rechtsberatungsgesetz which 
explicitly reserves the giving of legal advice to Rechtsanwälte (besides some excep-
tions mainly with regard to the other legal professions mentioned above). As of 
January 2008 the Rechtsberatungsgesetz is replaced by a new Rechtsdienleistungsgesetz 
which will maintain the same strict monopoly rules for lawyers. This means that 
even quasi-legal professions such as corporate lawyers (Syndikusanwälte) must qualify 
as Rechstanwälte before they can practise. The activities of Rechtsanwälte are regulated 
in the BRAO on a federal level. The general rights and duties of a Rechtsanwalt are 
laid down in the third part of the BRAO.433 In general, Rechtsanwälte are engaged 
in private practice from their office which must be located in the jurisdiction of the 
court with which they are registered.434 In addition to that, Rechtsanwälte can work in 
an occupation435 and in public service.436 To a certain extent, lawyers are allowed 
to advertise their qualities.437 The BRAO also deals with the problem of multi-
disciplinary practices. The relevant paragraph of the BRAO states that a Rechtsanwalt 
may practise jointly with another Rechtsanwalt (including lawyers from other Member 
States established under their home title), a Patentanwalt (patent attorney), a Steuer-
berater (tax advisor), a Steuerbevollmächtige, a Wirtschaftsprüfer (auditor) and a vereidigter 
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Buchprüfer (sworn-in language revisor).438,439 In 2006 there were 138,679 lawyers in 
Germany.440 With a population of approximately 82 million there is one lawyer for 
every 590 people, which is a high ratio. 
 
Austria 
In Austria the activities of a Rechtsanwalt entail the representation of clients in the 
broadest sense of the word.441 That means that in Austria both the representation of 
clients and the giving of legal advice are reserved for the profession of the Rechts-
anwalt. To that end, a Rechtsanwalt may practise alone, in a joint practice with other 
lawyers,442 with other persons as long as they are not public officers (with the ex-
ception of teachers), notaries, or other professions that are not compatible with the 
subject of the profession of Rechtsanwalt.443 There are about 4850 Rechtsanwälte in 
Austria, and there are about 1900 Rechtsanwaltsanwärter (prospective lawyers).444 With 
a population of 8.2 million445 there is one lawyer for every 1690 people, which is a 
low ratio. 
 
Greece 
As stated above, the characteristics of the legal profession in Greece bear some resem-
blance to the legal professions in Germany and France. With regard to the combina-
tion between the legal monopoly and the incompatibilities, however, the Greek 
system resembles more the classical civil law system as applied in France than the 
German system. A Greek Dikigoros has in general a complete legal monopoly with 
regard to legal advice and the representation of clients in court. There are, however, 
situations where representation by a lawyer is not obligatory. In addition to the 
legal monopoly with regard to advice and representation, the Dikigoros also has the 
right to be present at the conclusion of formal documents.446 
As opposed to this large legal monopoly, traditionally, there are a large number 
of incompatibilities. The incompatibilities in Greece are numerous and not all that 
clear in their application. General rules will often have a large number of exceptions. 
It goes beyond the purpose of this chapter to describe all these rules in a detailed 
fashion. A Dikigoros can generally not be employed in a public service, but there are 
a few exceptions to this rule.447 Furthermore, a lawyer may not work in a profession 
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that would compromise his dignity or independence.448 People who have received 
a prison sentence (or the death sentence), who do not have legal capacity with regard 
to their property, who have not completed their military service, who have been 
disbarred by decision of the Disciplinary Council of the relevant Bar Association, 
or people who are clergymen or monks, may not become a lawyer.449 Based on the 
rules concerning incompatibilities, salaried practice must be possible, as long as the 
independence and dignity of the Dikigoros is not violated. Lawyers are also allowed 
to practise in association among themselves, provided they are established with the 
same Bar Association.450 Multi-Disciplinary Partnerships are not allowed in Greece.451 
According to the CCBE, there were 36,000 lawyers in Greece in 2006.452 With a 
population of over 10.5 million453 that represents one lawyer for every 291 people, 
which is an extremely high rate of lawyers, even higher than in Spain where no 
additional qualification is needed after one has obtained a law degree. This high 
rate is possibly explained by the fact that Greece has a maximum age for qualifying 
as a Dikigoros, which is not absolutely fixed, but which lies somewhere around the 
age of 30.454 Many law graduates, who in addition to the maximum age limit, must 
apply for training as a Dikigoros within six months after graduating,455 qualify as a 
lawyer at an early stage of their professional life just to prevent exclusion from this 
career option later on. Similar to Italy, the qualified lawyers in Greece are not spread 
evenly over the territory. The Bars in Athens and Piraeus account for more than 
half of the lawyers in Greece.456 
§ 2.6 Observations 
Based on the overview of the legal professions given above, a number of observa-
tions can be made. First of all, a threefold division can be formed in connection with 
the legal monopoly that is reserved for the legal professions in those countries. There 
is a group of countries, albeit small, that have no legal monopoly for their legal 
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profession at all. In these countries, Sweden and Finland, no qualification as a lawyer 
is necessary to exercise the legal professions. In a larger group, the legal professions 
have, more or less, a monopoly in representing clients in court, but the giving of 
legal advice is free from regulation, or at the very least is less regulated. These coun-
tries are the United Kingdom, Ireland, Belgium and the Netherlands. Denmark is a 
borderline case between this group and the next. The last group, by far the largest, 
has a legal monopoly for lawyers in both legal representation and, aside from excep-
tions, legal advice. These countries are Luxembourg, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, 
Germany, Austria and Greece. Based on this threefold division, the following table 
demonstrates the link between the degree of regulation in each Member State and 
the ratio of lawyers when compared with the total number of inhabitants. 
 
Table 2:  Degree of regulation of legal profession and ratio of lawyers to population, 
by country 
  
Country Degree of Regulation Lawyer to Population 
Ratio 
Sweden Low 1:2045 
Finland Low 1:2971 
Denmark Intermediate/High 1:1186 
United Kingdom Intermediate 1:378 
Ireland Intermediate 1:355 
The Netherlands Intermediate 1:1158 
Belgium Intermediate 1:705 
Luxembourg High 1:562 
France High 1:1368 
Italy High 1:477 
Spain High 1:350 
Portugal High 1:832 
Germany High 1:590 
Austria High 1:1690 
Greece High 1:291 
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From this table the general conclusion that can be drawn is that in countries 
where the degree of regulation is high there are large numbers of lawyers, and 
therefore a low ratio of lawyers to the population at large. The opposite is true for 
countries that have a low degree of regulation, not because there is less work for 
lawyers in these countries, but because other professions (regulated or not) exercise 
elements of the legal profession. There are, however, a number of exceptions to this 
general conclusion. The common law countries reviewed, the United Kingdom 
and Ireland, do not fit in the system set out above. There the number of lawyers is 
higher than one would expect based on the degree of regulation in both countries. 
This can be explained in a number of ways. First of all, the nature of the legal 
system in these two countries is fundamentally different from that of the rest of the 
countries reviewed. Tradition might lead people to seek employment in the legal 
sphere to qualify themselves as lawyers even where there is no legal monopoly that 
forces them to do so. A second, yet less likely, explanation is the fact that both juris-
dictions have a dual legal profession, i.e., solicitor/barrister, a distinction that has not 
been included in the table above. This explanation does, however, offer less support 
since the number of barristers is so low that it is unlikely to fundamentally alter the 
outcome. A third, and even less plausible explanation, could be sought in the fact that 
London is an international economic centre and, as a consequence, would require a 
high number of lawyers. This cannot serve as an explanation for the many lawyers 
since this is a phenomenon also present in Ireland that does not fulfil the vital 
function as being an economic centre. 
The importance of Brussels may be an explanation for the anomalous situation 
in Belgium, however, where there are also more lawyers than one would expect on 
the basis of the degree of regulation. Brussels is the centre of the European Union 
and therefore attracts a high number of lawyers. A final anomaly occurs in two coun-
tries that have a high degree of regulation and where one would therefore expect a 
high number of lawyers. These countries are France and Austria, which have less law-
yers than one would expect based on their strict legal monopolies. In the preceding 
paragraphs it has been explained that the lower numbers are probably a reflection of 
the difficulty of qualifying as a lawyer. This is exemplified by France in the difficult 
CAPA stage, and by Austria in the long qualification process and financial hardship 
during this period. 
Another observation that can be made is that a majority of the countries reviewed 
have a high degree of regulation, which is also reflected in the systems of secondary 
legislation specifically applicable to lawyers. Both the Services Directive and the Estab-
lishment Directive are only applicable to certain legal professions. This could pose 
problems for professionals who exercise an activity that is protected for lawyers in 
countries with a high degree of regulation but is open to anyone in countries with a 
lesser degree of regulation. This leads to the creation of a group of professionals (in 
those countries with less regulation, who are not members of the profession) that will 
remain untouched by the application of secondary legislation and therefore cannot 
benefit from the system this legislation creates. I will deal with this hidden group in 
the review of the specific modalities of free movement in the remainder of this chapter. 
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§ 3. The Free Provision of Services 
The previous chapter set out the rules and developments in connection with the free 
provision of services for lawyers. It was established that at an early stage of develop-
ment of the free movement of lawyers Directive 77/249/EEC was adopted, which 
allows the free provision of legal activities based on the principle of mutual recog-
nition. It was also observed that the Directive generated remarkably little case law over 
the 30 years of its existence. At the end of the previous paragraph the position of 
lawyers seeking to provide services in another Member State was described, and it 
can be depicted graphically as follows: 
 
Figure 2: Free provision of services 
 
 
It will be the purpose of this paragraph to research how the Member States in-
cluded in the review have implemented the mechanism described above. It may go 
without saying that the emphasis of the research will be on the possible anomalies 
in the different implementation mechanisms in the various Member States. For the 
purposes of this review the order of Member States established in the previous 
paragraph will be maintained. 
Before embarking on the review another problem must first be tackled. In the 
previous paragraph it was established that, in those countries that have a low or an 
intermediate degree of regulation for the legal profession, there are people who exer-
cise professional activities falling within the legal monopoly of the lawyer in those 
Member States that maintain a high degree of regulation. It must first be established 
whether, and how, this group can exercise its freedom to provide services in Member 
States that maintain a high degree of regulation.  
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126 
§ 3.1 Freedom to Provide Services for Non Lawyers in 
Highly Regulated Member States 
From both Figure 2 above and from Article 1(2) of Directive 77/249/EEC it becomes 
immediately clear that persons who wish to benefit from the provisions in the Direc-
tive must undergo a rite of initiation, namely qualification as a lawyer in the home 
Member State. Only then does such a person fall within the scope of application of 
the Directive. This means that for the group of people who exercise legal activities 
in countries with a low or intermediate degree of regulation, the Services Directive is 
rendered useless. That does not mean, however, that this group does not enjoy the 
freedom to provide services. In the previous chapter it was already established that 
Article 49 of the EC Treaty was given direct effect in the Van Binsbergen case.457 More-
over, it was also established that the general rule laid down in Gebhard 458 applies, 
namely that any rule liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of any of the 
four freedoms is prohibited unless objectively justified. Such objective justification 
could be based on, for example, consumer protection arguments. Unfortunately there is 
no case law on this from the European Court of Justice and therefore there is no way 
of ascertaining how the European Court of Justice would go about applying possi-
bilities for objective justification in these cases. Similarly, it can only be speculated 
how Member States with a high degree of regulation would react to a request from 
a non-lawyer to provide services in their territory. A Member State could invoke a 
justification based on the proposition that such a person is not properly qualified or 
insured, or any other mandatory requirement such as consumer protection. As said 
above, no such case law has emerged over the past 30 years and it is likely that such 
case law will never emerge since the problem has recently been solved in secondary 
legislation. 
In the previous chapter it was already mentioned that the system for the recog-
nition of diplomas was extensively revised in 2005 with Directive 2005/36/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the recog-
nition of professional qualifications.459 Recognition of professional qualification was 
until then only relevant in cases concerning permanent establishment in the host 
Member State. Therefore, Directive 2005/36/EC will be discussed extensively below, 
when dealing with lawyers who seek to establish themselves in the legal profession of 
the host Member State. There is, however, one aspect of the Directive that has to be 
dealt with here. Where the old system for diploma recognition only applied to estab-
lishment, the scope of Directive 2005/36/EC has been widened in such a fashion 
that it also covers the recognition of qualification issues in the provision of services. 
It therefore acts as a lex specialis compared with the system of relying directly on 
Article 49 EC combined with the Gebhard test described above. The rules on the 
provision of services are laid down in Articles 5 to 9 of Directive 2005/36/EC. 
Article 5 of the Directive states that without prejudice to specific provisions of Com-
                                                  
457  Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid, [1974] ECR 
1299. 
458  Case C-55/94, Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, [1995] 
ECR 4165.  
459  Directive 2005/36/EC [2005] OJ L 255/22. 
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munity law460 and the provision laid down in Articles 6 and 7 of the Directive, 
Member States shall not restrict the free provision of services in another Member 
State for any reason relating to professional qualifications where the potential service 
provider is allowed to exercise the same profession in his home Member State, or 
where the potential service provided has legally pursued the same activities for at 
least two years during the past ten years where the home Member State does not 
regulate this profession.461 The Article states further that the temporal and occasional 
nature of the service provided will be assessed on a case to case basis,462 and that the 
provider is subject to host Member State professional rules.463 The application of 
professional rules is further elaborated on in Article 6 of the Directive. In that article 
it is laid down that the host Member State may not impose any professional rules 
with regard to compulsory registration464 with a professional body (although pro forma 
membership may be required) nor registration with a social security body.465 Article 7 
regulates the (additional) requirements that the host Member State may impose on 
the service provider. The Article states that the host Member State may require a 
declaration including the details of professional liability insurance. This declaration 
must be renewed every year if the service provider wants to provide services in that 
Member State for that year.466 In addition, when the first declaration is made or where 
there is a material change in circumstances the host Member State may require proof 
of nationality, an attestation that the holder is legally established in the home 
Member State, proof of professional qualifications, proof that where the profession 
is not regulated in the home Member State the person concerned has exercised the 
profession for at least two years during the last ten years.467 The service shall be pro-
vided under home country professional title, or where such title is lacking, with a 
mention of the formal qualification in the language of the home Member State.468 
In addition to these rules, the Directive also imposes rules with regard to adminis-
trative cooperation between the competent authorities469 and information that must 
be provided to the recipients of the service.470 
The rules laid down in Directive 2005/36/EC are clearly an improvement on 
the protection of those professionals who provide legal services without being fully 
qualified lawyers in those Member States that allow such activities due to a lesser de-
gree of regulation. Before the adoption of Directive 2005/36/EC only the ‘capstone’ 
rules could be applied to persons in this situation. This meant that any hindrance to 
the free movement of services was in principle prohibited unless such a prohibition 
could be objectively justified. In the new atmosphere the Directive expressly forbids 
                                                  
460  From which it may be concluded that Directive 2005/36/EC does not apply to lawyers who 
are caught under the system of Directive 77/249/EEC, which is corroborated by Recital 42 of 
Directive 2005/36/EC. 
461  Article 5(1) Directive 2005/36/EC. 
462  Article 5(2) Directive 2005/36/EC. 
463  Article 5(3) Directive 2005/36/EC. 
464  Article 6(1) Directive 2005/36/EC 
465  Article 6(2) Directive 2005/36/EC. 
466  Article 7(1) Directive 2005/36/EC. 
467  Article 7(2) Directive 2005/36/EC. 
468  Article 7(3) Directive 2005/36/EC. 
469  Article 8 Directive 2005/36/EC. 
470  Article 9 Directive 2005/36/EC. 
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the restriction of the free provision of services on grounds of qualification. The Direc-
tive offers no possibility for exemptions. Whereas, under Article 49 and the Gebhard 
system, an objective justification for such a restriction was possible at least in theory, 
no exemptions to the rule are allowed under the Directive, at least not with regard 
to restrictions on professional qualifications. The transposition period of Directive 
2005/36/EC ended on 20 October 2007. Thus, at this moment in time Member 
States should have adapted their national rules to Directive 2005/36/EC. 
The question remains how other restrictions, other than those related to profes-
sional qualifications, must be treated. As the general body of case law on the four 
freedoms shows, Member States can be inventive when it comes to possible restric-
tions. In relation to services provided by professionals who operate outside the legal 
monopoly of a lawyer in certain Member States in other Member States where 
such activity belongs to the legal monopoly of a lawyer, possible justifications in the 
light of insurance, or consumer protection can easily be imagined. Directive 2005/36/ 
EC is of no help in these situations since it only covers restrictions on professional 
qualifications. At this point in time it means that other restrictions on the provision 
of legal services by non-lawyers must be addressed under the general system of Article 
49 EC Treaty and the objective justification test laid down in Gebhard. In the near 
future this is about to change. In late 2006 the Institutions of the European Union 
finally adopted the watered-down ‘Bolkesteijn Directive’ on services in the internal 
market as Directive 2006/123/EC.471 The CCBE did its best to keep legal services 
entirely out of this Directive472 and the services caught under Directive 77/249/EEC 
are indeed exempted from the Directive.473 It seems, however, that legal services 
that are not caught by Directive 77/249/EC (like the ones discussed in this paragraph) 
fall under Directive 2006/123/EC. This book is not the place to give an extensive 
review of Directive 2006/123/EC, not least because the transposition period only 
ends in December 2009.474 In this book, and at this point in time, a short review of 
the substantive improvements to the service providers dealt with in this paragraph 
will suffice.  
The main consequence of legal services provided by non-lawyers not being caught 
by the exemptions laid down in Article 17 of Directive 2006/123/EC, is that the 
rules on the free provision of services laid down in Article 16 of Directive 2006/ 
123/EC apply. The rules in Article 16 of Directive 2006/123/EC state that Member 
States must honour the right of service providers to provide services in other Member 
States.475 The Member State will guarantee access and free exercise of the provision 
of services.476 Member States shall not make the provision of services dependent on 
requirements that do not fulfil the conditions of non-discrimination, necessity and 
suitability.477 In addition to this general rule, which is nothing more than a codification 
                                                  
471  Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2006 
on services in the internal market, [2006] OJ L 376/36. 
472  See CCBE position on the Proposal for a Directive on Services in the Internal Market, via 
<www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 2 November 2007. 
473  Article 17(4) Directive 2006/123/EC Moreover, 2006/123/EC does also not apply to restric-
tions to services caught under Directive 2005/36/EC. See article 17(6) Directive 2006/123/EC. 
474  Article 44 Directive 2006/123/EC. 
475  Article 16(1) Directive 2006/123/EC. 
476  Ibid. 
477  Ibid. 
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of the objective justification test laid down in Gebhard, paragraph 2 of Article 16 lays 
down a number of specific prohibitions.478 
In conclusion it can be said that recent developments in secondary legislation have 
considerably elaborated the rights of non-lawyers who exercise legal activities in 
Member States with an intermediate or low degree of regulation to provide services 
in Member States that have a high degree of regulation. Whereas previously such 
rights could only be exercised by relying on the general rules for the free provision 
of services, such professionals can now rely on more detailed provisions in secondary 
legislation. Graphically, the rules with regard to the free provision of services could 
be depicted as follows: 
 
Figure 3:  Free provision of services including non lawyers 
 
 
                                                  
478  § 2 of Article 16 of Directive 2006/123/EC forbids: (a) an obligation on the provider to have 
an establishment in their territory; (b) an obligation on the provider to obtain an authorisation 
from their competent authorities including entry in a register or registration with a professional 
body or association in their territory, except where provided for in this Directive or other 
instruments of Community law; (c) a ban on the provider setting up a certain form or type of 
infrastructure in their territory, including an office or chambers, which the provider needs in 
order to supply the services in question; (d) the application of specific contractual arrangements 
between the provider and the recipient which prevent or restrict service provision by the self-
employed; (e) an obligation on the provider to possess an identity document issued by its 
competent authorities specific to the exercise of a service activity; (f) requirements, except for 
those necessary for health and safety at work, which affect the use of equipment and material 
which are an integral part of the service provided; (g) restrictions on the freedom to provide 
the services referred to in Article 19 (which relates to recipients of services). 
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After this short excursion into the rights of non-lawyers to provide legal services in 
Member States that reserve such activities for lawyers, it is now time to turn to a 
review of the free provision of services by lawyers in the Member States con-
sidered. This review will focus mainly on those situations that are contrary to the 
Services Directive.  
§ 3.2 The Free Provision of Services by Lawyers in the 
Member States 
Sweden 
As was observed in the previous paragraph, Sweden represents a jurisdiction within 
which there is a complete lack of a legal monopoly for lawyers. None of the activities 
that lawyers normally perform, including the representation of clients in court, are 
legally protected. That means that anyone can exercise these activities, including law-
yers from other Member States. Furthermore, in theory, at least, implementation of 
the Services Directive would have been very easy in Sweden, or even superfluous. 
Although the Directive was implemented in Sweden according to EUR-LEX,479 
this adaptation of the Rättegångsbalken (Code of Judicial Procedure) seems to be dis-
solved by later adaptations to the Rättegångsbalken, most notably the implementation 
of Directive 98/5/EC, which will be dealt with below. The Rättegångsbalken that is 
in force today and the Charter of the Swedish Bar Association (Stadgar för Sveriges 
Advokatsamfund)480 make no mention of the freedom to provide services. Based on 
the absence of a legal monopoly in Sweden it must be assumed that lawyers from 
other Member States are free to provide services in Sweden and co-operation with 
a lawyer from a host Member State, in this case an advokat, will not be enforced. 
 
Finland 
Similar observations can be made for Finland. In EUR-LEX there is no specific 
reference to an implementation instrument of the Services Directive in the Finnish 
legal system. Moreover, neither the Advocates Act nor the By-laws of the Finnish 
Bar Association481 specifically address the freedom to provide services by lawyers of 
other EU Member States. There is however one article in the Advocates Act that 
may apply to lawyers providing services in Finland, however, its application is 
problematic in the light of the Services Directive. In Section 5a of the Advocates 
Act it is stated that when a lawyer from another Member State pursues a mandate 
in Finland he must act under his home country professional title. Moreover, he will 
be subject to Finnish professional rules when representing a client in court and while 
exercising other activities. This latter part is problematic in the light of the Services 
Directive that states that in relation to activities other than the representation of clients 
in court the home Member State’s rules apply unless application of host Member 
State rules is objectively justified in the light of Article 4 of Directive 77/249/EEC. 
 
                                                  
479  Lag om ändring i rättegångsbalken, Svensk författningssamling (SFS) 1992:1511. 
480  Via <www.advokatsamfundet.se>, last accessed 6 November 2007. 
481  Via <www.advonet.fi>, last accessed 6 November 2007. 
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Denmark 
In Denmark the free provision of services is covered by a regulation on the Govern-
ment level.482 The Bekendtgørelse states that Articles 3 and 4 of Directive 77/249/EEC 
will be directly applicable in Denmark. In addition, the Bekendtgørelse states that a 
lawyer must co-operate with an advokat while representing clients in court, and that 
the competent authority may require proof of professional qualification and per-
mission to practise in the home Member State. All these rules are in full accordance 
with the Directive. 
 
United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom Directive 77/249/EEC was implemented by means of a 
statutory instrument, a sub-law level of regulation.483 This order from 1978 applies 
to both barristers and solicitors in all jurisdictions of the United Kingdom. The order 
states that persons who are qualified as lawyers in other Member States of the Euro-
pean Union may provide services in the United Kingdom. When providing services 
that entail the representation of a client in court the lawyer is obliged to cooperate 
with a barrister/advocate or a solicitor who has audience rights in that specific court.484 
This requirement is in accordance with the Services Directive. 
 
Ireland 
The free provision of services for lawyers from other jurisdictions of the European 
Union in Ireland is regulated by statute.485 The division of the legal profession in 
Ireland between the professions of a solicitor and a barrister could be problematic, 
but it seems from the statutory instrument that a visiting lawyer has the freedom to 
exercise activities in both professions in Ireland. The implementation is in conformity 
with the Services Directive, excluding some specific activities for lawyers from other 
Member States, and requiring lawyers to cooperate with an Irish lawyer who has 
audience rights for a court. 
 
The Netherlands 
In the Netherlands the free provision of services is implemented in the Advocaten-
wet.486 Articles 16a–16f of the Advocatenwet cover the services provided by lawyers 
from other Member States. Like the Member States observed earlier in this para-
graph, the Netherlands also imposes obligatory co-operation with a Dutch advocaat 
in those cases where Dutch law requires compulsory representation by an advocaat.487 
                                                  
482  Bekendtgørelse om EU-advokaters tjenesteydelser her i landet, 14 September 2001, via <www. 
advokatsamfundet.de>, last accessed 6 November 2007. 
483  European Communities (Services of Lawyers) Order 1978 (S.I. 1978/1910) Most recently 
amended by European Communities (Services of Lawyers) (Amendment) Order 2004 (S.I. 
2004/1117). 
484  Yaqub (1993), p. 314. 
485  S.I. 58/1979 European Communities (Freedom to provide services) (Lawyers) Regulations, 
1979, as amended by S.I. 179/1981 and S.I. 226/1986, via <www.irishstatutebook.ie>, last 
accessed 25 August 2005. 
486  By means of the Wet van 15 october 1980, Stb. 1980, 588 
487  Article 16e Advocatenwet. 
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The Netherlands has also correctly implemented the rules with regard to professional 
rules and use of professional title.488 
 
Belgium 
In Belgium the free provision of services by lawyers from Member States of the 
European Union is governed by Title Ibis of the Gerechtelijk Wetboek. The first three 
articles of Title Ibis of the Gerechtelijk Wetboek (Articles 477bis–477quater) deal with 
the free provision of services. Article 477bis states that persons who are allowed to 
practise as a lawyer in their home Member State may also use their home country pro-
fessional title when pursuing activities in Belgium.489 Indeed, such a lawyer must use 
his home country professional title in the language of his home Member State. He 
must also indicate to which professional organisation he belongs in his home Mem-
ber State and the courts he may plead before in his home State.490 According to 
Article 477ter a lawyer providing services in Belgium on the basis of Article 477bis 
may exercise the same professional activities as a lawyer who is a member of a 
Belgian Bar.491 The second sentence of that paragraph immediately states that for 
activities with regard to representing a client in court a lawyer providing services in 
Belgium must cooperate with a lawyer who is a member of a Belgian Bar. Para-
graph 2 of the same article states that for a lawyer providing services in Belgium, in 
addition to the professional rules of his home Member State, he is also subject to 
the rules of professional conduct that have been laid down in Belgian legislation.492  
It is worth mentioning that the Belgian professional rules are not imposed ipso 
facto. First of all, it is explicitly mentioned that all rules with regards to nationality 
and residence find no application to lawyers providing services in Belgium. How-
ever, other rules of professional conduct do not find automatic application. First of 
all, it must be established that the professional rule in question can be applied to a 
lawyer not established in Belgium. Secondly, and more importantly, it must be estab-
lished that the application of the rule of professional conduct must be objectively 
justified as a safeguard for the correct exercise of the activity of a lawyer, for the dignity 
of the profession of lawyer, taking into account the rules of incompatibility.493 Para-
graph 3 of the Article states that the exercise of the profession of the lawyer in 
Belgium by a lawyer who is established in another Member State is incompatible 
with every form of salaried occupation, whether public or private, unless it affects 
neither the independence of the lawyer nor the dignity of the Bar.494  
The final article regarding free provision of services is Article 477quater which 
deals with disciplinary proceedings. The Article first of all lays down the fact that the 
Belgian rules regarding disciplinary proceedings and professional rules are applicable 
to all lawyers providing services in Belgium. The Article further states that the rules 
                                                  
488  Articles 16d, 16f and 16b respectively. 
489  Article 477bis § 1 Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
490  Article 477bis § 2 Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
491  Article 477ter § 1 Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
492  Article 477ter § 2 Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
493  Belgium is so far the only State that has implemented the Kumulatzionsprinzip in such a detailed 
manner, which leads to the application for a ‘rule of reason’ test every time a Belgian rule of 
professional conduct is applied to a lawyer from another Member State, providing services in 
Belgium.  
494  Article 477ter § 3. 
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regarding the profession and disciplinary proceedings from the lawyer’s home Member 
State shall also stay in force during the lawyer’s stay in Belgium. When lawyers do 
not adhere to the professional conduct rules they can be prevented from providing 
services in Belgium for a period of three years at most.495 Appeal is possible against 
the decision to bar a lawyer from practising in Belgium. For offences that would 
lead to removal from the tableau for Belgian lawyers, the sanction against lawyers 
providing services is a prohibition on practise in Belgium. A lawyer can ask for re-
vision until ten years after the sentence has been imposed.496 The second paragraph 
of the Article states that the relevant authority shall be the council of the relevant 
Bar Association.497 
 
Luxembourg 
The free movement of services in the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg is also regulated 
by law.498 The law pertaining to services is found in Luxembourg’s implementation 
of Directive 77/249/EEC into its legal system. The law states that lawyers from 
other EU Member States may exercise the same activities as Luxembourg avocats, 
however the rules differ with regards to residence and enlisting with a Luxembourg 
Bar.499 For the representation of clients in court the lawyer providing services is 
obliged to cooperate with a Luxembourg avocat and he also needs to be introduced 
by the batônnier to the leading magistrate in the relevant jurisdiction. The Luxembourg 
professional rules apply fully with regard to activities for the representation of clients 
but there is a rule of reason for the application of rules of professional conduct for 
other activities.500 There are no abnormalities in the services law when compared 
to Directive 77/249/EEC. 
 
France 
In France the free provision of services by lawyers is regulated in the décret du 27 
novembre 1991.501 Title 5 of this décret lays down the rules for this matter.502 Article 
200 of the décret states that lawyers who are allowed to practise under the professional 
titles listed in Article 201 of the décret503 are allowed to exercise the profession of 
lawyer in France to the same extent as avocats on a temporary basis.504 While exer-
cising professional activities in France the lawyers from other Member States are 
                                                  
495  Article 477quater § 1 Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
496  Ibid. 
497  Article 477quater § 2 Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
498  Loi du 29 avril 1980 réglant l’activité en prestations de service, au Grand-Duché de Luxem-
bourg, des avocats habilités à exercer leurs activités dans un autre Etat membre des Commu-
nautés Européenes, Memorial Journal Officiel du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, Recueil de 
Legislation, A-No. 32, 14 mai 1980, page 747, hereinafter referred to as the Services law. 
499  Article 2 Services law. 
500  Articles 3 and 4 Services law. This is completely in accordance with Article 4 of Directive 
77/249/EEC. 
501  Décret no 91-1197 du 27 novembre 1991 modifié organisant la profession d’avocat, JO de la 
République Française, 28 novembre 1991, 15502. 
502  Originally Directive 77/249/EEC was implemented in Décret no. 79-233 du 22 mars 1979, JO 
de la République Française 23 mars 1979, 695, but this was included in the new décret in 1991. 
503  Which are all the professional titles for the profession of lawyer for all the Member States. 
504  Article 200/201 of the décret du 27 novembre 1991. 
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subject to French professional rules when representing clients in court and to their 
home Member State rules while exercising other activities. In the latter case French 
rules may only be applied where this is objectively justified.505 With respect to the 
representation of clients in court, it is interesting to note that the rule that requires 
compulsory cooperation with a French avocat506 is only applied to civil litigation. In 
administrative and penal litigation, a lawyer can represent clients on his own.507 
Rules for disciplinary proceedings are also laid down in conformity with Directive 
77/249/EEC.508 
 
Italy 
In Italy a separate law implements the free provision of services as guaranteed by 
Directive 77/249/EEC.509 Lawyers may provide services under their home country 
professional title,510 representation of clients in court must be conducted in coopera-
tion with an Italian lawyer511 and the lawyer providing services must adhere to Italian 
professional rules.512 These provisions are in principle in accordance with the Directive. 
The only possible problem is that there is no reference to the objective justification 
test for the application of the host Member State’s professional rules regarding activities 
that do not entail the representation of clients in court. Moreover, there is another 
provision in the law implementing Directive 77/249/EEC in Italy that is not in 
accordance with European law. Article 1 of the Legge 9 febbraio 1982 states that 
services may only be provided if the lawyer concerned does not have any infra-
structure in the form of an office in Italy.513 This requirement was one of the com-
plaints the European Commission brought before the European Court of Justice in 
case C-145/99, which dealt with Italian inconsistencies in connection to the free 
movement of lawyers. The Court wasted little time and words in arriving to the 
conclusion that the requirement of having no infrastructure in the host Member 
State is contrary to European law. The Court stated that it had decided in the Gebhard 
case514 that it was in accordance with the free provision of services for lawyers that 
a lawyer could have a certain infrastructure at his disposal in the host Member State, 
and that the infrastructure as such was not the determining factor between estab-
lishment and provision of services.515 Moreover, the reasoning as to why Italy has 
included this provision in the Legge 9 febbraio has become redundant after the 
                                                  
505  Article 202/203 of the décret du 27 novembre 1991. 
506 The term of avoué is still used in the text of the décret, but, as described above, these professions 
have merged in recent history. 
507  Article 202 of the décret du 27 novembre 1991. 
508  Article 204 of the décret du 27 novembre 1991. 
509  Legge 9 febbraio 1982, n. 31 Libera prestazione di servizi da parti degli avvocati cittidani degli 
stati membri delle comunità europee, Gazzetta Ufficiale n.42, 12-02-1982. 
510  Article 3 Legge 9 febbraio 1982. 
511  Article 6 Legge 9 febbraio 1982. 
512  Article 11 Legge 9 febbraio 1982. 
513  Article 2 Legge 9 febbraio 1982. 
514  Case C-55/94, Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocatie e Procuratori di Milano, 
[1995] ECR 4165. 
515  § 22 case C-145/99. This is the same proposal as mentioned earlier. Progetto di Legge N.- 
5211, Nuove disposizioni sulla professione di avvocato. No evidence is present that this proposal 
has been transformed into a law at this point in time. 
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coming into force of Directive 98/5/EC. Italy included this provision in order to 
prevent illegal establishment under home title, since that form of establishment was 
not allowed in Italy.516 As this form of establishment is expressly allowed by Direc-
tive 98/5/EC there is no longer any reason to adhere to this prohibition. In case 
C-145/99, Italy claimed that in order to remove possible infringement of Article 
59 EC the Italian government proposed a bill to the Italian Parliament repealing 
the contested part of Article 2 of the Legge 9 febbraio 1982.517 
 
Spain 
In Spain lawyers from other Member States can provide services on the basis of 
Directive 77/249/EEC. This Directive is implemented in Spain by means of a Real 
Decreto.518 The Real Decreto is a straightforward implementation of Directive 77/249/ 
EEC. Lawyers providing services including the representation of clients before a 
court are compelled to cooperate with an abogado (presumably in addition to work-
ing with a procurador)519 and as forprofession rules, the kumulatzionsprinzip applies.520 In 
the original implementation, Article 9(2) prescribed a maximum number of cases 
that a lawyer providing services in Spain could deal with in a year. This subsection 
was abolished after the Commission v. Germany case.521 
 
                                                  
516  § 21 case C-145/99. 
517  Ibid. 
518  Real Decreto 607/1986, de 21 de marzo, de desarollo de la Directiva de Consejo de las 
Comunidades Europeas de 22 de marzo de 1977, encaminada a facilitar el ejercicio efectivo de 
la Libre Prestación de Servicios de los Abogados, BOE 78/1986 de 01-04-1986, p. 11479. 
Articles 6 and 9 of the Real decreto were changed by means of Real Decreto 1062/1988, de 
16 de septiembre, por el que se modifica el Real Decreto 697/1986, de 21 de marzo, de 
desarollo de la Directiva del Consejo de las Comunidades Europeas de 22 de marzo de 1977, 
encaminada a facilitar el ejercicio efectivo de la Ley 36/1988, de 5 de diciembre, de Arbitraje, 
BOE 227/1988 de 21-09-1988, p. 27737, after the judgment of the ECJ in Case 427/85, 
Commission v. Germany, [1988] ECR 1123.  
519  Article 6 Real Decreto 607/1986, de 21 de marzo, de desarollo de la Directiva de Consejo de 
las Comunidades Europeas de 22 de marzo de 1977, encaminada a facilitar el ejercicio efectivo 
de la Libre Prestación de Servicios de los Abogados. This article, which required collaboration 
with an Abogado even in situations where representation by an Abogado was not prescribed by 
Spanish law, was changed after the Commission v. Germany case by Article 1 of the Real Decreto 
1062/1988, de 16 de septiembre, por el que se modifica el Real Decreto 697/1986, de 21 de 
marzo, de desarollo de la Directiva del Consejo de las Comunidades Europeas de 22 de marzo 
de 1977, encaminada a facilitar el ejercicio efectivo de la Ley 36/1988, de 5 de diciembre, de 
Arbitraje, BOE 227/1988 de 21-09-1988, p. 27737 
520  Article 7 Real Decreto 607/1986, de 21 de marzo, de desarollo de la Directiva de Consejo de 
las Comunidades Europeas de 22 de marzo de 1977, encaminada a facilitar el ejercicio efectivo 
de la Libre Prestación de Servicios de los Abogados.  
521  See Merino-Blanco (1996), p. 111. Article 9(2) Real Decreto 607/1986, de 21 de marzo, de 
desarollo de la Directiva de Consejo de las Comunidades Europeas de 22 de marzo de 1977, 
encaminada a facilitar el ejercicio efectivo de la Libre Prestación de Servicios de los Abogados. 
This article was abolished by Article 2 of Real Decreto 1062/1988, de 16 de septiembre, por el 
que se modifica el Real Decreto 697/1986, de 21 de marzo, de desarollo de la Directiva del 
Consejo de las Comunidades Europeas de 22 de marzo de 1977, encaminada a facilitar el ejercicio 
efectivo de la Ley 36/1988, de 5 de diciembre, de Arbitraje, BOE 227/1988 de 21-09-1988, 
p. 27737. 
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Portugal 
Although Directive 77/249/EEC was originally implemented in Portugal in the 
1980s,522 it was also included in the implementation of Directive 98/5/EC (which 
will be addressed at a later stage) by means of a separate law, the Lei 80/2001 de 20 
de Julho.523 This law creates a separate title in the Advogado law524 to cover the free 
movement of lawyers. The Advogado law states that a lawyer who is established in 
an EU Member State may provide services525 in Portugal under his home country 
professional title.526 Lawyers exercising their professional activity under their home 
title are obliged to cooperate with an advogado if the exercise of their professional 
activities entails the representation of clients in Portuguese courts.527 With regard to 
applicable professional rules, the Advogado law states that, without prejudice to the 
professional rules applicable to the lawyer in his home Member State, activities of a 
lawyer in the host Member State will be subject to the professional rules of the host 
State.528 Clearly this formulation is not in accordance with Article 4 of Directive 
77/249/EEC because it requires a distinction to be made between services related to 
representing a client in court to which host country professional rules apply, and other 
activities. As for other activities, in principle, home State professional rules apply, 
except in cases of incompatibility, where the application of host Member State rules 
is objectively justified. Therefore it might be concluded that the ‘re-implementation’ 
of the Services Directive in Portugal is not in accordance with the Directive. 
 
Germany 
In Germany a similar operation was undertaken to that of Portugal. Even though the 
Services Directive had already been implemented in Germany529 it was included in 
a major overhaul in the process of implementation of Directive 98/5/EC. This led 
to the adoption of a single legal instrument that covered the free movement of lawyers 
in all three modalities in Germany, the Gesetz zur Umsetzung von Richtlinien der Euro-
                                                  
522  Decreto-Lei n. 119/86 de 28/05/1986. Harmoniza o direito interno ao preceitado na Directiva 
do Conselho 77/249/CEE, de 22 de Março de 1977, relativa à livre prestação de serviços em 
Portugal por advogados de outros Estados membros das Comunidades Europeias. Diário da 
Republica I Série de 28/05/1986 Página 1281 
523 See <www.dgci.min-financas.pt/NR/rdonlyres/6EBCF62A-1E11-421A-BFE2-95CF8E9BB985 
/0/lei_80-2001_de_20_de_julho_i_serie_a.pdf>, last accessed 06 November 2007. 
524  Estatuto da Ordem dos Advogados. Lei n. 15/2005, de 26 de Janeiro de 2005. - Aprova o Estatuto 
da Ordem dos Advogados e revoga o Decreto-Lei n. 84/84, de 16 de Março, com as alterações 
subsequentes. In diário da República. - S.1-A n.18 (26 Janeiro 2005), pp. 612-646. 
525  Article 198 (1) Advogado law. 
526  Article 197 (1) Advogado law. 
527  Article 197 (2) Advogado law. 
528  Article 199 (1) Advogado law. 
529  Gesetz zur Durchführung der Richtlinie des Rates der Europäischen Gemeinschaften vom 22. 
März 1977 zur Erleichterung der tatsächlichen Ausübung des freien Dienstleistungsverkehrs 
der Rechtsanwälte vom 16/08/1980, Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I vom 22/08/1980 Seite 1453; 
Erstes Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes zur Durchführung der Richtlinie des Rates der Euro-
päischen Gemeinschaften vom 22/03/1977 zur Erleichterung der tatsächlichen Ausübung des 
freien Dienstleistungsverkehrs der Rechtsanwälte vom 14/03/1990, Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I 
vom 21/03/1990 Seite 479. 
137 
päischen Gemeinschaft auf dem Gebiet des Berufrechts der Rechtsanwälte (EuRAG).530 The 
fifth part of the EuRAG (§§ 25 to 35) governs the provision of services for lawyers 
in Germany as established by Directive 77/249/EEC. The EuRAG states that a 
lawyer may provide services531 under his or her home country professional title.532 
Lawyers may exercise all legal services533 but when representing clients in court they 
must be accompanied by a German lawyer.534 In the previous chapter it was shown 
that this provision (or rather, its counterpart in the previous implementation mecha-
nism) led to case law of the European Court of Justice on the application of the coop-
eration rule.535 Under the new mechanism this rule is implemented correctly. Also 
the rules with regard to applicable professional rules536 are implemented correctly. 
 
Austria 
In Austria a similar operation took place to that in Portugal and Germany. Even 
though the Directive had been implemented earlier537 it was re-implemented at the 
time Austria implemented the Establishment Directive in the Bundesgesetz über den 
freien Dienstleistungsverkehr und Niederlassung von europäischen Rechtsanwälten in Österreich 
(hereinafter EuRAG).538 The first and second part of the EuRAG (paragraphs 1 to 
8) deal with the free provision of services by lawyers from other Member States in 
Austria. Paragraph 1 states that that part of the law applies to every lawyer who is 
entitled to practise as a lawyer in one of the Member States of the European Union 
or the European Economic Area (provided that the person has the nationality of 
one of the Member States of those organisations). These lawyers are referred to as euro-
päische Rechtsanwälte (European lawyers).539 In principle a European lawyer practising 
under his home title,540 while being subject to the same rules of professional con-
duct as an Austrian Rechtsanwalt,541 is entitled to exercise any activity that an Austrian 
Rechtsanwalt may do albeit with the restrictions laid down in that part of the law.542 
These restrictions mainly consist of the fact that when representing a client in court 
                                                  
530  Gesetz zur Umsetzung von Richtlinien der Europäischen Gemeinschaft auf dem Gebiet des 
Berufrechts der Rechtsanwälte, 9 March 2000, BGBl, 2000 I, page 182. What is notable about 
this law is that it not only transfers Directive 98/5/EC but also Directives 89/48/EEC and 
77/249/EEC. 
531  § 25 EuRAG. 
532  § 26 EuRAG. 
533  § 27 EuRAG. 
534  §§ 28-30 EuRAG. 
535  Case 427/85, Commission v. Germany, [1988] ECR 1123.  
536  §§ 27-28 EuRAG. 
537  Bundesgesetz über die Ausübung des freien Dienstleistungsverkehrs und die Niederlassung von 
Rechtsanwälten aus dem Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum (EWR-Rechtsanwaltsgesetz 1992 AG 
1992) sowie Änderungen der Rechtsanwaltsordnung, des Rechtsanwaltsprufungsgesetzes und 
des Berufsprüfungs-Anrechnungsgesetzes. Bundesgesetzblatt für die Republik Osterreich, Nr. 
21/1993, ausgegeben am 14/01/1993. 
538  Bundesgesetz über den freien Dienstleistungsverkehr und die Niederlassung von europäischen 
Rechtsanwälten in Österreich (EuRAG) sowie Änderungen der Rechtsanwaltsordnung, 23 
May 2000, BGBl I 27/2000. 
539  § 1 EuRAG. 
540  § 3(1) EuRAG. 
541  § 4(1) EuRAG. 
542  § 2 EuRAG. 
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a European lawyer must be accompanied by a registered Austrian Rechtsanwalt.543 
Lawyers who provide services are only allowed to have an office in Austria in so far 
it is necessary to provide the services.544 This last requirement is clearly dubious 
after the Court’s ruling in Gebhard, where it was held that having an infrastructure 
was deemed irrelevant for the distinction between services and establishment.  
 
Greece 
The rules implementing Directive 77/249/EEC in Greece also have a number of 
peculiar features which must be mentioned in this chapter. When a lawyer seeks to 
exercise his right to freely provide services in Greece he must notify the authorities 
of the fact that he seeks to come to Greece to provide services at least two days before 
he does so. He must provide identification and he must inform the authorities of 
the nature and the length of the activities which he wants to exercise as a lawyer in 
Greece.545 After the lawyer has been approved, he will be included in a register of 
European lawyers that is kept especially for this purpose by the respective Bars. When 
representing a client in court the lawyer providing services in Greece must cooperate 
with a Dikigoros and he must provide the President of the court with a document 
from the Greek Bar stating that he has fulfilled his duties in connection with the 
free provision of services. As a result of earlier case law from the European Court of 
Justice an earlier rule that required lawyers providing services in Greece to cooperate 
with a Dikigoros at all times was abolished.546 Kommatas discussed another interest-
ing rule, namely the fact that a lawyer who provides services in Greece may not set 
up an office in Greece in order to facilitate that provision of those services.547 It must 
be noted, however, that Kommatas’ piece predates the judgment of the European 
Court of Justice in Gebhard after which it was made more than clear that the free-
dom to provide services also included the right to set up an office in the host Member 
State in order to facilitate the free provision of services. Although Kerameos makes no 
mention of the rule in her article,548 which dates from 2001, it still is clear from all 
the formalities surrounding the exercise of the freedom to provide services that the 
legal profession is not very accessible in Greece. Greece is the only country reviewed 
that imposes the requirement of prior notification, at least in the implementation 
device itself. In light of the developments that have been described with respect to 
Directives 2005/36/EC and 2006/123/EC, it will be highly unlikely for the Court 
to quash this requirement. The prohibition on infrastructure is, of course, in viola-
tion of the Directive. 
§ 3.3 Observations with regard to Services 
It has been observed that the new Diploma Recognition Directive, Directive 
2005/36/EC, has largely improved the situation of those professionals who seek to 
                                                  
543  § 5(1) EuRAG. 
544  § 8 EuRAG. 
545  Kerameos (2001), pp. 349-353. 
546  Ibid. 
547  Kommatas (1993), p. 172. 
548  Kerameos (2001), pp. 349-353. 
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provide legal services in another Member State but who are not fully qualified law-
yers. Where previously the situation of these professionals was uncertain and was only 
covered by the capstone rules in Gebhard, the rules found under Directive 2005/ 
36/EC lay down a solid foundation for the possibility to provide legal services in 
those Member States where such activities belongs to the profession of the lawyer. 
In 2009, this protection will be offered even more thoroughly by the implementation 
of the rules laid down in Directive 2006/123/EC. In this respect a silent revolution 
has occurred, since there seems to be no professional or academic debate (apart from 
the CCBE position on services) that reflects a full understanding of the potential 
impact of these possibilities. 
These new Directives do not touch on the position of fully qualified lawyers in 
their ability to provide services. The provision of services by fully qualified lawyers 
is, after 30 years, still covered by Directive 77/249/EEC, which has been duly im-
plemented and even in some instances re-implemented in the Member States observed 
above. In these 30 years the Services Directive has only generated a little case law, 
which was dealt with in the previous chapter. That does not mean that the Member 
States have an unblemished track-record for implementation. Two modalities of prob-
lematic implementation have been observed. First of all, a number of Member States 
have had difficulties in applying the rather complicated rules of applicable professional 
rules. In some cases the division between activities relating to the representation of 
clients in court and other activities, and the application of sets of professional rules 
leads to difficulties or over-simplification. Member States just lay down the obligation 
to adhere to host Member State professional rules. Such a view, or implementation 
for that matter, is incompatible with the Directive. Secondly, there are additional 
requirements in the different implementing instruments that have, as such, no basis 
in the Directive. Examples are rules on infrastructure (offices) or notification proce-
dures. From the previous chapter it follows that two different regimes can be applied 
to such a situation. First, the ECJ, in a hypothetical case, may come to the con-
clusion that a certain rule (e.g. the rules on infrastructure) is contrary to the spirit of 
the Directive and therefore violates European law, as had been the case in AMOK. 
Where this is not the case, the Gebhard capstone rules apply, implying that the 
additional rule must be objectively justified by the Member State since it is liable to 
hinder or make less attractive the exercise of the free provision of services. 
With regard to the anomalies observed, I believe that the rules on infrastructure, 
as they have been, observed can no longer be upheld after Gebhard, where it was 
expressly stated that the exercise of the freedom to provide services was not defined 
by having a certain infrastructure. Therefore, such rules need to be objectively justi-
fied, or where it can be established that they go against the spirit of the Directive, 
be held to be a direct violation of the Directive. The rules on prior notification that 
are applied by Greece, on the other hand, seem to be in accordance with what is 
laid down in the new Directives, and may therefore be deemed to be in accord-
ance with the Services Directive and hence objectively justified.  
Based on this review of implementation procedures, the situation of fully qualified 
lawyers who provide services can be refined and represented as follows: 
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Figure 4: Free provision of services for qualified lawyers 
 
 
 
§ 4. Establishment of Lawyers under their Home Country 
Professional Title 
The second modality of the free movement of lawyers, viewed from the degree of 
integration in the host Member State’s profession, is the establishment of lawyers 
under their home country professional title. This modality is laid down in Directive 
98/5/EC and was, from a chronological point of view, the last modality to be regu-
lated by the legislative institutions. This paragraph will focus on the exercise of this 
modality. 
To that end, this paragraph will follow largely the same structure as the previous 
one. First, some attention will be devoted to those professionals who exercise activities 
in Member States with a lesser level of regulation who belong to the legal monopoly of 
lawyers in other Member States with a higher degree of regulation. This will then 
be followed with a review of the implementation of Directive 98/5/EC. This review 
is more detailed than the review given to the Directives in the other two modalities, 
since Directive 98/5/EC is the newest instrument specifically dedicated to lawyers, 
and a detailed review of its implementation has, until now, never been given. In order 
to place the review of implementation into context it will be preceded by a more 
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theoretical exercise, exploring the exact impact that Directive 98/5/EC has on 
national regulation of the free movement of lawyers. The establishment under home 
title can be represented as follows: 
 
Figure 5: Establishment under home country title 
 
 
 
 
§ 4.1 Establishment for Non-Lawyers in Highly Regulated 
Member States 
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exercising legal activities in Member States with a lesser degree of regulation who 
seek establishment in Member States that have a high degree of regulation, i.e., 
where these activities are reserved for the lawyer covered by Directive 98/5/EC.  
Clearly these professionals do not enjoy any rights under Directive 98/5/EC. It 
can also be easily imagined that Member States with a high degree of regulation will 
not allow these professionals to become established in their Member State under 
their home country title. It must be indicated, though, that these individuals do have 
the right to establish themselves as part of the host country’s profession. The details 
of this exercise will be dealt with in the next paragraph. At this point it suffices to 
state that in this case these professionals will also be subject to stringent compen-
satory measures in the form of an aptitude test, before full establishment is allowed. 
In the previous paragraph it had been established that the new Diploma Directive 
(Directive 2005/36/EC) and the Directive on Services (Directive 2006/123/EC) 
include rules that apply to professionals exercising legal services in Member States 
with a high degree of regulation. This is not the case for incidences of establish-
ment under home title. Neither Directive 2005/36/EC nor Directive 2006/123/EC 
contain specific provisions on establishment under home title. This means that a 
professional who seeks establishment under home title, in order to exercise legal 
activity as a non-lawyer in a Member State that has a high degree of regulation, can 
only rely on the capstone rules of Gebhard (and perhaps Vlassopoulou where the im-
posed restriction relates to diploma requirements). The possibilities for these profes-
sionals would look like this: 
 
Figure 6: Establishment under home title including non lawyers 
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the so-called installation limitée. It can also be observed in this respect that a similar 
development may take place for those professionals who are not lawyers and 
belongs to the legal monopoly of lawyers in Member States with a high degree of 
regulation but wish to exercise professional activities in less-regulated Member 
States. A difference in relation to the installation limitée is that, in this context, the 
European Court of Justice has given a clear ruling on the differences and mutual 
boundaries between establishment and services in the Gebhard case. On the one hand 
this may be beneficial for this category of persons since the Court has clearly stated 
that having an infrastructure (an office etc.) is not decisive for classifying an activity 
as one of services or establishment. The time factor is the only decisive element. 
Additionally, Directive 2005/36/EC states, in Article 5(2), that the temporary nature 
of the services shall be decided on a case by case basis. This means that the Member 
States cannot impose fixed time limits or limit recurrences of certain activities. On 
the other hand, it is now clear that the provision of services is limited in time and 
an ‘endless’ installation limitée is no longer reconcilable with the law as it stands 
today. At the time of writing no information is available that indicates whether, 
and to what extent, this modality of free movement occurs.  
§ 4.2 Impact of the Establishment Directive 
Before a detailed overview of the implementation of the Establishment Directive can 
be given, the impact of the Establishment Directive must be investigated. The main 
purpose of this investigation is to find out whether, and how much, residual legislative 
competence remains for the Member States after the implementation of the Estab-
lishment Directive. In general, this problem is influenced by two separate issues. 
First, there is the extent of the competence of the European Community.549 If 
it could be established that the Community has exclusive competence the problem 
of residual legislative competence for Member State would be easily solved. This is 
because in areas of exclusive competence for the EU the Member States have no 
residual legislative competence. Although there is no exhaustive list of exclusive 
competences550 it is generally accepted that the field of the internal market, to which 
Article 47 (the legal basis of the Establishment Directive) belongs, is not an exclusive 
competence but rather a shared competence.551 With regard to shared competences 
it is accepted that Member States retain legislative competence until the Community 
has acted. With regard to the Establishment Directive the extent of Community 
action must therefore first of all be established. Secondly, if it is decided that residual 
legislative competence exists, then which rules apply must be investigated. 
Assessing the impact of a Directive in European law is not an easy task. Article 
249 of the Treaty only provides a very limited amount of clarity as to the legal impact 
of a Directive in the national legal system. It establishes that the Member State must 
attain the result that is prescribed in the Directive. In a general sense, it can be said that 
the use of a Directive leads to ‘harmonisation’ of the legal provisions of the Member 
                                                  
549  See, for example: Craig & de Burca (2007), pp. 101-102 and Arnull (2006), pp. 91-97. 
550  Which will be included in Article 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
which is envisaged to enter into force in 2009. 
551  Arnull (2006), pp. 92-93. 
144 
States.552 A Directive is generally addressed to all Member States (although it does 
not have to be), and since it prescribes a result that must be achieved, it is generally 
expected that the result will be equal in all Member States after the Directive is 
implemented. 
The term ‘harmonisation’ as such leads to interpretational difficulties, and it seems 
that it has enjoyed some different meanings throughout the history of the European 
Community.553 Much of the literature uses the example of harmonisation in the field 
of health and safety requirements based on the free movement of goods.554 Deciding 
whether a directive leads to full or exhaustive harmonisation is ultimately555 of the 
competence of the European Court of Justice.556 Since full harmonisation leaves the 
Member States without any legislative competence in the relevant field whatsoever, 
great care is taken in the legislative process and instruments leading to full harmo-
nisation are often the product of years of preparation and negotiation.557 It was the 
loss of time in the mid 1980s that led to the ultimate abandonment of the full har-
monisation strategy (or at least the abandonment of full harmonisation as the only 
way to create harmonisation).558 The ‘new’ approach leads to a much less extensive 
harmonisation of laws of the Member States and is based on the principle of mutual 
recognition laid down in Cassis de Dijon.559 The process focuses on the creation of 
general rather than detailed rules in order to speed up and simplify the legislative 
process that must lead to the harmonisation measure. The essence of the new approach 
lies in the fact that a harmonisation measure only prescribes that free movement is 
ensured by means of mutual recognition, i.e., that Member States recognise each 
others’ rules for the free movement of goods and/or persons. Taken in its purest 
form, harmonisation on the basis of mutual recognition does not need a legislative 
instrument as such. The ECJ underlined in the Cassis de Dijon judgment (and con-
firmed in the Gebhard case for all the four freedoms) that free movement was more 
or less defined by the principle of mutual recognition, i.e., the principle of mutual 
recognition ensured the working of free movement. Therefore, a legislative measure 
reconfirming that principle is not completely necessary. In practice, mutual recog-
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nition did not turn out as the miracle solution it could potentially be.560 The Court 
itself already accepted in the Cassis de Dijon case that the principle of mutual recog-
nition could be curtailed by Member States relying on mandatory requirements.561 
In addition, Member States are often wary about readily accepting standards pre-
scribed in other Member States.562 It is because of these limitations on the principle 
of mutual recognition that measures are generally created but only to a level that is 
necessary to ensure the full working of the principle of mutual recognition.563 This 
new approach, however, is still referred to as harmonisation.  
This leads to a confusing situation, since the term harmonisation is used for more 
than one legislative process, the question arises as to what competences are left for a 
Member State after a legislative measure containing harmonisation has been passed 
by the institutions of the European Community. Both literature and case law do 
not provide a clear and definite answer to this question. What is clear, however, is 
that a number of different forms of harmonisation are distinguished. Terms like ‘total’, 
‘exhaustive’, ‘full’, ‘partial’, ‘optional’ and ‘minimum’ harmonisation are observed 
in both literature and case law.564 Exact definitions and clear and precise delimitations 
between the different forms of harmonisation cannot be given. The text containing 
the legal basis for the Establishment Directive, Article 47 EC, mentions that Directives 
will be adopted in order to provide for the coordination of national measures. The 
terms of the legal basis therefore do not solve the problems of the extent of the 
harmonisation. The solution must thus be sought in Directive 98/5/EC itself. 
The preamble and the text of Directive 98/5/EC do not state specifically what 
level of harmonisation is required, but there are some hints in the preamble of the 
Directive that may shed some light on the issue. First, the preamble states that there 
is a strong link between Directive 98/5/EC and Directive 89/48/EEC. The latter is 
based on the principle of mutual recognition and was a direct result from the change 
of approach proposed at the summit of Fontainebleu in 1984. In addition to that it 
is also indicated in the preamble (and later on repeated in the articles of the Direc-
tive itself) that in some fields the Member States retain some discretionary power. For 
example, Member States can reserve access to their highest courts for a special cate-
gory of lawyers and they may also require a lawyer established under his home country 
title to work in conjunction with a lawyer who is entitled to use the professional title 
of the host Member State (Article 5(3)). Another example can be found in Article 
6(2) of the Directive which states that lawyers established under their home country 
title must be represented adequately in the representative bodies of the profession, 
and that the adequate representation shall involve at least the right to vote in the 
elections of the governing bodies of the profession. The two examples illustrate that 
there is at least some form of residual legislative competence for the Member States. 
The two examples given also illustrate that this residual competence differs from 
article to article in the Directive. The examples from Article 5 of the Directive 
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show that a Member State can limit the professional activities of lawyers. Since the 
Member State has the choice of whether to implement this possibility or not, it can 
be said that the article leaves legislative discretion to the State. This residual competence 
is, however, very limited. Member States can choose either to apply the possibility 
or not to apply the possibility. The residual competence (apart from the practical 
implementation) is therefore confined to the choice of either to apply or not.565 
The example of Article 6 of the Directive works in a somewhat different manner. 
Article 6 lays down a minimum requirement. Although it is nowhere stated explicitly, 
it is clear that Member States are welcome to lay down rules that give lawyers estab-
lished under their home title more rights than active election rights in order to be 
adequately represented in the profession’s governing bodies. Therefore, in this case the 
residual legislative competence for the Member State is larger than in the previous 
example. The Directive lays down a minimum standard, but from the wording of 
that standard it becomes clear that Member States are welcome to implement a 
regime that is more lenient than prescribed by the Directive. In comparison with the 
regime of harmonisation occurring in the free movement of goods under Article 95 
EC Treaty (referred to as minimal harmonisation), this figure could be described as 
‘reversed minimal harmonisation’.566 Apart from these possibilities that can be de-
duced from the text of the articles there are no further indications as to the extent 
of harmonisation. 
As was described above, the European Court of Justice has the last word with 
respect to the extent of the harmonisation that is achieved by a piece of secondary 
legislation. In the recent cases of Commission v. Luxembourg567 and Wilson568 the Euro-
pean Court of Justice took the opportunity to rule on the extent of harmonisation 
of a number of articles in the Directive. In these cases described extensively above, 
the Court rules that Article 3 (registration under home country professional title) 
and Article 5 (exercise of professional activity) lead to full harmonisation of the 
subject matter and no further exceptions to the rules, other than those included in 
the Article, may be imposed. That means that on the basis of these rulings Member 
States have no residual legislative competence in the matters dealt with in Articles 3 
and 5 of the Directive. Next, it must be assessed whether that is also the case for other 
articles in the Directive, like Article 10, for instance, which governs the integration 
in the host Member State’s profession. It must be clear from the outset that no 
definitive answers can be given before the Court has ruled on the extent of harmoni-
sation in these remaining articles. However, if one compares the style and wording 
of Articles 3 and 5 with the other articles, such as Article 10, it can be concluded 
that there are no apparent differences between Articles 3 and 5 and the rest of the 
Directive. Therefore, I take the position that the rest of the Directive must be read 
                                                  
565  This could be called an ‘optional clause’ or ‘optional harmonisation’. In the free movement of 
goods there is what is called optional harmonisation but this works in a different manner, so in 
order to avoid confusion I will leave the above-mentioned method nameless. 
566  The normal ‘minimal harmonisation’ method in the field of the free movement of goods allows 
Member States to lay down stricter rules. Since this method, as observed above, allows for more 
lenient rules it is the opposite of normal minimal harmonisation, hence reversed harmonisation. 
567  Case C-193/05, Commission of the European Communities v. Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg, [2006] 
ECR I-08673. 
568  Case C-506/04, Graham J. Wilson v. Ordre des avocats du barreau de Luxembourg, [2006] ECR, I-
08613. 
147 
in the light of the Court’s judgments in Wilson and Commission v. Luxembourg. It 
can therefore be concluded (at least until more specific case law emerges) that no 
residual legislative competence remains for the Member States regarding matters 
that are dealt with in the Directive. 
The question remains as to whether the Directive also affects the legislative 
competence of the Member States in areas that are not (specifically) covered by the 
Establishment Directive, and what rules, if any, should be applied to the legislative 
competence of the Member States that is not affected by the Directive. In answering 
the first question, guidance may be found in the AMOK case.569 This case, described 
above, dealt with the Services Directive. In short, the Court ruled that restrictions 
that precluded the full working of the Directive are prohibited, even when the 
specific subject matter of the restriction was not covered by the Directive as such. Since 
it was already established that the Service Directive and the Establishment Directive 
are very closely linked, an analogous interpretation of the AMOK case can be applied 
in the context of the Establishment Directive. That would mean that where a Member 
State imposes restrictions on the free movement of lawyers for the establishment 
under home country professional title that precludes the full working of the Directive, 
such a restriction would be prohibited (without an apparent right to objectively 
justify such a restriction, at least not one that can be deduced from the AMOK 
case). At least in one instance such a restriction will be identified below in the 
review of implementation of the Establishment Directive. 
With regard to restrictions that are not covered by the Directive and which do 
not preclude the full working of the Directive, the applicable rules are also clear. In 
the case law it has been decided that those restrictions do fall under European rules, 
and do not remain in the exclusive competence of the Member States. From the case 
law described above, it becomes clear that the normal rules applicable to restrictions 
as laid down in the Gebhard case apply, where applicable preceded by specific rules, 
such as the Vlassopoulou rules for the recognition of diplomas. In general this means 
that any restriction that is liable to hinder, or make less attractive, the exercise of 
one of the freedoms (in this case the free movement of lawyers) is prohibited unless 
objectively justified. 
In conclusion, it can be said that the legislative competence of Member States is 
curbed on three distinct levels. There is no residual legislative competence with regard 
to matters covered by the Establishment Directive other than those choices specifi-
cally mentioned in the Directive. Secondly, restrictions outside the scope of the 
Directive that preclude its full working are prohibited and all other restrictions are 
prohibited unless objectively justified. This division can be represented as follows: 
                                                  
569  Case C-289/02, AMOK Verlags GmbH v. A&R Gastronomie GmbH, [2003] ECR I-15059. 
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Figure 7:  Layers of restrictions 
 
 
 
 
This threefold division can now be applied to the implementation of the Directive 
in the Member States. 
§ 4.3 Implementation of the Establishment Directive in the 
Member States 
The following paragraph provides a review of the implementation of the Establish-
ment Directive in the fifteen selected Member States. Since this is the first time the 
implementation of the Establishment Directive has been described on such a scale, 
the level of detail is greater than within the review for the Services Directive in the 
previous paragraph and the review of the Diploma Directive in the next paragraph. 
However, in order to avoid presenting a repetitive account of the implementation 
in all Member States, emphasis will be given to the problems arising from the im-
plementation in those specific States. Anomalies in implementation will be classed 
in the threefold division of possible restrictions as presented above. After the review 
of the implementation, observations and conclusions regarding the implementation 
of the Establishment Directive will be presented. 
Restrictions imposed on articles of the Directive that preclude residual 
legislative power of the Member States are prohibited per se. 
 
Based on Wilson and Commission v. Luxembourg it has been assumed 
that this is the case for Directive 98/5/EC. 
Restrictions imposed on matters where legislative power of the 
Member States is not precluded because it is not covered by the 
Directive concerned but where the full working of the Directive is 
frustrated are prohibited per se (AMOK case). 
Restrictions imposed on matters where legislative power of Member 
States is not precluded that do not frustrate the full working of the 
Directive are prohibited unless objectively justified. (Gebhard case). 
 
Specific rules for specific situations may apply (e.g. Vlassopoulou for 
diplomas). 
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§ 4.3.1  Implementation in the Scandinavian and Nordic 
Member States 
Sweden 
The Swedish government implemented Directive 98/5/EC by means of an adaptation 
to Chapter 8 of the Rättegångsbalken which came into force on 1 January 2000.570 
Since the adaptation, paragraph 2 of Chapter 8 of the Rättegångsbalken states that hence-
forth the Chapter shall be applicable to lawyers coming from other Member States 
of the European Union, whereas before it referred only to the Member States of 
the European Economic Area and Denmark and Finland.571 
Paragraph 2a of Chapter 8 of the Rättegångsbalken states that all persons who are 
entitled to practise as a lawyer in one of the Member States of the European Union 
are allowed to establish themselves on a permanent basis under their home country 
title in Sweden, once they have registered with the Swedish Bar Association.572 The 
remarkable feature is that the Swedish Bar Association has to ascertain that the 
lawyer who seeks establishment under his home title in Sweden fulfils the criterion 
laid down in section 6 of paragraph 2, namely that the lawyer concerned must be 
suitable to practise as an advocate.573 This is significant since Directive 98/5/EC 
allows no additional criteria to register a lawyer who seeks establishment under his 
home title, other than those regarding written proof of his registration in his home 
Member State. It can therefore be said that the additional requirement in the Rätte-
gångsbalken is a violation of the principle of mutual recognition that underlies the 
Directive, and therewith of the Directive itself.574 Based on the threefold division 
above, this must be classed as a restriction in the field where residual legislative 
power is precluded. Therefore this requirement must be classed as a direct violation 
of the Directive. As of 2006, fifteen lawyers were registered under their home country 
professional title.575 All applications regarding establishment under home title are to 
be examined by the Swedish Bar Association.576 
Paragraph 9 of Chapter 8 of the Rättegångsbalken lays down the rules in connec-
tion with professional activities and the use of the professional title by the lawyer who 
is established under his home country professional title. The paragraph states that all 
                                                  
570  Regeringens proposition 1998/99:108, Advokaters etableringsrätt. Mention must be made of 
the fact that the adaptation to the Rättegångsbalken will be dealt with on the basis of a French 
translation, which is accessible via the website of the CCBE, <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 
12 November 2002. 
571  Chapter 8 § 2 Rättegångsbalken. 
572  Chapter 8 § 2a Rättegångsbalken. § 3 of the Stadgar för Sveriges Advokatsamfund is also altered in 
such a way to incorporate lawyers who are established under their home title. 
573  Chapter 8 § 2a Rättegångsbalken. 
574  As it has been established in cases C-193/05, Commission of the European Communities v. Grand-
Duchy of Luxembourg, [2006] ECR I-08673 and C-506/04, Graham J. Wilson v. Ordre des avocats 
du barreau de Luxembourg, [2006] ECR, I-08613, that Article 3 of Directive 98/5EC leads to 
full harmonisation, it must be concluded that the Swedish requirement is a violation of the 
Directive. 
575  <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 11 June 2007. 
576  Chapter 8 § 3 Rättegångsbalken. This supervision is further elaborated upon in § 4a of the 
Stadgar för Sveriges Advokatsamfund which, among other things states the documents necessary 
for admission and the fact that all decisions of the Advokatsamfund must be reasoned. 
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the Swedish legislation regarding lawyers shall be equally applicable to lawyers who 
are established under their home country title in Sweden.577 Since there is no legal 
monopoly on legal activities in Sweden it is not surprising that the Rättegångsbalken 
says nothing about activities that may or may not be exercised by a lawyer who is 
established under his home title, or about the way in which certain activities should 
be exercised. 
Paragraph 9 does lay down rules regarding the use of the professional title. The 
paragraph states that lawyers who seek permanent establishment in Sweden must do so 
under their home country professional title. In addition to that, the lawyer is obliged 
to give information regarding the institution that has granted him his licence to practise 
in his home Member State, and he can be obliged to mention the competent author-
ity with which he is entitled to practise in his home Member State.578 Paragraph 10 
states that anybody who passes himself off as a lawyer when he does not hold the 
qualification to do so will be subject to a penalty.579  
Disciplinary proceedings for lawyers who are established under their home title 
are laid down in paragraph 7 of Chapter 8 of the Rättegångsbalken.580 The first section 
of the paragraph states that if a lawyer intentionally commits a wrong or acts dis-
honestly in any other way shall be expelled from the Bar. Where it concerns a lawyer 
who is established under his home title in Sweden, his licence to practise in Sweden 
shall be revoked. The section states further that the Advokatsamfundet may decide to 
issue a warning instead of an expulsion or revocation.581 The second section of the 
paragraph deals with other situations within which a lawyer has neglected to fulfil 
his duties. In these cases, the Advokatsamfundet shall issue a warning or a reprimand. 
However, if the situation is particularly grave the Advokatsamfundet can choose either 
to expel the lawyer (if he is an advokat) or to revoke his licence (where it is a lawyer 
who is established under his home title).582 In cases where a lawyer has been issued 
with a warning, the Advokatsamfundet can impose a fine.583 On the other hand, the 
disciplinary committee of the Advokatsamfundet may also decide to issue a mere decla-
ration that the concerned lawyer’s action was wrong or inappropriate.584 If a lawyer 
comes to a situation where he is no longer able to fulfil the criteria of paragraph 2 of 
Chapter 8 of the Rättegångsbalken he must resign from the Advokatsamfundet imme-
diately. Where he fails to do so, the Advokatsamfundet may order his expulsion. If a 
lawyer who is established under his home title in Sweden loses his competence to 
practise in his home Member State, his licence to practise in Sweden will also be 
revoked immediately.585 There remains a possibility of appeal to the Swedish Supreme 
                                                  
577  Chapter 8 § 9 Rättegångsbalken. 
578  Chapter 8 § 9 Rättegångsbalken. 
579  Chapter 8 § 10 Rättegångsbalken. 
580  With regard to notification of disciplinary proceedings and the result thereof to the relevant 
authorities in Sweden and to the competent authorities in the host Member State §§ 44-44a 
and 45 of the Stadgar för Sveriges Advokatsamfundet apply. 
581  Chapter 8 § 7 Rättegångsbalken. 
582  Chapter 8 § 7 Rättegångsbalken. 
583  Chapter 8 § 7 Rättegångsbalken. 
584  Chapter 8 § 7 Rättegångsbalken. 
585  Chapter 8 § 7 Rättegångsbalken. 
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Court against any decision regarding admission to, or expulsion from, the Advokats-
amfundet.586 
The means of integrating into the Swedish legal profession are laid down in 
paragraph 2 of Chapter 8 of the Rättegångsbalken. The paragraph states that anyone 
who has obtained a diploma in another Member State can take an examination in 
order to test whether he has enough knowledge of the Swedish legal system in order 
to become an advokat. When he passes this exam, he will be deemed to have fulfilled 
the education requirements laid down in paragraph 2 of the Chapter, which are dis-
cussed above.587 This exam is clearly an aptitude test under the system of Directive 
89/48/EEC, which will be discussed in the next paragraph. Accession into the pro-
fession of the advokat without having to take an aptitude test is also possible. The 
paragraph states that a lawyer who is established under his home title in Sweden can 
accede to the profession of the advokat without taking an aptitude test if he has 
regularly and effectively exercised the activities as a lawyer in Sweden for a period 
of at least three years, and where those activities consisted of working with Swedish 
law.588 It is strange that although Directive 98/5/EC indicates experience in the 
field of European law is also relevant for the accession to the profession of the host 
Member State without having to take an aptitude test, the Rättegångsbalken does not 
mention this at all. This is even stranger since the government has mentioned the 
relevant experience in European law in its proposal to change the Rättegångsbalken,589 
but in the final version its reference was absent. It will therefore be paramount to 
monitor how the Advokatsamfundet will deal with situations where a lawyer has 
gained three years of experience in European law and not in Swedish law. 
A second method which can be used to accede to the profession of the advokat 
without having to take an aptitude test is relevant for lawyers who are established 
under their home title in Sweden and where they have gained at least three years of 
experience, but they have not been active in Swedish law for those three years. In 
that case, the lawyer concerned can prove in another way that he has enough knowl-
edge and experience to be admitted to the Advokatsamfundet.590 In this case, i.e., 
without explicit reference to experience gained in European law, it looks like the 
Swedish authorities do not wish to grant automatic accession to lawyers who have 
gained three years of experience in (among other things) European law, since they 
would fall in the second category. This would be a direct violation of Article 10 of 
Directive 98/5/EC, which states that lawyers who have gained experience in Euro-
pean law have an automatic right of accession to the profession of the host Member 
State. The practice of the Advokatsamfundet needs to be monitored closely.591 As of 
2006, no lawyers had sought integration into the Swedish legal profession.592 
                                                  
586  Chapter 8 § 8 Rättegångsbalken. Which is in accordance with the requirements for a ‘remedy’ 
mentioned by the ECJ in the Wilson case. 
587  Chapter 8 § 2 Rättegångsbalken. 
588  Chapter 8 § 2 Rättegångsbalken. 
589  Regeringens proposition 1998/99:108 Advokaters etableringsrätt, prop.1998/99:108. 
590  Chapter 8 § 2 Rättegångsbalken. 
591  Acoording to the latest statistics of the CCBE (<www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 20 November 
2006) no lawyers have gained access to the profession of advokat via Article 10 of Directive 
98/5/EC. 
592  <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 11 June 2007. 
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No alterations have been made to the Rättegangsbalken with regard to joint prac-
tice of lawyers who have been established under their home title in Sweden. This 
leads to the conclusion that the rules regarding joint practice for advokats which are 
laid down in paragraph 4 of Chapter 8 of the Rättegångsbalken are also valid for 
lawyers who are established under their home title, on the basis of paragraph 9 of 
Chapter 8 of the Rättegångsbalken.593 According to the government, paragraph 4 did 
not need any alterations before becoming applicable for lawyers who are established 
under their home title.594 Paragraph 4 states that lawyers may only work in joint 
practice with people who are advokats. This may lead to two conclusions. Either, 
lawyers who are established under their home title may only practise jointly with 
Swedish advokats, or it may mean that lawyers who are established under their home 
title may practise jointly with those persons who are allowed to practise as a lawyer 
in any Member State of the European Union and the European Economic Area. 
On the basis of the government’s motivation with regard to alteration of the Rätte-
gångsbalken the conclusion must be that the Swedish government had the last 
option in mind, since it states that the prohibition for Swedish lawyers to work 
together with lawyers from other EU Member States must be revoked.595 
 
Finland 
By means of a law that entered into force on 1 January 2000, the Finnish govern-
ment has adapted the Advocates Act in order to bring it into conformity with 
Directive 98/5/EC.596 Section 5b of the Advocates Act regulates the right to establish-
ment for lawyers who have gained their professional qualification in another Member 
State. The section states that any person who is admitted to the legal profession of 
another Member State of the European Union is entitled to be entered into a 
register.597 The Finnish Bar Association shall keep this register and it shall encom-
pass lawyers who are entitled to practise in another Member State and who operate 
in Finland under their home country professional title.598 Further formalities with 
regard to this registration are laid down in the by-laws of the Finnish Bar Associa-
tion. Section 6a of the by-laws states that in order to be registered with the Finnish 
Bar Association the lawyer must submit a written application accompanied by a 
certificate which certifies he is allowed to practise as a lawyer in his home Member 
State. No more than three months should have elapsed since the certificate was issued. 
The Finnish Bar Association shall inform the competent authority of the host Member 
State that the lawyer concerned has sought entrance to the register of EU lawyers 
of the Finnish Bar Association.599 Section 8 of the by-laws of the Finnish Bar Asso-
ciation states further that the Board of the Finnish Bar Association shall give reasons 
for any decision made not to register a lawyer.600 Decisions which decline the reg-
istration of a lawyer in the EU register are eligible for appeal before the Court of 
                                                  
593  Chapter 8 §§ 4 and 9 Rättegångsbalken. 
594  Regeringens proposition 1998/99:108 Advokaters etableringsrätt, prop.1998/99:108. 
595  Regeringens proposition 1998/99:108 Advokaters etableringsrätt, prop.1998/99:108, p. 20. 
596  Law number 1249/1999. 
597  Section 5b Advocates Act. 
598  Section 5b Advocates Act. 
599  Section 6a by-laws of the Finnish Bar Association. 
600  Section 8 by-laws of the Finnish Bar Association. 
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Appeal of Helsinki.601 As of 2006, three lawyers were registered under their home 
country professional title in Finland.602 
Because there is no legal monopoly for the legal profession in Finland, there are 
few rules with regard to professional activity. As seen above, there are rules pertain-
ing to professional ethics for Finnish advokats or asianajajas, which are laid down in 
the rules of conduct.603 Section 5b states the rules of professional activity which 
must be adhered to by lawyers from other Member States of the European Union 
and are established under their home title in Finland.604 The section states that all 
the provisions in the law with regard to advokats or asianajajas and the by-laws of 
the Finnish Bar Association shall also apply, where appropriate, to lawyers who are 
registered in the EU register of the Finnish Bar Association. In addition to that, a 
lawyer who is registered in that same register shall arrange his activities in a manner 
consistent with the rules governing the activities of advokats or asianajaja’s.605 The by-
laws of the Finnish Bar Association say very little on professional activity for lawyers 
who are part of the EU register. Section 6a of the by-laws state that the rules laid 
down in the by-laws shall apply to lawyers who are registered in the EU register, 
where applicable.606 With regard to the use of professional title, Section 5b of the 
Advocates Act only states that the EU register shall encompass all lawyers who are 
allowed to practise in another Member State as a lawyer, and are established under 
their home title in Finland.607 The actual obligations for a European lawyer to prac-
tise under his home country title are not laid down in the Advocates Act, but it are 
rather encompassed in the by-laws of the Finnish Bar Association. Section 6a states 
that a lawyer who is enrolled in the register of EU lawyers shall use the professional 
title of his home Member State in the language of that State, and with reference to 
the professional organisation to which he belongs.608 Unauthorised use of the rele-
vant professional title is not allowed, and is punishable by a fine.609 
The rules regarding disciplinary proceedings for lawyers who are enrolled in the 
EU register are closely intertwined with the rules for disciplinary proceedings for 
advokats and asianajajas. Section 7 of the Advocates Act states that any lawyer who 
deliberately commits an injustice through his practice, or otherwise acts in a dishonest 
manner as an advocate must be disbarred.610 Instead of disbarment, the Bar Associa-
                                                  
601  Section 10(1) Advocates Act. 
602  <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 11 June 2007. 
603  Rules of proper professional conduct for advocates (9.6.1972), <www.advonet.fi>, last accessed 
10 December 2002. See also sections 38-41 of the by-laws of the Finnish Bar Association. 
604  Section 5b(2) Advocates Act.  
605  Section 5b(2) Advocates Act. 
606  Section 6a by-laws of the Finnish Bar Association. It is uncertain what the exact extent of this 
provision amounts to. Does it mean that in general all the provisions of the by-laws apply to 
European lawyers, or does it mean that only those rules that specifically refer to European 
lawyers, either in the by-laws or the Advocates Act itself. Section 29 of the by-laws, for example, 
refers to the right of lawyers in the EU register, to vote in meetings of the local Chapter of the 
Bar Association.  
607  Section 5b(1) Advocates Act. See Also Section 5a Advocates Act. 
608  Section 6a by-laws of the Finnish Bar Association. 
609  Section 11 Advocates Act. 
610  Section 7(1) Advocates Act. For procedural rules regarding disciplinary proceedings and appeals 
see sections 45–51 of the by-laws of the Finnish Bar Association. 
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tion can also opt for a caution when there are mitigating circumstances.611 In cases 
where an advocate has neglected to fulfil his duties and thus his coduct does not 
amount to the standard laid down in Section 7(1) of the Advocates Act, the sanctions 
are reversed, which means as a general rule a caution is given, which, in aggravating 
circumstances, can be transformed into a disbarment.612 Section 7(5) states that these 
rules shall also apply to lawyers who are entered in the EU register.613 Any lawyer, 
either a member of the Finnish regulated profession or any lawyer who is entered 
in the EU register, has the right to appeal against any of the decisions of the Disciplinary 
Board of the Finnish Bar Association in the Court of Appeal of Helsinki.614 Any 
lawyer who has suffered disbarment or removal from the EU register as a result of 
disciplinary matters may apply for readmission after three years.615 With regard to 
disciplinary proceedings commenced against a lawyer who is entered in the EU 
register, it must be stated that the Finnish Bar Association must inform the competent 
authority of the home Member State before the disciplinary proceedings start. The 
proceedings are then conducted in cooperation between the Disciplinary Board of 
the Finnish Bar Association and the competent authority of the home Member 
State. In this cooperation, however, none of the powers of the Disciplinary Board 
of the Finnish Bar Association shall be compromised.616 Lastly, when a lawyer who 
is entered in the EU register loses his right to practise in his home Member State, 
either as a result of disciplinary proceedings in his home Member State, or as a con-
sequence of some other action, he shall be removed from the EU register.617 
Section 3 of the Advocates Act lays down the means by which a lawyer who is 
entered in the EU register may integrate into the regulated legal profession in Finland. 
As stated earlier, anyone who is allowed to practise as a lawyer in another Member 
State of the European Union or the European Economic Area may at any time apply 
for an aptitude test in order to be admitted to the regulated profession in Finland.618 
Section 3(3) of the Advocates Act lays down the other ways in which integration 
into the regulated profession can take place, namely by gaining professional experience 
while being established under one’s home title.619 The subsection states that a person 
who holds the professional qualifications of a lawyer in another Member State of the 
European Union620 may be accepted as an advokat or asianajaja. In order to acquire 
                                                  
611  Section 7(1) Advocates Act. 
612  Section 7(2) Advocates Act. 
613  Section 7(5) Advocates Act. 
614  Section 10(1) Advocates Act. 
615  Section 8 Advocates Act. This is a matter not covered by the Establishment Directive. That 
means that this is a restriction that falls within the residual legislative competence of the Member 
States. At first sight this is a requirement that is not unreasonable and might therefore be 
objectively justified, assuming that it is applied in a non-discriminatory manner. 
616  Section 5b(3) Advocates Act. 
617  Section 9(3) Advocates Act. According to Section 9(2) of the Advocates Act, it is the Finnish 
Minister of Justice who deals with appeals regarding these decisions. 
618  Section 3(2) Advocates Act. 
619  Section 3(3) Advocates Act. 
620  It is peculiar that the Finnish Advocates Act refers to the European Economic Area in all the 
other sections with regard to European lawyers, except in this section. This is even more peculiar 
since Directive 98/5/EC is a text with EEA relevance, and is therefore also valid in those coun-
tries. It must be said that all other sections that refer to European lawyers and that deal with scope 
of application, and therefore refer to EEA Member States, date from a time when Finland itself 
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acceptance a lawyer must have been listed in the EU register for at least three years 
and must show that he has acted regularly as a lawyer in Finland for at least that 
same period.621 The subsection states further that the activities that must be under-
taken in order to fulfil the second part of the criterion mentioned above shall be 
elaborated upon in the by-laws of the Finnish Bar Association.622 The only part of 
the by-laws of the Finnish Bar Association that refers to the manner of integration 
is found in Section 5 of the by-laws.623 The only addition this section makes to the 
material already laid down in the Advocates Act is that the applicant shall provide 
the Board of the Finnish Bar Association with documentation or other information 
regarding the matters dealt with and the activities employed.624 In addition, it must 
be mentioned that experience gained before the entry into force of the adaptation 
to the Advocates Act and the by-laws of the Finnish Bar Association is also taken 
into account.625 Similar to Sweden, there is no reference whatsoever with regard to 
experience gained in European Law. So also in the Finnish situation it remains to 
be seen whether or not the Board of the Finnish Bar Association will take into account 
experience gained in European Law when deciding on applications for accession to 
the profession of the advokat or asianajaja.626 As of 2006, two lawyers had sought 
integration into the Finnish legal profession.627 
Just as in Sweden, there are no specific rules for lawyers entered in the EU 
register working in joint practice. It must therefore be assumed that the rules for 
advokats and asianajajas apply similarly to the situation of lawyers coming from other 
Member States.628 This is no more than an assumption, however, since in those 
rules no explicit reference is made to lawyers coming from other EU Member States. 
At first sight it appears that Finnish advokats or asianajajas are not allowed to practise 
with lawyers who are entered in the EU register, since the rules governing the 
advokats or asianajajas and lawyers entered in the EU register are not clear on this 
issue. When they are applied to the letter, lawyers entered in the EU register are not 
allowed to practise jointly with advokats or asianajajas.629 When glancing at the EU 
                                                  
was not yet a member of the EU but solely of the EEA. It must be assumed, however, that lawyers 
from EEA countries may also benefit from entrance into the regulated legal profession by this means. 
621  Section 3(3) Advocates Act. 
622  Section 3(3) Advocates Act. 
623  Section 5(5) of the by-laws of the Finnish Bar Association. 
624  Section 5(5) of the by-laws of the Finnish Bar Association. 
625  Amendment 2000 of the by-laws of the Finnish Bar Association and Section 14 of the Advocates 
Act. 
626  As of November 2006, two lawyers were admitted into the profession. See <www.ccbe.org>, 
last accessed 20 November 2006. 
627  <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 11 June 2007. 
628  Section 5 Advocates Act; Section 38 of the by-laws of the Finnish Bar Association. 
629  This is the case since Section 4 of the by-laws of the Finnish Bar Association states that lawyers 
who are entered in the EU register are not members of the Finnish Bar Association. Section 1 of 
the Advocates Act states that an ‘advocate’ is anyone who is registered in the Roll of Advocates 
as a member of the Finnish Bar Association. Section 5(2) of the Advocates Act and Section 38 
of the by-laws of the Finnish Bar Association state that Finnish advokats and asianajajas are only 
allowed to practise jointly with other ‘advocates’, it must therefore be assumed that they are 
not allowed to practice jointly with lawyers who are entered in the EU register, since they are 
not regarded as ‘advocates’ in the sense of Section 1 of the Advocates Act. On the other hand, 
Section 5b(2) of the Advocates Act and Section 6a of the by-laws of the Finnish Bar Asso-
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register,630 however, it appears that the Finnish Bar Association does not apply 
these rules to the letter since all the lawyers entered in this register work for bigger 
law firms, and are therefore practising jointly with advokats or asianajajas.631 As a 
result it must be concluded that lawyers entered in the EU register are at least allowed 
to practise jointly with advokats or asianajajas, and with other lawyers entered in the 
EU register.632 Similar to the rules laid down for advokats and asianajajas, lawyers who 
are entered in the EU register are not allowed to work in multi-disciplinary practices.633 
Section 26 of the by-laws of the Finnish Bar Association states that both the 
advokats and asianajajas and the lawyer entered in the EU register shall have to adhere 
to the Chapter of the Finnish Bar Association that mainly covers the area concerning 
where they practise.634 Section 29 of the by-laws of the Finnish Bar Association lays 
down the right for lawyers entered in the EU register to vote for the representative 
of the Chapter to the Delegation of the Finnish Bar Association.635 There is no 
right for lawyers entered in the EU register to be voted in as a Delegate, since Section 
16 of the by-laws states that the Delegates of the Chapters shall be advocates.636 
Although the Finnish Bar Association complies with the letter of Article 6(2) of 
Directive 98/5/EC, which states that appropriate representation shall at least include 
the right to vote in the election of the professions governing bodies. Section 30 of 
the by-laws of the Finnish Bar Association states that lawyers who are entered in 
the EU register must pay an annual fee which shall not exceed the annual member-
ship fee that advokats or asianajajas must pay to the Finnish Bar Association.637 The 
Establishment Directive is silent on the point of membership fees. In the light of 
the threefold division above, this restriction must be classed as a restriction that 
needs objective justification. Based on the fact that every Bar Association will ask for 
a (substantial) membership fee it must be assumed that objective justification is not 
hard to acquire. Related to this subject is a potential hindrance that flows from the 
structure of the Establishment Directive itself, namely the fact that double registration 
fees (both in the home and the host Member State) will have to be paid. This 
matter will be addressed further at the end of this paragraph. 
 
                                                  
ciation state that the rules for ‘advocates’ shall apply in principle equally to lawyers entered in 
the EU register. In my opinion this means no more than the fact that lawyers who are entered 
in the EU-register are allowed to practise jointly with other lawyers who are entered in the 
same register, on the basis of the rules that allow Finnish ‘advocates’ to practise jointly, but it 
does not say anything with regard to the possibility of a lawyer entered in the EU register 
practicing jointly with a Finnish ‘advocate’ since these belong to two different categories.  
630  As published at <www.advonet.fi>, last accessed 19 December 2002. 
631  As of December 2002, there were five lawyers entered in the EU register. These are three 
German Rechstanwälte, one Danish advokat and an English solicitor, working with three differ-
ent law-firms in Helsinki (Asianajotoimisto Bergmann Oy, Asianajotoimisto Castrén & Snellman 
Oy and Roschier Holmberg Asianajotoimisto Oy). 
632  Which may be concluded from the fact that the five lawyers entered in the EU register only 
work in three different law-firms.  
633  Section 5 Advocates Act and Section 38 by-laws of the Finnish Bar Association, read in conjunc-
tion with Section 5b(2) Advocates Act and Section 6a by-laws of the Finnish Bar Association. 
634  Section 26 by-laws of the Finnish Bar Association. 
635  Section 28 by-laws of the Finnish Bar Association.  
636  Section 16 by-laws of the Finnish Bar Association. 
637  Section 30 by-laws of the Finnish Bar Association. 
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Denmark 
Just like their Swedish and Finnish counterparts, the Danish authorities have opted 
for an adaptation of the Retsplejenloven638 combined with a ministerial decree that lays 
down more specific rules.639 The law adapting the Retsplejenloven is characteristic of 
a legal system that makes use of decentralised rule-makers. Instead of laying down the 
rules in the law, the law merely creates the framework in which the actual rule-
making can take place on a lower level. The law consists of only one article that states 
that a number of articles in the Retsplejenloven will be amended. The most significant 
adaptation to the Retsplejenloven is that paragraph 130 is changed in such a manner 
that it now states that the Justice Minister is allowed to lay down rules regarding 
the establishment of lawyers coming from other EU Member States.640 The provision 
in the law even allows the Minister to take up rules regarding offences and punish-
ment.641The Minister of Justice has taken up this opportunity and laid down addi-
tional rules regarding the free movement of lawyers in a ministerial decree.642 This 
decree is called Bekendtgørelse om EU-advokaters etablering her i landet (hereinafter the 
Bekendtgørelse). The essence of the Bekendtgørelse is laid down in the first paragraph. It 
states that lawyers, who have obtained a licence to practise in one of the Member 
States of the European Union, can exercise the activities of an advokat, either in estab-
lishment or in salaried practice, under their home professional title.643 The second 
section of the paragraph states the relevant professional titles of the Member States of 
the European Union, a list that is identical to Article 1(2a) of Directive 98/5/EC.  
The second paragraph of the Bekendtgørelse assigns the procedure to be followed 
by a lawyer who seeks to establish himself under his home title in Denmark. The 
paragraph first states that a lawyer who wants to establish himself in Denmark must 
register himself as a member with the Det Danske Advokatsamfundet.644 For regis-
tration, it is necessary to produce a certificate from the competent authority of the 
home Member State certifying that the applicant is allowed to practise as a lawyer 
in that Member State. No more than three months shall have elapsed since the cer-
tificate was issued.645 In addition to this certificate, the lawyer concerned must also 
inform the Advokatsamfundet of his membership of any partnership, and where appli-
cable, must provide to the Advokatsamfundet information concerning this partnership.646 
Paragraph 7 of the Bekendtgørelse states that the lawyer who is established under his 
home title shall, in addition to the use of his home title, indicate to which pro-
fessional organisation he belongs, or which competent authority has given him the 
authority to practise in his home Member State.647 A lawyer who is part of a joint 
practice in his home Member State shall indicate the legal form of that joint prac-
tice and he shall also provide the names of other persons who are members of that 
                                                  
638  Lov om aendring af retsplejenloven (EU-advokaters etablering her i landet m.v.) Nr. 231, 4 
April 2000. 
639  Bekendtgørelse om EU-advokaters etablering her I landet m.v., 14 April 2000. 
640  § 130 (1) Retsplejenloven. 
641  § 130 (2) Retsplejenloven. 
642  Bekendtgørelse om EU-advokaters etablering her I landet m.v., 14 April 2000. 
643  § 1 (1) Bekendtgørelse. 
644  § 2 (1) Bekendtgørelse. 
645  § 2 (2) Bekendtgørelse. 
646  § 2 (3) Bekendtgørelse. 
647  § 7 (1) Bekendtgørelse. 
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joint practice and who are established under their home title in Denmark.648 The 
third paragraph of the Bekendtgørelse lays down the fact that the Advokatsamfundet, as 
competent authority with regard to the registration of lawyers who seek establish-
ment under their home title, shall inform the Minister of Justice and the competent 
authority of the relevant home Member State of any registration carried out under 
paragraph 2 of the Bekendtgørelse. In 2006, 22 lawyers were registered under their 
home country professional title.649 
The activities that can be carried out by a lawyer who is established under his 
home Member State in Denmark are enlisted in paragraph 4 of the Bekendtgørelse. 
That paragraph states that a lawyer who is established under his home title in Den-
mark may carry out any activity in conformity with Articles 4(1), 5(1), 6(1) and 
7(1) of Directive 98/5/EC. In essence this means that a lawyer who is established 
under his home title in Denmark may carry out any professional activities that an 
advokat may, albeit under his home title and with respect for both the professional 
rules of the host and home Member State. In addition to that, both the competent 
authorities of the host and home Member State shall be involved in disciplinary 
proceedings.650 The second section of the fourth paragraph states that lawyers es-
tablished under their home title may represent clients under the same rules that are 
applicable to advokats, and which are described above. The third paragraph states 
that a Danish lawyer shall accompany a lawyer established under his home title when 
representing a client in court.651, 652 It must be mentioned that all these limitations 
are well within the limits laid down by Directive 98/5/EC. 
Paragraph 6 of the Bekendtgørelse states that the lawyer who seeks establishment 
under his home title in Denmark must hold insurance for professional liability, 
according to the rules of the Advokatamfundet. A lawyer seeking establishment under 
his home title does not have to fulfil this criterion if he is able to show that he has 
already procured professional indemnity insurance in his home Member State that 
is comparable to the required Danish insurance, i.e., that it fulfils the criteria laid 
down by the Advokatamfundet.653 In addition to that the Advokatamfundet can demand 
the lawyer to take insurance on those terrains that are not covered by the home 
Member State insurance.654 
From paragraph 8 of the Bekendtgørelse it becomes clear that the proceedings 
regarding the cessation of the right to exercise the professional activities of a lawyer 
are similar to those laid down for Danish lawyers in Chapter 14 of the Retsplejen-
loven.655 This is the case since the paragraph states that the Chapter 14 shall also be 
used for lawyers established under their home title. Paragraph 9 states that when 
Chapter 14 of the Retsplejenloven is applied to a lawyer who is established under his 
home title, the Advokatsamfundet shall revoke his registration.656 That registration shall 
                                                  
648  § 7 (2) Bekendtgørelse. 
649  <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 11 June 2007. 
650  § 4 (1) Bekendtgørelse. 
651  § 4 (2,3) Bekendtgørelse. 
652  § 5 of the bekendtgørelse states that the Advokatrådet (a supervisory organ of the Advokatsamfundet) 
shall monitor the lawyers established under their home title. 
653  § 6 (1) Bekendtgørelse. 
654  § 6 (2) Bekendtgørelse.  
655  § 8 Bekendtgørelse. 
656  § 9 (1) Bekendtgørelse. 
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also be revoked if the Advokatsamfundet receives information from the competent 
authority of the home Member State that the right to practise of the lawyer con-
cerned has been revoked in the home Member State.657 According to paragraph 10 
of the Bekendtgørelse, the Advokatsamfundet shall inform the competent authority of 
the home Member State of any disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer established 
under his home title in Denmark, brought before the Advokatnævnet (Board of Dis-
cipline).658 In addition the second section of the paragraph states that the Advokats-
amfundet shall inform the competent authority of the host Member State of any 
disciplinary proceedings in the case where such proceedings are brought against a 
Danish lawyer who is established under his home title in another Member State.659 
Paragraph 11 of the Bekendtgørelse regulates the way in which a lawyer established 
under his home title in Denmark can accede to the profession of the advokat. The 
paragraph states that any lawyer who has occupied himself for at least three years on 
an effective and regular basis with Danish law, including European Union law, and 
who can prove such occupation to the Minister of Justice, will be exempted from 
the provisions laid down in Directive 89/48/EEC.660 The twelfth paragraph deals 
with the situation where the lawyer established under his home title has been active 
for at least three years, but where his experience in Danish law has been shorter 
than three years. In that case, the Minister of Justice can appoint such a candidate as 
advokat.661 The second section of the paragraph states that when assessing the effective 
and regular nature of the activities of the lawyer who seeks entry into the profession 
of the advokat, the Minister of Justice shall take into account all experiences gained 
by the lawyer in connection to the Danish legal system, and also any knowledge 
gathered from courses and seminars about the Danish legal system.662 The third 
section of the paragraph states that any assessment of activities shall be conducted in 
communication with the Minister of Justice.663 As of 2006, two lawyers had re-
quested integration into the Danish legal profession.664 
Paragraph 13 of the Bekendtgørelse states that lawyers who are established under 
their home title in Denmark may exercise their activities in joint practice with 
lawyers originating from the same Member States, lawyers originating from other 
Member States or lawyers originating from Denmark (or any combination thereof).665 
Moreover the paragraph states that the relevant paragraphs of the Retsplejenloven 
(§§ 124–127) are also valid for these joint practices.666 In paragraph 14 it is laid 
down that if one or more established lawyers come from one joint practice in 
another Member State, they are allowed to exercise their activity in the form of a 
branch-office of that same joint practice.667 The second section of that same paragraph 
states that where the basic principles underlying the rules regarding joint practices 
                                                  
657  § 9 (2) Bekendtgørelse. 
658  § 10 (1) Bekendtgørelse. 
659  § 10 (2) Bekendtgørelse. 
660  § 11 Bekendtgørelse. 
661  § 12 (1) Bekendtgørelse. 
662  § 12 (2) Bekendtgørelse. 
663  § 12 (3) Bekendtgørelse.  
664  <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 11 June 2007. 
665  § 13 (1) Bekendtgørelse. 
666  § 13 (2) Bekendtgørelse. 
667  § 14 (1) Bekendtgørelse. 
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of the home Member State are incompatible with the rules of the host Member 
State, the latter shall prevail insofar as compliance therewith is justified by the 
public interest and the protection of clients and third parties.668 Multidisciplinary 
practices are however not allowed.669  
Paragraph 16 of the Bekendtgørelse states that persons who are not considered as 
lawyers in the sense of paragraph 1 of the same Bekendtgørelse, are not allowed to use 
any of the titles mentioned in that paragraph. The same applies to persons whose 
right to practise as a lawyer has been withdrawn.670 The second section states that 
any use of such a title without permission will be regarded as a criminal offence.671  
§ 4.3.2 Implementation in the United Kingdom and Ireland 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland 
This paragraph shall be concerned with the implementation of Directive 98/5/EC 
in the different jurisdictions of the United Kingdom. Although the United Kingdom 
consists of three different jurisdictions, the implementation of the Directive is governed 
by Regulations covering England, Wales and Northern Ireland, and by a separate 
instrument covering Scotland. The instrument used within the Scottish legal system 
will be dealt with in the next paragraph. The implementation of the Directive in 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland is covered by the European Communities 
(Lawyer’s Practice) Regulations 2000.672 The Regulations are issued by the Lord 
Chancellor’s Department. 
Regulation 2 lays down a number of definitions, in respect of which it is interest-
ing to note that a distinction is made between foreign lawyers and Irish solicitors and 
barristers,673 and that the notion of a ‘European lawyer’ is introduced.674 According 
to the Regulation, a European lawyer is a national of the United Kingdom, or of any 
of the Member States of the European Union, who is not a solicitor, a barrister or 
an advocate, but who is allowed to practise under one of the professional titles of the 
different Member States. If a European lawyer who is established with more than one 
competent authority within the United Kingdom gains access to one of those profes-
sions, he shall be deemed to be a European lawyer for the remaining jurisdictions.675 
The third part of the Regulations deals with the registration of the European 
lawyer. Regulation 15 states that all professional bodies shall maintain a register of 
‘European lawyers’. Regulation 16 states that in order to be registered as a Euro-
pean lawyer, which is necessary in order to exercise professional activities under his 
home country title,676 the lawyer must produce a certificate which states that he is 
allowed to practise in his home Member State. No more than three months shall 
                                                  
668  § 14 (2) Bekendtgørelse. 
669  § 15 (1,2) Bekendtgørelse. 
670  § 16 (1) Bekendtgørelse. 
671  § 16 (2) Bekendtgørelse. 
672  The European Communities (Lawyer’s Practice) Regulations 2000, S.I. 2000/1119, amended by 
the European Communities (Lawyer’s Practice) (Amendment) Regulations 2001, S.I. 2001/644. 
673  Ibid. Regulation 2(1). 
674  Ibid. Regulation 2(2) and 2(3). 
675  Ibid. Regulation 2(3). 
676  Ibid. Regulation 16(1). 
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have elapsed since the certificate was issued.677 The applicant must also pay an ap-
propriate fee.678 Subject to Regulation 18, a lawyer may register himself with more 
than one professional body.679 Regulation 17 lays down an obligation for the 
professional body to register any lawyer who fulfils the criteria of Regulation 16,680 
and an obligation to inform the competent authority of the home Member State of 
that fact.681 Regulation 18 states the limitations to the registration of a European 
lawyer. Generally, it can be said that these limitations do not flow from anxiety in 
the United Kingdom about allowing European lawyers to practise freely, but from 
the division of the legal profession in the United Kingdom. Firstly, Regulation 18 
states that a European lawyer cannot register with one of the professional bodies of 
a solicitor and one of the professional bodies of a barrister.682 This flows from the 
fact that one can be either a solicitor or a barrister but one cannot be both, hence one 
cannot register with both a solicitors’ body and with a barristers’ body. Secondly, 
the Regulation prohibits Irish solicitors from registering with a barristers’ professional 
body and Irish barristers from registering with a solicitors’ body.683 Lastly, the Reg-
ulation prohibits European lawyers, registered with the Law Society of Scotland, 
from registering with one of the barristers’ professional bodies, and those lawyers 
registered at the Faculty of Advocates from registering with any of the solicitors’ 
professional bodies.684 As of 2006, 230 ‘European lawyers’ had been registered with 
the Law Society of England and Wales.685 Regulations 19 and 20 respectively deal 
with the time limit for the professional bodies to take a decision on registration and 
the possibility of appeal for a European lawyer against such a decision. Regulation 
19 states that the professional bodies have a term of four months in which to decide 
on an application.686 If after the four months no decision has been taken, the appli-
cation will be deemed to be rejected.687 If the professional body has taken a decision, 
the European lawyer has three months, or longer (with the approval of the appellate 
body688) to appeal against such a decision.689 The appellate body has the right to 
reverse the decision of the professional body, to refuse the appeal or to remit the 
matter to the professional body with such directions as the appellate body sees fit.690 
All these decisions shall be reasoned.691 Regulation 21 deals with those lawyers who 
                                                  
677  Ibid. Regulation 16(2) and 16(3). 
678  Ibid. Regulation 16(4). See the remarks made with regard to Finland. 
679  Ibid. Regulation 16(5). 
680  Ibid. Regulation 17(1). 
681  Ibid. Regulation 17(2). 
682  Ibid. Regulation 18(1). 
683  Ibid. Regulation 18(2) and 18(3). 
684  Ibid. Regulation 18(4) and 18(5). 
685  Via <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 11 June 2007. 
686  The European Communities (Lawyer’s Practice) Regulations 2000, Regulation 19(1). 
687  Ibid. Regulation 19(2). 
688  These appeal bodies are laid down in Schedule 1 attached to the Regulations, they are; the 
Master of the Rolls for the profession of solicitor in England and Wales, the Lord Chief Justice 
of Northern Ireland for the profession of solicitor in Northern Ireland, the Visitors to the Inns 
of Court for the profession of barrister in England and Wales, and the Executive Council of 
the Inn of Court of Northern Ireland for the profession of barrister in Northern Ireland. 
689  The European Communities (Lawyer’s Practice) Regulations 2000, Regulation 20(1). 
690  Ibid. Regulation 20(2). 
691  Ibid. Regulation 20(3). 
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pretend to be a European lawyer but who are not registered as such. The Regulation 
states that carrying out professional activities as a lawyer without being registered 
shall be deemed an offence, punishable by a fine.692 This rule is not applicable to 
those lawyers providing services in the United Kingdom.693 Eventually, the ruling 
that the European Court of Justice gave in the Gebhard case694 might become im-
portant in criminal proceedings in the United Kingdom in order to find out whether 
a lawyer is established and unregistered, and thus is guilty of an offence, or that he is 
completely within the boundaries of the law, providing services under the European 
Communities (Services of Lawyers) Order 1978.695 Regulation 24 states that where 
the professional body publishes a list of its members it shall also publish a list of Euro-
pean lawyers registered with that professional body. Regulation 7 states that a Euro-
pean lawyer shall use the professional title of his home Member State in a manner 
that avoids confusion with the titles of a solicitor, barrister and advocate. In addition 
to that, he will also state the professional organisation by which he is authorised to 
practise, or the court of law before which he is entitled to practise in that State. He 
is also obliged to indicate the professional body with which he is registered in the 
United Kingdom.696 
Regulation 6 lays down the professional activities that a European lawyer may 
pursue. In essence, the Regulation states that the lawyer may carry out, under his 
home country professional title, all the activities that may lawfully be carried out by a 
member of the professional body with which the European lawyer is registered.697 
The same holds true for employed lawyers.698 It must be noted, however, that the 
rule of Regulation 6 is subject to other limitations laid down in the Regulations. In 
this context, it is paramount to take into account Regulations 12 and 13, which 
will be dealt with below. Regulation 11 deals with the representation of clients in 
legal proceedings. It states that a European lawyer will not be barred from repre-
senting clients in court only for the reason that he is not a solicitor or a barrister.699 
If a European lawyer wants to represent a client in legal proceedings in circumstances 
which are reserved for a solicitor, barrister or another qualified person,700 then the 
European lawyer will act in these proceedings in conjunction with such a solicitor, 
barrister or other qualified person.701 The latter will be answerable, if necessary, to 
the court, tribunal or public authority concerned. Regulations 12 and 13 refer back 
to Regulation 6(1) which states that European lawyers may exercise any profes-
sional activity of a solicitor or a barrister, except for limitations laid down in the 
Regulations. Regulations 12 and 13 lay down these limitations. Regulation 12 states 
that a registered European lawyer is not entitled to prepare for remuneration any 
                                                  
692  Ibid. Regulation 21(1). 
693  Ibid. Regulation 21(2). 
694  Case C55/94, Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, [1995] 
ECR 4165. 
695  The implementing instrument in the United Kingdom of Directive 77/249/EEC. 
696  The European Communities (Lawyer’s Practice) Regulations 2000, Regulation 7(2). 
697  Ibid. Regulation 6(1). 
698  Ibid. Regulation 6(2). 
699  Ibid. Regulation 11(1). 
700  It is clear that with regard to this last category such a rule can only be upheld if it falls in the 
margins defined by the ECJ in Case 427/85, Commission v. Germany, [1988] ECR 1123 
701  The European Communities (Lawyer’s Practice) Regulations 2000, Regulation 11(2). 
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instrument creating or transferring an interest in land unless he has a home professional 
title which was obtained in Denmark, the Republic of Ireland, Finland or Sweden. 
Regulation 13 states that a European lawyer is not entitled to prepare, in a similar 
manner, any instrument for obtaining title to administer the estate of a deceased 
person unless, again, he has a home professional title from Denmark, Germany, the 
Republic of Ireland, Austria, Finland or Sweden. The United Kingdom is perfectly 
entitled to limit these activities since Article 5(2) of Directive 98/5/EC specifically 
allows these limitations.  
Regulation 8 deals with joint practice. It states that a European lawyer may 
carry out professional activities in a joint practice with a member of the professional 
body with which he is registered, a European lawyer who is registered with the 
same professional body or any other person permitted by the professional body with 
which he is registered, to the same extent as members of the professional organisation 
with which the European lawyer is registered. In addition, a European lawyer may 
also practise jointly with another European lawyer who is practising on a permanent 
basis under his home country title in the first European lawyer’s home Member 
State. This rather cryptic description leads to the conclusion that, in principle a 
European lawyer can work in joint practice with either his peers who are registered 
with the same professional body, or with a European lawyer from another Member 
State other than his home Member State, but who is established in his home State. 
With regard to the first category it must be stated, that in effect, this comes down 
to solicitors, since it is forbidden per se, for barristers, to practise in any other way 
other than privately. Regulations 9 and 10 are concerned with the name and the 
notification of the joint practice. In connection to these rules, the Regulations do 
not deviate much from the Directive. Regulation 9 states that a European lawyer is 
allowed to use the same name for his joint practice as he does in his home Member 
State, except for those names that are already being used in any part of the United 
Kingdom by people who are not European lawyers or solicitors. He may also not 
use that name if the rules of the professional body prohibit him from using it. Reg-
ulation 10 states that a European lawyer who is part of a joint practice in his home 
Member State shall notify this fact to the professional body with which he wants to 
register. 
Regulations 25 to 29 deal with the rules of professional conduct that are appli-
cable to European lawyers and with the disciplinary proceedings that may be brought 
against him. Regulation 25 is completely in conformity with Article 6 of Directive 
98/5/EC, and states that a registered European lawyer is subject to the same pro-
fessional rules as the members of the professional body with which he is registered. 
If he is registered with more than one professional body he is therefore subject to 
the rules of all those bodies. Regulation 26 deals with the applicable disciplinary pro-
ceedings. The Regulation states that a European lawyer shall be subject to the same 
disciplinary proceedings as a member of the professional body with which he is 
registered. Again, this is completely in conformity with Article 7 of Directive 98/5/ 
EC.702 Sanctions imposed in disciplinary proceedings, which must be reasoned,703 
may involve the suspension or withdrawal of the registration.704 Regulation 27 
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regulates the actual disciplinary proceedings brought against a European lawyer. It 
lays down the obligation for the professional body to cooperate with the professional 
body of the home Member State of the European lawyer concerned.705 The Regu-
lation states further that when the professional body in the European lawyer’s home 
Member State decides to withdraw the practice licence of the European lawyer 
that would automatically lead to the revocation of the registration in the United 
Kingdom. This will not be the case if the European lawyer was allowed to practise 
under more than one home title, and would in such circumstances mean that his 
licence is taken away only in one of his home Member States.706 If there is the pos-
sibility for an appeal procedure, the professional body of the home Member State shall 
be allowed to make representation in such a procedure.707 Regulation 28 covers the 
situations where disciplinary proceedings are started against a solicitor or barrister 
who is established under his home title in another Member State. The Regulation 
states that a foreign professional body shall inform the competent authority in the 
United Kingdom of the intention to begin such proceedings, and of the decision 
reached, including any appeal proceedings. 
The last part of the Regulations, namely Regulations 29 to 36, deals with the 
integration of the European lawyer into one of the legal professions of the United 
Kingdom. Regulation 29 states that in principle a European lawyer will have to sit 
an aptitude test708 unless he can prove that he falls within the exemptions laid down 
in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Regulation.709 A European lawyer can be exempted 
from the applicable aptitude test if he has been registered with the professional body 
for at least three years. In addition he must have effectively and regularly pursued 
for the same period of time, in England, Wales or Northern Ireland, professional 
activities under his home professional title in the law of England and Wales or 
Northern Ireland.710 The other way to obtain exemption is to be registered for at 
least three years with a professional body, and to have effectively and regularly pur-
sued professional activities under home title for at least three years, but for a lesser 
period with the law of the England and Wales or Northern Ireland. With regard to 
these exemptions, it is at least remarkable to notice that, in contrast with the lan-
guage of Article 10 of Directive 98/5/EC, the Regulation makes no mention of 
European Community law as part of the professional activity that could lead to 
integration without an aptitude test. Again, there is no mentioning of European 
Community law in this respect. The difference in the two possible exemptions is 
the size of the discretionary power that is exercised by the professional bodies of the 
host Member State. The actual size of the discretion is regulated by Regulations 31 
and 32. Regulation 30 states that the professional body concerned will grant an 
exemption if the conditions under either paragraph 29(2) or 29(3) are met.711 Accord-
ing to the Regulation, a lawyer ceases to be a European lawyer at the moment he 
                                                  
705  Ibid. Regulation 27(1). 
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is integrated into the legal profession concerned.712 By far the most interesting part 
of this Regulation is laid down in the third paragraph, which states that the 
professional body may refuse to grant exemption if it considers that the European 
lawyer would be unfit to practise as a solicitor or barrister.713 This is probably the 
codification of Article 10(4) of Directive 98/5/EC, which states that the professional 
body may reject a lawyer based on reasons of public order, mainly with regard to 
previous disciplinary proceedings. It seems to me that this has been transferred into 
what seems to be a too broad discretion for the professional bodies. In my opinion, 
this Regulation must be applied in the light of what is laid down in Article 10(4) of 
the Directive. It is my opinion, nonetheless, that an application of Regulation 30(3) 
as such, i.e., without a reference to the situations laid down in Article 10(4) of the 
Directive and without an objective justification, must be classified as a violation of 
European Community law. Regulation 31 states that where a European lawyer 
wishes to be exempted under paragraph 2 of Regulation 29, he will provide the 
professional body with any relevant information and documents it may reasonably 
require.714 In addition, the professional body, in order to verify the regular and 
effective nature of the professional activity pursued, may request the European lawyer 
to provide, orally or in writing, clarification of, or further details on, the information 
and documents already provided.715 
Regulation 32 lays down what evidence is necessary in order to acquire an 
exemption under paragraph 3 of Regulation 29. This Regulation also states that the 
lawyer concerned shall provide the professional body with all the relevant informa-
tion and documents it may reasonably require.716 When deciding upon an application, 
the professional body shall take into account all the professional activities the 
registered European lawyer has pursued during his registration, and any knowledge 
and professional experience he has gained, and any of the training he has received 
in the law of any part of the United Kingdom and the rules of the professional con-
duct of the profession concerned.717 In principle, the information will be assessed 
and verified during an interview, unless the professional body deems this unneces-
sary.718 It is at least interesting to note that for the second exemption possibility for 
the aptitude test, professional activity throughout the United Kingdom is taken into 
account, and not only from England and Wales or Northern Ireland. This is the 
case, since the professional body has more discretion under this paragraph, which is 
completely in accordance with Article 10 of Directive 98/5/EC. Regulation 34 
lays down the time limits for the professional bodies, within which they have to 
take a decision based on Regulation 29. The time period is four months, just as it is 
the case in deciding upon registration as a European lawyer. If the professional body 
does not answer within four months then the application is deemed to have been 
rejected. Regulation 35 lays down the right for a European lawyer to appeal against 
a decision taken under Regulation 35 within three months of the decision, or later 
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if approval from the appellate body is granted. On the basis of the appeal, the appel-
late body may take the same decisions as they would in an appeal against a decision 
concerning the registration of a European lawyer. The appellate body may reverse 
the decision of the professional body, refuse the appeal or remit the matter to the 
professional body with any such directions as the appeal body sees fit. As of 2006, 71 
European lawyers entered the profession of the solicitor by means of the exemption 
laid down in Article 10 of the Directive.719 
 
Scotland 
As already stated above, Scotland forms a different jurisdiction within the United 
Kingdom, and therefore Directive 98/5/EC needed to be implemented separately 
in Scotland. This was also done by means of Regulations that were drawn up by 
the Scottish Ministers and approved by the Scottish Parliament.720 It might not be 
surprising to notice that the Scottish Regulations are very similar to those in England, 
Wales and Northern Ireland. I will therefore focus on the differences between the 
two statutory instruments. 
The first notable difference between the two sets of Regulations is to be found 
in Regulation 8 which deals with joint practice. As I have already stated above, the 
English Regulations provide that a European lawyer may practise jointly with 
another European lawyer who was established under his home title in the home 
Member State of the first European lawyer. The Scottish executive has wisely chosen 
to leave this unclear passage out of its Regulations.721 
Regulation 11 deals with matters concerning the representation of clients in 
legal proceedings. However, there is an additional section (section 4) in the Scottish 
Regulations which removes the right of audience from registered European lawyers 
in the Supreme Court unless they have completed a training course in evidence, 
pleading and practice before the Supreme Court.722 This seems to be in accordance 
with the Directive because Article 5(3) allows for the restriction of access to higher 
courts. However, some insecurity remains since the Directive does not mention 
the following of a course (the use of specialised lawyers is allowed however) and 
the Regulation remains unclear on whether the European lawyer is allowed to act 
on his own after the completion of the course, or whether he is still obliged to 
work in conjunction with a Scottish lawyer. 
Section 6 of the Scottish Regulation 16 states that there is no obligation for Euro-
pean lawyers to register with the professional bodies in Scotland if they are already 
registered with one of the professional bodies in England and Wales or Northern 
Ireland.723 The ratio behind this section lies in the fact that English, Welsh, or 
Northern Irish solicitors and barristers are also not obliged to register in Scotland.724 
This section caused an enormous stir in the process of creating these Regulations,725 
and it is my opinion that it causes more complications than it solves. Both Regulations 
                                                  
719  Via <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 11 June 2007. 
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721  The European Communities (Lawyer’s Practice) (Scotland) Regulations 2000, Regulation 8. 
722  Ibid. Regulation 11(4). 
723  Ibid. Regulation 16(6). 
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are based on the fact that England, Wales and Northern Ireland and Scotland are 
separate jurisdictions, and should be treated as such. In my opinion, it would have 
been better to continue with this point of view even at this level. This choice also 
leads to differences in Regulations 21 and 22 which exempt the unregistered Euro-
pean lawyer in Scotland (who is registered in England and Wales or Northern 
Ireland) from the offence (listed in Regulation 21) and the sanctions placed thereon 
(listed in Regulation 21 and 22).  
With regard to Regulation 29, it is interesting to note that the Scottish Executive 
has not failed to take into account professional activities pursued in Community 
law when deciding upon entrance into the profession without an aptitude test.726 
 
Ireland 
Ireland was one of the last Member States to implement Directive 98/5/EC in 
national legislation. Only late in 2003, on 29 December to be precise, did the 
national implementation of Directive 98/5/EC enter into force.727 Not only did it 
take a judgment of the European Court of Justice728 to press Ireland to implement 
the Directive, but also a formal notice from the Commission calling upon Ireland 
to comply with that judgement.729 Ireland chose to implement Directive 98/5/EC 
by means of a separate statutory instrument, the European Communities (Lawyer’s 
Establishment) Regulations 2003 (hereinafter, the Regulations).730  
Lawyers who seek to register and practise under their home country professional 
title in Ireland must make a choice between performing the tasks of a barrister or 
those of a solicitor. The fact that a migrating lawyer is confronted with this choice 
is in conformity with Article 3(3) of Directive 98/5/EC. It might be obvious when 
taking into account the fact that solicitors have a general right of audience in 
Ireland that the majority of lawyers who migrate there choose to register with the 
competent authority for the profession of the solicitor. Lawyers from the United 
Kingdom, both solicitors and barristers, do not have a choice between the two profes-
sions, but are obliged to register with the competent authority of the corresponding 
profession in Ireland, i.e., solicitors with the Law Society of Ireland and barristers 
and advocates with the Bar Council. Moreover, for solicitors from England, Wales 
and Northern Ireland this is a purely academic situation since they are allowed to 
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integrate in the profession of the Irish solicitor without further formalities. In re-
sponse to this situation with regard to the dichotomy of the legal profession in Ireland, 
Regulation 4 states that there shall be two competent authorities which monitor 
lawyers who seek establishment under their home country professional title’ The 
Law Society for those who seek establishment to exercise the professional activity 
of a solicitor and the Bar Council for those who seek to exercise the professional 
activities of barristers.731 
The procedure for registering lawyers who seek establishment under home title 
in Ireland is laid down in Regulation 6 of the Regulations. First of all, the regulation 
states that a lawyer who wants to exercise the activities belonging to the profession 
of either a solicitor or a barrister must register himself with the competent authority 
of that respective profession.732 The request for registration must be accompanied 
by several documents. The lawyer who seeks registration under his home title must 
produce a certificate proving his right to practise as a lawyer in his home Member 
State. No more than three months have elapsed since the certificate was issued.733 
In addition to this the lawyer may be required to produce written evidence that he 
has professional indemnity insurance in accordance with the rules in his home Mem-
ber State, which also covers the exercise of professional activities in Ireland, or that 
he is otherwise covered for indemnities.734 The coverage of the home insurance must 
be comparable to the Irish insurance, otherwise the lawyer may be obliged to take 
additional insurance in order to cover the missing parts in his existing insurance.735 
Any of the abovementioned documents may be required to be accompanied by a 
translation in English or Irish, where the competent authority so requires.736 In 
addition, the lawyer who seeks registration under his home title must pay the ap-
propriate fees to the competent authority.737 Directive 98/5/EC does not mention 
anything about fees, so it must be assessed whether this is a possible breach of the 
directive. This assessment will be made at the end of this chapter. The remainder of 
Regulation 6 deals with the decision of the competent authority with respect to 
the application of the lawyer concerned to be registered under his home title in 
Ireland. The competent authority shall take a decision on the request of the lawyer 
as soon as is practical.738 If the conditions of Regulation 6(2) are fulfilled, the lawyer 
will be entered in the register of lawyers who are established under their home title 
within a period of four months.739 If the application is rejected or is subject to 
conditions, the competent authority shall inform the lawyer concerned within four 
months of the reasons for the rejection or the imposition of its conditions.740 If no 
decision is communicated within the period of four months, the application is deemed 
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to have been rejected.741 The certificate shall contain any condition that may be 
imposed.742 Subsection 5 of Regulation 6 states that a lawyer may not be registered 
with both the Law Society and the Bar Council at the same time, but that lawyers 
(except for solicitors and barristers from the United Kingdom) are allowed to switch 
between the competent authority and professional activity.743 Any decision taken 
by the competent authority is eligible for appeal to the High Court, which may 
overturn the decision of the competent authority.744 The information that needs to 
be included in the register is laid down in Regulation 7.745 This Regulation also 
states that the competent authority shall inform the competent authority of the 
lawyer’s home Member State of that lawyer’s registration and any changes, suspen-
sion, or cancellation that may occur during the registration.746 If the lawyer fulfils the 
criteria laid down in Regulation 6 and is entered in the register of the competent 
authority, the lawyer will receive a ‘qualifying certificate’, which allows him to 
exercise professional activities under his home country professional title.747 If the 
registration is subject to conditions, these conditions will be mentioned on the cer-
tificate.748 A ‘qualifying certificate’ may be refused or suspended by the Law Society 
if the lawyer concerned has been prohibited, temporarily or permanently, from 
exercising the activities of a solicitor, if he has applied for registration with the Bar 
Council or if the Law Society deems that the cover for indemnity is not suffi-
cient.749 A ‘qualifying certificate’ shall expire at the moment the lawyer accedes to 
the profession of either the solicitor or barrister.750 Regulation 9 establishes the 
consequences of a revocation of the lawyer’s right to practise in his home Member 
State. If a lawyer’s right to practise is temporarily revoked in his home Member 
State he will no longer be allowed to exercise professional activities in Ireland, and 
where he has chosen to register himself with the Law Society his ‘qualifying 
certificate’ shall stand as suspended.751 Where the revocation of the right to practise 
is permanent, the lawyer concerned shall be removed from the register in Ire-
land.752 The lawyer shall be notified of any such decision as soon as possible.753 The 
revocation of the right to practise in the home Member States shall have no effect 
in Ireland if the lawyer concerned is fully qualified in more than one home Mem-
ber State, and where the revocation only concerns one of the qualifications. The 
only effect such a revocation shall have is that the lawyer concerned is no longer 
allowed to use the home title of the jurisdiction in which his right to practise was 
                                                  
741  Ibid. Regulation 6(3)(d). 
742  Ibid. Regulation 6(4). 
743  Ibid. Regulation 6(5). 
744  Ibid. Regulation 6(8) and (9).  
745  Ibid. Regulation 7. 
746  Ibid. Regulation 7(3). 
747  Ibid. Regulation 8(1). 
748  Ibid. Regulation 8(2). 
749  Ibid. Regulation 8(3). 
750  Ibid. Regulation 8(4). 
751  Ibid. Regulation 9(1). 
752  Ibid. 
753  Ibid. Regulation 9(2). 
170 
revoked.754 As of 2006, 33 lawyers were registered under their home country 
professional title in Ireland.755 
Regulation 10 covers the exercise of professional activity by lawyers established 
under their home title in Ireland. In general, the Regulation states that lawyers who 
are registered under their home title in Ireland, may exercise professional activities 
under their registered home title, as if they were solicitors or barristers, depending 
on the competent authority with which the lawyer chose to register.756 More spe-
cifically, lawyers registered under their home title may give advice on the law of 
their home Member State, European Community law and Irish law.757 In addition 
the registered lawyer shall have the same rights of audience in court as a solicitor 
and barrister.758 However, if representation in court is reserved for a person who is 
registered as a solicitor or barrister the registered lawyer is obliged to work in con-
junction with such a solicitor or barrister.759 While exercising professional activities 
in Ireland a registered lawyer is obliged to practise under his home country profes-
sional title, he must indicate the competent authority by whose virtue he is allowed 
to practise in his home Member State. In addition, he must use his professional title 
in one of the languages of his home Member State, where he is obliged to avoid 
any confusion with the professional title as it is used in Ireland.760 Activities that are 
specially reserved for solicitors in Ireland, may be exercised by lawyers established 
under their home title (no matter whether they exercise the professional activity of 
a solicitor or a barrister) provided that these activities are not reserved for a profes-
sion other than that of a lawyer in their home Member State (which will be the 
case for many continental jurisdictions where these activities fall under the respon-
sibility of the notary).761 Regulation 12 is a safety-net provision to make any Statute 
or Regulation that applies to solicitors or barristers also applicable to lawyers who 
are registered under their home title.762 
Regulation 11 states that the Irish rules of professional conduct that are in force 
for any of the legal professions in Ireland shall be applicable to registered lawyers 
who have sought to exercise that legal profession.763 When the need for disciplinary 
action arises, the competent authority involved shall notify the competent authority 
of the home Member State of the complaint received against the registered lawyer 
and it shall inform that authority of any outcome of its deliberations.764 Where a 
complaint is received from another source other than the competent authority, the 
Disciplinary Tribunal is responsible for communicating the complaint to the com-
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petent authority of the home State.765 The regulation elaborates further that the 
competent authority of the registered lawyer’s home Member State may make sub-
missions in any appeal against a disciplinary decision of the competent authorities in 
Ireland.766 In case of a disciplinary proceeding, the competent authority shall im-
pose the measures provided for in the rules governing the relevant profession.767 
According to Regulation 13, a lawyer who is established under his home country 
professional title and who is a member of a grouping in his home Member State 
must inform the competent authority of the relevant profession in Ireland of that 
fact.768 Where allowed under the rules of the profession concerned, such a lawyer 
may exercise his professional activity as a member of that group or he may open a 
branch or agency of that group.769 Although it is not specifically mentioned, clearly 
that this is only applicable for solicitors because the profession of the barrister can 
only be exercised in a solitary fashion. The Regulation states that in any circum-
stances a grouping consisting of registered lawyers and a combination of solicitors 
and registered lawyers will be allowed.770 At first sight this seems to be in order, yet 
the Irish implementation lacks the required justification771 as to why the rules 
governing the association (or rather the non-association) of barristers should prevail 
over the rules in force in the registered lawyer’s home Member State. A registered 
lawyer, who is apparently allowed to practise as a member of a grouping, may use 
the name of the grouping to which he belongs in his home Member State.772 
When a registered lawyer uses the name of the grouping while exercising profes-
sional activities in Ireland he must mention the legal form of that grouping and the 
members of the grouping who also exercise professional activities in Ireland.773 
Section 4 of Regulation 13 states the situations in which a grouping shall be deemed 
to consist of persons who are not members of the legal profession. This shall be the 
case where the capital of the grouping is held entirely or partially by, the name of 
the grouping is used by, or the decision making power lies de iure or de facto with 
persons who are not solicitors, barristers or lawyers.774 It is remarkable that the Regu-
lation does not go further into the consequences of a grouping that contains members 
who are not lawyers. In the first paragraph, it was established that barristers are not 
allowed to work in groupings per se, and that solicitors are not allowed to work in 
multi-disciplinary partnerships. It may therefore be concluded that lawyers who are 
established under their home country professional title in Ireland are not allowed to 
exercise professional activities in a multi-disciplinary partnership. 
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Regulation 16775 lays down the rules governing the integration of a lawyer who 
is established under his home country professional title in one of the legal professions 
in Ireland, i.e., solicitor or barrister. This integration is made possible by amending 
the statutory instrument which governs the recognition of diplomas.776 Regulation 
16 states that a new Regulation 5a is included in the S.I. 1/1991. That Regulation 
states that Regulation 5 of S.I. 1/1991 (which prescribes an aptitude test) shall not 
apply to circumstances in which a lawyer has effectively and regularly pursued pro-
fessional activities in Irish law, including Community law. for a period of at least 
three years and where this lawyer has applied for integration in the solicitor’s pro-
fession and the barrister’s profession.777 Effective and regular pursuit is construed as 
pursuing activities without interruptions other than those resulting from everyday 
life, and not following the course of ‘services’ as under Directive 77/249/EEC, or 
its implemention counterpart in Ireland.778 In order to be integrated into the legal 
profession of his choice the lawyer concerned must provide the competent author-
ity with the necessary proof which it requires. Ordinarily this proof will be pro-
vided by means of any relevant document or information, especially with regard to 
the number, and nature, of any cases dealt with. In addition, for the purposes of 
validating the effective and regular pursuit of the activities, any other information 
or documentation that the competent authority requests.779 Where a lawyer seeks 
integration after pursuing activities in Ireland in a regular and effective manner for a 
period of at least three years, but where he has been active in the Irish law for a period 
shorter than that, the competent authority may decide to integrate the lawyer in 
the profession without an aptitude test.780 When making this decision the compe-
tent authority will take into account the activity in Irish law that is pursued, and con-
sider any knowledge and professional experience in Irish law, and any attendance 
of the lawyer at lectures and seminars on Irish law, including the rules of profes-
sional conduct and practice.781 To this end, the lawyer will provide the competent 
authority with any information and documentation relating to the cases with which 
he has dealt. The assessment and verification of the lawyer’s effective and regular 
pursuit of the professional activities and his ability to continue that pursuit will take 
place in the form of an interview with the competent authority, unless the com-
petent authority deems such an interview unnecessary.782 A lawyer who is allowed 
integration in the solicitor’s profession or the profession of the barrister will still be 
able to use his home country professional title alongside the title of the solicitor or 
barrister, provided that he remains authorised to practise in his home Member State.783 
Integration in the profession in the host Member State leads to the revocation of 
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the practising or qualifying certificates that were issued under home title.784 A 
request to be integrated in one of the Irish legal professions based on Regulation 16 
may be refused, with a reasoned statement, by the relevant competent authority, in 
circumstances where the lawyer concerned fails to provide the necessary evidence 
required under the Regulation or where the admission of the lawyer to one of the 
legal professions in Ireland would be contrary to public policy in particular because 
of disciplinary proceedings, complaints, or incidents of any kind.785 Any informa-
tion provided by the lawyer in the process of integrating into one of the legal 
professions in Ireland shall be dealt with confidentially.786 
§ 4.3.3 Implementation in the Benelux 
The Netherlands 
The process of implementing Directive 98/5/EC in the Netherlands was a lengthy 
one. Although the Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten was already dealing with the 
possible consequences of the Directive in May 1998,787, 788 an official proposal for a 
law implementing the Directive did not emerge until 20 January 2001, and the 
proposal did not become law until 13 July 2002.789 The reasons for this delay have 
always been unclear, although anecdotal information seems to suggest that the Dutch 
Ministry of Justice was of the opinion that the Directive did not have any real 
added value and that all situations could be solved with the existing rules.790 Similar 
to the Scandinavian countries and unlike the United Kingdom, the Dutch authorities 
have opted for an elaborate amendment of the Advocatenwet instead of creating a 
new law to govern all the nuances of the free movement of lawyers in the European 
Union. The law which adapts the Advocatenwet791 consists of six articles, of which 
Article 1 is the most important since it includes the significant changes to the Advo-
catenwet (the other articles change other laws but are of minor importance to this 
review). The adaptation of the Advocatenwet consists of a number of elaborations in 
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order to make the rules of the Advocatenwet also applicable to those lawyers who 
seek permanent establishment under their home title in the Netherlands. 
The establishment under home title for lawyers is laid down in a new paragraph 
in the Advocatenwet that is introduced after the paragraph which deals with lawyers 
from other Member States who provide services in the Netherlands.792 Article 16h 
of the new Advocatenwet states that a lawyer who is qualified to practise as a lawyer 
in a Member State of the European Union, or in a Member State of the European 
Economic Area, may also exercise the same activities as a Dutch lawyer. He may 
exercise these activities after he is entered in the registers of the Raad van Toezicht793 
of the constituency where he intends to practise.794 Section 2 of Article 16h states 
that the Raad van Toezicht shall enrol any lawyer who can produce a certificate from 
the competent authority of his home Member State stating that he is allowed to 
practise as a lawyer in his home Member State.795 No more than three months shall 
have elapsed since the certificate was issued.796 The Raad van Toezicht shall notify 
the competent authority of the host Member State of the lawyer’s enrolment in the 
Netherlands.797 When the Raad van Toezicht publishes a list of lawyers that are en-
rolled in that constituency it shall not only list the lawyers who are enrolled on the 
basis of Article 1 of the Advocatenwet. but it shall also include the lawyers who are 
enrolled by virtue of Article 16h Advocatenwet.798 As of 2006, 41 lawyers were reg-
istered under their home country professional title.799 According to Article 16i of 
the new Advocatenwet, lawyers from other Member States who are enrolled in the 
Netherlands are obliged to use their home country professional title in the language 
of their home Member State, or in such a way that it does not lead to confusion 
with the Dutch professional title of the advocaat.800 In addition to that, a lawyer 
established on the basis of Article 16h of the Advocatenwet is also obliged to mention 
the professional organisation under which he is allowed to practise in his home 
Member State, and the fact that he is enrolled by the Raad van Toezicht.801 
Article 16h of the Advocatenwet states that a lawyer who is established on the 
basis of that article may exercise the same activities as a lawyer who is established by 
way of Article 1 of the Advocatenwet.802 In addition to the rule mentioned in Article 
16h Advocatenwet, Article 16j states that with respect to activities which involve 
representing clients in legal proceedings, a lawyer established on the basis of Article 
16h must seek cooperation with a lawyer803 who is established on the basis of Article 
                                                  
792  Article 16g-16k Advocatenwet.  
793  The Raad van Toezicht is the controlling body of the Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten in the 
different legal constituencies. Since there are nineteen constituencies in the Netherlands there 
are also nineteen Raden van Toezicht. See Article 22 Advocatenwet. 
794  Article 16h Advocatenwet. 
795  Article 16h(2) Advocatenwet. 
796  Ibid. 
797  Article 16h(3) Advocatenwet. 
798  Article 16h(4) Advocatenwet. 
799  <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 11 June 2007. 
800  Article 16i(1) Advocatenwet. 
801  Article 16i(2) Advocatenwet. 
802  Article 16h Advocatenwet. 
803  The rules with regard to cooperation between a lawyer from another Member State who 
provides services in the Netherlands and a Dutch lawyer, which are laid down in Article 16d 
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1 of the Advocatenwet. This obligation is only enforced if Dutch law prescribes that 
a person must be represented by a lawyer (i.e., where the legal monopoly with 
regard to representing clients in court is effective).804 
Article 16k of the Advocatenwet states that a lawyer who is established under 
Article 16h of the Advocatenwet is subject to the same professional rules as a lawyer 
enrolled under the regime of Article 1 of the Advocatenwet.805 According to this Article, 
the professional rules laid down in both the Advocatenwet806 and the Verordeningen807 
shall be applicable to lawyers who establish themselves in the Netherlands under 
the regime of Article 16h of the Advocatenwet.808 The amendments to the Advocaten-
wet in connection with disciplinary proceedings are not laid down in the new 
paragraph that is introduced in the new Advocatenwet but instead find their place in 
the articles that were written for the lawyers established under the regime of Article 
1 Advocatenwet. Article 46fa of the new Advocatenwet states that when the Raad van 
Toezicht of a legal constituency is of the opinion that disciplinary proceedings 
should be commenced against a lawyer who is established under the regime of 
Article 16h of the Advocatenwet, the Raad shall first inform the competent authority 
of the host Member State. In addition, it shall provide that competent authority 
with all the necessary information.809 The newly introduced Article 60b of the 
Advocatenwet lays down the procedure for disciplinary proceedings involving law-
yers who are established under Article 16h of the Advocatenwet. In essence, the Article 
states that the procedure for lawyers who are established under the regime of Article 1 
of the Advocatenwet shall be followed when disciplinary proceedings are initiated 
against a lawyer who is established on the basis of Article 16h Advocatenwet.810 In 
addition to that basic rule, this Article lays down a number of exceptions, i.e., cir-
cumstances where the disciplinary proceedings against lawyers who are established 
under their home title differ from the proceedings used when dealing with lawyers 
who use the host country title. The first deviation from the traditional procedure is the 
possible outcome of a disciplinary proceeding.811 Article 16h states that in deviation 
of Article 48 of the Advocatenwet the possible measures that may be taken after a 
disciplinary proceeding are a simple warning, a reprimand, a prohibition on exercising 
the activities authorised under Article 16h of the Advocatenwet for a maximum of 
                                                  
and 16e of the Advocatenwet are also applicable to the situation where a lawyer established on 
the basis of Article 16h Advocatenwet is obliged to co-operate with a Dutch lawyer. 
804  Article 16j Advocatenwet. 
805  Article 16k Advocatenwet. 
806  Article 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 16 are named explicitly in the Article. The first five are genuine 
professional rules (clothing in court etc.), while the latter resembles more the articles covering 
disciplinary proceedings, since it regulates that a lawyer’s licence to practise shall be revoked 
when he is declared bankrupt, or when he is physically or mentally incapable of exercising his 
profession. 
807  Such as the Samenwerkingsverordening (cooperation regulation) as mentioned above. 
808  Although not explicitly mentioned in the amended Advocatenwet a lawyer established under his 
home title, according to Article 6 of Directive 98/5/EC, is also bound by the rules of professional 
conduct of his home Member State. 
809  Article 46fa Advocatenwet. 
810  Article 60b(1) Advocatenwet. It falls outside the scope of this work to deal with the Dutch 
disciplinary proceedings extensively. It suffices to remark that the same procedure shall be 
followed for lawyers who are established under their home title. 
811  Article 60b(2)-60b(7) Advocatenwet. 
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one year, or a complete revocation of the enrolment in the registers of the Raad 
van Toezicht.812 The third section of the new Article 60b of the Advocatenwet states 
that the rules concerning the publication of the verdict of the Raad van Toezicht as 
they apply to lawyers who are established under Article 1 of the Advocatenwet, shall 
also apply to lawyers who are established under Article 16h of the Advocatenwet.813 
In the event of a disciplinary proceeding being commenced in the Netherlands 
against a lawyer who is established under the regime of Article 16h of the Advocatenwet, 
the competent authority of the home Member State shall be informed and shall be 
asked for its opinion. The fact that the competent authority of the host Member 
State is informed of the disciplinary proceeding shall be communicated to the lawyer 
involved. During the disciplinary proceeding, the Raad van Toezicht shall co-operate 
with the competent authority of the host Member State.814 If the competent authority 
of the host Member State revokes the right of a lawyer who is established under 
the regime of Article 16h of the Advocatenwet, to practise in his home Member State 
(either temporarily or permanently) the lawyer is automatically precluded from prac-
tising law in the Netherlands. The Raad van Toezicht shall revoke the registration of 
the lawyer, either temporarily or permanently.815 The Raad van Toezicht shall inform 
the competent authority of the host Member State of this decision.816 
Two modifications to the existing articles in the Advocatenwet ensure the rules 
laid down in Article 6(2) of Directive 98/5/EC regarding representation in pro-
fessional bodies, are implemented correctly. The modified Articles 24 and 40 of the 
Advocatenwet state that lawyers who are established under the regime of Article 16h 
of the Advocatenwet are allowed to elect and be elected in the elections of the 
profession’s bodies.817 
The integration of lawyers established under their home title in another Member 
State into the profession of the host Member State, as guaranteed by Article 10 of 
Directive 98/5/EC, is covered by the newly introduced Articles 2a, 2b and 2c of 
the Advocatenwet. As of 2006, eight lawyers were integrated into the legal profession 
of the Netherlands.818 Article 2a of the Advocatenwet states that in addition to the 
situation described in Article 2 of the Advocatenwet,819 lawyers who gained their 
professional education in another Member State of the European Union or the 
European Economic Area may establish themselves as an advocaat, i.e., under the 
professional title of the host Member State (the Netherlands). This is subject to 
their producing a document which proves that over a period of at least three years 
the lawyer has been pursuing effectively and regularly professional activities that 
                                                  
812  Article 60b(2) Advocatenwet. Article 48 is essentially the same apart from the fact that it speaks about 
different registers, since it only applies to lawyers established under Article 1 of the Advocatenwet. 
813  Article 60b(3) Advocatenwet. 
814  Article 60b(4), (6) and (7) Advocatenwet. 
815  Article 60b(5) Advocatenwet. Article 9aa of the Advocatenwet mirrors this article since it deals 
with Dutch lawyers whose registration as a lawyer in another Member State is revoked by the 
competent authority of the host Member State. 
816  Ibid. 
817  Articles 24 and 40 Advocatenwet. 
818  <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 11 June 2007. 
819  This article lists the requirements that a prospective lawyer has to fulfil in order to be estab-
lished under the regime of Article 1 of the Advocatenwet. 
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involve Dutch law, including European Community law.820 The lawyer who seeks 
integration in the legal profession of the host Member State must file an application 
for such integration with the Raad van Toezicht of the legal constituency where he 
has exercised his professional activities under his home country professional title.821 
The application must be accompanied by documents that provide information on 
the number and sorts of cases dealt with over the three-year period.822 The Raad 
van Toezicht can verify this information by asking the lawyer concerned for further 
information if this is regarded as necessary.823 In addition to this information, the 
lawyer will also have to provide a document regarding his conduct (as is required 
for Dutch lawyers on the basis of Article 2 of the Advocatenwet) issued by a Dutch 
judge, or an equivalent document originating from his home Member State.824 As 
with most implementations reviewed in this section of the book, the newly created 
articles for the Advocatenwet do not mention anything about the amount of Dutch 
law that a foreign lawyer must have dealt with in order to integrate into the legal 
profession of the host Member State. The Dutch Minister of Justice has addressed 
this subject a number of times in the preparatory stages of the new Advocatenwet. 
On three occasions, his clarification of the bill itself,825 his reaction to the Raad van 
State,826 and in his answers to the questions posed by Parliament,827 the Minister of 
Justice stated that if the experience gained was only in European Community law 
then this was not sufficient to integrate into the profession of the Netherlands. This 
is potentially in violation of the Establishment Directive. What is far more disturbing 
in the Dutch implementation is that the Dutch authorities have made use of an old 
distinction of functions that are exercised by an advocaat in order to deprive Article 
10, and the Dutch implementation thereof, of much of its effect.828 In the Nether-
lands the separate function of the procureur also exists.829 This function is that of the 
representative in a trial. An advocaat pleads the case of the client, a procureur deals 
with the relationship between the client and his advocaat on the one side and the 
court on the other side.830 Since all district courts have different rules with regard to 
filing documents etc., a procureur can only practise within the legal constituency 
where he is established.831 If a lawyer wants to represent a client in another district, 
he needs to work with a procureur from that district.832 Where an advocaat deals with 
a case in his ‘own’ constituency, he fulfils the task of both advocaat and procureur. 
                                                  
820  Article 2a(1) Advocatenwet. 
821  Article 2a(2) Advocatenwet. 
822  Article 2a(3) Advocatenwet. 
823  Article 2a(4) Advocatenwet. 
824  Article 2a(5) Advocatenwet. 
825  TK 2000-2001, 27 587, nr. 3. 
826  TK 2000-2001, 27 587, nr. A. 
827  TK 2001-2002, 27 587, nr. 5. 
828  See Claessens (2003) B, p. 881. 
829  In other systems avoué or procurador etc. See Adamson (1998), pp. 22-23. 
830  Van Boneval Faure (1893), p. 193, who cites Von Feuerbach, Ueber die Gerichtsverfassung 
Frankreichs, Giessen 1825, page 163: ‘Die Verrichtung der avoués wird mehr als mechanischer 
Handwerkdienst betrachtet, das Geschäft der Advocaten, welke als Rechtsgelehrte mit den 
Waffen der Wissenschaft und durch die Macht der Beredsamkeit die Rechte der Partheijen 
durchzufechten berufen sind, als ein edle freie Kunst.’  
831  Hoegen Dijkhoef (1993), p. 226. 
832  Ibid. 
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Historically the functions of the advocaat and procureur were meant to be exercised 
by different persons.833 Until the 1879, it was prohibited to be both an advocaat and 
a procureur.834 After this prohibition was revoked, it became more commonplace for 
advocaten to fulfil the task of procureur in their own constituency. Nowadays it is com-
mon usage to follow this route, and new advocaten are automatically sworn in as pro-
cureurs, and the profession of the procureur is no longer viewed as a separate function, 
it is merely a guise that advocaten uses in some procedures.835 In the current discus-
sion regarding legal reform in the Netherlands, there has also been debate on whether 
to abolish the difference between the functions of the advocaat and procureur. Re-
cently a bill was proposed by the government to abolish the distinction.836 The reason 
why this distinction is of importance lies in the problem of the legal monopoly of 
advocaten/procureurs in civil proceedings.837 As was mentioned above, the previously 
separate functions of the procureur and advocaat are now embodied in the modern 
advocaat. However, unlike criminal cases, where the legal monopoly rests with the 
advocaat, the legal monopoly to represent clients in civil cases lies with the procureur 
and not with the advocaat.838 So in order to benefit from the legal monopoly in civil 
cases, the advocaat must also be entitled to use the title of procureur. As seen above, 
Dutch advocaten are automatically sworn in as procureurs at the same time as they are 
sworn in as advocaten.839 According to Article 62 of the Advocatenwet which regu-
lates the functions of the procureur, a lawyer from another Member State can also 
become a procureur if he obtains an EC declaration. As seen above, in the case of 
advocaten such a declaration can be obtained by taking an aptitude test that is con-
structed by the Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten. According to the Orde the aptitude 
test for an advocaat and the test for a procureur are identical.840 In fact, there is only 
one test, and if a lawyer from another Member State passes that test he is sworn in as 
an advocaat and a procureur, just like his Dutch counterparts. 
The problem lies in the fact that the law implementing Directive 98/5/EC in 
the Netherlands does not amend Article 62 of the Advocatenwet. This leads to the 
conclusion that a lawyer who integrates under the regime of Article 2a of the 
Advcoatenwet, i.e., the implementation of Article 10 of Directive 98/5/EC, will 
only gain access to the profession of the advocaat and not to that of the procureur. 
This leads to the conclusion that advocaten who have integrated on the basis of 
Article 2 of the Advocatenwet are not allowed to represent clients in civil proceedings, 
                                                  
833  Van Boneval Faure (1893), p. 201. 
834  Ibid. p. 202. 
835  See NOVA (1965), p.15; Hoegen Dijkhoef (1993), p. 223 and Adamson (1998), p. 23. 
836  Wetsvoorstel 30815, via <www.overheid.nl>, last accessed 21 November 2006. The Ministry 
of Justice wanted to abolish the profession of procureur by 1 March 2008. See <www.advocaten 
orde.nl/newsarchive/06-04-07_Brief_avp.pdf>, last accessed 11 June 2007. This was postponed 
until 1 September 2008. See <www.advocatenorde.nl/algemeen/afschaffing _procuraat.asp>, 
last accessed 24 April 2008. 
837  Besides the defence of clients in criminal proceedings (where the procureur does not exist) and 
certain tax cases, this is the only area where advocaten have a legal monopoly. See Hoegen 
Dijkhoef (1993), p. 226. 
838  Hoegen Dijkhoef (1993), p. 226. See also: Van Boneval Faure (1893), R. p. 195. 
839  Article 62 Advocatenwet lists the same educational requirements as Article 2 of that same law 
in the case of advocaten.  
840  <www.advocatenorde.nl>, last accessed 28 April 2008. 
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since that legal monopoly lies with the procureurs and not with the advocaten. An 
advocaat who is integrated in the Netherlands on the basis of Article 2a of the Ad-
vocatenwet is therefore not allowed to represent clients in court in civil proceedings, 
but he will be obliged to work together with a procureur (either a Dutch procureur, 
or a procureur who has taken an aptitude test). One can therefore conclude that the 
Dutch implementation does not lead to full integration in the Dutch legal pro-
fession, and it is therefore in breach of Article 10 of Directive 98/5/EC.841 Since the 
exact extent of harmonisation of Article 10 was not assessed by the Court in the 
Commission v. Luxembourg and the Wilson cases, it is not completely clear into which 
of the three categories of restrictions identified above such a breach would have to 
be put. However, it might be clear that, were it were to be considered to fall in the 
legislative competence of the Member State, it is a restriction that frustrates the full 
working of the Directive and is therefore prohibited per se. The official explanation 
given for this irregularity is at best ambiguous. Both the Ministry of Justice842 (who 
was responsible for the implementation) and the Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten843 
state that it is an unwelcome situation that a lawyer from another Member State is 
able to integrate fully in the legal profession of the Netherlands without having 
their knowledge of procedural law tested by an independent institution, in this case 
the Orde. This cannot save this anomaly from being illegal. However, the problem 
might solve itself, with the abolition of the profession of the procureur, and with it 
the abolition of this irregularity, which is envisaged for 1 September 2008.844 Arti-
cle 2b of the Advocatenwet states that lawyers who have been working for at least 
three years on an effective and regular basis, but who have been dealing with 
Dutch law for a shorter time, are also eligible for integration. This integration may 
take place if the Raad van Toezicht is of the opinion that the lawyer concerned is 
sufficiently able to exercise the profession of the advocaat in the Netherlands.845 When 
ascertaining this ability, the Raad will take into account; the period of time the 
lawyer has worked in the Netherlands, his knowledge of, and experience in, Dutch 
law, together with his participation in courses and seminars regarding Dutch law, 
and his knowledge, experience and participation in courses and seminars with 
regard to Dutch professional rules. In order to verify the lawyer’s knowledge and 
professional experience, the Raad van Toezicht will conduct an interview with the 
lawyer.846 Although not specifically mentioned (as was also the case with integration 
on the basis of Article 2a of the Advocatenwet) it can be assumed that integration via 
this route leads to the same irregularity as is the case with integration on the basis of 
Article 2a; namely that the lawyer concerned will integrate into the profession of the 
advocaat without gaining access to the functions that are performed by an advocaat in 
                                                  
841  This situation is acknowledged by both the Ministry of Justice and the Orde (phone conversation 
with author 23 July 2003). 
842  Which is even more strange, since the Minister has always upheld the appearance that inte-
gration on the basis of Article 2a Advocatenwet would lead to a full integration in the profession 
of lawyer, without ever hinting at the fact that a substantial difference between integration on 
the basis of Directive 98/5/EC and integration on the basis of Directive 89/48/EEC would 
occur. See Kamerstukken II 2000-2001, 27587 no. 3; no. A and no. 5. 
843  Van der Pijl (2003), p. 955. 
844  See Blokland (2008) and Heemskerk & Bijlsma (2008). 
845  Article 2b(1) Advocatenwet. 
846  Article 2b(2) Advocatenwet. 
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his guise of a procureur. Similar to integration on the basis of Article 2a of the Advo-
catenwet it can be safely concluded that this result is contrary to the results that 
Directive 98/5/EC seeks to establish. Article 2c of the Advocatenwet states the result 
of integration on the basis of Article 2a or 2b of the Advocatenwet, namely the fact 
that such a lawyer is, as of then, entitled to use the title of the advocaat in com-
bination with the title he is entitled to use in his home Member State.847 The 
second section of Article 2c states that if disciplinary proceedings are brought against 
an integrated lawyer in his home Member State, which lead to the conclusion that 
the lawyer concerned is no longer entitled to exercise his profession in his home 
country title, that automatically means that the lawyer is also no longer entitled to 
work under his home country professional title in the Netherlands. 848 
Not all the rules laid down in Directive 98/5/EC are implemented by means of 
an adaptation to the Advocatenwet. Provisions in the Directive referring to legal 
remedies or access to court are not implemented in the Advocatenwet since they are 
covered by the Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht.849 There are, however, some other rules 
laid down in the Directive, namely those rules laid down in Articles 6, 8 and 11 of 
the Directive that are not implemented in the Advocatenwet. These rules are imple-
mented in the Dutch legal system via verordeningen (regulations) of the Nederlandse 
Orde van Advocaten. Article 6(3) of Directive 98/5/EC states that the host Member 
State may require a lawyer who seeks to establish himself in that State under the 
regime of the Directive to acquire professional indemnity insurance. In the Nether-
lands, this provision is not implemented in the Advocatenwet but in a verordening of 
the Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten.850 The verordening states that advocaten are obliged 
to have professional indemnity insurance, the requirements of which are listed in 
Article 3 of the verordening. One of the criteria worth mentioning is that the insurance 
must at least cover events that occur within the entire European Community.851 It 
must be stated, however, that apart from the applicability rule laid down in Article 
1 of the verordening, there is no reference whatsoever to lawyers established under 
their home country professional title. So in order to conclude that the verordening is 
a correct implementation of Article 6(3) of Directive 98/5/EC, one must assume 
also that insurance acquired in other Member States (provided it fulfils the criteria 
of Article 3 of the verordening) is recognised as insurance prescribed in Article 2 of 
the verordening. If the insurance acquired in another Member State is not up to the 
standards of Article 3 of the verordening, additional insurance must be acquired in 
the Netherlands in order to bring the insurance up to that standard. It can be con-
cluded that the adaptations made to the verordening constitute the minimal imple-
mentation of Article 6(3) 98/5/EC which could have been possible without violating 
the Article. 
The rules pertaining to salaried practice in the Netherlands are laid down in a 
verordening of the Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten.852 Without going too far into the 
rules covering the salaried practice of an advocaat in the Netherlands, it can be said 
                                                  
847  Article 2c(1) Advocatenwet. 
848  Article 2c(2) Advocatenwet. 
849  General Administrative law. 
850  Verordening op de beroepsaansprakelijkheid 1991, Staatscourant 2002, 169. 
851  Article 3(d) Verordening op de beroepsaansprakelijkheid 1991. 
852  Verordening op de praktijkuitoefening in dienstbetrekking, Staatscourant 2002, 169. 
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that the rules are semi-liberal. That means that lawyers are allowed to work in the 
employ of certain other professions, among which are other lawyers. As Article 8 
of Directive 98/5/EC provides for no more than equal treatment with lawyers estab-
lished under the host Member State professional title, implementation of the article 
can be guaranteed by declaring the verordening equally applicable to lawyers established 
under their home country title. That is exactly what the Orde did in Article 1 of the 
verordening, which states that where the verordening uses the term advocaat, this 
includes lawyers who are established under their home country professional title.853 
The rules for joint practice for advocaten are laid down in a verordening of the 
Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten.854 This verordening allows joint practice with advocaten 
who are established in the Netherlands, some lawyers who are not established in 
the Netherlands, and some other professions (such as tax-advisors). Article 1 of this 
verordening states that those lawyers who are established under their home country 
title under the regime of Article 16h of the Advocatenwet also fall under the notion 
of the advocaat as used in the verordening.855 That means that, for the purpose of the 
verordening, lawyers who are established under their home title are completely equal 
to advocaten who are established under the regime of Article 2 Advocatenwet. With that 
adaptation to the verordening, the implementation of the majority of the rules of 
Article 11 of Directive 98/5/EC is guaranteed. One problem remains, however. Sec-
tion 1 of Article 11 states that where the host Member State allows joint practice, 
which is the case in the Netherlands, the host Member State must also permit one 
or more lawyers who belong to a joint practice in their home Member State to 
form a branch or an agency of that joint practice in the host Member State. It can 
be assumed that those lawyers would remain members of that joint practice which 
is based in their home Member State. Translated to the Dutch situation, that would 
lead to the following. A lawyer established under the professional title of his home 
Member State is viewed as an advocaat for the purposes of the verordening. A lawyer 
who is part of a joint practice in his home Member State who comes to the Nether-
lands to set up an agency or a branch of that joint practice would then be viewed as 
an advocaat who practises jointly with lawyers who are not registered in the Nether-
lands. That situation is only allowed if the lawyers who are not registered in the 
Netherlands are members of a Bar Association that is recognised by the Nederlandse 
Orde van Advocaten.856 The Orde has only recognised a number of selected Bar Asso-
ciations.857 Remarkably, a number of European Bar Associations are not mentioned on 
                                                  
853  Article 1(a) Verordening op de praktijkuitoefening in dienstbetrekking. 
854  Samenwerkingsverordening 1993, Staatsblad 2002, 169. 
855  Article 1(a) Samenwerkingsverordening 1993. 
856  Article 4(b) and 5 Samenwerkingsverordening 1993. 
857  Annotation 7 Samenwerkingsverordening 1993: 
 ‘7) De Algemene Raad heeft de volgende organisaties erkend als organisaties waarvan de leden 
een samenwerkingsovereenkomst kunnen aangaan in de zin van de Samenwerkingsverordening: 
- de State Bars of California, Delaware, Illinois, New York, Michigan, District of Columbia 
en the Bar of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
-  de 29 Orden van Advocaten in België (waaronder zowel de Nederlandse als de Franse balie 
in Brussel) 
-  de 23 Rechtsanwaltkämmer in Duitsland 
-  de Law Society of England and Wales (beslissing AR 12.8.74) 
-  de 179 Ordres des Advocats des Barreaux de France 
182 
the list of the Orde. That would mean that if a Danish lawyer who practises jointly 
in Denmark establishes himself in the Netherlands in order to form a branch or an 
agency of that Danish joint practice, he would not be allowed to do so since the 
Orde has not recognised the Danish Bar Association. If that situation should occur, 
it would constitute a breach of the guarantees laid down by Article 11(1) of Direc-
tive 98/5/EC.858 In addition to this possible breach of Article 11(1), there is abso-
lutely no mention of the situation mentioned in Article 11(1) where fundamental 
rules governing joint practice in the home and host Member State collide. The 
rules with regard to the name of the joint practice, which are allowed by Article 12 
of Directive 98/5/EC, are laid down in Article 8 of the verordening.859 These rules 
are in accordance with Article 12 of the Directive. 
 
Belgium 
Belgium implemented Directive 98/5/EC by means of introducing a new law that 
provides for an adaptation of the Gerechtelijk Wetboek.860 The Law of 22 November 
2001 provides for a number of general adaptations to the Articles in the Gerechtelijk 
Wetboek. The most important part of the Adaptation Law is Article 18, which deals 
with the adaptation of Title Ibis of the Gerechtelijk Wetboek, which is concerned 
with the exercise of the legal profession in Belgium by persons who are citizens of a 
Member State of the European Union. Chapter II of Title Ibis is devoted to lawyers 
from other Member States who are established in Belgium, without being completely 
integrated into the Belgian legal profession.  
Article 477quinquies of the Gerechtelijk Wetboek lays down the rules with respect 
to establishment of lawyers under home title. The Article states that everyone who 
has the right to bear the title of a lawyer in any one of the Member States may 
establish himself on a permanent basis in Belgium. The Article further states that 
                                                  
-  Ordem dos Advocados Portugueses 
-  de Law Society of Scotland 
-  de 82 afzonderlijke Spaanse Collegio´s de Abogados 
-  Sveriges Advokatsamfund 
-  Czech Chamber of Advocacy 
-  Consiglio dell´Órdine degli Avvocati di Milano (beslissing AR 4.12.95) 
-  de State Bar of Alabama (beslissing AR 14.1.02)  
-  de Law Society of Hong Kong (beslissing AR 27.5.02) 
-  Consiglio dell´Órdine degli Avvocati di Roma (beslissing AR 6.11.02) 
-  Consiglio dell´Órdine degli Avvocati di Venezia (beslissing AR 6.11.02).’ 
858  The violation can easily be avoided since Article 5 of the verordening gives authority to the Orde to 
recognise Bar Associations on an ad hoc basis. Probably the list of the previous footnote resembles, 
due to the scattered nature of that list, actual requests of recognition filed with the Orde, but it 
could make establishment for a foreign lawyer who belongs to a joint practice in his home Member 
State less attractive if that lawyer first has to go through the hassle of having his Bar Association 
recognised by the Orde. It is also unclear why the Orde does not recognise the Bar Associations 
that are part of the CCBE as such, and whether or not the Orde is allowed to use its own criteria, as 
listed in Article 5 of the verordening, to decide whether or not it recognises a Bar Association. 
859  Article 8 Samenwerkingsverordening 1993. 
860  Wet ter vergemakkelijking van de uitoefening van het beroep van advocaat en van de vestiging 
in België van advocaten die onderdaan zijn van een andere lidstaat van de Europese Unie, 22 
November 2001. Via <www.juridat.be> , last accessed 26 April 2004. Hereinafter referred to as 
Adaptation Law. 
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these persons must register themselves with the relevant Belgian Bar Association 
and that they must prove to the relevant Bar Association that they are allowed to 
practise the profession of lawyer in their home Member State. In addition to this, 
the lawyer must also use his home country professional title while being established 
in Belgium. The Belgian Bar Association shall inform the relevant Bar Association of 
the lawyers’ establishment in Belgium.861 While engaging in professional activities 
in Belgium the lawyer from the other Member State is always obliged to mention 
in his correspondence the Bar at which is registered,862 the professional authority by 
virtue of which he is allowed to practise as a lawyer in his home Member State and his 
home country professional title. The professional title must be used in the language 
of the home Member State and in at least one of the official Belgian languages (Dutch, 
French or German), depending on the Bar where the lawyer is registered.863 As of 
2006, 406 lawyers were established under their home country professional title.864 
The rules regarding the professional activities that may be pursued by a lawyer 
established in Belgium under his home country professional title are laid down in 
Article 477sexies. The Article states that a lawyer who is established in Belgium 
under his home country professional title may exercise all the professional activities 
that a Belgian avocat may pursue.865 The only limitation with regard to the pursuit 
of professional activities lies in the fact that a lawyer who is established under his 
home country professional title is obliged to cooperate with a Belgian avocat who is 
listed on the tableau when he deals with situations that involve defending a client 
before a court. Before the court session commentces, the Belgian avocat will intro-
duce the lawyer established under his home country title to the President of the 
relevant court.866 It is clear that these rules are in accordance with the possible 
limitations laid down in Article 5 of Directive 98/5/EC. 
The second paragraph states which professional rules apply to the lawyer established 
under his home member state. It is stated in the paragraph that a lawyer who is 
established under his home country professional title must not only adhere to the 
professional rules of his home Member State, but also to the professional rules, 
regardless of their origin, that are in force at any given point in time in Belgium. It 
is clear that the rules laid down in paragraph 2 of Article 477sexies are well within 
the limits set by Directive 98/5/EC. 
The third paragraph of Article 477sexies states that the Council of the relevant 
Bar Association can oblige a lawyer established in Belgium under his home country 
professional title to obtain professional indemnity insurance. If the lawyer already 
has insurance in his home Member State that is comparable to the Belgian insurance 
then he will be exempted from the abovementioned obligation. In the event that 
the insurance in the home Member State is only partly comparable, then the Belgian 
authorities can oblige the lawyer established under his home country title to acquire 
                                                  
861  Article 477quinquies § 2 Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
862  Presumably the Belgian Bar where he is registered. 
863  Article 477quinquies § 3 Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
864  <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 11 June 2007. 
865  Article 477sexies § 1 Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
866  Ibid. 
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additional insurance.867 Again, these rules are in complete conformity with Directive 
98/5/EC. 
The last paragraph of Article 477sexies, paragraph 4, states that in conformity 
with the rules that are applied for Belgian avocats, lawyers who are established under 
their home country professional title are not allowed to exercise their profession in 
a salaried capacity unless the position does not jeopardise the independence of the 
lawyer nor the dignity of the Bar Association.868 This rule is the correct implemen-
tation of Article 8 of Directive 98/5/EC. 
The rules for disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer established in Belgium under 
his home country professional title are listed in Article 477septies of the Gerechtelijk 
Wetboek. The Article begins by stating that the disciplinary proceedings that are 
applied for Belgian avocats shall also be applied to lawyers who are established under 
their home title in Belgium.869 Before the Belgian authorities start disciplinary pro-
ceedings against a lawyer, the bâtonnier of the relevant Bar Association shall inform 
the competent authority in the home Member State of all circumstances relevant to 
the procedure. The bâtonnier shall inform the competent authority in writing of any 
further decision taken.870 In the event of the lawyer’s right to practise being revoked 
in his home Member State on either a temporary or a permanent basis, this would 
automatically lead to the revocation of the right to practise under home country 
professional title in Belgium for the duration of the revocation in the home Member 
State.871 This Article is the correct implementation of Article 7 of Directive 98/5/EC. 
Article 11 of Directive 98/5/EC lays down rules for the exercise of the profession 
under home country professional title in another Member State in the so-called 
Multi-Disciplinary Practices, i.e., practices where lawyers work alongside non-law-
yers. The Article also contains provisions regarding lawyers practising in association. 
These rules have been implemented in a rather detailed manner by the Belgian author-
ities in Article 477octies of the Gerechtelijk Wetboek. The first paragraph of Article 
477octies states that one or more lawyers who are established under their home 
country professional title in Belgium and who practise in association in their (shared) 
Member State of origin may exercise their profession in association in Belgium as a 
branch-office of their association.872 When the basic rules governing associations of 
lawyers in the Member State of origin are incompatible with the Belgian rules then 
the latter will prevail because of the fact that these rules protect clients and other 
people.873, 874 The second paragraph regulates a somewhat different situation. The 
paragraph states that two or more lawyers who are established under their home 
country professional title from one group or one Member State may exercise their 
profession in Belgium as a group subject to the rules that are applicable for Belgian 
                                                  
867 Article 477sexies §3 Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
868 Article 477sexies §4 Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
869 Article 477septies Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
870  Ibid. 
871  Ibid. 
872  I.e., two English solicitors from the law firm Linklaters establishing an office of Linklaters in 
Belgium. 
873  The ‘rule of reason’ that is introduced here is a literal translation of Article 11 § 1 Directive 
98/5/EC. 
874 Article 477octies § 1 Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
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avocats with regard to practising in groups.875 What seems to be the distinguishing 
factor between the first and the second paragraph is that in the first paragraph the 
lawyers exercise their profession in the form of a branch or agency of a grouping, 
while this is not the case with the second paragraph. Paragraph 3 states that para-
graphs 1 and 2 are also applicable to groupings of lawyers from different Member 
States and groupings including lawyers from different Member States and Belgian 
avocats.876 A lawyer who is established under his home country professional title and 
is part of a grouping in his home Member State has a duty to inform the Belgian 
authorities of that fact and of the characteristics of the grouping (laid down in 
paragraph 4 of Article 477octies).877 Paragraph 5 of Article 477octies deals with the 
situation where non-lawyers form part of the grouping. The paragraph states that 
the Belgian authorities can deny a lawyer from another Member State the right to 
practise in a grouping if that grouping also contains persons from outside the pro-
fession of the lawyer. The group shall be considered a grouping containing persons 
who do not belong to the profession of the lawyer if any of the following criteria 
are fulfilled: The capital of the grouping is controlled in whole or in part by persons 
who are not lawyers, the name of the grouping is used for persons who are not 
lawyers, or the decision making power in the grouping is exercised, either de iure or 
de facto, by persons who are not lawyers. In addition to this, the Council of the 
relevant Bar Association in Belgium can prevent the opening of a branch office or 
agency from any grouping from another Member State if the aforementioned 
grouping is considered to be a grouping containing persons who are not lawyers.878 
Persons who are allowed to practise in a group in Belgium are also allowed to use 
the name of the grouping in all their professional correspondence. In addition to the 
name of the grouping the lawyers involved will also indicate the legal form of the 
grouping in the home Member State, and the names of the lawyers belonging to 
the grouping who exercise their profession (either under their home title or under 
the professional title of Belgium) in Belgium.879 It is clear that Article 477octies of 
the Gerechtelijk Wetboek is a thorough implementation, little short of a literal trans-
lation, of Article 11 of Directive 98/5/EC. As was mentioned above the rules with 
regard to MDPs for Belgian avocats were adapted to bring them into conformity 
with the rules found in Directive 98/5/EC, since previously MDPs were prohibited 
for Belgian avocats because of the civil law tradition of the Belgian legal system. 
Article 10 of Directive 98/5/EC is implemented in Belgium by means of Article 
477nonies Gerechtelijk Wetboek. The first paragraph states that in addition to what is 
found in Article 428bis (dealt with earlier on in this chapter), persons who are estab-
lished under the professional title of their home Member State can also integrate into 
the legal profession of Belgium. They can do so if they are able to prove that they 
have practised on an effective and regular basis under their home country profes-
sional title for at least three years. During these three years, they have to have dealt 
with Belgian law, including European Community law. Once they have proved 
that they have dealt with Belgian law for at least three years, they may use the title 
                                                  
875 Article 477octies § 2 Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
876 Article 477octies § 3 Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
877 Article 477octies § 4 Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
878 Article 477octies § 5 Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
879 Article 477octies § 6 Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
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of avocat, take the oath and be included on the tableau of the relevant Bar Associa-
tion. In order to apply for integration they must provide the Council of the relevant 
Bar Association with all the correspondence and information necessary for the Council 
to make a decision. This information is ordinarily concerned with the number and 
the nature of the cases dealt with.  
Similar to Article 10 of Directive 98/5/EC, the second paragraph of Article 
477nonies deals with lawyers who have been actively and regularly pursuing activities 
in Belgium for at least three years, but for a shorter amount of time in connection 
with Belgian law. These persons can also integrate into the legal profession of Bel-
gium, albeit with slightly lesser ease. In order to integrate into the legal profession, 
the prospective avocat who practises under his home title must provide the Council 
of the relevant Bar Association with all the documents and information pertaining 
to the number and nature of the cases with which he has dealt. The Council will take 
into account all the activity pursued, all the knowledge and experience of Belgian 
law the prospective avocat has, and all the seminars and lectures on the topics of 
Belgian law the prospective avocat has attended. The bâtonnier of the relevant Bar 
Association will then have a conversation with the prospective avocat in which the 
bâtonnier will assess all the activities pursued and the capacity of the prospective 
avocat to continue to exercise these activities as a member of the Belgian legal pro-
fession. The bâtonnier will report to the Council of the Bar Association, who, in turn, 
will make a decision. The applications under paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 477nonies 
have to be made in the official language of the relevant Bar Association, or when 
they are not in the official language, they must be accompanied by a certified trans-
lation into the official language of the relevant Bar Association.880 Applications 
made under paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 477nonies may only be denied if the set 
criteria are not proven or if granting a request forms a breach of public policy, espe-
cially in cases of disciplinary proceedings, accidents or incidents of any other kind.881 
If a lawyer established under his home country title is allowed to integrate into the 
legal profession of Belgium, then he is still allowed to use his home country pro-
fessional title in conjunction with the title of avocat on the condition that the lawyer 
remains enlisted with his home country professional body.882 As of 2006, there 
were five lawyers integrated into the Belgian legal profession.883 
 
Luxembourg 
Two and a half years after the deadline for implementation had passed, Luxembourg 
implemented Directive 98/5/EC into its legal system. This delay was most probably 
caused by the nullity appeal of Luxembourg against Directive 98/5/EC before the 
European Court of Justice.884 Luxembourg chose to implement Directive 98/5/EC 
                                                  
880 Article 477nonies § 3 Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
881 Article 477nonies § 4 Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
882 Article 477nonies § 5 Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
883  <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 11 June 2007. 
884  Case C-168/98, Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg v. European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union, [2000] ECR I-09131. See Chambre de Deputés, No 4790 Projet de Loi, 9-5-2001; 
Chambre des Deputés, No 4790, Projet de Loi (avis du Conseil d’État) 6-12-2001; Chambre 
des Deputés, No 4790, Projet de Loi (amendement adoptes par la commission juridique) 26-
3-2002; Chambre des Deputés, No 4790, Projet de Loi (avis complementaire du Conseil 
d’État) 25-4-2002; Chambre des Deputés, No 4790, Projet de Loi (observations de l’ordre des 
187 
by means of a separate law.885 This law complements, and has an effect on, the Avocat 
law but is not an integral part of it. Article 1 of the establishment law lays down the 
general criteria for application. It states that all nationals of Member States who are 
allowed to exercise the legal profession in their home Member State may benefit 
from the establishment law. For this purpose, the Article provides the list found in 
Article 1 of Directive 98/5/EC which lists the different legal professions for the dif-
ferent Member States. Interestingly, Article 1 of the establishment law introduces the 
concept of avocat européen. This designation is used for every lawyer who establishes 
himself under the provisions of the establishment law. The concept is, however, 
not a professional title, and lawyers established under the provisions of the establish-
ment law may not use the designation avocat européen in the exercise of their profess-
ional activities. The designation is merely used to indicate that a lawyer falls under 
the scope of Article 1 of the establishment law. The Article states further that the 
Avocat law applies to lawyers established under their home title unless the establish-
ment law prescribes otherwise.886 
Every avocat européen has the right to exercise the same activities, in an independ-
ent or in a salaried manner,887 as a regular avocat may under the provisions of the 
Avocat law. This right may be influenced by provisions laid down in the establish-
ment law.888 In order to exercise this right, an avocat européen needs to obtain an 
inscription on the tableaux on one of the two Bar Associations in Luxembourg. In 
order to obtain such an inscription, a prospective avocat européen must send a com-
plete application, in French, to the batônnier of the Bar Association in the jurisdic-
tion in which he wants to establish himself. Aside from the documents indicated 
hereafter a prospective avocat européen must indicate whether or not he is part of a 
group in his home Member State.889 Article 3 states further that in order to become 
inscribed on one of the tableaux the prospective avocat européen must have a meeting 
with the relevant Bar Association in order to verify the language capacities of the 
prospective avocat européen. Inscription on ‘Liste IV’ will follow if this meeting with 
the Bar Association is successful, and if the prospective avocat européen is able to pro-
duce a certificate from his home Member State’s competent authority stating that 
the lawyer is entitled to exercise the legal profession in his home Member State. 
No more than three months shall have elapsed since the certificate was issued, and 
                                                  
avocats du Barreau de Luxembourg relatives a l’avis du Conseil d’État) 27-6-2002; Chambre 
de Deputés, No 4790 Projet de Loi (Rapport de la Commission Juridique) 9-7-2002. See also: 
<eu-anwaelte.org>, last accessed 19 July 2004. 
885  Loi du 13 novembre 2002 portant transposition en droit luxembourgeois de la Directive 
98/5/CE du Parlement Européen et du Conseil du 16 février 1998 visant à faciliter l’exercice 
permanent de la profession d’avocat dans un Etat member autre que celui où la qualification a 
été acquise et portant:  
 1: modification de la loi modifiée du 10 août 1991 sur la profession d’avocat. 
 2: modification de la loi du 31 mai 1999 régissant la domiciliation des sociétés, Memorial 
Journal Officiel du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, Recueil de Legislation, A-No 140, 17 décembre 
2002, page 3202, hereinafter Establishment law. 
886 Article 1 Establishment law. 
887  Working in a salaried position is in principle prohibited for avocats in Luxembourg, and therefore 
also for lawyers who are established under their home title. There is however one small 
exception, which will be dealt with later on in this chapter. 
888 Article 2 Establishment law. 
889 Article 3(1) Establishment law. 
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such a certificate must be produced again every first month of the year after regis-
tration (again with the three-months rule). Failing to produce these certificates may 
lead to the revocation of the registration.890  
When compared with Article 3 of Directive 98/5/EC which deals with registra-
tion, two problems with the Luxembourg implementation immediately surface. First, 
the interview in which the lawyer’s language capabilities are assessed finds no basis 
in Directive 98/5/EC. The second problem arises in connection to the demand to 
produce a certificate each year certifying that an avocat européen is allowed to practise 
in his home Member State. Due to all the hassle and costs involved in obtaining such 
a certificate this can be seen as an indirect discrimination. Moreover, the articles of 
that Directive make the Luxembourg rule completely redundant since the compe-
tent authority of the home Member State is obliged under Article 7 of the Directive 
to inform the competent authority in the host Member State of any proceedings 
started against a lawyer in the host Member State. A revocation of the permission 
to practise in the home Member State shall automatically lead to the revocation of 
that permission in the host Member State, according to the Directive. The Luxem-
bourg rule which requires the lawyers to reproduce the named certificate therefore 
serves no purpose at all. The Luxembourg authorities may not impose such a require-
ment. The European Court of Justice also followed this line of reasoning in Com-
mission v. Luxembourg and Wilson v. Ordre des Avocats, in which it concluded that with 
regard to Article 3 of Directive 98/5/EC the Luxembourg requirements were con-
trary to the Directive.891 
Article 4 of the establishment law lays down the rules for the use of professional 
title. It states that the avocat européen is obliged to use his home country professional 
title when engaging in activities in Luxembourg. When doing so, an avocat européen 
is always obliged to avoid confusion. Lawyers who have the title avocat in their home 
Member State are therefore obliged to mention the professional authority that allows 
them to practise, or the jurisdiction in which they are allowed to practise in their 
home Member State, given in the language of the home Member State. 892  
The rules with respect to professional activities that may be pursued by an avocat 
européen in Luxembourg are laid down in Article 5 of the establishment law. The 
Article first states that an avocat européen may exercise the same professional activities 
as a Luxembourg avocat.893 Furthermore, the Article lists a couple of activities that 
are excluded or regulated for avocats européens. An avocat européen may not exercise 
the professional activities that are reserved for other legal professions, such as the 
profession of the notaire, and an avocat européen must cooperate with an avocat when 
representing clients in court.894 These limitations on the professional activity are 
perfectly in accordance with the principles laid down in Article 5 of Directive 
98/5/EC. There are however two limitations on professional activity that prove to 
be more problematic. First of all, there is a limitation in Article 5 of the establish-
                                                  
890 Article 3(2) Establishment law. 
891  Cases C-193/05, Commission of the European Communities v. Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg, [2006] 
ECR, I-08673 and C-506/04, Graham J. Wilson v. Ordre des avocats du barreau de Luxembourg, 
[2006] ECR, I-08613.  
892 Article 4 Establishment law. 
893 Article 5(1) Establishment law. 
894 Article 5(2) and (4) Establishment law respectively. 
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ment law that cannot pass the test of Directive 98/5/EC. Article 5 of the establishment 
law states that an avocat européen may not exercise the same activities as lawyers who 
provide services in Luxembourg.895 Such a limitation is not sanctioned by Directive 
98/5/EC and is therefore contrary to that Directive. On a more detailed note, it is 
also incomprehensible why the Luxembourg authorities have introduced this pro-
vision since the ECJ made it more than clear in the Gebhard case896 that it is not the 
activities which distinguish between establishment and services but the manner in 
which these activities are exercised, i.e., on a temporary or permanent basis. Ex-
cluding the activities of a lawyer who provides services would therefore inherently 
mean excluding an avocat européen from all his activities, since the activities deployed 
will, in essence, be the same, and only the manner in which they are exercised would 
be different. This limitation can therefore be regarded as no more than a violation of 
Directive 98/5/EC.897 Another limitation can be found in Article 15 of the estab-
lishment law. That specific article refers to a specific law which regulates the 
domicile for firms.898 According to this law, only certain regulated professions can 
provide this domicile. Among the professions listed in that law, the profession of 
the avocat is also mentioned.899 Article 15 of the establishment law revises this article 
in such a manner that only avocats inscribed on ‘Liste I’ may exercise this activity, 
therewith excluding the avocat européen who is inscribed on ‘Liste IV’ of the rele-
vant tableau. This is also a violation of Article 5 of Directive 98/5/EC. Subsection 2 
of that article does allow certain limitations on the exercise of professional activities, 
but the aforementioned matter is not among those exceptions. Moreover the 
wording of Article 5(2) of Directive 98/5/EC makes it clear that these exceptions 
were specifically introduced to honour the fundamental differences between the 
legal professions in civil and common law systems. The exceptions are therefore very 
specific and can in no way be interpreted as a general exception. The exception on 
professional activity with regard to the domicile of firms is, therefore, also a violation 
of Directive 98/5/EC.900 
Article 6 states that an avocat européen is subject to the same professional rules as 
the avocats established in Luxembourg. In addition to that, he also remains subject 
to the professional rules of his home Member State.901 Subsection 2 of Article 6 states 
that an avocat européen has the right to vote in the elections of the General Council 
                                                  
895 Article 5(3) Establishment law. 
896  Case C-55/94, Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, 
[1995] ECR 4165. 
897  This problem was not addressed in cases C-193/05, Commission of the European Communities v. 
Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg, [2006] ECR, I-08673 and C-506/04, Graham J. Wilson v. Ordre 
des avocats du barreau de Luxembourg, [2006] ECR, I- 08613. From the nature of the ruling 
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898  Loi du 31 mai 1999 régissant la domiciliation des sociétés, Memorial Journal Officiel du Grand-
Duché de Luxembourg, Recueil de Legislation, A-No. 77, 21 juin 1999, p. 1681. 
899 Article 1(2) Loi du 31 mai 1999 régissant la domiciliation des sociétés, Memorial Journal Officiel 
du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, Recueil de Legislation, A-No. 77, 21 juin 1999, p. 1681. 
900  Which was confirmed by the ECJ in cases cases C-193/05, Commission of the European Communities 
v. Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg, [2006] ECR, I-08673 and C-506/04, Graham J. Wilson v. Ordre 
des avocats du barreau de Luxembourg, [2006] ECR, I- 08613.  
901 Article 6(1) Establishment law. 
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of their relevant Bar Association.902 Finally Article 6 lays down the obligation to pay 
a membership fee to the Bar Association903 and that the avocat européen must have 
professional indemnity insurance either in Luxembourg or in his home Member 
State.904  
Article 7 of the establishment law lays down the rules for disciplinary proceedings 
initiated against an avocat européen. Firstly, the Article states that in case of a disciplinary 
procedure the Luxembourg rules shall apply.905 To that effect, the relevant Bar 
Association shall inform the competent authority of the host Member State imme-
diately if a disciplinary proceeding is initiated by the Luxembourg Bar Association.906 
The Luxembourg Bar Association shall maintain this cooperation throughout the 
entire procedure, and it shall inform the competent authority of the home Member 
State of its decision.907 This co-operation (with the possibility for the competent 
authority of the home Member State to issue its views) will also be maintained in 
appeal.908 In return, the Luxembourg Bar shall also be informed of any disciplinary 
proceedings against an avocat européen in his home Member State, and the tem-
porary or permanent revocation of an avocat européen from the legal profession of his 
home Member State shall also be automatically imposed in Luxembourg.909  
Similar to avocats established in Luxembourg, avocats européen are also not allowed 
to work in a salaried occupation, except with other lawyers. Therefore an avocat euro-
péen is allowed to work in salaried practise with a lawyer enlisted with one of the 
Bar Associations in Luxembourg (either an avocat or an avocat européen).910 
Article 9 of the establishment law regulates the entry into the profession of the 
avocat by an avocateuropéen. An avocat européen has the right to enter into the pro-
fession of the avocat if he has effectively and regularly dealt with the Luxembourg 
law, including Community law, for a period of at least three years, without having 
to take the aptitude test specified in the recognition law. In order to be inscribed as 
an avocat on ‘Liste I’ an avocat européen must issue a request at the Bar Association and 
he must prove that he fulfils the above-named criteria. In any case an avocat européen 
must provide all the relevant information and documents, most notably on the 
number and the nature of cases with which he has dealt. In cases where the docu-
ments which are provided are unclear, the Bar Association is allowed to invite the 
avocat européen to clarify. A decision not to inscribe an avocat européen as an avocat on 
‘Liste I’ will be made by the Bar Association and the avocat européen will be offered a 
legal remedy by way of challenging the decision.911 An avocat européen who has 
been established in Luxembourg for at least three years but has been active for less 
than three years in Luxembourg law may also request to be inscribed as an avocat on 
                                                  
902 Article 6(2) Establishment law 
903  A matter not explicitly sanctioned by the Directive, but in my view not problematic as long as 
it is not discriminatory. 
904 Article 6(3) Establishment law. 
905 Article 7(1) Establishment law. 
906 Article 7(2) Establishment law. 
907 Article 7(3) Establishment law. 
908 Article 7(4) Establishment law. 
909 Article 7(5) Establishment law. 
910 Article 8 Establishment law. 
911 Article 9(1) Establishment law. It must be mentioned that the remedy offered fell short of what 
was required in Article 9 of Directive 98/5/EC, as was established in the Wilson case. 
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‘Liste I’ of the relevant tableau without having to take the aptitude test that is 
specified in the recognition law. In this situation, the Bar Association when dealing 
with the request shall take into account any relevant experience that the avocat euro-
péen has gained in fields of Luxembourg law, including any seminars or courses fol-
lowed on Luxembourg law. The avocat européen must again produce all the relevant 
proof. This proof shall be the subject of a meeting between officials of the Bar 
Association and the avocat européen, on the basis of which the Bar Association shall 
take a decision on the inscription as an avocat on ‘Liste I’ of the avocat européen in-
volved. If a decision is taken not to inscribe the avocat européen then it shall be 
reasoned and the avocat européen shall be offered a legal remedy.912 When an avocat 
européen has been inscribed on ‘Liste I’ of a Bar in Luxembourg, he may freely trans-
fer to ‘Liste I’ of the other Bar Association in Luxembourg.913  
Aside from the possibility to integrate into the legal profession of Luxembourg 
without having to take an aptitude test, an avocat européen also has the right to take 
an aptitude test at any time in order to integrate into the profession of the avocat.914 
The Bar Association shall deal with all the information acquired in a confidential 
manner.915 Aside from the reasons mentioned above, inscribing an avocat européen as 
an avocat on ‘Liste I’ of the tableau can also be refused if the inscription would be 
against public policy, in particular because of disciplinary proceedings, complaints 
or incidents of any such kind. A decision by the Bar Association on these grounds must 
be reasoned and a legal remedy shall be offered to the avocat européen involved.916 As 
of 2006, one lawyer had managed to integrate into the Luxembourg legal pro-
fession.917 
Article 11 of the establishment law states that practice in association is in principle 
not allowed except for the circumstances described under Article 34 of the Avocat 
law.918 In addition Article 11 states that exercise of the legal profession in a group 
that is composed of persons who do not belong to the legal profession is prohibited. 
An avocat européen who is a member of such a group in his home country is not 
allowed to exercise his profession in Luxembourg as a member of that group. In 
order to determine whether the group also consists of persons who are not members 
of the legal profession, the criteria of Article 11 of Directive 98/5/EC are used.919 
An avocat européen who is a member of such a grouping in his home Member State 
is not allowed to open a branch or an agency of that grouping in Luxembourg. 
Article 12 of the establishment law lists some additional requirements with regard 
to use of professional title. An avocat européen who is inscribed as an avocat on ‘Liste 
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915 Article 9(5) Establishment law. 
916 Article 10 Establishment law. 
917  <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 11 June 2007. 
918 Article 11 Establishment law. Article 34 of the Avocat law only allows practice in association 
between lawyers. 
919 Article 11 Establishment law. A grouping is a grouping containing persons who are not a 
member of the legal profession when the capital of the grouping is held entirely or partly, or the 
name under which the grouping practises is used, or the decision making power in that 
grouping is de iure or de facto exercised by, persons who are not avocats in the sense of the Avocat 
law.  
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I’ of one of the tableaux may make use of both the title of avocat and the professional 
title of his home Member State.920 If an avocat européen operates legally in Luxem-
bourg as a member of a group established in his home Member State, he is allowed 
to mention his membership of that grouping in his professional communication.921 
The Bar Association where he is enlisted may also demand from the avocat européen 
to indicate the legal form of the grouping and/or the names of the members of the 
group who also exercise their profession in Luxembourg.922 
Article 13 lists a general duty of cooperation between the relevant Luxembourg 
Bar Association and the Bar Association of the home Member State.923 Article 14 
lists a number of textual changes to the Avocat law. The most notable of these has 
been discussed above, namely the fact that an avocat européen must undergo a language 
test in order to be inscribed as avocat européen.924 Article 15 introduces the notorious 
limitation on professional activity that has also been discussed above.925 
§ 4.3.4 Implementation in France, Italy, Spain and Portugal 
France 
France also exceeded the deadline for the implementation of Directive 98/5/EC. 
In France, the European Court of Justice was also involved in the implementation 
process. However, where the delay in Luxembourg could be explained by Luxem-
bourg’s appeal against the Directive and the time that request took for nullity before 
the ECJ reached a decision, the story in France is different. Here, the ECJ’s involve-
ment was a reaction to the delay and not the cause of it. On 26 September 2002, 
France was convicted by the ECJ on the basis of Article 226 EC Treaty for failing 
to implement Directive 98/5/EC.926 In a very short judgment, only three pages 
long, the ECJ stated that France failed to meet the requirements for implemen-
tation, and was therefore convicted.927 After its conviction in 2002, it would take 
France more than a year to finally implement Directive 98/5/EC into French legis-
lation. In French legislative tradition this implementation was realised by adapting 
existing legislation, most notably the loi of 31 December 1971.928 Article 1 of the 
Loi du 11 février 2004 states that the law will create a new section in the Loi du 31 
décembre 1971 that will deal with the establishment of lawyers from other Member 
States under their home title in France.929 The Loi du 11 février 2004 creates a new 
Article 83 in the Loi du 31 décembre 1971 that states that every resident of one of 
                                                  
920 Article 12(1) Establishment law. 
921 Article 12(2) Establishment law. 
922  Ibid. 
923 Article 13 Establishment law. 
924 Article 14 Establishment law. 
925 Article 15 Establishment law. 
926  Case C-351/01 Commission v. France [2002] ECR I-08101. 
927  France did not contest the allegation of the Commission that it had violated its obligations under 
the EC Treaty, but it did not provide any information to the Commission or the Court as to 
why this delay in implementation occured. 
928  Loi no. 2004-130 du 11 février 2004 réformant le statut de certaines professions judiciaires ou 
juridiques, des experts judiciaires, des conseils en proprieté industrielle et des experts en ventes 
aux enchères publiques, JO de la République Française, 12 février 2004, p. 2847. 
929 Article 1 of the Loi du 11 février 2004. 
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the Member States of the European Union may exercise the profession of the avocat 
in France using their home country professional title, if this professional title occurs 
on a list fixed by decree.930 
Article 4 of the Loi du 11 février 2004 creates a new Article 84 in the Loi du 31 
décembre 1971 to regulate the establishment under home title. The new article states 
that every lawyer who is established under his home country title in France shall be 
inscribed on a special list of the tableau of the Bar of his choice. Inscription on this 
list is possible when the lawyer concerned is able to produce a certificate from the 
competent authority of the home Member State stating that the lawyer concerned 
is indeed a lawyer in his home Member State and that his title is recognised by that 
authority.931 The second section states that the lawyers who are established under 
their home title will become a part of the Bar of their choice under the same con-
ditions as their French counterparts. When they have become part of the Bar they 
are also allowed to participate in the elections of the National Bar Association.932 
The last section of the newly introduced Article 84 states that a revocation, either 
temporarily or definitively, in the home Member State will automatically lead to a 
similar revocation of the right to practise in France. The Council of the relevant 
Bar is authorised to take decisions in these matters.933 As of 2006, 128 lawyers were 
established under their home country professional title.934 
Article 5 of the Loi du 11 février 2004 creates a new Article 85 in the Loi du 31 
décembre 1971 that regulates the use of the professional title by a lawyer who is 
established under his home country title in France. The Article states that a lawyer 
who is established under his home country professional title must use the professional 
title in one of the official languages of his home Member State. In addition to that, 
the lawyer who is established under his home country professional title must also 
mention the professional organisation by whose virtue he is allowed to practise in 
his home Member State, the jurisdiction where he practises in his home Member 
State, and the Bar to which he belongs in France.935 
In the 6th Article of the Loi du 11 février 2004 a new Article 86 is created in the 
Loi du 31 décembre 1971. This new Article 86 lays down the rules pertaining to 
necessary professional indemnity insurance which must be acquired by the lawyer 
who is established under his home title. The text of the newly introduced Article 
86 closely mimics the text of Article 6(3) of Directive 98/5/EC. The Article states 
that a lawyer who is established under his home title must obtain professional indem-
nity insurance that fulfils the criteria laid down for his French counterpart, which is 
found in Article 17 of the Loi du 31 décembre 1971. A lawyer who is established under 
his home title may be exempted from the obligation to obtain professional indemnity 
insurance in France if he can convince the competent authority in France that he 
already has compatible insurance in his home Member State. If complete equivalence 
                                                  
930 Article 2 of the Loi du 11 février 2004. It may be assumed that this decree, which to my 
knowledge does not exist at this point in time, uses the list mentioned in Article 1(2) of 
Directive 98/5/EC. 
931 Article 4 of the Loi du 11 février 2004. 
932 Article 4 of the Loi du 11 février 2004. 
933 Article 4 of the Loi du 11 février 2004. 
934  <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 11 June 2007. 
935 Article 5 of the Loi du 11 février 2004. 
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cannot be guaranteed, the lawyer established under his home country professional 
title may be required to obtain complementary insurance in order to guarantee 
equivalence.936 
Article 7 of the Loi du 11 février 2004 lays down the rules with regard to pro-
fessional activities, and the pursuit of legal activity in Multi-Disciplinary Partner-
ships by lawyers who are established under their home country professional title in 
France. Article 7 creates a new Article 87 in the Loi du 31 décembre 1971. The first 
section of the new Article 87 states that a lawyer who is established under his home 
country title in France may exercise his profession under the preconditions laid 
down for French avocats in Articles 7 and 8 of the Loi du 31 décembre 1971.937 In 
deviation from these preconditions, and therefore explicitly laid down for lawyers 
established under their home title, under certain conditions they may work in group-
ings that contain members who are not of the legal professions. Lawyers are allowed 
to exercise professional activities as members of a grouping if this grouping fulfils 
certain criteria.938 This construction therefore allows for more liberal rules for 
lawyers who are established under their home country professional title for practising 
in MDPs, than for avocats who are, by virtue of Article 8 of the Loi du 31 décembre 
1971 only allowed to practise in association with fellow avocats.939 When the crite-
ria listed in the newly created Article 87 are not fulfilled, the Article states that the 
lawyer established under his home title may exercise his profession in France, but not 
as part of the grouping. He is allowed, on the other hand, to mention his member-
ship of the contested MDP in his home Member State.940  
With regard to professional activity it is impossible not to notice the absence of 
the rule of cooperation when representing a client in court. As is well established, 
Article 5 of Directive 98/5/EC allows Member States to limit the exercise of pro-
fessional activities when it concerns representing clients in court to the extent that 
                                                  
936 Article 6 of the Loi du 11 février 2004. 
937 Article 7 of the Loi du 11 février 2004. Articles 7 and 8 of the Loi du 31 décembre 1971 lay 
down rules with regard to independence of avocats and rules with regard to practising in 
groups, which is allowed for avocats among themselves. 
938  These criteria are mentioned in the newly constructed Article 87 and mirror to a certain extent 
the criteria laid down in Article 11 of Directive 98/5/EC. Exercising activity as part of a 
grouping is allowed for a lawyer established under his home title if the majority of the capital 
or the decision making power is in the hands of people who are lawyers or exercise one of the 
other legal professions which are protected by a title (e.g., notaries); when the lawyers exercise 
activity in the name of the grouping, and the usage of the name is reserved for people belonging 
to the professions named above. 
939  The rules with regard to MDPs for avocats have become very vague due to the merger between 
the profession of avocat and conseil juridique whereas the rules for practising in MDPs for the 
latter were more lenient than those of the profession of avocat, and some MDPs seem to exist 
de facto. See Adamson (1998), p. 156. It can, however, be concluded from the fact that the 
French legislature deemed it necessary to create separate rules with regard to MDPs for lawyers 
established under their home title, that the official view with regard to avocats practising in MDPs 
still is restrictive.  
940 Article 7 Loi du 11 février 2004. The newly constructed Article 87 contains another provision 
which is of minor importance to this thesis and deals with the legal form of the MDP 
concerned: ‘L’avocat inscrit sous son titre professionel d’origine peut, dans des conditions fixées par décret 
en Conseil d’État, exercer en France, au sein ou au nom d’une société régie par le droit de l’État membre 
où le titre a été acquis et ayant pour objet l’excercice en commun de plusieurs professions libérales soumises à 
un statut législatif ou règlementaire ou dont le titre est protégé.’ 
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Member States can oblige lawyers established under their home title to cooperate 
with a domestic lawyer, similar to the provisions found in Directive 77/249/EEC. 
This absence is remarkable since all Member States, at least those who maintain a 
legal monopoly for lawyers to represent clients in court, have made use of this restric-
tion. It is even more remarkable since France does invoke this restriction with regard 
to the application of Directive 77/249/EEC.941 Reasons for this omission are not 
readily apparent, but it must be concluded that a lawyer who is established in France 
under his home country professional title is allowed to exercise all the activities of 
an avocat without the restriction of compulsory cooperation with an avocat when 
representing clients in court. This is perhaps a reflection of the very liberal stance of 
the French CCBE delegation that pleaded for an automatic mutual recognition of 
the legal professions in Europe. 
In order to streamline the difficult issue of disciplinary proceedings against a 
lawyer who is established in France under his home country professional title, either 
in France or in his home country, Article 8 of the Loi du 11 février 2004 created a 
new Article 88 in the Loi du 31 décembre 1971 to regulate the modus operandi for 
disciplinary proceedings. Article 88 states that before disciplinary proceedings are 
started against a lawyer established in France under his home country professional 
title, the batônnier of the relevant Bar will inform the competent authority of the 
home Member State, which is then allowed to utter its views on the matter.942 The 
Article states that the normal procedure for disciplinary proceedings is followed.943 
Articles 9 to 11 of the Loi du 11 février 2004 deal with the integration of lawyers 
who are established under their home title in France into the profession of the avocat 
via the route described in Article 10 of Directive 98/5/EC. Article 9 of the Loi du 
11 février 2004 does nothing more than create a new chapter in the Loi du 31 
décembre 1971 called: ‘Dispositions relatives à l’accès des ressortissants communautaires à la 
profession d’avocat’.944 The main body of rules regarding entrance to the profession of 
the avocat is laid down in Articles 10 and 11 of the Loi du 11 février 2004. Article 10 
of the Loi du 11 février 2004 creates a new Article 89 in the Loi du 31 décembre 1971 
which states that lawyers who exercise their profession under their home country 
professional title in France may integrate into the French legal profession without 
having to deal with the legal provisions that implement Directive 89/48/EEC in 
France.  
A lawyer can integrate into the profession of the avocat in this manner when he 
has regularly and effectively pursued professional activities in French law for a period 
of at least three years.945 Although this requirement closely mirrors what is laid 
down in Article 10 of Directive 98/5/EC, the reference to European Community 
law that is included in Article 10 of the Directive is absent in the French imple-
mentation. It could well be the case that the French competent authorities regard 
Community law as an integral part of French law, but it could also be that they do 
not think so, which could potentially lead to an infringement of the Directive. 
                                                  
941  To such an extent that it was even condemned by the ECJ: Case C-351/01 Commission v. 
France, [2002] ECR I-08101. 
942 Article 8 of the Loi du 11 février 2004. 
943  Ibid. 
944 Article 9 of the Loi du 11 février 2004. 
945 Article 10 of the Loi du 11 février 2004. 
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Although the Commission is of the opinion that experience in Community law 
alone is not enough to integrate in the legal profession of the host Member State, 
that is a long way off the view that experience in national law (in this case French 
law) alone, can lead to an integration in the legal profession of the host Member 
State. The French implementation is formulated in such a way that makes it pos-
sible for this contravening view to be upheld on the basis of the French imple-
mentation. That is a (potential) breach of Directive 98/5/EC. The newly constructed 
Article 89 of the Loi du 31 décembre 1971 further regulates cases in which a lawyer 
who is established under his home country professional title fulfils the criteria dis-
cussed above, so he may continue to exercise his professional activity under the 
professional title of France, i.e., the title of avocat.946  
The second part of the new Article 89 regulates the eventuality where a lawyer, 
who is established under his home title, seeks to establish himself after he has been 
active in France for a period of at least three years, but had not been active in the 
field of French law for that same amount of time. If that is the case, the conseil of 
the Bar involved will appreciate the effective and regular nature of the activities 
exercised, and the capacity of the lawyer involved and allow him to continue the 
named professional activity.947 This section is intended as an implementation of 
Section 3 of Article 10 of Directive 98/5/EC but it lacks the detailed procedure 
laid down in Section 3 of Article 10 of Directive 98/5/EC in order to ascertain 
whether the named criteria are fulfilled. It can only be a matter for speculation 
whether or not France will follow this procedure. Article 11 of the Loi du 11 février 
2004 creates a new Article 90 in the Loi du 31 décembre 1971 which lays down a 
number of more procedural requirements for accessing the profession of the avocat by 
lawyers who are established under their home country professional title. The first 
section of the newly introduced Article 90 states that the conseil of the Bar involved 
will maintain secrecy with regard to applications made for integration into the pro-
fession of the avocat.948 The second section of the new Article 90 states that the conseil 
of the Bar may not refuse an application of a lawyer who is established under his 
home title in France to integrate into the profession of the avocat if the said lawyer 
fulfils the criteria named in newly constructed Article 89 of the Loi du 31 décembre 
1971. The only possibility to refuse such an application is, according to Article 90, 
on the basis of Articles 11(4), (5) and (6) of the Loi du 31 décembre 1971949 is in cases 
of incompatibility and if problems arise in connection with public policy. When 
the lawyer is allowed to integrate into the profession of the avocat he will be in-
scribed on the tableau after he has taken the oath.950 A lawyer who is allowed to in-
tegrate into the profession of the avocat will still be allowed to use his home country 
professional title (besides the title of avocat) while exercising professional activities in 
France.951 
                                                  
946  Ibid. 
947  Ibid. 
948 Article 11 of the Loi du 11 février 2004. 
949  These sections of Article 11 regulate the instances that may lead (on the basis of Article 10(4) 
of Directive 98/5/EC) to a refusal to allow a lawyer established under his home title to 
integrate in the legal profession of the host Member States. 
950 Article 11 of the Loi du 11 février 2004. 
951  Ibid. 
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Italy 
Directive 98/5/EC was implemented in Italy by means of two legal instruments. 
The first legal instrument is one of these typical Italian laws that are used to imple-
ment Directives.952 These laws are created periodically in order to transpose large 
amounts of European law into the Italian legal system. Article 19 of the law con-
cerned deals with the implementation of Directive 98/5/EC and is basically no 
more than a detailed delegation of the implementation to the Government.953 The 
Government laid down this implementation in a Decreto Legislativo.954 The Decreto 
Legislativo is a special form of legislation, where the legislative power is delegated to 
the Government by the Parliament, but where the result leads to a form of regu-
lation that is equal in status to an Act of Parliament (Legge).955  
The first three articles of the Decreto Legislativo deal with the scope of its ap-
plication and define the terms that are used throughout the text. Article 1 states that 
the scope embraces all lawyers from the EU and the EEA who seek to establish 
themselves permanently in Italy. Lawyers who provide services may not rely on 
this Decreto Legislativo.956 Those persons who are regarded as lawyers coincide with 
the professional titles mentioned in Article 1(2) of Directive 98/5/EC.957  
The Decreto Legislativo states that a lawyer who has established himself under the 
provisions of the Decreto Legislativo may exercise his profession under the rules that 
are valid for avvocati, and under the conditions of the Decreto Legislativo, under his 
home country professional title. This general provision is accompanied by a number 
of more specific provisions. Article 5 states specifically that the rules with regard to 
activities that are incompatible with the profession of avvocato are also applied to 
lawyers established under their home country title. Exemption rules for these in-
compatibilities are also applied to lawyers established under their home title.958 The 
same applies to rules regarding professional indemnity insurance.959 The fourth para-
graph lists a requirement that was not explicitly named in the implementation 
devices of the foregoing Member States. The paragraph lists the requirement that a 
lawyer who is established under his home country professional title is obliged to 
attend the permanent training courses that are mandatory for avvocati, even when 
the lawyer established under his home country professional title is obliged to follow 
these courses in his home country.960 The fact that a lawyer established under his 
home country professional title can be obliged to follow permanent training courses 
where they are also mandatory for avvocati can probably be justified under Article 7 
                                                  
952  Legge 21 dicembre 1999, n. 526, ‘Disposizioni per l’adempimento di obblighi derivanti dall’ 
apertenenza dell’Italia alle Cominutà europee – legge comunitaria 1999’, Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 
13, 18 gennaio 2000 – Supplemento Ordinario n. 15. 
953 Article 19 Legge 21 dicembre 1999. 
954  Decreto Legislativo 2 febbraio 2001, n. 96, Attuazione della direttiva 98/5/CE volta a facilitare 
l’esercizio permanente della professione di avvocato in una Stato membro diverso da quallo in cui 
e’ stata acquisita la qualifica professionale. (via <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 22 November 
2004).  
955  Prakke & Kortmann (1993), pp. 394-395. 
956 Article 1(1), (2) and (3). Decreto Legislativo 21 febbraio 2001. 
957 Article 2 Decreto Legislativo 21 febbraio 2001. 
958 Article 5 (2) Decreto Legislativo 21 febbraio 2001. 
959 Article 5 (3) Decreto Legislativo 21 febbraio 2001. 
960 Article 5 (4) Decreto Legislativo 21 febbraio 2001. 
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of Directive 98/5/EC.961 It seems more doubtful for the rule that this is mandatory 
irrespective of rules regarding permanent education in the home Member State, 
since this would violate the principle of mutual recognition that underlies the 
Directive as a whole. 
The actual establishment of a lawyer under his country professional title is laid 
down in Article 6 of the Decreto Legislativo. It lays down a number of detailed pro-
visions that need to be fulfilled before a lawyer can actually establish himself under 
his home country professional title. First, a lawyer may only practise under his home 
country professional title when he is enrolled in a special register of the district where 
the lawyer has his permanent residence or professional domicile.962 Secondly, a 
lawyer needs to be fully qualified to practise as a lawyer in his home Member 
State.963 The application to be listed in the special section of the register must be 
accompanied by a certificate of citizenship in one of the Member States, a certificate 
of residence or substitute document such as a certificate of professional domicile,964 
and a certificate of registration with the competent authority of the home Member 
State issued within three months of the date of the application.965 Furthermore, if 
the lawyer who seeks establishment under his home title in Italy belongs to a partner-
ship or a firm in his home Member State the lawyer must indicate the name and 
the legal status of the partnership/firm and the names of its members who operate 
in Italy.966 The application, and all the enclosed documents, must be produced in 
Italian, or must be accompanied by an authenticated translation.967 When the law-
yer who seeks establishment has filed for registration and he has fulfilled the criteria 
mentioned above, the Council of the Bar Association shall register the lawyer within 
30 days.968 A rejection of an application shall not take place without the applicant 
having been heard. A rejection shall state reasons, and a copy will be sent to the 
lawyer who had filed for registration and the public prosecutor in conformity with 
the Avvocato law.969 When the Council of the relevant Bar Association has not 
reached a decision within 30 days, the lawyer concerned can go the National Bar 
Association 10 days after the said 30 days have expired in order to obtain a deci-
sion.970After the lawyer is registered as a lawyer established under his home country 
professional title he shall acquire active voting rights but no passive voting rights.971 
Although not specified further, it must be assumed that this subsection seeks to 
                                                  
961  Albeit with some effort, since Article 7 seems to refer only to professional, i.e. deontological, 
rules. It is doubtful whether a requirement of permanent education must be seen as a deonto-
logical rule or a rule regarding qualification. 
962 Article 6(1) Decreto Legislativo 21 febbraio 2001. It is interesting to note that again a reference 
is made to a requirement of residence, while it has been clearly established in case C-145/99 
that a residence requirement is not allowed. The question is whether it is enough to state ‘or 
professional domicile’ in order to counter the illegality of the residence requirement. 
963 Article 6(2) Decreto Legislativo 21 febbraio 2001. 
964  See note 944.. 
965 Article 6(3) Decreto Legislativo 21 febbraio 2001. 
966 Article 6(4) Decreto Legislativo 21 febbraio 2001. 
967 Article 6(5) Decreto Legislativo 21 febbraio 2001. 
968 Article 6(6) Decreto Legislativo 21 febbraio 2001. 
969 Article 6(7) Decreto Legislativo 21 febbraio 2001; Article 31 of the Royal Decree Law no. 
1587 of 1933. 
970 Article 6(8) Decreto Legislativo 21 febbraio 2001. 
971 Article 6(9) Decreto Legislativo 21 febbraio 2001. 
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implement, albeit in a minimalist manner, Article 6(2) of Directive 98/5/EC which 
guarantees lawyers established under their home title adequate representation in the 
governing bodies of the profession. The Directive states that lawyers established 
under their home title shall at least have voting rights in the elections of the govern-
ing bodies. Lastly, the lawyer established under his home title is required to present 
on an annual basis a certificate of registration issued within the last three months.972 
This odd, overly cumbersome, and useless973 criterion was also observed in Luxem-
bourg’s implementation, where it was observed that he ECJ held that such a require-
ment was contrary to Directive 98/5/EC.974  
When a lawyer is established under his home country professional title, he is re-
quired to use that title in its entirety and in the language of the home country pro-
fessional title, in a comprehensible manner, and in such a way as to avoid confusion 
with the title of avvocato.975 In addition, a lawyer must indicate the professional organ-
isation by virtue of which he is allowed to practise in his home Member State.976 
Where a lawyer is a member of a firm or partnership in his home Member State he 
must add the name of that firm or partnership to his professional title as well as the 
legal form of the firm or partnership and the names of the members of that firm or 
partnership who operate in Italy.977 
Article 8 of the Decreto Legislativo states that where a lawyer established under his 
home country professional title exercises professional activities that involve repre-
senting a client before a court, in civil, criminal and administrative procedures, as well 
as disciplinary proceedings, he shall do so in cooperation with an avvocato.978 The 
avvocato shall uphold relations with the competent authorities and will be responsible 
for fulfilling the requirements that the regulations lay down for a lawyer exercising 
professional activities as stated above.979 The relationship between the lawyer estab-
lished under his home title and the avvocato concerned shall be laid down in a cer-
tified private deed or a declaration made by the lawyers involved and be given to the 
judge or another competent authority before the said activity is carried out.980Activity 
before certain superior courts is reserved for lawyers who are listed on special 
registers.981 Lawyers established under their home title are only allowed to carry out 
activity before these courts if they are listed on these special registers.982 A lawyer 
established under his home country professional title can apply to the National Bar 
                                                  
972 Article 6(10) Decreto Legislativo 21 febbraio 2001. 
973  Any changes in the lawyers’ status in the home Member State must be communicated to the 
competent authority in the host Member State under the provisions of Article 7 of Directive 98/ 
5/EC. Such a requirement would therefore have no added value apart from extra hassle and costs 
for the lawyer established under his home country title. 
974  Cases C-193/05, Commission of the European Communities v. Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg, [2006] 
ECR I-08673, and C-506/04, Graham J. Wilson v. Ordre des avocats du barreau de Luxembourg, 
[2006] ECR I-08613. 
975 Article 7(1) Decreto Legislativo 21 febbraio 2001. 
976 Article 7(2) Decreto Legislativo 21 febbraio 2001. 
977 Article 7(3) Decreto Legislativo 21 febbraio 2001. 
978 Article 8(1) Decreto Legislativo 21 febbraio 2001. 
979 Article 8(1) Decreto Legislativo 21 febbraio 2001.  
980 Article 8(2) Decreto Legislativo 21 febbraio 2001. 
981 Article 33 Avvocato law. 
982 Article 9 (1) Decreto Legislativo 21 febbraio 2001. Directive 98/5/EC allows for exemptions 
with regard to superior courts in Article 5(3) 
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Association to be included in these registers when he has exercised the profession 
of lawyer in his home Member State for at least twelve years, taking into account 
also any professional activity carried out in Italy.983 The requirements for coop-
eration as discussed above remain in force for lawyers exercising activities before 
superior courts. So a lawyer established under his home country professional title who 
is enrolled in a special register is still obliged to cooperate with an avvocato.984 The 
requirements of Article 8 do not apply to professional activities that are regarded as 
‘extra-judicial activities’, where the existence of a legal monopoly is much less 
certain, and Directive 98/5/EC does not allow forced co-operation with a host 
Member State lawyer.985 
While exercising professional activities in Italy, the lawyer established under his 
home country professional title is subject to the disciplinary rules in force in Italy 
and the disciplinary power of the Council of the Bar Association where he is 
registered.986 Before starting a disciplinary procedure against a lawyer established 
under his home title in Italy, the Council of the Bar Association shall first inform 
the competent authority of the home Member State. The information shall be 
treated as confidential.987 In order to set up a preliminary investigation, the Council 
of the Bar Association concerned may request necessary information from the com-
petent authority of the home Member State.988 Members of the competent authority 
of the home Member States are allowed to participate in the procedure at first in-
stance and in an appeal procedure, where applicable, before the National Bar Asso-
ciation.989 Any decision by the Council of the Bar Association or the National Bar 
Association shall be communicated immediately to the competent authority of the 
home Member State.990 Any measure from the competent authority of the home 
Member State to revoke the right to practise, temporarily or permanently, shall have 
the same effect on the right to practise under home title in Italy. Measures taken by 
the home State’s competent authority, which may have a different effect, shall be 
considered by the Council of the Bar Association which will then adopt appropriate 
measures on the basis of the Legislative Decree concerned and the forensic rules in 
force in Italy.991 The last section states that the Italian competent authorities shall 
also furnish all necessary information in connection with the disciplinary proceedings 
started against avvocati established under their home title in other Member States.992 
Articles 12 and 13 of the Decreto Legislativo deal with the integration of a lawyer 
established under his home title in Italy in the profession of the avvocato. A lawyer 
established in Italy under his home country professional title shall be exempted 
from the aptitude test when it is established that he has actually and regularly pursued 
the profession for at least three years in Italy.993 The actual and regular pursuance 
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means an uninterrupted exercise of the profession, but not taking into account 
interruptions arising from everyday life. Interruptions other than those arising from 
everyday life, which are not detrimental to the actual and regular character of the 
activity pursued, will not be taken into account when establishing the time period 
of three years.994 The lawyer concerned must apply for an exemption with the 
Council of the Bar Association.995 The lawyer concerned shall accompany his request 
with documentation regarding the number and the nature of cases handled as well 
as proof that he has exercised the profession on national law, including European 
Community law, on an actual and regular basis for at least three years. The lawyer 
is also obliged to inform the Council of any criminal or disciplinary procedures 
against him in his home State and any other useful information.996 The Council of 
the Bar Association shall verify regularity and actual exercise of the profession. Where 
necessary it may request information from other persons, or request the lawyer 
concerned to provide explanation and clarification on the information given.997 
The Council of the Bar Association shall give its reasoned decision within three 
months of the application. Within fifteen days after that, the Council shall commu-
nicate its decision to the applicant and the public prosecutor. The Public prosecutor 
shall have ten days to give a reasoned opinion, which will then be sent to the 
Attorney General of the Court of Appeal concerned. The Attorney General and the 
applicant will have the right to appeal to the National Bar Association within 20 
days. The appeal of the Attorney General (which will most likely only occur in the 
situation where the Bar has exempted the lawyer, but the public prosecutor has 
advised against it) shall have a suspending effect. The decision of the Bar Association 
shall also be communicated to the Ministry of Justice for the exercising of super-
visory functions.998 This integration procedure based on Article 10 of Directive 
98/5/EC is rather complicated. In particular, the role of the public prosecutor, his 
advice and the Attorney General are rather opaque. The essence of the competent 
authority’s task in the implementation of Article 10 is to ascertain whether the 
lawyer fulfils the criteria laid down in the article. These criteria are of an objective 
nature, thus no subjective judgement of the competent authority is required. The 
criteria are either fulfilled and the lawyer can then integrate into the legal profession 
or they are not fulfilled, in which case a secondary procedure is followed or the 
application for integration is declined. Since this is purely an objective exercise, it is 
unclear what the advice of the public prosecutor to the Attorney General should 
entail, and how this could affect the decision of the Bar Association. The possibility 
of a breach of the rights conferred by Directive 98/5/EC can only be judged on 
the application of this procedure in practice. The Council of the Bar Association 
may refuse an application even before verifying the criteria laid down in this article 
in the event of any disciplinary proceedings against the lawyer who applies for in-
tegration, or in the case of any other issues arsing which relate to public security.999 
This exception is in line with Section 4 of Article 10 of Directive 98/5/EC. If the 
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Council of the Bar Association fails to react to an application within the said 30 
days, both the applicant and the public prosecutor may appeal to the National Bar 
Association who in turn will decide on the exemption.1000 All information dealt 
with in connection with this procedure shall be treated confidentially.1001  
Integration into the profession of the avvocato after having less than three years’ 
experience in national law is governed by Article 14 of the Decreto Legislativo. This 
Article states that a lawyer can also be exempted from the aptitude test when he has 
been established under his home country title for at least three years in Italy but has 
been active in Italian law for a lesser period of time, when he is deemed to be able 
to continue this activity.1002 This ability to continue the activity shall be verified 
through an interview. Besides the activity carried out, note will also be taken of all 
the professional knowledge and experience acquired in Italian law as well as parti-
cipation in courses or seminars on Italian law, including forensic and deontological 
rules.1003 The interview shall be carried out by the Council of the Bar Association 
and integration into the profession of avvocato shall be subject to the procedure of 
Article 13, as described above.1004 A lawyer who is successfully integrated into the 
profession of the avvocato has the right to use both the title of avvocato and his home 
country professional title.1005 
The final part of the Decreto Legislativo, the part following the general rules on 
practice in association, deals with practice in association of lawyers who are established 
under their home country professional title. The Decreto Legislativo begins by stating 
that lawyers established under their home country professional title are also allowed 
to practise in association when they come from different Member States, under the 
designation studio associate, followed by the names and surnames of the associates and 
their professional titles.1006 The association as such cannot take on assignments; each 
associate must take on his own assignments.1007 Associations cannot be registered 
into the registers of the Bar Association.1008 This is a peculiar prerequisite since asso-
ciations of avvocati are required to enrol in the registers.1009 Although Article 11 of 
Directive 98/5/EC does not guarantee equal treatment as such, it is clear from its 
wording that it was drafted with equal treatment in mind. The reason for difference 
in treatment is also not readily apparent. Due to the rather vague wording of Article 
11 (a form of joint practice shall be made available) it cannot be said that Italy is in 
breach of the Directive, but the difference in treatment is remarkable nonetheless. 
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Subsection 5 of Article 43 of the Decreto Legislativo states that the rules of Article 7, 
as described above, apply when the lawyer established under his home country title 
is a member of an association in his home Member State.1010 Lawyers who are 
established under their home country title are also allowed to practise in an asso-
ciation with avvocati as long as one of the partners is an avvocato.1011 Article 8 applies 
when a lawyer established under his home title, practising in association, seeks to 
represent a client in court.1012 Partnership between avvocati and lawyers who are 
established under home title falls under the rules of Section II of the Decreto Legislativo 
which declares that the rules applicable to associations of avvocati also apply to these 
mixed associations.1013 Partnerships established (also other than those consisting of 
lawyers alone) in Member States other than Italy may exercise professional activities 
in Italy by means of a branch office with permanent representation, provided that 
all partners are lawyers.1014 It is clear that the Italian government has some policy 
regarding the section of Article 11 of Directive 98/5/EC that deals with Multi-
Disciplinary Partnerships.1015 However, it is not readily apparent what the exact 
result of this implementation entails. Subsection 2 of Article 36 of the Decreto Legis-
lativo leads to the conclusion that lawyers who are members of an association, which 
also includes persons who are not lawyers, can also establish themselves in Italy as a 
branch office of the partnership they belong to in their home Member State, as 
long as the criteria of subsection 2 are fulfilled. The occurrence of MDPs that fulfil 
the criteria of subsection 2 will be rare to non-existent, since non-lawyers in such a 
partnership are very likely to use the name of that partnership.1016 In such cases the 
subsection will not apply, and the lawyer concerned would not be allowed to estab-
lish himself in a branch office of the partnership to which he belongs in his home 
Member State. There are also additional criteria. The partnership that opens a 
branch office in Italy is obliged to ensure, by means of specific provisions in the 
Articles of the Association, the personal nature of the service provided by the law-
yer, the right of the client to choose his own counsel, the full independence of the 
lawyers within the partnership with regard to professional activities, and personal lia-
bility of the lawyer, the liability of the partnership and the deontological rules.1017 If 
the professional activity entails defending clients in court, Article 8 of the Decreto 
Legislativo, as described above, shall apply. Branch offices in Italy of partnerships 
originating from other Member States are obliged to enrol in the register of the 
relevant Bar Association.1018 Provisions of Sections I and II of the Decreto Legislativo 
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shall apply to lawyers established under their home title in Italy as a branch office of 
a partnership established in another Member State. The rules shall also apply to the 
branch office itself.1019  
The Italian implementation of Article 11 of Directive 98/5/EC is a complete 
mess. It creates a completely non-transparent body of regulations. In essence it comes 
down to this: Italian avvocati who practise in association fall under Section II of the 
Decreto Legislativo (very detailed rules regarding partnerships, enrolment in Registers); 
Lawyers established under their home title in Italy who seek to practise in associa-
tion fall under Section III (no registration of partnership). Lawyers established under 
their home title who belong to a partnership in their home Member State and who 
seek to set up a branch office also fall under Section II (detailed rules and enrolment). 
The reason for this complicated structure is not readily apparent, and could, in my 
opinion, be more condensed. It seems that the Italian authorities have struggled 
with the complicated structure of Article 11 of Directive 98/5/EC and the hier-
archy between the host and home Member State rules found in that article. Article 
11 of Directive 98/5/EC states that, in case of incompatibility between home and 
host Member State rules, the latter shall prevail insofar as compliance therewith is 
justified by the public interest. Subsection 5 allows Member States altogether to 
refuse groupings that partly consist of non-lawyers. Italy has only made use of this 
possibility to the extent that it does not allow groupings that contain members who 
are not lawyers. What Italy has done, and which is contrary to Article 11 of the 
Directive, is to apply its own rules on partnerships to branch offices of lawyers1020 
without judging whether the rules in the respective Member States are incompat-
ible with those in Italy or whether the application of the Italian rules on groupings 
is justified in the light of the public interest to protect clients and third parties. With 
regard to joint practice outside a branch office, different rules apply to associated 
lawyers from other Member States on the one hand, and associated avvocati and 
associated avvocati and lawyers from other Member States on the other. Although 
sanctioned by the Directive, Article 11(2) and (3) state that joint practice is regulated 
by the rules of the host Member State. However this seems overly complicated, 
and, perhaps, discriminatory. 
 
Spain 
On 3 August 2001, over a year after the deadline had passed for the implementation 
of Directive 98/5/EC, the Spanish Government issued a Real Decreto that had the 
purpose of implementing Directive 98/5/EC in Spain.1021 The implementation 
stands alone, i.e., it does not directly change the established legislation in the field 
(such as the Abogado law). The first article of the Real Decreto regulates the scope of 
its application. The Article states that the Real Decreto shall apply to all citizens of 
Member States of the European Union and citizens of Member States of the EEA 
who are entitled to exercise professional activities under one of the professional titles 
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listed in Article 2 of the Real Decreto.1022 The Article states further that the present 
Real Decreto does not affect the legal provisions mentioned above with regard to the 
recognition of foreign qualifications (Directive 89/48/EEC) and the free provision 
of services by lawyers in Spain (Directive 77/249/EEC).  
Article 3 of the Real Decreto gives any lawyer from any Member State of the 
European Union or the European Economic Area the right to exercise his profes-
sional activity in Spain under the conditions given in the Real Decreto.1023 The first 
condition under which a lawyer from another Member State is allowed to exercise 
professional activities in Spain is listed in Article 4 of the Real Decreto. This Article 
states that a lawyer must be inscribed with the professional authority of the district 
where the lawyer concerned has his professional domicile or where he exercises the 
majority of his activities in Spain.1024 The formalities of the inscription are listed in 
Article 5 of the Real Decreto.1025 The Real Decreto requires proof of name and nation-
ality, identification of the country where the professional title was obtained, details 
of the competent authority of the home Member State, professional domicile, and 
(where applicable) the name and legal form of the grouping to which the lawyer 
belongs in his home Member State.1026 In addition, the Real Decreto requires (an 
authentic copy and/or translation)1027 of the lawyer’s passport, certification of in-
scription with the competent authority of the home Member State, issued within 
three months of the application, which is to be accompanied with any information 
regarding disciplinary proceedings, and any other document the relevant Colegio 
may require, provided that it also requires these additional documents from Spanish 
lawyers at their inscription.1028  
It seems that, with this last requirement, the Spanish authorities have attempted 
to remove any sense of discrimination between Spanish lawyers and lawyers from 
other Member States seeking registration in Spain. This attempt seems in vain, as 
Article 3 of Directive 98/5/EC lays down the criteria for registration. Article 3 only 
requires a certificate of inscription with the competent authority of the home Member 
State. This line of reasoning was acknowledged by the European Court of Justice 
when it ruled that Article 3 of the Directive leads to full harmonisation.1029 It seems 
that, although the Government sought to formulate the provision to exclude dis-
crimination, a breach of Directive 98/5/EC is nonetheless present.  
The same may hold true for Article 6 of the Real Decreto. This article allows 
Colegios to ask for an inscription fee if certain criteria are fulfilled. These criteria are 
twofold. Firstly inscription fees may not exceed those required from those who enter 
                                                  
1022 Articles 1 and 2 Real Decreto 936/2001. The list mentioned in Article 2 coincides with the 
list of Article 1(2) of Directive 98/5/EC with the addition of the professional titles in Norway 
(avokat), Liechtenstein (rechtsanwalt) and Iceland (lögmaður).  
1023 Article 3 Real Decreto 936/2001. 
1024 Article 4 Real Decreto 936/2001. 
1025 Article 5 Real Decreto 936/2001.  
1026 Article 5(1) Real Decreto 936/2001. 
1027 Article 5(3) Real Decreto 936/2001. 
1028 Article 5(2) Real Decreto 936/2001. 
1029  Cases C-193/05, Commission of the European Communities v. Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg, [2006] 
ECR, I-08673 and C-506/04, Graham J. Wilson v. Ordre des avocats du barreau de Luxembourg, 
[2006] ECR, I-08613. 
206 
in the Spanish legal profession, they must be adequate and proportional to the service 
provided.1030  
The procedure of inscription is laid down in Article 7 of the Real Decreto. The 
Article states that the Governing Council of the Colegio concerned will have two 
months to decide upon the request of a lawyer who seeks establishment under his 
home title in Spain. If the Governing Council does not decide within two months 
of the request, it will be assumed that the Council has made a positive decision.1031 
The general rules for appeal on administrative decisions will apply to decisions 
taken by the Governing Council of the Colegio concerned.1032 According to Article 
8 of the Real Decreto, the Colegio concerned shall keep a separate register of those 
lawyers who are established under their home country professional title. All infor-
mation known at the time of inscription shall be laid down in the register.1033 Where 
the lawyer concerned seeks establishment, the Colegio shall communicate the inscrip-
tion of that lawyer within a period of fifteen days to the General Council of Spanish 
Abogados also indicating the competent authority governing the legal profession in 
the lawyer’s home Member State. The General Council shall than have fifteen days 
to inform the competent authority of the home Member State and the Minister of 
Justice of the lawyer’s inscription.1034 The final section of Article 8 of the Real Decreto 
states that where a Colegio publicises the names of its members, this must also be 
done for those lawyers who are established under their home title, accompanied with 
the professional title under which they are allowed to practise.1035  
Article 9 of the Real Decreto lays down a number of general criteria a lawyer 
established under his home title needs to comply with when being established in 
Spain. The first principle laid down in Article 9 of the Real Decreto concerns appli-
cable professional rules. It is stated in the Article that aside from the rules of pro-
fessional conduct and deontology the lawyer is subject to in his home Member State, 
the Spanish rules of professional conduct and deontology will be applicable to the 
lawyer established under his home country professional title when he exercises any 
professional activity on Spanish territory.1036 This is clearly a very straightforward 
implementation of Article 6(1) of Directive 98/5/EC. Moreover, a lawyer established 
under his home country professional title is subject to the same rights, duties, pro-
hibitions, and incompatibilities that are applicable to Abogados, with no discrimina-
tion or exceptions other than those provided for in the Real Decreto. It is unclear 
what this extra sentence in Article 9 of the Real Decreto adds to the general rule 
already given in the first section of the Article.1037 The final section of Article 9 of 
the Real Decreto states that a temporary or definitive revocation of the right to 
exercise the legal profession in his home Member State shall have a similar effect on 
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the lawyer who is established under his home country professional title in Spain, 
i.e., he will no longer be allowed to exercise his profession in Spain.1038 
Article 10 of the Real Decreto regulates the use of professional title for those 
lawyers who are established under their home country title in Spain. First of all, the 
Article lays down the obligation for a lawyer from another Member State to always 
use his professional title as mentioned in Article 2 of the Real Decreto (correspond-
ing with Article 1(2) Directive 98/5/EC and the three professional titles of the 
EEA countries). A lawyer established under his home title is prohibited from using 
the designation of Abogado as such, or in any of the official languages in Spain.1039 
Moreover, where a professional title is the same in a number of Member States, the 
lawyer concerned is also obliged to mention his Member State of origin.1040 Where 
there are special limitations or privileges conferred on a legal profession in one of 
the Member State, a lawyer coming from such a Member State must indicate the 
professional authority by whose virtue he is allowed to practise and the judicial 
organs before which he is allowed to appear.1041 
The rules with respect to the professional activities that a lawyer established under 
his home country professional title in Spain may exercise are laid down in Article 
11 of the Real Decreto. The first section states that a lawyer established under his 
home country professional title may exercise the same professional activities as a 
Spanish Abogado, in particular, he is allowed to give legal advice concerning the law 
of his home Member State, European Community law, international law and the 
Spanish law.1042 Where professional activities include defending a client, either before 
a court or a tribunal (where representation by an Abogado is required), or regarding 
assisting, communicating with or visiting detainees or prisoners, cooperation with an 
Abogado is obligatory.1043 This also applied to circumstances in which representation 
by an Abogado is not obligatory, but where a party cannot intervene as such before 
a judicial body, since only intervention by an Abogado is possible.1044 Internal pro-
cedural rules will always be followed, and the Abogado who cooperates with the 
lawyer established under his home title will assume responsibility for the procedure 
with respect to the judicial body and the public organs.1045 Lawyers established 
under their home title are not allowed to be included in the list of the Colegio that 
lists the Abogados available for defending clients.1046 Clearly this requirement is a 
direct violation of Directive 98/5/EC as it would make it very difficult for lawyers 
to establish their own clientele. Furthermore, a lawyer established under his home 
country professional title may not exercise professional activities that are reserved 
for other professions in Spain, even where such lawyers are allowed to exercise this 
professional activity in their home Member State.1047 Finally, the Article states that 
lawyers are allowed to exercise their professional activities in their own capacity or 
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in salaried practice insofar as this is permitted for those exercising professional activity 
under the title of Abogado.1048  
Article 12 of the Real Decreto briefly, but firmly, states that lawyers established 
under their home country professional title shall have the right to vote in the elec-
tions of the Governing Council of the Colegio where the lawyer is established under 
the same conditions as Abogados.1049  
Article 13 of the Real Decreto seeks to implement Article 6(3) of Directive 
98/5/EC. The Article states that a lawyer who is established under his home country 
professional title in Spain must have professional indemnity insurance, either in 
Spain or in his home Member State. Where a lawyer is insured in his home Member 
State but the insurance is only partly compatible with the necessary insurance in 
Spain, he is obliged to purchase additional insurance.1050 
Article 14 of the Real Decreto lays down the process which is applied when 
disciplinary proceedings are initiated against a lawyer established under his home 
title in Spain. Firstly, the Colegio concerned shall inform the competent authority of 
the home Member State as soon as possible of the intention to start disciplinary pro-
ceedings against the lawyer. The Colegio shall give the competent authority of the 
home Member State all necessary information.1051 Secondly, the Article lays down 
obligatory cooperation between the Colegio and the competent authority of the 
home Member State throughout the disciplinary proceedings. It is explicitly stated 
that the obligation of cooperation shall not influence the decision making power of 
the Colegio with regard to sanctions. The competent authority of the home Member 
State shall be invited to utter its views in the procedure before the competent 
authorities in Spain.1052 Thirdly, the Article reiterates what was already laid down 
in Article 9 of the Real Decreto, namely that, where a lawyer’s right to practise is 
revoked, either permanently or temporarily, in his home Member State, the same 
will hold true automatically for his right to exercise professional activities under his 
home country professional title in Spain.1053 Fourthly, the Article states that the 
Colegio shall communicate its final decision to the competent authority of the host 
Member State. The decision of the Colegio can be appealed against under the rules 
governing such procedures for Abogados.1054 In order to inform all the Colegios and 
in order to ensure that an imposed sanction is given full effect, the cooperation 
between the Colegio and the competent authority of the host Member State shall be 
realised through the General Council of Spanish Abogados.1055 In conclusion, it can 
be mentioned that the Spanish authorities have successfully implemented Article 7 
of Directive 98/5/EC. 
Alternatively, something which does not particularly adhere to the order of 
Directive 98/5/EC is Article 15 of the Real Decreto, which regulates the possibilities 
for lawyers established under their home country professional title in Spain to practise 
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in association or in a multi-disciplinary partnership. The first section of Article 15 
lays down a general rule (which is then further elaborated on in subsections (a) to (d)). 
Firstly, the Article states that lawyers established under their home country professional 
title may practise in association under the same rules, modalities, prohibitions and 
limitations as their Spanish counterparts.1056 This main rule is then elaborated on with 
four more specific rules pertaining to practise in association and multi-disciplinary 
partnerships. First of all, Article 15 of the Real Decreto states that lawyers established 
under their home title who are part of a grouping in their home Member State 
may exercise their professional activity in Spain as a branch office or agency of their 
grouping. Where the rules governing such a grouping in the home Member State 
are fundamentally incompatible with rules governing such groupings in Spain, the 
latter shall apply.1057 Strangely, and in breach of Directive 98/5/EC, the justifica-
tion procedure mentioned in subsection 1 of Article 11 Directive 98/5/EC is com-
pletely ignored. Secondly, two or more lawyers who are established under their 
home title in Spain, and who belong to the same grouping in their home Member 
State, may exercise their professional activity in association under the rules govern-
ing such practice in association in Spain.1058 Thirdly, the Article allows lawyers 
established under their home country title but who come from different Member 
States to practise in association with each other or with lawyers practising under the 
Spanish professional title under the rules in force for Spanish lawyers practising in 
association.1059 The fourth subsection of Section 1 of Article 15 of the Real Decreto 
states that lawyers who are established under their home country professional title 
are not allowed to establish themselves as part of a grouping when this grouping 
contains persons with whom Spanish lawyers are not allowed to cooperate. The 
Article states further that a grouping shall be deemed to contain people who are non-
lawyers when the conditions of Article 11(5) of Directive 98/5/EC are fulfilled.1060 
Furthermore, the subsection states that Spain may oppose the opening of an agency 
or branch office of a grouping that falls under the definition laid down in this sub-
section when the fundamental rules governing such a grouping in the home Member 
State are incompatible with the rules governing such groupings in Spain.1061 Similar 
to Italy, albeit to a lesser extent, the Spanish government seems to struggle with the 
implementation of Article 11 of Directive 98/5/EC. There remain questions about 
the use of the second and third sentences of subsection 1(d) of Article 15 of the Real 
Decreto. Article 11 subsection 5 clearly states that it only applies in circumstances 
when the host Member State prohibits multi-disciplinary partnerships for its own 
lawyers. This is not the case in Spain, since it allows MDPs to a certain extent, 
therefore subsection 5 of Article 11 does not apply to the Spanish situation.1062 
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1057 Article 15(1a) Real Decreto 936/2001.  
1058 Article 15(1b) Real Decreto 936/2001. 
1059 Article 15(1c) Real Decreto 936/2001. 
1060 Article 15(1d) Real Decreto 936/2001. The conditions named in Article 11 of Directive 98/5/EC 
are: when the capital of the grouping is held entirely or partly, or the name under which it 
practises is used, or the decision-making power is exercised, de facto or de iure, by persons who 
are not a lawyer within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Directive 98/5/EC. 
1061 Article 15(1d) Real Decreto 936/2001. 
1062  I believe that in the end it does not make much difference, since Spain would probably be able 
to enforce its rules regarding MDPs on the basis of more general rules laid down in this article. 
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The other important feature of Directive 98/5/EC, namely the possibility to 
integrate in the legal profession of the host Member State without having to take 
the aptitude test provided for in Directive 89/48/EEC, is implemented in Articles 
17 to 22 of the Real Decreto. Article 17 of the Real Decreto states that a lawyer estab-
lished under his home country professional title in Spain has the right to integrate 
into the profession of Abogado without having to take the aptitude test, as pre-
scribed by the Real Decreto 1665/1991 which implements Directive 89/48/EEC in 
Spain. Such integration can take place after the lawyer has been established under his 
home country professional title for a period of three years in which he has effectively 
and regularly pursued professional activity in Spain.1063 The procedure for inte-
gration into the profession of Abogado is laid down in Article 18 of the Real Decreto. 
The Article firstly states that the period of three years mentioned in the previous 
article commences at the moment the lawyer registers as a lawyer established under 
his home country professional title.1064 When a lawyer sends his request to be in-
tegrated into the profession of the Abogado to the Colegio he must accompany his 
request with all the relevant documents, especially those regarding the number and 
nature of the cases with which he has dealt in the three-year period.1065 On receiv-
ing the request and the relevant information, the Colegio will analyse and assess the 
request and the accompanying information.1066 Where necessary, the Colegio will ask 
the requesting lawyer to clarify, add to or elaborate on (either orally or in writing) 
the information accompanying the request.1067 Before the Colegio will reach its final 
decision, it will ask for a report from the General Council of Spanish Abogados.1068 
Article 19 of the Real Decreto lays down the possible decisions the Colegio may take. 
First of all, the Article states that the Colegio shall have three months after the request 
has been filed to come to a decision.1069 There are several options for the Colegio. 
Firstly, the Colegio may refuse the request of the lawyer established under his home 
title.1070 This refusal can either be based on the fact that the lawyer concerned has 
not been active, regularly and effectively, for the period prescribed in Article 17 of 
the Real Decreto, or on the fact that there are concerns in connection with public 
policy, in particular as a result of disciplinary proceedings, complaints or incidents 
of any kind being faced by the requesting lawyer.1071 Secondly, the Colegio can de-
cide to integrate the lawyer established under his home country professional title 
into the profession of the Abogado without the lawyer having to take the aptitude 
test. This integration will be justified on the fact that the lawyer concerned has been 
regularly and effectively active for a period of at least three years in Spanish law, 
including European Community law.1072 Thirdly and lastly, the Colegio can require 
                                                  
1063 Article 17(1) Real Decreto 936/2001. 
1064 Article 18(1) Real Decreto 936/2001. 
1065 Article 18(1) Real Decreto 936/2001. 
1066 Article 18(2) Real Decreto 936/2001. 
1067 Article 18(3) Real Decreto 936/2001. 
1068 Article 18(4) Real Decreto 936/2001. 
1069 Article 19(1) Real Decreto 936/2001. 
1070 Article 19(1a) Real Decreto 936/2001. 
1071 Article 19(1a) Real Decreto 936/2001. 
1072 Article 19(1b) Real Decreto 936/2001. It is at least notable to state that it is only here, and not 
in Article 17, that mention is made of the nature of the activity that needs to be deployed in 
order to integrate in the profession of Abogado. 
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the lawyer to come for an interview. This interview can be imposed if the lawyer 
has been active on a regular and effective basis for a period of three years under his 
home title in Spain, but for a shorter period in connection with actitivities in Spanish 
law. The interview shall have the object of verifying the effective and regular 
nature of the activities undertaken. After the interview, all the relevant information, 
i.e., the dossiers treated by the relevant lawyer, and his knowledge and experience 
with Spanish law (including participation in courses and seminars) will be examined. 
After that, the Colegio will make its final decision either to allow or to refuse the 
integration of the lawyer concerned.1073 In any case, the Colegio will give reasons 
for the decision taken, and the legal remedies available for Abogados finding them-
selves in similar circumstances will also apply to lawyers established under their 
home title in Spain applying for integration into the Spanish legal profession.1074 
The effects of the decision taken by the Colegio are laid down in Article 20 of the 
Real Decreto. In the case of a refusal to integrate the lawyer established under his 
home title into the profession of the Abogado the lawyer may still continue the 
pursuit of establishing his professional activities in Spain under his home country 
professional title. He may also attempt to integrate into the profession of Abogado 
by means of an aptitude test.1075 Where the Colegio decides to permit the lawyer 
concerned to integrate into the profession of Abogado, the lawyer may proceed to 
take the necessary steps in order to finalise his inscription with the Colegio. To this 
end the Colegio will stipulate conditions in accordance with Articles 5 and 6 (which 
may include inscription fees) of the Real Decreto in order to finalise the inscription 
of the new Abogado.1076 After he has been inscribed the lawyer concerned will be a 
fully-fledged Abogado, but he may continue to use his home country professional 
title alongside the title of Abogado.1077 Any decision taken by the Colegio will be com-
municated within a period of fifteen days to the competent authority of the home 
Member State, the General Council of Spanish Abogados and the Ministry of 
Justice.1078 The same holds true for finalised inscriptions of those lawyers who are 
allowed to integrate into the profession of lawyer without having to take the 
aptitude test.1079 All the organs taking part in the procedures set forth in the Real 
Decreto shall assure the confidentiality of all the information concerned.1080 The 
applicant lawyer may ask for the return of any documents he has provided to the 
Colegio at any point in time.1081 
 
Portugal 
The implementation of Directive 98/5/EC in Portugal was introduced by Lei 80/ 
2001 de 20 de Julho, which brought a change to the Advogado law. Article 196 of 
the Advogado law lays down the scope of application of Chapter V of the same law, 
                                                  
1073 Article 19(1c) Real Decreto 936/2001. 
1074 Article 19(2) Real Decreto 936/2001. 
1075 Article 20(1) Real Decreto 936/2001.  
1076  Clearly this may be problematic in the event that the Colegio decides to impose measures that 
can be classed as restrictions that might fall in either of the three categories identified above. 
1077 Article 20(2) Real Decreto 936/2001. 
1078 Article 21(1) Real Decreto 936/2001. 
1079 Article 21(2) Real Decreto 936/2001. 
1080 Article 22(1) Real Decreto 936/2001. 
1081 Article 22(2) Real Decreto 936/2001. 
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which is of concern to lawyers from other Member States of the European Union. 
The Article enumerates the legal professions of the 25 Member States and states that 
members of these legal professions will be allowed to exercise the professional activities 
of an advogado under the terms laid down in the remainder of the chapter.1082 
There are three ways for lawyers from other Member States to exercise professional 
activities. First of all, a lawyer from another Member State of the European Union 
may exercise professional activities under his home country professional title. This 
title must be used in the language of the home Member State and must be accom-
panied by an indication of the professional authority by whose virtue the lawyer is 
allowed to practise in his home Member State.1083 It is clear that this is the estab-
lishment under home title laid down in Article 2 of Directive 98/5/EC. Lawyers 
exercising their professional activity under their home title are obliged to cooperate 
with an advogado if the exercise of their professional activities entails the represen-
tation of clients in Portuguese courts.1084 This provision is an implementation of 
both Article 5(3) of Directive 98/5/EC and Article 5 of Directive 77/249/EEC. 
Finally, Article 197 states that lawyers from other Member States of the European 
Union may exercise professional activities under the professional title of advogado 
when they have been admitted to the Ordem dos Advogados.1085 Admission to the 
Ordem will be enlarged upon later on in this paragraph. 
Article 198 of the Advogado law elaborates on the exercise of professional activities 
under home country professional title. The Article states that lawyers from other 
Member States of the European Union are free to provide legal services in Por-
tugal.1086 There is one requirement which does not, however, influence the right 
to provide services, and that is that the Ordem dos Advogados shall be informed of 
any services which are to be provided. The second paragraph of Article 198 of the 
Advogado law deals with permanent establishment under home title in Portugal. 
The paragraph requires lawyers who seek to exercise professional activities in Por-
tugal to register with the Ordem dos Advogados before they are allowed to exercise 
any such activity.1087 According to paragraph 3, registration can be obtained on the 
basis of the Regulamento de Registo e Inscrição des Advogados de Outros Estados Membros 
de União Europeia.1088 More specifically a lawyer seeking establishment must pro-
duce proof of the fact that he is allowed to practise as a lawyer in his home Member 
State, and he must prove that his licence to practise has not been revoked due to 
any convictions in criminal or disciplinary matters.1089 These documents may also be 
                                                  
1082 Article 196 Advogado law. 
1083 Article 197 (1) Advogado law. 
1084 Article 197 (2) Advogado law. 
1085 Article 197 (3) Advogado law. 
1086 Article 198 (1) Advogado law. 
1087 Article 198 (2) Advogado law. 
1088  Regulamento de Registo e Inscrição dos Advogados Provenientes de Outros Estados Membros 
da União Europeia, 07-05-2002 via <www.oa.pt>, last accessed 25 April 2005. It is interesting 
to note that Article 3(d) of the Regulamento requires a permanent establishment in Portugal. 
It is unclear whether this also entails a residence requirement, which is prohibited under Euro-
pean law, see Case C-145/99 . 
1089 Article 198 (3) Advogado law. 
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required from a lawyer who provides services on an occasional basis.1090 As of 2006, 
82 lawyers were established under their home country professional title.1091 
Article 199 of the Advogado law governs the professional rules applicable to law-
yers from other Member States of the European Union who provide legal services 
in Portugal. The choice of wording in Article 199 is not very helpful, since it implies 
that the Article would only apply to the free movement of services. The text of the 
Article, however, mimics the text of Article 6 of Directive 98/5/EC. Moreover, it 
can be safely argued, based on the character of Chapter V of the Advogado law, that 
the article with regard to applicable professional rules applies to both the provision 
of services in Portugal and the establishment under home title. It states that, without 
prejudice to the professional rules applicable to the lawyer in his home Member 
State, activities of a lawyer in the host Member State will be subject to the profes-
sional rules of the host Member State.1092 The second paragraph deals with voting 
rights. According to this paragraph, lawyers from other Member States of the European 
Union established in Portugal may choose, among themselves, a representative for 
the representative body of advogados, the Congresso dos Advogados Portugueses.1093 This 
provision is a somewhat unusual implementation of Article 6(2) of Directive 98/5/ 
EC. Article 6(2) guarantees that lawyers established under their home title shall be ade-
quately represented in the governing bodies of the profession. It also states that this 
shall entail, at least, the right to vote on the governing bodies of the profession. Most 
of the Member States observed have limited their implementation of this article to 
this minimum, the right to vote. The Portuguese implementation seems to be 
more elaborate on the one hand, since a passive voting right is also included, i.e., 
one of the lawyers established in Portugal may be elected as a representative, yet on 
the other hand, it also seems to be below the standard set by Article 6(2) Directive 
98/5/EC. This may be the case since the article implies, through its wording, that 
active voting is limited to the candidate(s) who seek to become the representative 
for the lawyers established under their home country title in Portugal. 
Article 200 of the Advogado law deals with the registration of lawyers from other 
Member States of the European Union with the Ordem dos Advogados, who there-
with gain the right to exercise their profession under the title of advogado, with the 
same rights and duties as Portuguese lawyers.1094 When a lawyer from another 
Member State registers with the Ordem and therewith gains the right to practise as 
an advogado, this does not preclude him from exercising his professional activities 
under his home country professional title.1095  
Paragraph 4 of Article 200 of the Advogado law states that a lawyer established 
under his home title in Portugal may register with the Ordem dos Advogados without 
taking an aptitude test if he can prove that he has been active in a regular and effec-
tive manner for a minimum period of three years in the field of domestic Portuguese 
                                                  
1090 Article 198 (4) Advogado law. 
1091  <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 11 June 2007. 
1092 Article 199 (1) Advogado law. 
1093 Article 199 (2) Advogado law. The Congresso is established by Article 26 ff. of the Advogado 
law. 
1094 Article 200 (1) Advogado law.  
1095 Article 200 (2) Advogado law. 
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law or European Community law.1096 The last part of this paragraph is remarkable, 
to say the least, since this is the only Member State observed up to this point that 
seems willing to allow the integration of lawyers who only have experience with 
European Community law. All the other Member States have sought justification 
in the wording of Article 10(1) Directive 98/5/EC (‘...at least three years activity 
an activity in the host Member State in the law of that State including Community 
law...’) to provide that experience in European Community law alone was not 
enough to integrate into the legal profession of the host Member State without having 
to take an aptitude test. Based on the wording of Article 200(4) of the Advogado law 
it may be concluded that Portugal allows integration into the profession of advogado 
without an aptitude test based on experience with European Community law alone. 
The final paragraph of Article 200 of the Advogado law deals with exemption from 
the aptitude test without the minimum of three years’ experience as described above. 
The paragraph states that a lawyer established under his home title may integrate 
without an aptitude test and without a minimum of three years’ experience in Por-
tuguese or European Community law. Integration in by this method can take place 
if it has been established that the lawyer has enough knowledge and professional 
experience to exercise the profession of the advogado with the dignity and ability 
required from a Portuguese advogado.1097 Nothing is said about the manner in which 
a lawyer is required to demonstrate such ability, in contrast with Article 10 of 
Directive 98/5/EC which states that this takes place via an interview. As of 2006, 
two lawyers had sought integration in the profession of the abogado in Portugal.1098 
The rules in connection with disciplinary proceedings for lawyers established 
under their home country professional title in Portugal are laid down in Article 201 
of the Advogado law. The first paragraph states that lawyers established under their 
home country professional title in Portugal shall be subject to the same sanctions as 
Portuguese advogados. In addition, the paragraph mentions that the competent authority 
of the home Member State will be informed that a disciplinary proceeding will be 
started against their lawyer, and the authority will likewise be informed of the sanc-
tion applied to the lawyer established under his home country professional title.1099 
The second paragraph states that a lawyer established under his home country title 
has a separate disciplinary responsibility towards the Ordem dos Advogados and the 
competent authority in his home Member State. A communication of the latter con-
cerning a disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer who also exercises professional 
activities in Portugal shall, however, be taken into account.1100 Lawyers who have 
been suspended or struck from the Bar in their home Member State will, auto-
matically, no longer be allowed to exercise professional activities in Portugal unless 
the right to practise in the home Member State is reinstituted.1101  
The final article of Chapter V of the Advogado law deals with the practice in 
association of lawyers from other Member States of the European Union who are 
established in Portugal under their home country professional title. The first para-
                                                  
1096 Article 200 (4) Advogado law. 
1097 Article 200 (5) Advogado law. 
1098  <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 11 June 2007. 
1099 Article 201 (1) Advogado law. 
1100 Article 201 (2) Advogado law. 
1101 Article 201 (3) Advogado law. 
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graph states that lawyers who are members of a professional association in their 
home Member State may exercise professional activities under their home country 
professional title in Portugal as a branch office or agency of this professional asso-
ciation.1102 This can be done under the condition that prior notification of that fact 
is given to the Ordem dos Advogados and the professional association.1103 Registration 
of professional associations established in conformity with the internal law of other 
Member States of the European Union will be subject to verification of compatibility 
with the rules of the Advogado law and the Decreto-Lei 229/2004 de 10 de Dezembro, 
which govern the practice in association of lawyers in Portugal. In this verification 
process, specific attention will be paid to the laws protecting the interest of clients 
and third parties.1104 It is at least doubtful whether this formulation is in conformity 
with Article 11(1) of Directive 98/5/EC. The Portuguese rule implies that the pro-
fessional associations of lawyers should always be in conformity with the Portuguese 
professional rules (with special attention paid to the protection of clients and third 
parties). This is not in accordance with Article 11(1) of the Directive, since that Article 
implies that a test must be taken in order to find out whether the rules governing 
associations in the host and home Member State are incompatible with one another, 
and such a test is completely absent from the Advogado law. In addition, application 
of the host State rules can only be justified on the basis of protecting clients and 
third parties, and not on the basis of professional rules as such, with extra emphasis 
on the protection of clients and third parties, as is prescribed by Article 202(2) 
Advogado law. The third paragraph of Article 202 governs the right of lawyers to 
form associations among themselves. The paragraph states that lawyers from other 
Member States of the European Union who are established under their home 
country professional title and who are not part of a professional association in their 
home Member State, may form a professional association with other lawyers from 
their home Member State, with lawyers of other Member States or with Portu-
guese lawyers in accordance with Portuguese law.1105 Albeit minimal, this para-
graph is an adequate implementation of Article 11(2) and (3) of Directive 98/5/EC.  
The final paragraph of Article 202 governs multi-disciplinary partnerships. As 
described above, MDPs are generally not allowed in Portugal. This principle is 
reiterated by the final paragraph of Article 202. The paragraph states that lawyers 
from other Member States of the European Union established under their home 
country professional title in Portugal are not allowed to exercise professional activities 
as members of a professional association that also includes members that are not 
lawyers.1106 This rule is clearly in accordance with Article 11(5) of Directive 98/5/EC. 
There is a problem, however. Article 202(4) of the Advogado law also states that 
practice in an association that for any other reason (other than for an MDP) violates 
the Decreto-Lei 229/2004 de 10 de Dezembro and is prohibited. That is a rule that 
finds no justification under Article 11 of Directive 98/5/EC. It may be concluded 
that the Portuguese implementation of Article 11 of Directive 98/5/EC fails on a 
number of crucial points. 
                                                  
1102 Article 202 (1) Advogado law. 
1103  Ibid. 
1104 Article 202 (2) Advogado law. 
1105 Article 202 (3) Advogado law. 
1106 Article 202 (4) Advogado law. 
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§ 4.3.5 Implementation in Germany, Austria and Greece 
Germany 
Similar to the United Kingdom, the German authorities have chosen to implement 
Directive 98/5/EC by means of a separate legislative instrument, namely the Gesetz 
zur Umsetzung von Richtlinien der Europäischen Gemeinschaft auf dem Gebiet des Berufrechts 
der Rechtsanwälte (EuRAG).1107 Paragraph 1 of the EuRAG limits the personal scope 
of the law. The paragraph states that any national of a Member State of the Euro-
pean Union or the European Economic Area (i.e., Iceland, Liechtenstein and Nor-
way) who is entitled to work, on his own, as a lawyer in the respective Member 
States, will be designated as a europäische Rechtsanwalt (European lawyer) in terms of 
the application of the law. The part of the paragraph that refers to lawyers working 
on their own could lead to the belief that the law excludes those lawyers working 
in a salaried capacity or those working in joint practice, but according to the rea-
sons behind the law, this is not the case.1108 According to thereasons behind the law, 
the phrase, ‘practising on one’s own’ refers to the fact that some Member States 
allow prospective lawyers to work in association with a patron. These lawyers are 
exempt from the law. It does not matter whether one works in a salaried capacity 
or in joint practice, as long as one is allowed to practise on one’s own.1109  
In the second paragraph of the EuRAG it is laid down that a European lawyer 
may exercise all the activities that a German Rechtsanwalt may do.1110, 1111 The arti-
cle once more stresses that the person concerned must be qualified as a lawyer in 
one of the Member States.1112 According to the motivation of the law, Paragraph 2 
distinguishes the EuRAG from the old Paragraph 206 of the BRAO which allowed 
establishment under home title, but did not allow those lawyers to be involved in 
German law.1113 The European lawyer established under the EuRAG may involve 
himself with German law since Paragraph 2 of the EuRAG states that European 
lawyers may exercise the same activities as German lawyers.1114 
The means by which a European lawyer is registered is found in Paragraph 3 of 
the EuRAG. The paragraph firstly states that the decision to register somebody as a 
European lawyer lies with the Ministry of Justice of each of the Länder.1115 Further-
more, in order to be registered, the lawyer in question is required to prove that he 
                                                  
1107  Gesetz zur Umsetzung von Richtlinien der Europäischen Gemeinschaft auf dem Gebiet des 
Berufrechts der Rechtsanwälte, 9 March 2000, BGBl, 2000 I, p. 182. What is notable about 
this law is that it not only transposes Directive 98/5/EC but also Directives 89/48/EEC and 
77/249/EEC. 
1108  Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Umsetzung von Richtlinien der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft auf dem Gebiet des Berufrechts der Rechtsanwälte, 1 December 1999, Drucksache 
14/2269, p. 22. 
1109  Ibid. 
1110  § 2(1) EuRAG. 
1111  See Klein (2002), pp. 23-25. 
1112  § 2(2) EuRAG. 
1113  The new § 206 BRAO covers Member States of the WTO, that are not EU Member States. 
1114  Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Umsetzung von Richtlinien der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft auf dem Gebiet des Berufrechts der Rechtsanwälte, 1 December 1999, Drucksache 
14/2269, p. 23. 
1115  § 3(1) EuRAG. 
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is a national of a Member State of the European Union or the European Economic 
Area. In addition, he needs to produce a certificate which states that he is a fully 
qualified lawyer in one of the Member States of the aforementioned organisations.1116 
The authorities may require that this certificate shall have been issued no more than 
three months previously. The last part of the paragraph states that all the information 
should be given in German, or where this is not possible, be accompanied with a 
German translation.1117 Paragraph 4 states that for the admission procedure, the 
relevant paragraphs of the BRAO are applicable.1118 With the declaration that these 
paragraphs are applicable, the EuRAG is in accordance with Article 9 of Directive 
98/5/EC which lays down the obligation for Member States to give European law-
yers a right to appeal to a court on the basis of decisions taken by the competent 
authorities.1119 What is strange, however, is not that neither the EuRAG nor the 
BRAO impose any time limit on the competent authorities to decide upon the 
applications of the European lawyers. In theory, this could mean that a European 
lawyer could de facto be denied registration just because of the fact that the competent 
authorities may take as long as they like to make a decision. Paragraph 4 states further 
that, in addition to the reasons laid down in the BRAO, a European lawyer can also 
be denied registration, or his existing registration can be revoked, when his capacity 
to practise in his home Member State ceases because his licence had been revoked, 
either temporarily or permanently.1120 Lastly, the paragraph states that the German 
competent authorities shall inform the competent authorities of the home Member 
State of all the decisions taken by them.1121 
The fifth paragraph states that the European lawyer must use the professional 
title of the Member State in which he gained his professional qualifications. If the 
title in that Member State is Rechtsanwalt,1122 then the lawyer is obliged to mention 
the professional organisation of the home Member State that allowed the lawyer to 
practise in order to avoid confusion.1123 In addition to his home title, a European 
lawyer may also use the designation Mitglied des Rechtsanwaltskammer (member of the 
Rechtsanwalt, the chamber), but he may not use the designation europäischer Rechts-
anwalt (European lawyer).1124 When the registration of a European lawyer is revoked 
under the previous paragraph, the lawyer is no longer entitled to use his home title.1125 
                                                  
1116  § 3(2) EuRAG. 
1117  § 3(3) EuRAG. It may be clear that this language requirement falls under the definition of a 
measure with equivalent effect given by the European Court of Justice in the Dassonville case 
and therefore, when applied, it must be objectively justified in the light of the Gebhard case. 
1118  § 4(1) EuRAG. The relevant paragraphs of the BRAO are paragraphs 4 to 17, without the 
exceptions mentioned in paragraph 4(1) EuRAG. 
1119  Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Umsetzung von Richtlinien der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft auf dem Gebiet des Berufrechts der Rechtsanwälte, 1 December 1999, Drucksache 
14/2269, p. 25. 
1120  § 4(2) EuRAG. 
1121  § 4(3) EuRAG. 
1122  As is the case in Austria, Belgium, Italy and Liechtenstein. 
1123  § 5(1) EuRAG. 
1124  § 5(2) EuRAG. 
1125  § 5(3) EuRAG. A European lawyer who is refused registration or whose registration is revoked 
thus may not profit from § 206 BRAO. That leads one to believe that § 206 BRAO only applies 
to the Member States of the WTO that are not simultaneously Member States of the European 
Union, although this is not mentioned explicitly in the paragraph.  
218 
Paragraph 6 of the EuRAG declares that when a European lawyer is registered 
with the Rechtsanwaltskammer the third, fourth, sixth, seventh, ninth, tenth, eleventh, 
and thirteenth part of the BRAO apply to the European lawyer.1126 According to 
the motivation, the EuRAG herewith implements Sections 1 and 2 of Article 6 of 
Directive 98/5/EC (dealing with the applicable professional rules and the represen-
tation in the professional bodies), Article 7 (dealing with disciplinary proceedings), 
Article 8 (dealing with salaried lawyers), Article 9 (dealing with the right of appeal 
for a lawyer against decisions taken) and parts of Article 11 (dealing with joint 
practice).1127 Without going into too much detail, the effect of this paragraph is that 
everywhere the Directive so requires, European lawyers are treated in the same 
manner as national lawyers and thus the relevant parts of the BRAO are applicable. 
In Paragraph 2 of the EuRAG it was stated that a European lawyer may exercise 
any activity a German lawyer is entitled to do. In this paragraph, it becomes clear 
that this is not entirely true, since the eighth part of the BRAO is not applicable. 
That part of the BRAO deals with a special category of Rechtsanwälte, namely those 
entitled to practise before the Bundesgerichtshof (the German Supreme Court). That 
effectively means that European lawyers are not entitled to practise before the Bundes-
gerichtshof.1128 Furthermore, Paragraph 6 states that, on an annual basis, a European 
lawyer must provide the German competent authority with a certificate that certifies 
that he is still allowed to practise in his home Member State.1129 An identical require-
ment was held as violating the Directive by the ECJ in two cases which involved 
Luxembourg’s implementation.1130 As a consequence, it might be concluded that 
this requirement violates the Directive. The paragraph states further that any decisions 
with regard to professional conduct and any violations thereof, and convictions flow-
ing therefrom, shall be effectuated on a federal level.1131 Following such a conviction, 
the European lawyer will lose his membership of the Rechtsanwaltskammer.1132 
Lastly, Paragraph 6 once more states that a European lawyer must cease his activities 
in Germany when his licence in his home Member State is revoked, temporarily or 
permanently.1133 
Paragraph 7 deals with obligatory professional indemnity insurance. In Germany, 
every Rechtsanwalt must have such insurance under Paragraph 51 of the BRAO. 
European lawyers are exempt from this obligation if they can prove that they have 
a similar insurance in their home Member State (the evidentiary documentation 
must be in German, or accompanied by a translation). Discrepancies that might occur 
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are solved with clauses providing for additional insurance.1134 The paragraph also 
states that the European lawyer must supply proof of insurance once a year. Non-
fulfilment of this requirement will lead to revocation of the European lawyer’s 
registration.1135 
The problems faced by a lawyer who is engaged in joint practice in his home 
Member State are addressed in Paragraph 8.1136 Firstly, the paragraph states that if a 
European lawyer is part of a joint practice in his home Member State, he must make 
this known to the German competent authority. He must also provide information 
regarding the legal form and the composition of the joint practice.1137 Furthermore, 
the paragraph states that the fact that the European lawyer is part of a joint practice 
in his home Member State only limits his professional indemnity to such an extent 
as is allowed by the relevant paragraph of the BRAO.1138 Lastly, Paragraph 8 allows 
the European lawyer to mention his membership of the joint practice in his pro-
fessional life, as long as he also mentions the legal form in which this joint practice 
is conducted.1139 
Paragraph 9 deals with disciplinary proceedings. Firstly, the paragraph states that 
the Staatsanwalt (public prosecutor) shall inform the competent authority of the 
home Member State if he intends to prosecute a European lawyer.1140 Secondly, 
the paragraph lays down the obligation for the competent authorities of the home 
and the host Member State to communicate between them and with the court that 
deals with the proceedings.1141 The paragraph also lays down rules for the protection 
of information that is of a sensitive and private nature.1142 Lastly, the paragraph 
states that the competent authority of the home Member State has standing before 
the court that deals with the proceedings, and that it will be possible for the com-
petent authority of the home Member State to give its opinion on the matter.1143 
Paragraph 10 deals with procedural rules which must be followed when notifying 
the European lawyer of any disciplinary proceedings brought against him.1144 
The third part of the EuRAG (§§ 11 to 15) deals with the European lawyer’s 
access to the profession of the Rechtsanwalt. Paragraph 11 states that where a Euro-
pean lawyer has been effectively and regularly engaged for a period of at least three 
years in the law of Germany, including Community law, he will be given access to 
the profession of the Rechtsanwalt. In addition, the paragraph states that ‘effectively 
and regularly’ means the exercise of the profession with no other disruptions other 
than those stemming from everyday life.1145 This last element is elaborated on further 
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in the second section of the paragraph, which states that interruptions arising from 
everyday life can generally be no longer than three weeks. If interruptions exceed 
three weeks, then the competent authority will take its decision based on the par-
ticular facts of the case.1146 If the competent authority decides that the interruption 
falls outside those present in everyday life, then the period before the interruption 
will be taken into account as long as this does not conflict with the effective and 
regular pursuit of the profession.1147 Paragraph 12 lays down the means by which 
the European lawyer must prove that he falls into the situation described by Para-
graph 11. Firstly, the Paragraph states that a European lawyer must provide the 
competent authority with the number and nature of cases he has dealt with that 
have been connected to German law, together with proof of the duration of his 
activities. The competent authority can ask for oral clarification of these materials.1148 
In addition to this, the second section states that with respect to the cases dealing 
with German law, the European lawyer needs to supply lists of cases he or she has 
dealt with, with details regarding the case number, the subject matter, the time 
elapsed when dealing with the case, nature and size of the activities of the lawyer, and 
the outcome of the case. Moreover, the competent authority may require samples 
of the lawyer’s work, which should be made anonymous with regard to the pro-
tection of the parties involved.1149 What is remarkable in this paragraph is that no 
further reference is made to activities pursued in European law. It was mentioned 
in Paragraph 11, but merely as a direct translation of the relevant part of Article 10 
of Directive 98/5/EC. It seems to me that the German authorities have implemented 
Article 10 to its minimum, but in terms of any further action, they would like to 
discourage European law, since no further mention is made of that possibility. It is 
also remarkable that, again, no reference is made to a set time limit within which 
the competent authority must take its decision. This could lead to the de facto ex-
clusion of persons through default in making a decision, which would be a violation 
of Community law. Paragraph 13 states that a European lawyer, who has been active 
in the field of German law for a period shorter than three years, may be admitted to 
the profession of the Rechtsanwalt if he can convince the competent authority that he 
is competent to be a part of that profession.1150 When deciding on this, the compe-
tent authority will take into account all the activities pursued by the lawyer as well 
as his knowledge of German law, and his attendance at courses and lectures of 
which the subject matter was German law.1151 Paragraph 14 states that the European 
lawyer concerned must deliver the same proof as a lawyer who seeks entrance to 
the profession under Paragraph 11.1152 In Paragraph 15, it is laid down that the 
competent authority of Germany will establish in an interview whether the European 
lawyer has been pursuing activities in German law in a regular and effective manner, 
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and whether or not he is capable of further pursuing these activities. The contents 
of the interview will consist of the lawyer’s experiences with German law.1153 
 
Austria 
Similar to Germany, the Austrian authorities have chosen to take all the Directives 
regarding lawyers together and combine it into one separate law. This law is called 
Bundesgesetz über den freien Dienstleistungsverkehr und Niederlassung von europäischen 
Rechtsanwälten in Österreich (hereinafter EuRAG).1154 Although the acronym for the 
law is the same as that for the German law, the laws have little further in common 
besides the fact that they both implement, among other things, Directive 98/5/EC.  
The first chapter of the third part of the EuRAG (Paragraphs 9 to 17) deals with 
the establishment of lawyers under their home title. Paragraph 9 of the EuRAG states 
that European lawyers are allowed to establish themselves under their home title in 
Austria, albeit under the requirement that the European lawyer is registered with 
the competent authorities of Austria. Once he is registered, he is allowed to exercise 
all the activities that may be exercised by an Austrian Rechtsanwalt, except for those 
activities explicitly prohibited by the EuRAG.1155 As of 2006, 70 lawyers were 
established under their home title in Austria.1156 
The manner in which a European lawyer can become registered in Austria is laid 
down in Paragraph 10 of the EuRAG. That paragraph states that a lawyer wishing 
to establish himself in Austria must send his application to the relevant Austrian 
Rechtsanwaltskammer (similar to Germany, Austria is a federation consisting of different 
Länder).1157 In the application, the prospective European lawyer must supply proof 
that he or she is a national of a Member State of the European Union or a national 
of a Member State of the European Economic Area. In addition, he must present a 
certificate stating that he is allowed to practise in his home Member State, issued 
within a period of three months prior to the application to the Rechtsanwaltskammer. 
Finally, he must supply proof that he is insured in the manner prescribed by the 
EuRAG.1158 Similar to the German rules, all documentation must be produced in 
the German language, or where this is not possible, accompanied with a certified 
German translation.1159 Paragraph 11 states that if the European lawyer fulfils the 
above criteria he must be registered as a European lawyer in Austria. The paragraph 
states also that European lawyers will not be tested on their trustworthiness, an 
element that forms part of the rules of access to the legal profession for Austrians 
laid down in Paragraph 5 of the Rechtsanwaltsordnung.1160 If the competent authorities 
refuse to enter the prospective lawyer into the registers as a European lawyer, Para-
graph 11 states that the same remedies are available to him as are available to Austrian 
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lawyers under Paragraph 5a of the Rechtsanwaltsordnung.1161 The competent authority 
of Austria will inform the competent authority of the home Member State of any 
decision regarding registration as a European lawyer,1162 while the registration of 
the European lawyer must also be made known in conformity with the rules of 
Paragraph 5(5) of the Rechtsanwaltsordnung.1163 
European lawyers must use their home title when practising in Austria. This is 
laid down in Paragraph 12. Lawyers who are entitled to use the title of Rechtsanwalt 
in their home Member State are obliged to mention the professional authority of 
the home Member State that allows them to practise under that title.1164 
Paragraph 13 lays down the professional activities a European lawyer may pursue. 
The paragraph states that a European lawyer may, in principle, pursue any activities 
that an Austrian lawyer is allowed to pursue, except for three fields of activity that 
are not open to European lawyers.1165 First of all, European lawyers are not allowed 
to be chosen as members of representative bodies of the profession. Secondly, Euro-
pean lawyers are not allowed to educate prospective Austrian lawyers in their Rechts-
anwaltsanwärter period. Thirdly, they may not act as a lawyer in legal aid schemes, 
and they are not eligible for the compensation that Austrian lawyers receive when 
they work in a legal aid scheme.1166 With regard to the first limitation, it can be 
argued that this is in conformity with Directive 98/5/EC, since the Directive states 
that lawyers established under their home title must at least have the opportunity to 
vote in the elections of the competent authorities’ governing bodies.1167 On the 
other hand, however, it seems doubtful whether the strict prohibition on standing 
as candidates in the elections of those bodies, as mentioned in the EuRAG, is enough 
to guarantee the appropriate representation that the Directive requires. Similar, and 
even stronger, observations hold true for the second and third limitations. The 
limitations regarding the activities a European lawyer may pursue are mentioned 
exclusively in Article 5 of Directive 98/5/EC.1168 The Article, however, makes no 
mention of a prohibition on educating prospective lawyers and activities within 
legal aid schemes because of the lack of knowledge with respect to Austrian law,1169 
the second and third limitation under the EuRAG. This leads to the belief that these 
limitations are contrary to the Directive, and therewith contrary to Community 
law. This is corroborated by the rulings of the European Court of Justice which dealt 
with Luxembourg’s implementation of Directive 98/5/EC, where it was stated 
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that the limitations in connection with professional activity, listed in Article 5 of 
the Directive, are exhaustive.1170  
Paragraph 14 lays down a further limitation on the activities of European lawyers, 
but this time a limitation sanctioned by Directive 98/5/EC, namely the fact that in 
proceedings before a national court a European lawyer is obliged to be accompanied 
by an Austrian lawyer.1171 This limitation is a direct translation of Article 5(3) of 
Directive 98/5/EC. 
In Paragraph 15 it is laid down that European lawyers in principle are obliged 
to have Austrian professional indemnity insurance unless they can prove to the 
Austrian competent authorities that they have professional indemnity insurance in 
their home Member State that is equal to the Austrian insurance, which also covers 
their activities in Austria.1172 In addition to that, European lawyers who keep their 
insurance in their home Member State must instruct their insurer to inform the 
Austrian competent authority of their insurance.1173 
In Paragraph 16, the EuRAG deals with the situation of lawyers who are part of 
a joint practice in their home Member State. European lawyers who are part of a 
joint practice in their home Member State must inform the Rechtsanwaltskammer of 
that fact, and they must inform the Rechtsanwaltskammer of the name and legal form 
of that joint practice and any other information that the Rechtsanwaltskammer might 
require.1174 When European lawyers want to exercise their professional activities 
within the context of the joint practice, they are allowed to do so as long as they 
mention the name of the practice and the legal form of that practice in the exercise 
of their professional activities.1175 Notice that this article only deals with the member-
ship of a foreign joint practice. Membership and rules of Austrian joint practices are 
dealt with in the Rechtsanwaltsordnung.1176 This leads to the belief that Austria has 
not implemented the objective justification test with regard to applicable professional 
rules that is included in Article 11(1) of the Directive, which constitutes yet another 
potential breach of that Directive. 
Paragraph 17 states that European lawyers are subject to the same disciplinary 
controls as Austrian lawyers.1177 The Austrian competent authorities may only issue 
disciplinary measures within the Austrian jurisdiction, i.e., the Austrian competent 
authorities cannot issue measures that have effect outside of Austria.1178 In case of the 
commencement of proceedings against a European lawyer in Austria, the compe-
tent authorities shall inform the competent authorities of the home Member State. 
In this case, the latter has the possibility to intervene in the procedure.1179 When a 
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European lawyer is withdrawn from the register in his home Member State this 
automatically means that he is no longer allowed to practise in Austria.1180 
The second chapter of the third part of the EuRAG deals with the integration 
of a European lawyer into the profession of the Rechtsanwalt. It must be mentioned 
that the integration dealt with in this chapter is the integration meant by Article 10 
of Directive 98/5/EC. The integration of a lawyer into the profession of the Rechts-
anwalt as meant by Directive 89/48/EEC is dealt with in the third chapter of the 
third part of the EuRAG. Paragraph 18 states that where a lawyer has pursued 
activities in Austria as a European lawyer in the field of Austrian law, including Euro-
pean Community law, for at least three years in an effective and regular manner,1181 
he will be registered as an Austrian Rechtsanwalt.1182 In addition to that, the para-
graph states further that the Rechtsanwaltskammer involved will assess any lacunae in 
professional activity and they will decide as they fit in the particular circumstances 
of the case.1183 The way in which a European lawyer must prove that he has been 
pursuing activities involving Austrian law effectively and regularly is laid down in 
Paragraph 19 of the EuRAG. The paragraph states that a European lawyer who 
wants to integrate into the Austrian profession of the Rechtsanwalt must provide the 
relevant Rechtsanwaltskammer with the number, subject and result of all the cases he 
has dealt with in Austrian law, and he must prove the duration of his professional 
activities. The Rechtsanwaltskammer can require the European lawyer to elaborate, 
either orally or in writing, on the evidence produced.1184 The paragraph states further 
that the evidence in connection to the cases which the lawyer has dealt with must 
be produced in the form of a list of cases accompanied with case numbers, subject 
matter of the case, duration, etc. Moreover, the Rechtsanwaltskammer may require 
examples of the lawyer’s work, such as pleadings which have been made anony-
mous in order to protect the lawyer’s clients.1185 Furthermore, the paragraph states 
that all the evidence should be produced in the German language or be accom-
panied with a German translation.1186  
Since the Austrian implementation of this part of the Directive 98/5/EC is very 
similar to its German counterpart, the same can be said for the Austrian imple-
mentation. The reference to European Community law in the paragraph of the 
EuRAG is very basic and in the further text of the paragraph no further reference is 
made to experience gained in this field of law. In the reasoning of this paragraph, 
the Austrian Government stated that the experience gained should replace the 
professional education Austrian candidates receive and could therefore never consist 
purely of experience gained in European law.1187 Although that argument seems 
reasonable, it is in no way supported by the Directive, so this is another element of 
the EuRAG that seems contradictory to the Directive. Questions remain on how 
the Rechtsanwaltskammers are to assess the experience which has been gained in that 
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field. Furthermore, the paragraph makes no reference at all to the time limit within 
which a decision on a request must be made. To this date, no requests have been 
made for integration.1188 Paragraph 20 deals with the situation where the European 
lawyer has been regularly and effectively pursuing activities in Austria for at least 
three years, but for a shorter period of time in Austrian law. Lawyers in this 
situation are eligible for integration into the profession of the Rechtsanwalt without 
taking an aptitude test under the system of Directive 89/48/EEC, if they can prove 
that they are able to exercise this profession successfully.1189 In addition to the docu-
mentary evidence that must be supplied with an application for integration into the 
profession of the Rechtsanwalt under the previous paragraph, the Rechtsanwaltskammer 
will interview the candidate in order to ascertain whether he or she has been active 
in Austrian law and whether he or she is therefore able to continue this activity in a 
proper manner. The contents of the interview will concentrate on the practical 
experience the candidate has with Austrian law.1190 In its final decision, the Rechts-
anwaltskammer must take into account all experiences in Austrian law that the can-
didate has gained, including his or her attendance at courses and seminars on Austrian 
law or disciplinary rules for lawyers.1191  
In addition to the two systems of integration for lawyers into the profession of 
the Rechtsanwalt, Paragraph 21 states that, in accordance with Directive 98/5/EC, a 
European lawyer can at any time request to take an aptitude test under the system 
of Directive 89/48/EEC. Upon successful completion of this test, a lawyer will be 
integrated into the profession of the Rechtsanwalt.1192 Paragraph 22 states that with 
regard to the protection of the lawyer requesting to be integrated, all the rules with 
regard to appeals, etc., laid down in Paragraph 5a of the Rechtsanwaltsordnung are 
applicable to requests to be integrated into the profession of the Rechstanwalt.1193 
Lastly, Paragraph 23 states that when a lawyer is integrated into the profession of 
the Rechtsanwalt he is entitled to use that title in addition to his home title which he 
also may continue to use.1194 
 
Greece 
The Directive was implemented in Greece by means of a Presidential Decree.1195 
The Presidential Decree stands on its own and does not affect the Kodex Dikigoros. 
The Presidential Decree has as its object the facilitation of the exercise of professional 
activities by lawyers who have gained their professional qualifications in other Member 
States of the European Union, either in an independent or salaried fashion.1196 All 
the persons who bear the professional titles mentioned in Article 2 of the Presiden-
tial Decree, which coincide with the titles laid down in Article 1(2) of Directive 
98/5/EC, have the right to establish themselves under their home country profes-
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sional title.1197 The Presidential Decree does not apply to lawyers who seek to per-
form services in Greece. There are also specific rules for lawyers who are in salaried 
practice. These rules will be dealt with later on in this paragraph.1198 
In order to become established under home title, a lawyer from another Member 
State of the European Union first needs to register with the Greek authorities. He 
must register with the Bar Association of the district in which he exercises his 
professional activity and where he has an office.1199 In order to obtain that regis-
tration, a lawyer must provide the Bar Association with a document stating that he 
is has the nationality1200 of one of the Member States of the European Union, an 
extract from his criminal record,1201 a certificate of registration with the competent 
authority of the home Member State which must at least include an indication of 
the purpose for which the certificate is issued and, where appropriate, must make 
mention of any disciplinary proceedings against the lawyer, the nature of the dis-
ciplinary proceedings and the sanctions imposed by the competent authority of the 
home Member State. The certificate must have been issued within three months of 
the date it is presented to the Greek Bar Association where registration is sought.1202  
Whenever a registration is refused, or where an existing registration is removed, 
the lawyer concerned shall have legal recourse before the Council of State in 
Greece.1203 The competent authority in Greece shall inform the competent authority 
of the home Member State of any decision taken either to register or not, the lawyer 
who seeks to establish himself under home title in Greece.1204 Every Bar Association 
in Greece must keep a separate register of those lawyers who are established under 
their home country professional title in Greece.1205 As of 2006, 79 lawyers are 
established under their home country professional title in Greece.1206 Article 4 of 
the Presidential Decree states that a lawyer who is established under his home title 
may, on a permanent basis, exercise the professional activities that are specified in 
Article 7 of the Presidential Decree, and which will be dealt with later on in that 
chapter.1207 Article 6 of the Presidential Decree governs the use of professional title 
by lawyers who are established under their home country professional title. Any 
lawyer who is established within the frame of the Presidential Decree must use 
their home country professional title in its official language, or one of the official 
languages of the home Member State.1208 Additionally, every individual Bar Asso-
ciation in Greece may require a lawyer established under his home country profes-
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sional title to indicate the name of the professional organisation by virtue of which 
the lawyer is allowed to practise in his home Member State. He must also make 
mention of his registration with the Greek Bar Association.1209 
Article 7 lays down the rules in connection with the professional activities a 
lawyer who is established under his home country professional title may pursue in 
Greece. The general rule is laid down in subsection 1 and states that lawyers estab-
lished under their home State professional titles may employ the same activities as 
Dikigoros. More specifically, the lawyer may give legal advice on relevant questions 
of Greek law, Community law, International law and the law of his home Member 
State. He may also carry out acts and operations sanctioned by the rules in force in 
Greece.1210 With regard to the representation of clients in court, the second sub-
paragraph requires lawyers who are established under their home country professional 
title to cooperate with a Dikigoros who is allowed to practise in the district where the 
lawyer is established.1211 The third subsection states that any activity employed by a 
lawyer established under his home country professional title shall be subject to the 
professional rules in force in Greece.1212  
Finally, Article 7 of the Presidential Decree provides that a lawyer who is established 
under his home country professional title, unless he has Greek nationality, may not 
exercise activities that entail the exercise of public authority in Greece. Subsection 
4 gives a number of examples of activities that may not be exercised by lawyers 
established under their home country professional title. Examples include; being a 
member of a supervisory commission during elections, functioning as a liquidator 
or an administrator in cases of succession or bankruptcy, preparing certified docu-
ments, or partaking in a court.1213 This subsection provides some interesting material. 
Although not sanctioned by the Directive itself, apart from Article 5(2) of Directive 
98/5/EC, I am of the opinion that the Greek implementation is not necessarily in 
breach of the Directive. The general public service exception, laid down in Article 
45 of the EC Treaty, prevails over secondary legislation. Aspects of the legal pro-
fession that are unreconcilable with the fact that they can be exercised by people who 
do not have Greek nationality, can, therefore, still be brought under the public 
service exception of Article 45 of the EC Treaty. Whether or not the exception of 
subsection 4 applies depends on the nationality of the lawyer. A lawyer who is estab-
lished under his home country title, but who has Greek nationality, is allowed to 
exercise the activities mentioned in subparagraph 4. This makes it clear that it is not 
the fact that the person is not a Dikigoros but the fact that a person does not have 
Greek nationality that makes the exception of subsection 4 apply. The provision, 
therefore, does not undermine the underlying principle of mutual recognition of 
lawyers, and is therefore acceptable, as long as the criteria laid down in case law for 
the application of the public service exception are respected.1214 On the other hand, 
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this entails that persons without Greek nationality who integrate into the profession 
of the Dikigoros also may not carry out these activities. Evidence of this in Greece has 
not been found while researching this chapter. If a non-Greek Dikigoros is allowed 
to exercise the activities that have been banned for lawyers working under their 
home country professional title, a violation of the rules laid down in the Directive 
may occur. Above all, the Greek authorities may not unilaterally impose this ex-
ception. If an inconsistency between two European rules is found, which might be 
the case in this instance, it is for the European Court of Justice to rule on the issue. 
A Greek court must therefore ask for a preliminary ruling in order to solve this 
question. Since that has not yet happened, it must be concluded that this rule is 
contrary to Article 5 of the Directive. Moreover, the European Court of Justice has 
ruled that the limitations on professional activities laid down in Article 5 of 
Directive 98/5/EC are exhaustive.1215 
Article 8 of the Presidential Decree lays down the rules on professional conduct 
that are applicable to lawyers who are established under their home country profes-
sional title in Greece. Subsection 1 states that, irrespective of the rules of professional 
conduct which are applicable in his home Member State, a lawyer established under 
his home country professional title is subject to the rules of professional conduct in 
force in Greece in respect of all the activities he pursues within Greek territory. 
Moreover subsection 1 states that the lawyer shall be subject to the obligations 
flowing from the Kodex Dikigoron, the Code of Deontology, and the internal regu-
lations of the Bar Association where he is established. He is also obliged to respect 
the rules governing the exercise of the legal profession, most notably those con-
cerning incompatibilities, the exercise of activities that do not form part of the legal 
profession, professional secrecy, publicity, professional dignity and the good exercise 
of the profession.1216 When a lawyer is registered with a Bar Association in Greece, 
he will be deemed to be a member of the Bar Association, he will take part in the 
meetings of that Bar Association and he will have a right to vote in the adminis-
trating Council of the Bar, in conformity with the rules laid down in the Kodex 
Dikigoron.1217 A lawyer who is established under his home country professional title 
is obliged to hold professional indemnity insurance, which means that he must 
affiliate himself with a professional guarantee fund, in accordance with the rules laid 
down in Greece. A lawyer will be exempted from this rule if it is established that 
he takes part in insurance or a guarantee fund that is similar to that prescribed in 
Greece. Where the similarity is only partial, the administrative Council of the Bar 
Association may prescribe additional insurance or guarantee fund in order to cover 
                                                  
establishment (Article 55 does the same for the freedom to provide services). On the subject 
see Craig & de Burca (2007), pp. 764-770. At this point, it must also be mentioned that the 
application of this stricter regime, i.e., excluding free movement by upholding a nationality 
requirement, is not static. Recently the European Commission has initiated legal proceedings 
on the basis of Article 226 EC against 16 Member States that apply the Article 45 EC 
exception to the profession of notary. See Press Release IP/06/1385, 12 October 2006, via 
<europa.eu.>, last accessed 1 June 2007.  
1215  Cases C-193/05, Commission of the European Communities v. Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg, [2006] 
ECR, I-08673 and C-506/04, Graham J. Wilson v. Ordre des avocats du barreau de Luxembourg, [2006] 
ECR, I-08613. 
1216 Article 8(1) Presidential Decree. 
1217 Article 8(2) Presidential Decree. 
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the elements that are not covered by the insurance or guarantee fund in the home 
Member State.1218 The lawyer who is established under his home country profes-
sional title in Greece must also obtain obligatory membership to the lawyer’s fund, 
mutual assistance insurance for lawyers, and health insurance for lawyers.1219 It is 
interesting to note the casual way in which these obligations are entered at the end of 
the Article, which happens to be almost a literal translation of Article 6 of Directive 
98/5/EC, without there being any basis in the Directive for any of these obliga-
tions. It might well be the case that these obligations can be construed as restrictions 
to the free movement of persons for certain individuals, and therefore may need to 
be objectively justified in such cases in order to avoid a violation of the rules 
regarding the free movement of persons. 
The first paragraph of Article 9 states that a lawyer who does not exercise his 
professional activities according to the professional rules of conduct in force in 
Greece shall be considered to have committed a disciplinary fault. To this disciplinary 
fault, the rules in the Kodex Dikigoron concerning disciplinary proceedings shall be 
applicable. The competent authority shall be the disciplinary Council of the Bar 
Association with which the lawyer is registered.1220 Before disciplinary proceedings 
are initiated, and throughout the course of the disciplinary proceedings, the com-
petent authority of the host Member State is required to cooperate with the com-
petent authority of the home Member State. To that end, the Greek competent 
authority shall inform the competent authority of the home Member State without 
delay and in a confidential matter of the intention to open proceedings, and during 
proceedings it shall inform the competent authority of the home Member State of 
all the relevant details in connection to the case.1221 Where the competent authority 
of the home Member State, either temporarily or permanently, revokes the right of 
a lawyer who is established under his home country title in Greece to practise in his 
home Member State, then his right to practise in Greece shall also be automatically 
revoked. Within a month of receiving a sanction notification imposed on the lawyer 
in his home Member State and the relevant file on the lawyer, the president of the 
Bar Association concerned shall transmit the decision to the disciplinary Council of 
the Bar Association, which shall publish the decision and therewith impose the 
sanction on the lawyer established in Greece.1222 
In principle, a lawyer who is established under his home country title may exer-
cise his professional activity in a salaried manner. To that end he may be employed 
with a public or a private legal entity, a public or a private undertaking, or an asso-
ciation of lawyers (subject to the provisions regarding practice in association dealt 
with later on). It must be mentioned that the right to practise in a salaried capacity 
is not unconditional. Respect must be paid to the rules regarding incompatibilities 
as they are laid down in the Kodex Dikigoron.1223 Clearly this rule is in accordance 
with Article 8 of Directive 98/5/EC since it merely secures equal treatment between 
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1219 Article 8(4) Presidential Decree. 
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1222 Article 9(3) Presidential Decree. 
1223 Article 10 Presidential Decree. 
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lawyers established in the host Member State and lawyers established in the host 
Member State under their home country professional title. 
Article 11 of the Presidential Decree governs the integration of lawyers who are 
established under their home country professional title in Greece into the profes-
sion of the Dikigoros without having to take the aptitude test provided for in Directive 
89/48/EEC. Subparagraph 1 provides that a lawyer who is established under his 
home country professional title may, after a regular and effective exercise of activities 
for a minimum of three years in Greek law, including Community law, integrate 
into the profession of the Dikigoros. In order to effectuate that integration the law-
yer must send an application to the Bar Association where he is registered. He must 
accompany the application with documents establishing that he has exercised the 
relevant professional activity in connection with Greek law, for the required period 
of time. These are, for example, copies of cases dealt with, contracts, various judicial 
acts, official reports of the meetings of administrative authorities, and a certificate of 
salaries paid.1224 The Council of the Bar Association will decide upon the request 
based on a report concerning the request that is drawn up by one of its members. 
Where necessary the Council may request the lawyer concerned to give more details, 
orally or in writing, concerning the documents submitted. In conformity with 
Article 10 of the Directive, it is stated that effective and regular pursuit of activities 
means the pursuit without interruptions other than those arising from the events of 
everyday life.1225 
In cases where the lawyer has been active in Greece for a minimum period of 
three years, but where his experience with regard to Greek law is less than three 
years, he may still integrate into the profession of the Dikigoros. He may affect that 
integration if he has successfully participated in courses or seminars about Greek 
law, including professional law and rules regarding deontology. Additionally, he 
must have detailed knowledge of and professional experience in Greek law.1226 It 
must be noted that this is a very loose interpretation of the rules laid down in 
Article 10(3) of Directive 98/5/EC. The Directive speaks about taking into account 
courses, seminars, knowledge and professional experience, but states at no point 
that courses or seminars are necessary in order to integrate into the host Member 
State’s profession. In other words, where somebody acquires enough knowledge 
without taking courses or seminars, he should still be eligible to be integrated into 
the legal profession of the host Member State. The way in which the Greek imple-
mentation of this article is formulated, however, implies that following courses is, 
either way, obligatory. If the Greek authorities maintain that point of view, it will 
be in violation of the Directive. 
In order to be integrated into the Greek legal profession without at least three 
years experience in Greek law, the lawyer concerned would be invited by the ad-
ministrative Council of the respective Bar Association for an interview. The objective 
is to verify whether or not the lawyer fulfils the criteria mentioned above, and whether 
or not the lawyer concerned is able to continue the pursuit of the activities.1227 The 
decision of the administrative Council of the Bar Association can exempt the lawyer 
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from taking the aptitude test as prescribed by the Greek implementation of Direct-
ive 89/48/EEC.1228 A lawyer who is established under his home country professional 
title may, at any point in time, opt for the possibility to take the aptitude test in 
order to integrate in the Greek legal profession.1229  
Subsection 6 of Article 11 of the Presidential Decree states that a decision taken 
by the Bar Association not to integrate a lawyer who is established under his home 
Member State in the profession of the Dikigoros shall include a statement of the 
reasons, and judicial recourse must be made available. Such a decision can be taken 
if the administrative Council of the Bar Association is of the opinion that the ad-
mission of the lawyer concerned in the profession of the Dikigoros would be against 
public policy, in particular because of disciplinary proceedings, complaints or incidents 
of any kind taken again him.1230 A lawyer whose request has been refused has the 
right to submit a new request for integration.1231 The officials of the Bar Association 
who deal with an application to be integrated in the legal profession shall assure the 
confidential treatment of any information provided by the lawyer.1232  
As mentioned above, in the paragraph concerning the profession of the Dikigoros, 
a Dikigoros can only qualify to practise before higher courts through seniority. This 
is solved, rather creatively, for lawyers established under their home country profes-
sional title, who integrate in the profession of Dikigoros. Subsection 9 of Article 11 
of the Presidential Decree states that a lawyer who is integrated into the profession 
of the Dikigoros through the means of Article 11 of the Presidential Decree shall in 
principle be authorised to practise only before courts of first instance. If, however, a 
lawyer can prove that he or she has been professionally active for a period of more 
than four years, taking into account professional activity exercised in the lawyer’s 
home Member State, the administrative Council of the Bar Association can also allow 
him or her to practise before the Court of Appeal. If the lawyer can prove that he 
has been exercising professional activities for over eight years, he can be allowed to 
practise before the Court of Cassation. This is an interesting development, which is 
a more liberal approach than what is prescribed by the Directive, even amounting 
to something that is similar to reverse discrimination. Lawyers from other Member 
States may include experience gathered even before they were integrated into the 
profession of the Dikigoros. Looking at the requirements indicated above, it would be 
most likely that a lawyer from another Member State who integrates into the 
profession of the Dikigoros shall at least be eligible to practise before the Court of 
Appeal.1233 Lastly, Article 11 of the Presidential Decree states that a lawyer who is 
integrated into the profession of the Dikigoros still has the right to use his original 
professional title alongside the title of Dikigoros, while exercising professional activi-
ties in Greece.1234 As of 2006, six lawyers had integrated into the profession of the 
Dikigoros.1235 
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Articles 12 to 14 of the Presidential Decree govern the different modalities in 
which lawyers can practise in association in Greece. The first paragraph of Article 12 
of the Presidential Decree states that one or more lawyers who are established in 
Greece under their home country professional title, and who belong to the same 
grouping in their home Member State, may exercise their professional activities as a 
branch or agency of that grouping.1236 To that end, the lawyers who want to exer-
cise their profession in the form of a grouping must send a request to the Bar Asso-
ciation where they are established. That request must be accompanied by the statutes 
of the grouping, which is to be signed by all the members of the grouping who 
seek to establish themselves in Greece, and authorised by the competent authority of 
the home Member State.1237 The request must also be accompanied by a document 
which identifies the manager and the deputy-manager of the branch or agency of the 
grouping.1238 The decision to authorise the opening of a branch or agency shall be 
taken by the administrative Council of the Bar Association concerned, upon the 
proposition of one of the members of the proposed grouping. The administrative 
Council of the Bar Association shall verify the statutes and check their conformity 
with the Presidential Decree, the Kodex Dikigoron, the deontological rules and all the 
other rules governing the legal profession in Greece. The statutes of the grouping, 
and therewith apparently the request to open a branch, may be refused in situations 
where the grouping has been operational for less than three years, or where the 
capital is held entirely or partly by, where the name is used, or where the decision 
making power lies, either in law or in fact, with persons who are not part of one of 
the legal professions mentioned in Article 2 of the Presidential Decree.1239 In other 
words, Multi-Disciplinary Partnerships are prohibited in Greece. However, refusal 
on the grounds that a grouping has been operational for less than three years is in 
violation of the Directive. There is no authority in the Directive for excluding 
groupings that have been in operation for a certain period. On top of that, it is a 
rule that is inherently discriminatory since the rule can never be applied to Greek 
groupings, which are recognised from their moment of inception.  
Section 5 of Article 12 states that the authorisation for lawyers established under 
their home country professional title to practise in a grouping is subject to the re-
strictions laid down in the Presidential Decree governing practice in association in 
Greece.1240 Here, again, the Greek authorities violate Article 11 of the Directive. The 
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Directive states that the fundamental rules governing a grouping in the host Mem-
ber State shall only prevail when the fundamental rules of the host and the home 
Member State are incompatible, and where the application of the host Member State’s 
rules is objectively justified in light of the public interest in protecting clients and 
third parties. Application of host Member State rules to a branch or an agency of a 
grouping of lawyers from another Member State is by no means an automatic pro-
cess. If a decision is taken not to allow the opening of a branch or agency in Greece, it 
shall be reasoned and the lawyers who sought to open a branch or agency shall have 
judicial recourse before the Greek Council of State. They must seek this recourse 
within a period of 60 days.1241  
Section 7 of Article 12 states that the means of publication of the authorisation 
to open a branch or agency, the dissolution of such a branch or agency, and the 
entry into force of the legal personality of that branch or agency, are regulated by 
the Presidential Decree governing practice in association in Greece.1242 The com-
ments made with regard to Section 5 can also be extended to this section: Directive 
98/5/EC does not sanction an automatic application of the host Member State’s 
professional rules governing practice in association. The rules mentioned above are 
also applicable to situations where the statutes of the grouping are changed.1243 With 
regard to this rule, it must be mentioned that its application is only allowed where it 
would fall within the situation described in Article 11 of Directive 98/5/EC, i.e., in 
order to ascertain whether the change in the statutes creates an incompatibility be-
tween the host and home Member State’s rules.1244  
Lastly, and completely in line with the previous sections, Section 9 of Article 12 
states that the functioning of the branch or agency in Greece – in terms of the obli-
gations imposed on members, the legal personality of the group, the administration, 
representation and policy of the group, the accession, withdrawal and exclusion of 
members, the decision-making process, the distribution of profits and loss, the 
relationship with clients, the dissolution and liquidation of the group as well as the 
book-keeping – shall be governed by the Presidential Decree governing practice in 
association in Greece.1245 Once again it must be indicated that the rules governing 
practice in association in Greece are not automatically applicable to branches or 
agencies of groupings from other Member States established in Greece. Section 9 
of Article 12 therefore violates Directive 98/5/EC. 
Article 13 Section 1 states that two or more lawyers from the same group or from 
the same Member State shall have the right to create a new grouping under the rules 
laid down in the Presidential Decree governing practice in association in Greece.1246 
In Section 2 that rule is extended to lawyers who come from different Member 
States and those from Greece.1247A lawyer who is a member of a grouping in his 
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home Member State must, at all times, both during the period of approval of the 
new group and during its functioning, provide the competent authorities in Greece 
with all the relevant information in connection with the grouping of which he is a 
member in his home Member State. To that end, the lawyer concerned must pro-
duce the statutes of the group he belongs to, authorised by the competent authority 
of the home Member State.1248 Section 4 states that approval of the constitution of 
an association of lawyers can be withheld, or approval already given can be revoked, 
if in the home Member State that group is regarded as a Multi-Disciplinary Part-
nership (i.e., where the capital is held entirely or partly, the name of the grouping 
is used, or the decision making power is (in law or in fact) exercised by, persons 
who are not a part of one of the legal professions mentioned in Article 2 of the 
Presidential Decree).1249 Lawyers who are members of a group in their home Mem-
ber State shall, in any event, have the right to practise individually in Greece.1250 
Article 14 states that lawyers who are established under their home country pro-
fessional title in Greece, and who are members of a group in their home Member 
State, may use the name of that group while pursuing professional activities in 
Greece. In addition, the lawyer concerned may be required to mention the legal 
form of the group and the names of the other members of the group who pursue 
professional activities in Greece. The Presidential Decree governing practice in asso-
ciation in Greece shall govern any other eventualities with regard to the formation 
and the denomination of the group.1251 It is not completely clear what is meant 
exactly by this last sentence, but it may be a reference to the application of Greek 
professional rules on branches and agencies of groups from other Member States, a 
practice that was established as violating Directive 98/5/EC. 
Article 15 of the Presidential Decree lays down a general duty of cooperation 
between the competent authorities of the home and host Member States. Greek Bar 
Associations can request any information from lawyers established under their home 
country professional title in Greece. On the other hand, the competent authorities 
of the home Member State may also request information from the Greek Bar 
Associations. Any decisions taken by the Greek Bar Associations shall also be com-
municated to the Minister of Justice.1252 
§ 4.4 Observations and Conclusions in Connection with 
Establishment under Home Title 
Although, chronologically, it was the last modality of the free movement of lawyers 
to be realised, doctrinally the establishment of lawyers under home title represents 
the middle phase of the three modalities of free movement of lawyers observed. It 
is more intensive than the free movement of services, yet less intensive than the 
direct integration into the host legal profession based on the Diploma Directive.  
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For persons who are not fully qualified lawyers but who nevertheless exercise 
legal activities in a Member State with a lesser degree of regulation than their own, 
it has been observed that the Establishment Directive does not cover the situation 
where these persons choose to establish themselves in a Member State that reserves 
the activities of their choice for fully qualified lawyers. The more recent Directives 
that were observed in light of the free movement of services do not cover this 
situation either. This means that these persons can only rely on the rules laid down 
in the case law of the European Court of Justice, notably in the Gebhard case.1253 As 
more extensive protection is available in the free provision of services, it might well 
be the case that these persons resort to a method of exercising their professional activity 
in a manner reminiscent of the installation limitée that was observed in circumstances 
where lawyers sought to establish themselves under home country professional title 
before the Establishment Directive was created. Such a situation is undesirable for both 
clients and for these professionals. It would therefore be better if it was established, 
either through case law or through secondary legislation, that the mutual recognition 
rule also applies in these circumstances. 
The Establishment Directive was implemented in all fifteen Member States 
under review. In the part preceding the review of its implementation, a threefold 
division of violations was presented. Now it is time to divide the violations iden-
tified along the lines of this threefold division. After that, a more general assessment 
of the impact of Directive 98/5/EC will be given.  
 
Restrictions Where Residual Legislative Competence is Precluded: 
Violations per se 
The European Court of Justice established in Commission v. Luxembourg and in the 
Wilson case, that Articles 3 and 5 of Directive 98/5/EC lead to complete harmoni-
sation, i.e., they preclude Member States from imposing further requirements than 
those listed in these articles. It has been asserted that this rule can be applied to the 
entire Directive. Therefore, it may not be surprising that the majority of infringe-
ments identified fall into this category. 
The majority of violations have been identified as to pertaining to Article 3 
(registration) and Article 5 (professional activity). With regard to all the registration 
violations that have been observed in the different Member States, the most obvious 
violations of this article have been in connection with the requirement to repeat 
the production of the certificate mentioned in Article 3, i.e., lawyers are required 
to produce such a certificate on an annual basis. This method is used in Luxembourg, 
Germany and Italy, and was dealt with in the case law described above. Luxembourg 
and Italy have also violated Article 3 on other grounds. Italy has imposed a residence 
requirement that is already deemed to be against the freedom of establishment on 
the basis of earlier case law,1254 whilst Luxembourg imposes a language assessment 
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for lawyers who seek establishment under home title, a requirement that was also 
assessed by the European Court of Justice in the cases against Luxembourg.1255  
Other violations of Article 3 have been identified in other Member States. Sweden 
authorises investigations into whether the lawyer who seeks registration under his 
home title is ‘suitable to practise’ as a lawyer in Sweden. Greece requires examination 
of criminal records, also a violation of the principle of mutual recognition and the 
provision of Article 3. Spain has a more subtle approach. The Spanish implemen-
tation allows competent authorities in Spain to ask for any other document that 
may be deemed necessary by the competent authority in order to process the request 
for registration. This is also not sanctioned by Article 3 of the Directive. Lastly, both 
Spain and Ireland demand fees for registration in the implementation mechanism. 
The Directive itself does not mention anything with regard to fees so it must be 
assessed whether Member States are allowed to ask for fees for services provided 
under the Directive. This assessment will take place later on in this paragraph. For 
now it is sufficient to state that, where the payment of fees is a condition for 
registration, as this is not sanctioned on the basis of Article 3 it is therefore in vio-
lation of the Directive. 
Also in connection with the rules regarding the exercise of professional activities 
in the host Member State, a number of violations have been identified. Austria places 
two illegal limitations on the professional activities of a lawyer who is established 
under his home country professional title in Austria. First, such a lawyer is not 
allowed to educate prospective Austrian lawyers (Rechtsanwaltanwärter). This limi-
tation is not sanctioned by Directive 98/5/EC and is therefore illegal.1256 In addition, 
Austria denies lawyers established under their home country professional title to 
participate in a legal aid scheme. In addition to that, it is also mentioned that law-
yers established under their home title shall not receive compensation if they 
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ment this unsanctioned limitation to Article 5 in such clear terms. However, even in the terms 
in which it is worded, I believe that the Commission would never initiate proceedings with 
regard to this violation. 
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participate in a legal aid scheme.1257 These limitations are not sanctioned by the 
Directive and are therefore illegal.  
Luxembourg also violates Article 5 of the Directive. Luxembourg disallows law-
yers who are established in Luxembourg under their home country professional title 
from acting as professional domiciles for firms, where lawyers who are established 
under the Luxembourg professional title are allowed to act as professional domiciles. 
This exception was specifically dealt with by the European Court of Justice in the 
cases described above.1258 Lastly, Greece withholds some activities from lawyers who 
are established under their home country title in Greece if they do not have Greek 
nationality. In the relevant part on Greece, I indicated that there is probably some 
justification in Article 45 of the EC Treaty for excluding these persons from some 
activities, but that would mean that the Directive violates Article 45 of the Treaty. 
The only entity which can establish such a situation and act upon it is the Euro-
pean Court of Justice. Until the European Court of Justice has ruled in this field, 
the Greek implementation of Article 5, where it exempts certain non-nationals 
who are established under their home country professional title from certain activities, 
must be deemed as illegal. 
Violations of other articles in the Directive are scarce. With regard to the parti-
cipation of lawyers in elections of the representative bodies of the profession in the 
host Member State, as laid down in Article 6, it must be mentioned that nine out 
of the fifteen countries reviewed have no provisions about voting rights in their 
primary implementation mechanisms.1259 It might of course be the case that this 
matter is dealt with on a lower administrative level, or even on a level of the pro-
fessional associations themselves. However, if it turns out that lawyers established 
under their home country professional title do not have the right to vote in the 
elections of the relevant associations’ professional bodies, such will constitute a vio-
lation of the Directive.  
Additionally, Greece violates the Directive by requiring lawyers to take out obli-
gatory membership of the Greek lawyers’ fund, the Greek mutual assistance fund 
for lawyers, and also Greek health insurance. In my opinion, obligatory member-
ship of these organisations cannot be caught under the provisions of paragraph 3 of 
Article 6 of the Directive. If paragraph 3 of Article 6 must be read in a restrictive 
manner (which in my opinion it should be) then Member States can only request 
there to be indemnity insurance or membership of a guarantee fund. Since Greece 
also requires professional indemnity insurance then it cannot, in addition to that, 
require membership of other professional funds or insurances.  
With respect to Article 9 (legal remedies), no violations have been observed 
while researching the implementation of Directive 98/5/EC in the Member States 
reviewed, although it was established in the Wilson case that the appellate system in 
                                                  
1257  Which is a contradiction in terms after stating that lawyers established under their home country 
professional title are not allowed to participate in a legal aid scheme. 
1258  Case C-193/05, Commission of the European Communities v. Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg, [2006] 
ECR I-08673. Luxembourg failed to act after this case, which is now the subject of an Article 
228 procedure. See European Commission Press Release IP/07/358, via <europa.eu>, last 
accessed 12 June 2007. 
1259  United Kingdom; Austria; Denmark; Sweden; the Netherlands; Belgium; Italy; Portugal and 
Ireland. 
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Luxembourg was in violation of the Directive. If that were to mean that any intra-
profession appellate system is in violation of the Directive, the United Kingdom at 
least and potentially many more Member States are in violation of the Directive.  
Although the majority of the Member States have successfully implemented 
Article 10 of the Directive (integration in the host Member State profession), ir-
regularities were observed in different Member States. Both France and Portugal have 
failed to implement the rather detailed procedure laid down for lawyers who have 
been active for at least three years (but for a lesser period in the law of the host 
Member State, including Community law) and have replaced that detailed procedure 
with very general procedures that are potentially illegal if competent authorities do 
not apply the procedure provided for in Article 10(3). The Greek implementation 
of Article 10(3) is even worse since, according to the implementation, it is obligatory 
for lawyers in the above situations to take courses and seminars on Greek law, 
whereas Article 10(3) only states that experience gained through courses and seminars 
will be taken into account.  
Spain delegated the formulation of the exact criteria for the integration of lawyers 
in the Spanish legal profession to the individual Colegios, a situation that could po-
tentially lead to practices that are contrary to the Directive. In Italy, the decision of 
the competent authority to integrate a lawyer into the Italian legal profession must 
be reviewed by the public prosecutor and the respective Court of Appeal, a require-
ment that cannot be reconciled with the procedure laid down in Article 10 of 
Directive 98/5/EC.  
The rather difficult drafting of Article 11 (joint practice) of the Directive has led 
to considerable problems in the Member States. The violation observed, in all but 
two of the Member States, is the need to objectively justify application of the host 
Member State’s professional rules with regard to branch offices and agencies. Member 
States either completely ignore the requirement of Article 11(1) or, even worse, they 
explicitly state that their own professional rules shall apply. This violation contri-
butes to the fact that Article 11 has not fulfilled its revolutionary potential, which is 
to be discussed below. With regard to the other articles of the Directive, no viola-
tions were found. 
 
Restrictions that Frustrate the Full Working of the Directive: 
Violations per se 
This category of restrictions was created through analogous interpretation of the 
AMOK case that accepted this category of restrictions for the Services Directive. It 
has been argued that nothing precludes the extension of this category of restrictions 
in order to cover any restriction that flows from the implementation of the Estab-
lishment Directive. With regard to this category two restrictions must be mentioned.  
First, the most flagrant violation that has been observed must be mentioned 
here. It was observed that the Netherlands only awards integration into the profession 
of the advocaat on the basis of Article 10 of Directive 98/5/EC, where the legal 
monopoly in civil cases is awarded to the profession of the procureur, an old profes-
sion that is joined with the profession of the advocaat.1260 According to the Nether-
                                                  
1260  Every domestic advocaat is sworn in simultaneously as an advocaat and a procureur. Lawyers who 
seek integration through the diploma directive are also admitted to both professions.  
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lands, integration into the profession of the procureur without objective assessment 
of the candidate’s knowledge in civil procedural law through an aptitude test is 
‘undesirable’.1261 The Establishment Directive does not apply exactly to the letter to 
the profession of the procureur but exclusion from this profession undoubtedly leads 
to a frustration of the full working of the Directive, since every Dutch advocaat (and 
every advocaat who is integrated on the basis of the Diploma Directive for that 
matter) is sworn in as an advocaat and procureur. It is clear that the reason behind the 
exploitation of this ‘hidden’ division in the profession of the advocaat is none other 
than to frustrate the full working of the Establishment Directive. Although the 
Netherlands deserves to be dealt with by the European Court of Justice on this 
matter, this is unlikely to happen since the abolition of the profession of the procureur 
is envisaged for September 2008, after which the problem will resolve itself. It does, 
however, show the completely irrational xenophobia that the Dutch Bar Association 
seems to have with regard to the free establishment of lawyers, that would be 
expected rather from a country like Luxembourg. 
The other case that must be mentioned here is much more subtle, but potentially 
just as devastating. Spain imposes a rule under which lawyers who are established 
under their home country professional title may not appear on a list of lawyers 
available for defending clients. If this rule could be caught under one of the articles 
in the Directive, most notably Article 5, then it would be illegal per se since it is a 
limitation not sanctioned by the Directive. This is not a clear-cut case, however, 
because as such the rule does not limit the activity but rather only reduces the likeli-
hood that the lawyer will actually be exercising the professional activity. It must 
therefore be assumed that this rule, although not directly in violation of the Direc-
tive, does indeed frustrate its full working, and is therefore illegal. 
 
Other restrictions: Objective Justifications 
The last category of possible restrictions is the residual category caught by rules laid 
down in case law such as Vlassopoulou and Gebhard. The rules that apply to these 
restrictions assume they such restrictions are illegal unless they can be objectively 
justified. None of these restrictions have been observed in the reviews of imple-
mentation in the fifteen Member States concerned. Restrictions that were identified 
either fell within the first or second category. The only observed restriction that has 
not yet been (completely) classified is the matter concerning payment of fees for 
registration or membership to the Bar Association of the host Member State. It has 
been asserted that where the payment of fees is presented as a condition for regis-
tration this is in violation of Article 3 of the Directive. This is because Article 3 
seeks full harmonisation, and such provisions are therefore illegal per se. The question 
                                                  
1261  This argument fails on two important points. First: the legal monopoly for lawyers in the 
Netherlands in the field of criminal law lies with the profession of advocaat. No lawyer in the 
Netherlands will assert that criminal procedural law is less complicated than civil procedural 
law. So the argument that procedural law is too complicated fails. Secondly, the Dutch Bar 
Association seems to assume that an aptitude test can be imposed automatically. This is not 
true. It must first be assessed whether a person has the knowledge necessary. From an 
integrated advocaat that may be expected (all the more so because the aptitude tests for both 
professions are identical). An integrated advocaat who wants to become a procureur can do so 
without an aptitude test. 
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of what is to happen with fees payable which are not a condition for registration is 
still unresolved. One could assume that the imposition of a fee by a Member States 
is a restriction (since it is liable to hinder free movement or make it less attractive) 
that needs to be objectively justified. That approach, however, would be too super-
ficial. It is not the fact that membership fees must be paid in the host Member 
State1262 that leads to the extra burden, but the fact that these fees must be paid on 
top that fees that are already paid in the home Member State. That is undoubtedly 
likely to occur because membership of the home State’s Bar is necessary for appli-
cation of the Establishment Directive. It is therefore not the Member State that 
causes the restriction but the Directive itself.  
On the basis of this reasoning it must be assumed that there is a fourth category 
of restrictions, namely restrictions flowing from the Directive itself and which must 
therefore be accepted. Aside from the membership fees, or even the continued mem-
bership of the home Bar itself, there are also rules in connection with continued edu-
cation which could potentially be problematic (if continued education was imposed 
in both home and host Member State). This situation has however been identified 
by the CCBE and included in its guidelines on implementation, stating that only 
the host Member State’s scheme of continued education will apply.1263 See page 
241 for the graphical representation of the possible restrictions. 
 
Impact of Directive 98/5/EC on the Free Movement of Lawyers 
The main point of criticism in connection with the rules governing the free move-
ment of lawyers before Directive 98/5/EC was the fact that the system of Directive 
89/48/EEC left considerable discretionary powers to the Member States. Although 
candidates seeking integration into the legal profession of a host Member State had 
(and still have) the right to have their professional qualifications and experience 
reviewed individually, the nature of the legal professions in the Member State (i.e., 
the focus on the national legal system in the qualification track for the legal pro-
fessions) will almost always lead to a situation where the prospective candidate would 
be obliged to take an aptitude test as a compensating measure under the system of 
Directive 89/48/EEC. It was established in an earlier part of this book that the con-
tents of the aptitude test are at the discretion of the Member States, and that more 
often than not it is very hard for lawyers to successfully complete an aptitude test. 
In one instance, it was established by the European Court of Justice that the Italian 
requirements for the aptitude test were in fact more rigorous than the requirements 
imposed on prospective lawyers who studied law in Italy.1264 
                                                  
1262  It would be hard, if not impossible, to construe this as a restriction. See, for example, C-190/98, 
Graf v. Filzmoser Maschinenbau [2000] ECR I-493. See also: Guidelines for the Implementation 
of Directive 98/5/EC via <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 12 June 2007 which state: ‘All law-
yers registering under Article 3 of the Directive shall pay a registration fee or fees (which term 
includes either a one-off or a regular payment) to the relevant competent authority (as defined 
under Article 1.2(f) of the Directive), and to such other authorities as may be required under 
local rules. Such fee or fees may be equivalent to, but not higher than, the fee or fees charged 
to lawyers enrolled in the host Member State.’ 
1263  Guidelines for the Implementation of Directive 98/5/EC via <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 
12 June 2007. 
1264  Case C-145/99 Commission of the European Community v. Italian Republic, ECR[2002] I-02235. 
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Figure 8: Layers of restrictions revisited 
 
 
 
 
 
Restrictions imposed on articles of the Directive that preclude residual 
legislative power of the Member States are prohibited per se. 
 
Based on Wilson and Commission v. Luxembourg it has been assumed 
that this is the case for Directive 98/5/EC. 
Restrictions imposed on matters where legislative power of the 
Member States is not precluded because it is not covered by the 
Directive concerned but where the full working of the Directive is 
frustrated are prohibited per se (AMOK case). 
Restrictions imposed on matters where legislative power of Member 
States is not precluded that do not frustrate the full working of the 
Directive are prohibited unless objectively justified. (Gebhard case). 
 
Specific rules for specific situations may apply (e.g. Vlassopoulou for 
diplomas). 
Restrictions that flow from the Directive itself: 
these restrictions are lawful. 
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In that sense Directive 98/5/EC has brought about many positive changes. First 
of all, the rules for practice under home title have been harmonised between Member 
States. Before the Directive came into force, only Member States with a lesser degree 
of regulation allowed lawyers to exercise professional activities under their home 
country professional title in that Member State. However, after the implementation 
of Directive 98/5/EC, every lawyer who was established in one of the Member 
States of the European Union was allowed to establish himself, in a permanent fashion, 
in another Member State of his choice under his home country professional title, 
without any further requirements other than registration with the designated com-
petent authority in that Member State. This harmonisation has provided for smooth 
access for lawyers wishing to establish themselves in the host Member State.  
A second, and more important, advantage of the system after the implemen-
tation of Directive 98/5/EC, as compared with the system before the Directive’s 
implementation, is the fact that lawyers who are established under their home country 
professional title are allowed to exercise professional activities in the law of the host 
Member State. This was a new rule even for countries that allowed practice under 
home country professional title, since lawyers who were established under their 
home country professional title in these Member States were allowed to exercise 
professional activities that did not encroach upon the legal monopoly of the legal 
profession of the host Member State. After implementation of the Directive, mem-
bers of the legal profession of the host Member State were forced to share their 
legal monopoly with their colleagues from other Member States. This rule has 
offered lawyers established under their home country professional title the chance 
to actually deal with the law of the host Member State in a ‘hands on’ fashion rather 
than to study the law of the host Member State in preparation for an aptitude test. 
In my opinion, this method of familiarising oneself with the law of the host 
Member States offers better preparation for integration into the legal profession of 
the host Member State than the much more theoretical approach that is used in 
preparation for an aptitude test. It must be said that the implementation of Article 5 
of the Directive, which actually guarantees lawyers established under their home 
country professional title the right to practise in the host Member State, has been 
correctly implemented by the majority of the Member States, and only Austria, 
Greece and Luxembourg have incorrectly implemented this article. The violations 
in Luxembourg were severe enough for the European Commission to initiate pro-
ceedings before the European Court of Justice to have Luxembourg convicted on 
the basis of Article 226 of the EC Treaty. The European Court of Justice did so in 
Commission v. Luxembourg. 
The third and final change that was brought about by the implementation of 
Directive 98/5/EC was the fact that registration under home title could, after a 
certain amount of time, be transferred into accession to the legal profession of the 
host Member State outside the regime of Directive 89/48/EEC. This is possibly 
the greatest benefit to the system of free movement of lawyers. After having been 
allowed to work in their home Member State, in the profession of other Member 
States, and after having been allowed to exercise the same professional activities as 
members of the legal profession of the host Member State while being established 
under their home country professional title, Directive 98/5/EC finally allows lawyers 
to integrate into the legal profession of the host Member State without having to 
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take an aptitude test under the regime of Directive 89/48/EEC. Even more so, 
lawyers who have been established under their home country professional title in 
the host Member State and who fulfil the criteria laid down in Article 10 of the 
Directive may integrate into the legal profession of the host Member State without 
any test whatsoever. The only discretionary power that is left for the Member 
States is the power to ascertain whether the criteria of the Article are fulfilled.1265 In 
assessing the implementation of Directive 98/5/EC it must be concluded that this 
single feature of the Directive is the single most important one, since it should 
make the integration of lawyers into the legal profession of the host Member State 
much easier than it was under Directive 89/48/EEC. Combined with the two other 
changes described above – i.e., the right to be established under one’s home country 
professional title in another Member State and the right to exercise professional 
activities that are normally reserved for the legal profession of the host Member 
State – the right to integrate into the legal profession of the host Member State after a 
given period of time provides for a fully-fledged alternative to the integration track 
that is provided for by Directive 89/48/EEC. 
When compared with one another other, it becomes clear that the integration 
track under Directive 98/5/EC has many more advantages than its counterpart, 
Directive 89/48/EEC. First, it must be mentioned that lawyers fall within the stric-
test category possible within the system of Directive 89/48/EEC. This is the case 
since the course of preparation for lawyers tends to focus on the legal system of the 
respective Member State, and therefore the competent authority may require com-
pensatory measures.1266 In addition to that, Directive 89/48/EEC states that Member 
States can prescribe a form of compensatory measures when the regulated professions 
are concerned with national law, whilst, with regard to other professions the choice 
of the compensatory measure is left to the candidate. It was established above that 
all Member States have opted for an aptitude test in connection with the legal 
professions described in this book. It was also established that Member States have a 
broad discretion when determining the level of the aptitude test, and the level of 
the aptitude test should be equal to the level required from students who qualify for 
the legal profession in the host Member State. It was established by the European 
Court of Justice that an aptitude test may not require more than what is required of 
domestic qualifiers. In practical terms, ‘taking an aptitude test’ is basically compara-
ble to completing university education in law and successfully completing the pro-
fessional training that would be required for lawyers established in the host Member 
State.1267 Deciding to take an aptitude test is not an easy step. It involves commit-
ment over a considerable period of time during which the lawyer is1268 not allowed 
(in many cases) to practise in the host Member State, or where he is allowed to 
                                                  
1265  That this is not as straightforward as it looks will be dealt with later on in this chapter. 
1266  This will almost always be the case if the candidate has no special ties with the host Member 
State, i.e., where a candidate has qualified for the legal profession of the home Member State 
and has no further knowledge of the legal profession of the host Member State. 
1267  Which is also illustrated by the fact that a considerable number of applicants fail the test, and it 
remains unknown how many people are actually deterred from taking the test. See Report to 
the European Parliament and the Council on the state of Application of the general system for 
the recognition of higher education diplomas, 15-02-1996, COM(96) 46 Final. 
1268  Before the entry into force of Directive 98/5/EC. 
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practise in a limited capacity but not allowed to exercise the professional activities 
that are legally reserved for the legal profession of the host Member State.  
Given that Directive 89/48/EEC was the consequence of the new strategy in 
the European Union towards the recognition of diplomas (which was based on the 
principle of mutual recognition as formulated by the European Court of Justice in 
the Cassis de Dijon case), it can safely be said that taking into account all the exemp-
tions that apply to lawyers, little or nothing of that original principle of mutual 
recognition remains applicable for lawyers. The system of Directive 98/5/EC has 
much more in common with the principle of mutual recognition. The Directive is 
based on the pretence that lawyers who are fully qualified members of the legal 
profession in one of the Member States are equally competent to exercise the pro-
fessional activities that are reserved for the legal profession of the host Member 
State. Moreover, after having exercised that professional activity for a number of 
years, lawyers are deemed to be competent enough to integrate into the legal pro-
fession of the host Member State without other involvement from the competent 
authority of the host Member State other then their requirement to verify whether 
the criteria listed in the Directive are fulfilled. It is obvious that this method of 
integration into the legal profession of the host Member State is preferable to the 
method provided for in Directive 89/48/EEC. It therefore seems obvious that the 
integration track of Directive 89/48/EEC will become less popular as time marches 
on, and integration via Directive 98/5/EC will become more popular until the 
aptitude test has become almost superfluous.1269 
In my opinion, after the implementation of Directive 98/5/EC, there will be 
only a limited role for integration via the aptitude test in the system of free move-
ment of lawyers. As stated above, compensatory measures, which in the case of the 
legal profession take the form of an aptitude test, will only be applied if it is established 
during an earlier assessment of the candidate’s previous knowledge and experience 
that the application of a compensatory measure is necessary. As stated above, it seems 
more beneficial for lawyers who have no experience with the legal system of the 
host Member State to integrate into the legal profession via the track of Directive 
98/5/EC rather than opting for the aptitude test provided for in Directive 89/48/ 
EEC. At the other end of the spectrum there are those persons who seek integration 
into the host Member State equipped with knowledge and experience in that 
Member State (through earlier experience or other ties with that Member State) 
and who may qualify for integration into the legal profession of the host Member 
State without having to take an aptitude test. Only the lawyers who seek integration 
into the host Member State but fall outside these two categories will be interested 
in taking an aptitude test. These will be lawyers who have some experience and 
knowledge with regard to the legal profession in the host Member State but which 
is unfortunately not sufficient enough to integrate him into the profession without 
compensatory measures, but which on the other hand, fortunately does not warrant 
the exercise of professional activities for a minimum period of three years under their 
home country professional title. This, in my opinion, will be a rather small group. 
                                                  
1269  Extreme criticism with regard to the phasing out (or abolition, as the author wrongly states) of 
the aptitude test can be found in Podell (1999), pp. 57-70. In this article Podell concludes, 
without any apparent foundation other than his own authority, that the aptitude test cannot be 
replaced with an adaptation period of only ‘three’ years.  
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There are, of course, also points of criticism to be mentioned in connection with 
the system as it stands after the implementation of Directive 98/5/EC. It is by no 
means the case that, with the implementation of Directive 98/5/EC, the free move-
ment of lawyers has created a lawyer’s Utopia.  
Firstly, the Directive only applies to those lawyers who are members of a profes-
sion mentioned in the Directive. It has been shown that this leads to considerable 
problems for professionals who are not lawyers, but who have nonetheless exercised 
legal activities in Member States with a lesser degree of regulation, who now seek 
establishment in a Member State with a higher degree of regulation.1270  
Another point of criticism is that the weak, if not confusing, wording of certain 
articles in the Directive may lead to situations that do not benefit the free move-
ment of lawyers. An example of this is found in Article 10 of the Directive, with 
regard to the integration of lawyers in the legal profession of the host Member 
State. As stated above, the Article mentions the fact that European Community law 
will be regarded as national law, i.e., that Community law should be read as being 
an integral part of the national law. At first sight, that would mean that theoretically 
a lawyer established under his home country professional title can integrate into the 
legal profession of the host Member State without ever dealing with national law 
after having regularly and effectively pursued professional activity in European Com-
munity law for a period of at least three years.1271 This extreme view is not even 
accepted by the European Commission.1272 Instead, it seems to be the case that a 
lawyer seeking integration into the host Member State’s profession must have at least 
exercised some professional activity in the national law of the host Member State, 
not being European Community law. The following question is, of course, how 
much national law? The only thing that can be said with certainty is that a require-
ment to have professional experience in national law in the strict sense (i.e., without 
Community law) for the full three years is not in conformity with the Directive 
because if that were the case it would render the mention of European Community 
law in Article 10 of the Directive pointless. For the time being, without clear guide-
lines from the European Commission, and without definitive rulings by the European 
Court of Justice on this matter, the amount of national law required (between the 
two extremes mentioned above) to integrate into the legal profession of the host 
Member State will be determined by the competent authority of the host Member 
State. This gives competent authorities a considerable amount of discretion that was 
not actually intended by Article 10 of the Directive. The original intention was that 
the only function of the competent authority of the host Member State was to 
ascertain whether the candidate did have three years’ professional experience, without 
giving any normative judgement on the professional experience. That situation has 
now changed since, in practice, the competent authority must give a normative 
decision on the amount of professional experience in national law in the strict sense, 
within the required period of professional experience in national law in the broad 
sense (i.e., including European Community Law). Without any further guidelines, 
this is a situation that could possibly be abused by a competent authority that un-
                                                  
1270  See Hickman (2004). 
1271  In my view this is no more than an academic possibility since even the effectuation of 
Community Law generally involves national courts, and therefore national law. 
1272  Personal communication: E-mail to author. 
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willing to admit foreign lawyers, or could lead to discriminatory application within one 
Member State or between Member States. It any sense it will lead to unwanted legal 
uncertainty.1273 
Similar observations can be made with regard to the formulation of Article 11. The 
majority of the Member States have failed to implement Article 11 of Directive 98/5/ 
EC correctly. A possible explanation for this apparent difficulty could lie in the fact 
that the text of the Article (and most notably the relationship between paragraph 1 
and paragraph 5 of that article) is extremely complicated. In addition it is also un-
clear why the system under paragraph 1 deviates from the systems in Articles 6 and 
8, where the Directive provides that the rules of the host Member State shall apply 
to the lawyer who is established under his home country professional title. Because 
of the fact that many Member States have missed this subtlety in connection with 
the implementation of Article 11, the article has missed its potential and Member 
States simply impose their own rules with regard to practice in association. 
Besides other, smaller problems, for example, the problems concerning fees, the 
legal impact of Directive 98/5/EC seems to create a more beneficial situation for the 
free movement of lawyers than was the case under the old system. Directive 98/5/EC 
can, therefore, be classified as a significant step forward in the free movement of 
lawyers. Above it has been proposed that the articles of the Directive that were not 
subject to the rulings of the ECJ in the Wilson and Commission v. Luxembourg cases 
also leave little or no residual legislative competence for the Member States, so that 
Directive 98/5/EC in its entirety leads to full harmonisation of the rules that are 
covered by the Directive. If that is assumed to be the case, it is interesting to assess 
what sort of professions a lawyer established under the regime of Directive 98/5/EC 
can actually exercise. In Luxembourg v. European Parliament and Council it was stated 
by the ECJ that the profession that Article 98/5/EC lawyers exercised could be 
distinguished from the host Member State’s profession because of the possible limi-
tations on professional activities and the use of professional title. The profession that 
is exercised by a Directive 98/5/EC lawyer must also be distinguished from the 
home Member State profession. A Directive 98/5/EC lawyer mainly pursues the 
host country professional activities and is primarily subject to the host Member 
State’s professional rules. This leads to the conclusion that if the European Court of 
Justice was correct in its judgment in Luxembourg v. European Parliament and Council, 
lawyers who are established under their home country professional title exercise a 
profession that is only marginally different from the host Member State’s profession 
since it is only distinguished from that profession by its title and a very small number 
of limitations on professional activities that are exhaustively listed in Article 5 of the 
Directive. This view is corroborated by the fact that after three years of professional 
activity the lawyer established under his or her home country professional title may 
integrate into the host Member State profession without any further proficiency tests. 
If this conclusion is somewhat rephrased, it may be said that Directive 98/5/EC 
completely harmonises the legal professions in Europe in all but name and with 
only very few limitations on professional activity. Full integration can be easily ob-
tained after three years of exercising professional activity in the host Member State. 
                                                  
1273  See comment of the Law Society at: <www.ccbe.org/doc/En/table_number_lawyers_2004 
_en.pdf>, last accessed 12 June 2007. 
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This conclusion is corroborated by the wrong implementation of Article 11 by a 
majority of the Member States. Article 11 provides for an objective justification test 
before national professional rules can be applied but this has been reduced to a 
mere national treatment rule by all but two Member States, therewith bringing the 
98/5/EC lawyer even closer to a domestic lawyer. Therefore, 20 years after the 
vertical approach was abandoned, it can be concluded that the profession of the 
lawyer has been completely harmonised. Moreover, this harmonisation was achieved 
without all the difficult negotiations and detailed legal instruments that character-
ised the vertical harmonisation Directives. 
In order to complete the review of the application of the model, the third modality 
must now have its own review, although it has been established that its importance 
is only residual.  
 
 
§ 5. Integration into the Host Member State’s Profession: 
Recognition of Diplomas 
Before the adoption of Directive 98/5/EC, the only way for a lawyer to become 
officially established in another Member State was through integration into the pro-
fession of the host Member State. This could only be avoided in those States where 
certain legal activities could be exercised by non-lawyers or where lawyers managed 
to (ab)use the provisions on the free provision of services in order to realise an 
installation limitée. From 1989 this modality was governed by Directive 89/48/EEC. 
As of 20 October 2007, Directive 89/48/EEC has been replaced by Directive 
2005/36/EC. In the previous chapter it was established that this modality of the 
free movement of lawyers has a structure that can be represented as shown in figure 
9 on the next page. 
In the following paragraph a number of issues will be reviewed. Firstly, I will 
assess the present situation of persons who are not lawyers who exercise legal activi-
ties in Member States with a lesser degree of regulation but who seek establishment 
in a Member State with a higher degree of regulation. After that, a review will be 
given of the rules in force that relate to this modality in the fifteen Member States 
selected.  
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Figure 9: Integration in the host Member State profession 
 
 
 
§ 5.1 Diploma Recognition for Non-Lawyers in Highly 
Regulated Member States  
Similar to the other two modalities, this paragraph will assess whether persons who 
exercise legal activities in Member States with a lesser degree of regulation may utilise 
this modality in order to establish themselves in a Member State where such activity 
is reserved for the lawyer’s profession. The new Directive 2005/36/EC caters for 
this category in a similar manner to the old Directive 89/48/EEC, and similarly to 
Article 5 of Directive 2005/36/EC which is applicable to the free movement of 
services. Article 13 of Directive 2005/36/EC states that where a candidate seeks access 
to a regulated profession in a Member State, and where his profession is not regulated 
in his home Member State, he will be allowed mutual recognition if he has exercised 
the profession for two years in the previous ten years in the host Member State.1274 In 
addition to that, the candidate must supply evidence in the form of an attestation of 
professional competence which is to be issued by a competent authority in the home 
Member State. This must establish that the candidate has a level of qualification that 
                                                  
1274 Article 13(2) Directive 2005/36/EC. 
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candidate the 
nationality of 
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candidate 
fully qualified 
as lawyer in 
his home 
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Yes 
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lawyer seek 
full entrance 
to the legal 
profession of 
the host MS? 
Yes 
Is the lawyer 
willing to take 
an aptitude 
test?
Yes 
The lawyer may integrate immediately into the legal 
profession of the host MS after successfully completing an 
aptitude test in the sense of Art. 14 Dir.2005/36/EC 
(where this is deemed necessary). The aptitude test may 
not be more demanding than the qualification track in the 
host MS (Commission v. Italy). 
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is at least equivalent to the level required in the host Member State.1275 Additionally, 
the attestation must prove that the candidate has been prepared for the pursuit of the 
profession in question. Irrespective of these rules, compensatory measures may be 
(and will be) imposed.1276 
From this short review it becomes clear that the rules applying to the establish-
ment of non-lawyers are not easy to fulfil. First of all, the mere right to have one’s 
diploma recognised is qualified. Not every professional who exercises legal activities 
in a non-regulated manner in a Member State with a lesser degree of integration may 
apply for diploma recognition. Only those candidates who have a qualification level 
that is equal to, or one level below, the level required in the host Member State (in 
connection to the profession of the lawyer the level is at least one of a university 
education and almost always an ensuing professional education) can benefit from 
the rules laid down in Articles 13 and 14 of Directive 2005/36/EC. The rest cannot 
rely on the provisions of the Directive (although nothing precludes the application 
of the principles laid down in Gebhard and Vlassopoulou). Secondly, formal require-
ments must be fulfilled. If the non-lawyer can produce the requested attestations, 
integration remains by no means guaranteed. The only thing that is established at 
that point is the mere right to have one’s qualification recognised. Nothing precludes 
the host Member State from imposing compensatory measures, which will be the 
general rule in such cases since, as was already established earlier, there are substan-
tial differences between qualifications in the host and home Member State because 
of the different legal systems. Since all Member States have opted for an aptitude 
test it is clear that non-lawyers will be confronted with an aptitude test. This test, 
which will allow them to practise, will essentially be the test that is imposed on other 
lawyers that seek entrance into the profession of the host Member State. This might 
be too much for those non-lawyers who restrict their activities in their home Member 
State to the provision of legal advice. A non-lawyer might therefore seek a more 
limited entrance into the profession of the host Member State, namely limited to 
those activities that the non-lawyer previously exercised in his home Member State. 
This could be achieved by reliance upon the Caminos case1277 where the European 
Court of Justice accepted that the extent of integration in the host Member State’s 
profession, and therewith the extent of the aptitude test, could be limited upon re-
quest of the candidate. In effect, application of the Caminos case would lead to the 
result that upon the application for integration of non-lawyers from other Member 
States, the host Member State would be obliged to create a sub-level of lawyers 
who are restricted in their activity. How this would be solved in practice (use of 
professional title, notification of public) is unclear. With regard to the aptitude test 
itself, it is clear that the rules laid down in the Commission v. Italy case1278 apply to 
                                                  
1275 Article 11 Directive 2005/36/EC. 
1276 Article 14 Directive 2005/36/EC. 
1277  Case 330/03 Colegio de Ingenieros de Caminos, Canales y Puertos, [2006] ECR I-00801. In this 
case the Court accepted that instead of applying compensatory measures laid down in Article 4 
of the Diploma Directive, the competent authority can also allow a candidate, at the latter’s 
own request, partial access to the profession in question, in order to provide access to at least a 
portion of the profession. The reason behind this ruling lies in the intimidating character and 
often far reaching consequences of applying compensatory measures. 
1278  Case C-145/99 Commission of the European Community v. Italian Republic, [2002] ECR I-
02235. 
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this issue, i.e., that the aptitude test may not be more demanding than the qualifica-
tion track designated for domestic candidates. How that rule must be applied in 
situations like this is also unclear. Due to the extensive burdens that integration 
through this route entails, very few, if any, people would use this modality. Graph-
ically this modality would look as follows: 
 
Figure 10: Integration in the host Member State including non lawyers 
 
§ 5.2 Implementation of the (New) Diploma Directive in the 
Member States 
Although it was established that integration on the basis of the third modality, i.e., 
integration through application of the Diploma Directive, would only have residual 
importance because of the provisions of Article 10 of Directive 98/5/EC, a review 
of its implementation is still warranted, albeit merely for the sake of completeness. 
In consequence of it being established that Directive 2005/36/EC does not bring 
changes to the system for integration of lawyers, it is therefore unlikely that Member 
States will (considerably) change their implementation devices that sought to imple-
ment Directive 89/48/EEC for their legal professions. It is these mechanisms that 
will be reviewed in this paragraph. 
 
Sweden 
In Sweden Section 2 of Chapter 8 of the Rättegångsbalken lays down rules in connec-
tion to the recognition of diplomas of those prospective advokats who want to enter 
into the legal profession of Sweden. These categories are persons who are qualified 
as lawyers in one of the Member States of the European Union or the European 
Economic Area, lawyers from Denmark, Finland, Iceland or Norway, and lawyers 
who have been established in Sweden under their home title for at least three years.1279 
This last category was already dealt with in the light of the implementation of 
Directive 98/5/EC. Any person who is qualified to be a lawyer in one of the Member 
                                                  
1279  Ch. 8 section 2 Rättegångsbalken. 
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251 
States of the European Union or in one of the Member States of the European 
Economic Area has to pass a test which shows he has sufficient knowledge of the 
Swedish legal system to enter the legal profession of the advokat.1280 If a lawyer has 
passed that test he shall be deemed to have fulfilled the criteria regarding the profi-
ciency tests and the practical and theoretical training mentioned above. The lawyer 
still has to convince the advokatsamfund that he has the integrity to become an advo-
kat and that there are no other circumstances that render him unfit to be an advokat. 
Lawyers who are trained in Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway are eligible to 
become Swedish advokats when they have worked for at least three years, in a satis-
factory manner, as an assistant lawyer in a Swedish law office. When a lawyer has 
fulfilled those three years he will be deemed to have fulfilled the criteria for educa-
tion, training, integrity and other incompatibilities.1281  
 
Finland 
Section 3 of the Advocates Act in Finland regulates the access of those prospective 
advokats or asianajajas who have completed the education necessary to become a law-
yer in another Member State of the European Union. Subsection 2 states that any 
national of a Member State of the European Economic Area (Member States of the 
EU included) who is entitled to practise in his home Member State may gain access 
to the legal profession of Finland.1282 In such cases, a candidate must show that he 
has sufficient knowledge of Finnish legislation and of legal practice in Finland, by 
means of passing an examination that is organised by the Finnish Bar Association.1283 
After passing this exam the lawyer will have fulfilled the second criterion of the 
three criteria for the profession of the lawyer as was reviewed earlier in this chapter, 
so the fact that he must generally be eligible for the lawyer’s profession and the fact 
that he may not be bankrupt or in any other way legally incapacitated must still be 
reviewed by the Finnish Bar Association. 
 
Denmark 
Denmark has no rules with respect to an aptitude test. After implementation of 
Directive 98/5/EC, a working period at least three years, either as a lawyer (under 
home country professional title) or working for at least three years with the Department 
of Justice or the police, is the only way to integrate into the Danish legal profes-
sion.1284 Originally, Denmark was the only State1285 that opted for an adaptation 
period rather than the aptitude test that was adopted by all other Member States.1286 
Apparently, the Danish authorities succumbed to the influence of other Member 
                                                  
1280  Ch. 8 section 2 Rättegångsbalken. 
1281  Ch. 8 section 2 Rättegångsbalken. 
1282  Section 3(2) Advocates Act. 
1283  Section 3(2) Advocates Act. The by-laws of the Finnish Bar Association stipulate that this 
examination shall be organised by the Faculty of Law of the University of Helsinki according 
to the rules of the Decree on the Recognition of Diplomas of Citizens of States in the Euro-
pean Economic Area (1993/1622).  
1284  See <www.ciriusonline.dk/Default.aspx?ID=6824>, last accessed 24 April 2008. Cirius is the 
Danish agency that overlooks the recognition of qualifications in Denmark. 
1285  Apparently because it was at that time still possible to become a Danish lawyer by vocational 
training alone. 
1286  Torbøl & Worsøe, (1993) p. 115. 
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States and sought to introduce an aptitude test later, although no implementation of 
it has been witnessed.1287 Whatever seemed to be the case before the implementation 
of Directive 98/5/EC, after the implementation the Danish authorities returned to 
the point where an adaptation period was issued rather than an aptitude test which 
would henceforth lead to integration into the host Member State’s profession. 
Denmark is thus the only Member State that has recognised that the aptitude test 
has become completely superfluous under the new system. 
 
United Kingdom 
The six legal professions observed in the United Kingdom regulate access of other 
qualified lawyers from EU Member States by means of an aptitude test. Each of the 
professions has its own instrument on the basis of the rules of the aptitude test laid 
down. In all cases, rules are laid down on a professional level, i.e. the different com-
petent authorities have laid down their rules with regard to the test. Qualified lawyers 
can enter the English and Welsh profession of the solicitor by means of a Qualified 
Lawyers Transfer Test (QLTT) which covers property law, litigation, professional con-
duct, accounts and the principles of common law.1288 Access to the Bar in England 
and Wales is also governed by an aptitude test, but no further details are available.1289 
No document could be retrieved for access to the solicitor’s profession in Northern 
Ireland but undoubtedly the Law Society of Northern Ireland will govern access to 
its profession by means of a QLTT.1290 Access to the Bar in Northern Ireland for 
European lawyers is governed by the Honorable Society of the Inn of Court of 
Northern Ireland that has laid down detailed rules for application for the aptitude 
test, but not for the test itself.1291 The Law Society of Scotland also imposes an 
aptitude test for the solicitor’s profession that covers the law of property, trust and 
sucessions and family law, the Scottish legal system, evidence, civil and criminal pro-
cedure, European Community law and Institutions, and professional conduct and 
account rules.1292 The Faculty of Advocates also imposes an aptitude test which 
covers; the Scots legal system; constitutional and administrative law; trust and suc-
cession and/or property and conveyancing and/or bankruptcy and diligence (two 
out of three must be chosen), criminal law and one out of delict and quasi-delict or 
contract and quasi-contract. Additionally, the candidate must pass the Faculty 
examination covering evidence, pleading, practice and professional conduct.1293  
                                                  
1287  See Schneider (1995), p. 320.  
1288  The Law Society: Qualified Lawyers Transfer Regulations 1990 via. <www.lawsociety.org>, 
last accessed 27 November 2007. 
1289  The Bar Council: Registration as a European Lawyer. Via <www.barcouncil.org>, last accessed 
27 November 2007. 
1290  See also: Schneider (1995), p. 348. 
1291  Rules of the Honourable Society of the Inn of Court of Northern Ireland with regard to the 
Admission of Students into the Society and to the degree of Barrister at Law with regard to the 
admission of practising Members of the Bar of England and Wales and of the Bar of Ireland to 
the Degree of Barrister at Law and with regard to the Call to the Bar of Northern Ireland by 
virtue of EC Directive 89/48/EEC and with regard to Cessation and Resumption of Practice, 
via <www.barlibrary.com>, last accessed 27 November 2007. 
1292  Aptitude test for EU Qualified lawyers, via <www.lawscot.org>, last accessed 27 November 
2007. 
1293  Faculty of Advocates, Regulations as to Intrants, December 2006. 
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Ireland 
Recognition of foreign qualifications in Ireland is similar to the recognition of 
foreign qualifications as they are observed in the United Kingdom. Each of the two 
professions governs its own scheme for the admittance of lawyers who gained their 
professional qualifications in another Member State of the European Union or even 
in a non-Member State. The Qualified Lawyers Transfer Test (QLTT) regulates access 
for lawyers who gained their professional qualifications outside Ireland.1294 The 
QLTT must be taken by all lawyers qualified in any Member State of the European 
Union (alongside a number of other jurisdictions) where the Law Society decides 
that their professional qualifications are not equivalent to the Irish qualifications. 
There is an exception for solicitors qualified in England and Wales or Northern Ire-
land who may gain admittance to the profession of the solicitor in Ireland without 
any further restrictions.1295 The QLTT takes place twice a year at the headquarters 
of the Law Society in Dublin.1296 The test encompasses constitutional and company 
law or constitutional law and criminal law, contract and tort, land law and convey-
ancing, professional conduct, probate and tax, solicitor’s accounts and European 
Union law. No mention is made of the language in which the QLTT is taken, but 
everything seems to indicate that the QLTT is taken in English, and not in Irish 
(Gaelic).  
The barrister’s profession has its own aptitude test in order to facilitate the entrance 
to the profession by lawyers who have gained professional qualifications in other 
Member States of the European Union. A lawyer who seeks admittance to the pro-
fession of the barrister in Ireland must apply to the Council of the King’s Inn.1297 
The Council will then assess the professional qualifications of the lawyer concerned. 
Based on that assessment the Council may take a number of different decisions. The 
Council can deny the application,1298 approve the application, or make the approval 
of the application subject to the passing of all or part of the aptitude test.1299 The 
aptitude test consists of a written section dedicated to the Irish legal system and con-
stitutional law, the law of tort and contract and a choice between property law or 
criminal law. In addition, there is an oral part that focuses on legal practice and 
procedure, advocacy and the Code of Conduct for the Bar of Ireland.1300 Every-
thing seems to indicate that the aptitude test takes place in the English language. 
 
The Netherlands 
The method by which integration takes place into the profession of the advocaat in 
the Netherlands is through obtaining one’s diploma in another Member State, and 
having it recognised as equivalent to the Dutch diploma on the basis of Directive 
                                                  
1294  See Hartnett (1993), pp 183-184 and Schneider (1995), pp. 329-330. 
1295  The Law Society of Ireland (s.d.) B. Barristers from those jurisdictions must sit the QLTT. 
1296  Ibid. 
1297  Hartnett (1993), p. 184. 
1298  It seems unclear how an application can be refused if the applicant lawyer fulfils the criteria for 
the legal profession in his home Member State. The Vlassopoulou judgment gives EU citizens the 
right to have their professional qualifications recognised. A denial can, in my view, only then take 
place if a person who applies turns out not to be qualified as a lawyer in his home Member State.  
1299  Ibid. 
1300  Ibid. 
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89/48/EEC,1301 and therewith integrating into the Dutch legal profession. Accord-
ing to Article 2 of the Advocatenwet, in addition to this route, persons who have 
received an EC declaration on the basis of the laws implementing the Diploma 
Directive and its counterparts1302 can be eligible for registration as an advocaat.1303 
The rules in connection with acquiring an EC declaration are laid down in a number 
of hierarchically sorted rulings (i.e., an Act of Parliament, a Ministerial Ruling, and 
two rulings of the Orde). Article 11 of the Algemene Wet erkenning EG-hoger-onder-
wijsdiploma’s,1304 was specifically created in order to implement Directive 89/48/ 
EEC in the Netherlands, and it provides that the relevant Minister shall issue rules 
with regard to either the adaptation period or the aptitude test which gives access 
to that specific profession.1305 With respect to the profession of the lawyer, these 
rules have been laid down in the Regeling EG-verklaring advocaten1306 (hereinafter 
Regeling), issued by the Minister of Justice, who is the relevant Minister in respect 
of lawyers. Article 2 of the Regeling specifies the documents a prospective advocaat is 
expected to provide with his application for an EC declaration. It also states that 
such an application shall be directed towards the Algemene Raad of the Orde.1307 Arti-
cle 3 of the Regeling lays down more of the procedure. If the Orde is of the opinion 
that the applicant’s diploma, which has been awarded in his home Member State, is 
comparable, both in length and in content, then the applicant will be granted the EC 
declaration.1308 If the Orde is of the opinion that discrepancies exist in respect of dura-
tion and content of the diploma awarded in the home Member State, which is 
more often the case than not, then the Orde will issue a probationary EC declara-
tion. After that, the Orde will set additional educational requirements that need to 
be fulfilled in order for a definitive EC declaration to be issued.1309 The additional 
educational requirements set by the probationary EC declaration must be fulfilled 
by means of following additional courses and finishing them by passing an examin-
ation.1310 This examination will be conducted in Dutch, and the language proficiency 
of the candidate will be taken into account in the grading of the examination.1311 If 
a candidate passes the examination, the Orde will issue a definitive EC declaration. 
The Orde has also laid down rules for this examination: a Verordening,1312 and a Regle-
ment.1313 In the Verordening, it is stated that the Algemene Raad of the Orde shall issue a 
                                                  
1301  [1989] OJ L 19/16. 
1302  Directive 91/52/EEC [1992] OJ L 209/25 and Directive 99/42/EC [1999] OJ L 201/77. 
1303 Article 2(1) Advocatenwet. 
1304  Algemene wet erkenning EG-hoger-onderwijsdiploma’s, 19-01-1994, Stb. 1994, 29 (General law for 
the recognition of EC higher education diplomas). 
1305 Article 11 Algemene wet erkenning EG-hoger-onderwijsdiploma’s. 
1306  Regeling EG-verklaring advocaten, 31-10-1994, Stcrt. 1994, 215 (Regulation EC-declaration lawyers). 
1307 Article 2 Regeling. 
1308 Article 3(2a) Regeling. 
1309 Article 3(2b)-(3) Regeling. 
1310 Article 3(4) Regeling. 
1311 Article 3(6) Regeling. 
1312  Verordening op de proeve van bekwaamheid als bedoeld in de algemene wet erkenning EG-
hoger-onderwijsdiploma’s, 25 November 1994, Stcrt. 1994, 249. (Regulation with regard to the 
aptitude test). 
1313  Reglement op de proeve van bekwaamheid als bedoeld in de algemene wet erkenning EG-
hoger-orderwijsdiploma’s, 14 October 1996, Stcrt. 1996, 216. (Rules with regard to the aptitude 
test). 
255 
Reglement in which it states how the aptitude test shall be arranged.1314 In this Regle-
ment, it is stated that nine professional fields can be the subject of an examination 
(this is of course dependent upon the discrepancies between the diploma awarded in 
the home Member State, and the diploma in the Netherlands). These subjects are 
civil law, criminal law, administrative law, divorce law, labour law, bankruptcy law, 
company law, tax law and rules of deontology.1315 After a candidate has passed both 
the written1316 and oral1317 part of the examination, then the EC declaration will be 
awarded to him after he pays a fee of € 159.1318 
 
Belgium 
The Gerechtelijk Wetboek in Belgium specifies a number of alternative routes to 
qualification as an avocat by the method described at the beginning of this chapter. 
Article 428bis of the Gerechtelijk Wetboek states that lawyers who gained their quali-
fications in another Member State of the European Union may consequently enter 
the profession of the avocat. The Article states that lawyers who have obtained a 
qualification to work as a lawyer in another Member State can integrate into the 
profession of the avocat on the condition that the candidate fulfils a number of con-
ditions. These conditions are; the prospective avocat must be able to prove that he is 
entitled to exercise the lawyer’s profession in another Member State of the Euro-
pean Union.1319 In addition to that requirement, he must also prove his decent 
behaviour, the fact that he has never gone bankrupt, and the fact that no incidents 
have ever occurred that could lead to the situation where the prospective avocat is 
no longer able to exercise the profession of the avocat (either temporarily or perma-
nently). Incidents that are meant in this case are serious faults regarding the exercise 
of the lawyer’s profession, or felonies committed by the prospective avocat. In addition 
to the things mentioned above, a prospective avocat must also produce a list of subjects 
that he has dealt with in order to obtain a degree in another Member State.1320 When 
the lawyer has fulfilled the above named criteria he must take an aptitude test, if the 
subject matter of the lawyer’s own degree differs substantively from the Belgian 
licenciaat (Belgian law degree).1321 Clearly this criterion applies to the majority of 
lawyers who seek integration in the Belgian legal profession. After all these criteria 
have been fulfilled, the prospective avocat may take the oath. Article 428bis regulates 
on which list the integrating lawyer is to be placed. The Article states that if a law-
yer has followed a stage in his home Member State in order to qualify as a lawyer, 
or where such a stage is not prescribed in order to enter the legal profession of the 
                                                  
1314 Article 2 Verordening. 
1315 Article 2 Reglement. 
1316 Article 5 Reglement. 
1317 Article 6 Reglement. 
1318 Article 8 Reglement. 
1319 Article 428bis sub 1 Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
1320 Article 428bis sub 2 Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
1321 Art.428bis sub 3 Gerechtelijk Wetboek. What is remarkable in this case is that the Gerechtelijk 
Wetboek refers to the Belgian licenciaat, i.e., the law degree, and not to the total amount of 
education that an avocat receives before he is considered a produit fini, namely the licenciaat, the 
experience gathered in the stage, and the CAPA (the Bar exam). The Diploma Directive 
focuses on these produits fini whereas the Belgian authorities focus more on the licenciaat alone.  
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lawyer’s home Member State,1322 he is exempted from the obligation to follow a 
stage in Belgium and can be entered on the Tableau immediately. The Article states 
that in all other cases the prospective avocat who has taken the oath will be listed on 
the list of stagiaires.1323 
Remarkably, the Belgian Gerechtelijk Wetboek contains a number of detailed pro-
visions with regard to the aptitude test. In the other jurisdictions reviewed these 
detailed provisions are often reserved for legislation on a lower level, or even for 
regulation by professional bodies. This can be characterised as a form of regulation 
that is akin to self-regulation, as is the case in the Netherlands. The reason why this 
level of detail is created at a federal level is possibly explained by the fact that the 
Belgian legal profession is very decentralised, and that the local Bars have much 
autonomy in the exercise of the legal profession in the jurisdiction of their Bar. Article 
428ter Gerechtelijk Wetboek states that the Flemish and the Walloon Bar Associations 
shall be the competent authorities to deal with requests for the aptitude test to in-
tegrate prospective lawyers into the Belgian legal profession. The second paragraph 
states further that the documents which the prospective avocat must produce, which 
were dealt with above, must be delivered either in Dutch, French or German, or, 
according to the third paragraph, they must be accompanied by a certified trans-
lation in one of these languages. The fourth paragraph states that there is a certain 
fee, prescribed by the Minister of Justice, which may be requested but will not ex-
ceed the average costs of such a request. The fifth paragraph provides more clarity 
on the processing of the request for integration. The Bar Association that is the 
competent authority (depending on the Bar where access is sought, the Flemish or 
the Walloon Bar Association) examines the dossier as it is provided by the candidate, 
and within four months the Bar Association will inform the candidate whether or not 
an aptitude test must be taken. When the Bar Association decides that an aptitude 
test must be taken, it will inform the candidate of the subjects in which he is re-
quired to take a test.1324 The remainder of Article 428ter is devoted to the possibility 
                                                  
1322  As is the case in Spain. 
1323  The latter part of this article is not clear. At first sight it implies that those who are still in the 
process of qualifying as a lawyer in another Member State can also benefit from these 
integration procedures. That primary observation is supported by the fact that the question of 
whether a lawyer must taken an aptitude test is answered by comparison with the licenciaat 
alone. This observation, i.e., that a person who is still in the process of qualifying as a lawyer in 
his home Member State (because there are the other situations: Member States where a stage is 
prescribed, but where the prospective lawyer has not fulfilled this obligation) can take an 
aptitude test in Belgium, take the oath, and complete his stage in Belgium, is, however, not 
true. The first subparagraph of Article 428bis states clearly that only those who are qualified as 
lawyers in another Member State are eligible to benefit from this provision. It remains thus 
unclear who are the persons envisioned by the Belgian lawmaker when this part of Article 
428bis was drafted. 
1324  Curiously enough a sub-sentence of paragraph 5 states that if no decision from the Bar Asso-
ciation is received by the candidate, that automatically means that he must take an aptitude test. If 
this eventuality occurs the candidate himself decides in which subjects he should take the aptitude 
test. He will inform the Bar Association of the result of that test. I fail to see the rationale of this 
extra sentence in so far as I can understand that the sentence might have been included as a 
safeguard against administrative laziness, but I see no other practical use for this sentence. 
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of, and the procedure for, appeal against a decision of the Bar Association regarding 
integration into the Belgian legal profession.1325 
The matter of the aptitude test itself is regulated by Article 428quater Gerechtelijk 
Wetboek. Paragraph 1 of the Article states that the aptitude test will only deal with 
the knowledge of the prospective avocat in order to ascertain whether or not the 
candidate has enough knowledge to integrate into the Belgian legal profession. The 
paragraph further states that the aptitude test will consist of a written and an oral 
part, and that the test is passed when a total of 60 per cent or more of the points are 
awarded. Candidates can re-sit any subjects they have failed three times. Paragraph 2 
of the Article contains the actual substance of the aptitude test. The paragraph states 
that the written part of the aptitude test shall consist of a part regarding civil law 
(including civil procedure), a part on penal law (including procedural law) and a 
choice between public law, administrative law, fiscal law, company law and social 
law. The oral part will consist of deontology and any subject failed in the written 
part. Although it is not explicitly stated anywhere, it is at least implied that the 
aptitude test will take place in one of the official Belgian languages (Dutch, French 
or German).1326 The remainder of Article 428quater1327 is devoted to the examina-
tion committees supervising the aptitude test and is of little concern to this study. 
The remainder of the section in the Gerechtelijk Wetboek regarding the aptitude 
test1328 deals with the appeal against a decision of either the Bar Association or the 
exam committee and is also of little importance to this study. Apart from some 
ambiguous wordings in the relevant articles of the Gerechtelijk Wetboek no apparent 
inconsistencies appear to exist with regard to the aptitude test. 
Long before the Diploma Recognition Directive came into force, and even 
before anyone envisioned the establishment Directive that is the focal point of this 
book, the Brussels Bar devised a mechanism that provided for limited establishment 
for foreign lawyers. This is the so-called Liste B1329 that was created by the Brussels 
Bar in 1984.1330 The ‘Liste B’ provides for the possibility for foreign to lawyers 
exercise, to a certain extent, the profession of the lawyer within the jurisdiction of 
Brussels. Lawyers who are on the ‘Liste B’ may work in conjunction with avocats 
who are a member of the Brussels Bar. When a lawyer has been on the ‘Liste B’ for a 
period of at least three years, he may engage in a partnership with Brussels avocats.1331 
The ‘Liste B’ is not really a means of integration into the legal profession of Bel-
gium, but it provides for a form of controlled establishment under home title. The 
list is no longer used for European lawyers since the implementation of the Estab-
lishment Directive. 
 
                                                  
1325  § 6-§ 10 Article 428ter Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
1326  § 4 of 428quater states that the German aptitude test will be supervised by the French exam-
ination committee. That sentence at least implies that there are three different aptitude tests: 
Dutch, French and German. 
1327  §§ 3-5 428quater. 
1328 Articles 428quinquies-428decies Gerechtelijk Wetboek. 
1329 Article 273 of the Statutes of the Brussels Bar. 
1330  See Philippe & Roberts (1993), pp. 73-74. 
1331  Ibid. 
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Luxembourg 
Luxembourg has a separate system for the recognition of diplomas on the basis of 
Directive 89/48/EEC. This system is laid down in a separate law.1332 Article 1 of 
the recognition law states that any lawyer from a Member State of the European 
Union who is allowed to practise in that Member State may integrate into Luxem-
bourg’s legal profession by means of an aptitude test, the details of which are laid 
down in that respective law.1333 The aptitude test shall consist of a written and an 
oral part.1334 The written part shall comprise of questions regarding civil law (in-
cluding procedural law), penal law (including procedural law) and at the choice of 
the candidate either administrative or commercial law. The oral part shall consist of 
questions regarding deontology and re-sits of the written exam, where applicable.1335 
After the lawyer has completed both parts of the aptitude test he will be awarded a 
certificate1336 that allows him to request entry into Luxembourg’s legal profession. 
That access will be granted after it has been affirmed that the candidate has the 
honour and morality required for a lawyer, that he has never been declared bank-
rupt nor committed any grave professional mistakes.1337 After the lawyer has taken 
the oath in front of the Cour de Cassation he will be included in ‘Liste I’ of the rele-
vant tableau.1338 Because of the fact that Article 5 of the Avocat law precludes any 
non-avocats from exercising professional activities that have been reserved for 
avocats, a solution with regard to establishment under home title as was observed in 
connection to the ‘Liste B’ in Belgium, does not occur in Luxembourg. 
 
France 
Aside from the numerous derogations that are possible in the general route to 
becoming an avocat in France (as was described earlier in this chapter), an important 
derogation that must be given special attention is the recognition of foreign diplomas. 
This recognition is laid down in Article 99 of the décret du 27 novembre 1991. The 
Article states that anyone who is allowed to practise as a lawyer in other Member 
States of the European Union (or the EEA) may accede to the profession of the 
avocat without having to fulfil the conditions described in the previous sub-para-
graph.1339 The Conseil national des barreaux will deal with applications for entry to 
the profession of the avocat under the regime of Article 99, and will prescribe an 
aptitude test when the education necessary for becoming a lawyer in the other 
Member State concerned differs substantially from the education in France.1340 The 
aptitude test (the subjects are indicated by the Conseil national) shall consist of a 
written and an oral part, and will be taken before a jury of the CRFPA of the can-
                                                  
1332  Loi du 10 août 1991, determinant, pour la profession d’avocat le système général de recon-
naissance des diplômes d’enseignement supérieur qui sanctionnent des formations professionelles 
d’une durée minimale de trois ans, Memorial Journal Officiel Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, 
Recueil de Legislation, A-No 58, 27 août 1991. Hereinafter referred to as the Recognition law. 
1333 Article 1 Recognition law. 
1334 Article 7 Recognition law. 
1335 Article 8 Recognition law. 
1336 Article 11-12 Recognition law. 
1337 Article 13 Recognition law. 
1338 Article 14-15 Recognition law. 
1339 Article 99 of the décret du 27 novembre 1991. 
1340  This will of course be the case in the majority of applications. 
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didate’s choice (which depends, of course, on the Bar chosen by the candidate).1341 
The aptitude test cannot be taken more than three times.1342 
 
Italy 
In Italy, a lawyer who is qualified in a Member State of the European Union can have 
his diploma recognised under the Italian implementation of Directive 89/48/EEC.1343 
Articles 8 to 12 of the Decreto Legislativo regulate the aptitude test that needs to be 
taken by lawyers from other Member States of the European Union in order to in-
tegrate into the Italian legal profession. The manner in which the Italian aptitude 
test is conducted was also a subject of the Article 226 EC case against Italy.1344 The 
Commission argued that the aptitude test was discriminatory since it is more elabo-
rate, and therefore more difficult than the Italian Bar Exam.1345 Although the Advo-
cate General disagreed with the Commission’s view,1346 the Court ruled that the 
provisions in the Decreto Legislativo were too general to be viewed as a correct 
implementation of Directive 89/48/EEC since there are no specific rules for the 
aptitude test that needs to be taken by lawyers who seek entry to the Italian legal 
profession. The Court therefore ruled that the Italian implementation of Directive 
89/48/EEC was in violation of the Directive.1347 In reaction to this judgment, the 
relevant Italian ministers created a Decreto which laid down more detailed rules for 
the aptitude test for the profession of the avvocato, therewith complying with the 
recommendations of the Court in case C-145/99.1348 
 
Spain 
The first method by which a lawyer from a different Member State can become a 
member of the Spanish legal profession is via the implementation of Directive 89/ 
48/EEC. This Directive is implemented in Spain by means of a Real Decreto (Royal 
Decree)1349 and a number of lower-level regulations. The Real Decreto lays down 
the general rules for the implementation of Directive 89/48/EEC. This Real Decreto 
is rather non-specific and offers no detailed information on the legal professions, 
apart from the fact that there are no less than ten legal and economist regulated 
                                                  
1341 Article 4 of the arrêté du 7 janvier 1993 portant application de l’article 99 du décret du 27 
novembre 1991. 
1342 Article 99 of the décret du 27 novembre 1991. It is doubtfull whether this rule can be 
maintained under EU law. 
1343  Decreto Legislativo 27 gennaio 1992, n. 115, Attuazione della direttiva n. 89/48/CEE relative 
ad un sistema generale di riconoscimento dei diplomi di instruzione superiore che sanzionano for-
mazioni professionali di durata minima di tre anni, Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 40 del 18 febbraio 1992.  
1344  Case C-145/99. 
1345  § 57 of A-G Stix-Hackl’s opinion in case C-145/99. 
1346  § 79 of A-G Stix-Hackl’s opinion in case C-145/99. 
1347  § 57 Case C-145/99. 
1348  Decreto 28 maggio 2003, Regolamento di cui all’articolo 9 del decreto legislativo 27 gennaio 
1992, n. 115, in materia di prova attitudinale per l’esercizio della professione di avvocato, Gazzetta 
Ufficiale 25 luglio 2003, n. 171. 
1349  Real Decreto 1665/1991, de 25 de octubre, por el que se regula el Sistema General de 
Reconocimiento de los títulos de Enseñanza Superior de los Estados miembros de la Comunidad 
Económica Europea que exigen una formación mínima de tres años de duración, BOE 
280/1991 de 22-11-1991, p. 37916. 
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professions, among them the professions of the abogado and procurador.1350 More 
detailed information in connection with these latter professions is laid down in 
lower level regulation, in an Orden (ministerial level regulation).1351 This Orden deals 
exclusively with the profession of the abogado and procurador. For both professions 
the Orden prescribes an aptitude test.1352 Without going into too much detail on 
the aptitude test, it must be observed that the test for the profession of the procurador 
is less elaborate than the aptitude test for the abogado.1353 Additionally, it must be 
noted that one must be a member of the corresponding profession in another 
Member State in order to benefit from the recognition system as it is laid down in 
the Orden. The corresponding professions are listed in an annex to the Orden and it 
is noteworthy to state that the profession of lawyer as it is listed in Article 1(2) of 
Directive 98/5/EC does not give access to the procurador profession.1354 In the annex 
it is stated that only the professions of the avoué in France, the procureur in the Nether-
lands and the solicitador in Portugal have access to the profession of the procurador. 
Since the profession of the avoué in France has been abolished, it must be assumed 
that only the Dutch and the Portuguese professions have access to the profession of 
the procurador by means of an aptitude test.1355Another important aspect to the recog-
nition of foreign qualifications receives more attention in Spain than in the other 
Member States, namely the recognition of foreign university qualifications. It may 
be evident as to why this recognition is so important in Spain, since a completed 
university education alone gives access to the profession of the abogado. Rules with 
regard to the recognition of university qualifications are laid down in a number of 
regulations.1356 Without elaborating too much on them at this point, it must be 
stated that the recognition of university diplomas also takes place via a test, the so 
                                                  
1350  Anexo I. Relación de profesiones reguladas en España. Real Decreto 1665/1991, de 25 de 
octubre, por el que se regula el Sistema General de Reconocimiento de los títulos de Enseñanza 
Superior de los Estados miembros de la Comunidad Económica Europea que exigen una 
formación mínima de tres años de duración, BOE 280/1991 de 22-11-1991, p. 37916. 
1351  Orden de 30 abril de 1996, por la que se desarrolla el Real Decreto 1665/1991, de 25 de 
octubre, en lo que afecta a las Profesiones de Abogado y Procurador, BOE 112/1996 de 08-
05-1996, p. 15939. 
1352 Articles unidecimo–decimonoveno Orden de 30 abril de 1996, por la que se desarrolla el Real 
Decreto 1665/1991, de 25 de octubre, en lo que afecta a las Profesiones de Abogado y Procurador. 
1353 Article decimocuarto and decimotercero Orden de 30 abril de 1996, por la que se desarrolla el 
Real Decreto 1665/1991, de 25 de octubre, en lo que afecta a las Profesiones de Abogado y 
Procurador, respectively. 
1354  Anexo 1. Orden de 30 abril de 1996, por la que se desarrolla el Real Decreto 1665/1991, de 
25 de octubre, en lo que afecta a las Profesiones de Abogado y Procurador. 
1355 Ibid. 
1356  Real Decreto 86/1987, de 16de enero, por el que se regulan las Condiciones de homologación 
de títulos extranjeros de Educación Superior, BOE 20/1987 de 23-01-1987, p. 1987; Orden 
de 21 de julio de 1995, por la que se establecen los Criterios generales para la realización de 
Pruebas de conjunto previas al la homologación de títulos extranjeros de educación superior, 
BOE 178/1995 de 27-07-1995, p. 22912; Orden ECD/272/2002, de 11 de febrero, para la 
aplicación de lo dispuesto en el Real Decreto 86/1987, de 16 de enero, por el que se regulan 
las condiciones de homologación de títulos extranjeros de educación superior, BOE 40/2002 
de 15-02-2002, p. 6084. 
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called prueba de conjunto.1357 This test must be taken if the diploma in the home 
Member State and the host Member State are not equivalent.1358  
 
Portugal 
Based on the Advogado law it seems that Portugal is not too unfriendly to foreigners 
seeking entrance into the profession of the advogado. The Advogado law states that 
any foreigner who has obtained a diploma in law from a Portuguese university may 
register with the Ordem dos Advogados1359 as long as Portuguese nationals enjoy the 
same right in the home Member State of the foreigner concerned.1360 Due to the 
prohibition against discrimination on grounds of nationality, as laid down in Article 
12 of the EC Treaty, this requirement of reciprocity will at least be fulfilled in all of 
the other Member States of the European Union. Moreover, Brazilian advogados who 
have a law degree from a Brazilian or Portugese university may be registered as 
advogados with the Ordem dos Advogados in Portugal based on the principle of 
reciprocity (i.e., that Portuguese advogados enjoy the same rights in Brazil).1361 
The old Advogado law1362 provided for a separate chapter on the provision of 
services in Portugal by lawyers from other Member States.1363 In this chapter, a 
separate article was devoted to integration into the legal profession of the advogado.1364 
This article is also incorporated in the new Advogado law.1365 Since Chapter V of 
the Advogado law, Capitulo V. Advogados de outros Estados membros de União Europeia, 
incorporates all three modalities of the free movement of lawyers, it is sufficient to 
say at this point that lawyers who seek integration into the legal profession of the 
advogado can do so via an aptitude test.1366 Rules with regard to this aptitude test are 
laid down in a Regulation of the Ordem dos Advogados.1367 The aptitude test consists 
of an oral and a written part, both in Portuguese,1368 and the oral test is to be taken 
when the written test has been passed on the subjects of civil law and procedural 
law, penal law and procedural law, organisation of the judiciary, a choice between 
commercial law or administrative law, and deontology.1369  
                                                  
1357 Article 2 Real Decreto 86/1987, de 16de enero, por el que se regulan las Condiciones de homo-
logación de títulos extranjeros de Educación Superior, BOE 20/1987 de 23-01-1987, p. 1987. 
1358 Ibid. 
1359  Although not mentioned specifically in the article concerned, it is self evident that foreign lawyers 
who are allowed registration via this route must also fulfil the criteria with regard to the Estagio.  
1360 Article 194(1) Advogado law. 
1361 Article 194(2) Advogado law. Contrary to subsection (1) which mentions ‘estrangeiros’ (foreigners), 
subsection (2) speaks about ‘advogados brasileiros’. That presumes that subsection (2) governs 
produits fini from Brazil and registration of these people will be full, i.e. these advogados do not 
have to fulfil the criteria of the estagio in Portugal. 
1362  Decreto-Lei 84/84 de 16 de Março. 
1363 Article 173A–173G Decreto-Lei 84/84 de 16 de Março. 
1364 Article 173G Decreto-Lei 84/84 de 16 de Março. 
1365 Article 200 Advogado law. 
1366  Ibid. 
1367  Regulamento de Registo e Inscrição dos Advogados Provenientes de Outros Estados Membros 
da União Europeia, 07-05-2002 via <www.oa.pt>, last accessed 25 April 2005. 
1368 Article 3(2) Regulamento de Registo e Inscrição dos Advogados Provenientes de Outros Estados 
Membros da União Europeia, 07-05-2002 via <www.oa.pt>, last accessed 25 April 2005. 
1369 Article 7 Regulamento de Registo e Inscrição dos Advogados Provenientes de Outros Estados 
Membros da União Europeia, 07-05-2002 via <www.oa.pt>, last accessed 25 April 2005. 
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Germany 
The implementation of Directive 89/48/EEC in Germany is found in the EuRAG, 
more notably in §§ 16–24. This Directive was implemented in an earlier law1370 
but the German authorities found it preferable to have all the rules in connection 
with lawyers in one law, so the contents of the previous law was transferred to this 
one and the previous law was thus revoked.1371 Paragraph 16 states that anyone who 
is established as a European lawyer in Germany can at any moment in time apply 
for an aptitude test.1372 This part further states that the aptitude test is meant to assess 
the candidate’s capacity to practise as a Rechtsanwalt.1373 The test will consist of a 
combination of compulsory and facultative subjects,1374 and will be conducted in 
both written and oral form in the German language.1375 The candidate can appeal 
against any decision taken by the authority that undertakes the aptitude test.1376 
 
Austria 
Part III Chapter 3 of the EuRAG of Austria deals with integration of lawyers into 
the profession of the Rechtsanwalt under the system of Directive 89/48/EEC. 
Paragraph 24 states that any national of a Member State of the European Union, or 
a national of the European Economic Area, who has a diploma as understood under 
Directive 89/48/EEC is eligible to take an aptitude test in order to become inte-
grated into the profession of the Rechtsanwalt in Austria.1377 The goal of that apti-
tude test is to find out whether a person, who is entitled to exercise the profession 
of the lawyer in either a Member State of the European Union or a Member State 
of the European Economic Area, is able to exercise the profession of the Rechts-
anwalt in Austria.1378 A commission that is attached to an Oberlandesgericht will 
carry out the aptitude test. The commission chosen to take the lawyer’s test will 
depend on the country from which the lawyer originates.1379 Within four months 
of the application, the President of the Commission will decide whether or not to 
allow a candidate to take the aptitude test.1380 With his application for a test, a law-
yer will additionally need to send his diploma, proof that he is allowed to practise in 
his home Member State, proof of nationality of the home Member State, his choice 
of subjects for the test and the fee for the test. Similar to all documentary evidence 
required under the EuRAG, all the above-mentioned documents must be produced 
in German.1381 The President of the Commission can decide to exempt the candi-
                                                  
1370  Gesetz über die Eignungsprüfung für die Zulassung zur Rechtsanwaltschaft, 6 July 1990, BGBl 
I, p. 1349. See extensively: Schneider (1995), pp. 295-304. 
1371  Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Umsetzung von Richtlinien der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft auf dem Gebiet des Berufrechts der Rechtsanwälte., 01 December 1999, Drucksache 
14/2269, p.1. 
1372 § 16 EuRAG. 
1373  § 17 EuRAG. 
1374  § 20 EuRAG. 
1375  § 21 EuRAG. 
1376  § 23 EuRAG. 
1377  § 24 EuRAG. 
1378  § 25 EuRAG. 
1379  § 26 EuRAG. 
1380  § 27 EuRAG. 
1381  § 28 EuRAG. 
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date from one or more subjects because they have been dealt with in his previous 
education.1382 The aptitude test itself will have an oral and a written part.1383 A 
prospective lawyer may retake the aptitude test twice.1384 Aside from the applicable 
paragraphs in the EuRAG, the Rechtsanwaltsprüfungsgesetz is also applicable.1385 After 
the lawyer has successfully completed the aptitude test, he can apply to be registered 
as a Rechtsanwalt in Austria. A lawyer who enters the profession in this manner must 
prove that he is of a trustworthy character.1386 Lastly, Paragraph 37 states that the 
Rechtsanwaltskammern have to cooperate with the competent authorities of the home 
Member State,1387 while Paragraph 38 states that European lawyers may not use the 
designation ‘europaïscher Rechtsanwalt’ when practising as a lawyer in Austria.1388 
 
Greece 
The rules in Greece in connection to the integration of nationals of other Member 
States into the Greek legal profession (whether these persons are already qualified as 
lawyers in their home Member State or not) are rather strict. The general rule for 
integration into the Greek legal profession by persons who are fully qualified as law-
yers in their home Member State is by means of an aptitude test.1389 Kerameos states 
in her article that every (my italics, S.C.) lawyer who seeks to integrate into the 
Greek legal profession may do so after successfully completing the aptitude test. It 
may be clear that under the system of Directive 89/48/EEC that the aptitude test is 
a means of last resort. The Vlassopoulou principle that was included in Directive 
89/48/EEC guarantees that every individual who seeks integration can have his 
qualifications and experience scrutinised, and where necessary, an aptitude test will 
be used in order to fill the gap of knowledge that has been established. The apparently 
automatic way in which an aptitude test is prescribed in Greece seems to indicate 
that such individual scrutiny does not take place in Greece. Schneider has also voiced 
criticism about this in her dissertation regarding the recognition of diplomas.1390 The 
aptitude test consists of both a written and an oral part which is to be undertaken in the 
Greek language, which covers at least civil law (and procedural law), constitutional 
and administrative law, commercial law and rules governing the legal profession. In 
addition to that, a choice must be made between criminal law (including proce-
dural law) and labour law. The aptitude test, which takes place in Athens, can be 
repeated as many times as one likes.1391 
                                                  
1382  § 29 EuRAG. 
1383  § 30, 31 and 32 EuRAG. 
1384  § 33 EuRAG. 
1385  § 34 EuRAG. 
1386  § 35 EuRAG. 
1387  § 37 EuRAG. § 36 is a provision about the oath that must be taken by lawyers and is not of 
importance to this book. 
1388  § 38 EuRAG. 
1389  Kerameos (2001), pp. 349-353. 
1390  Schneider (1995), p. 328. 
1391  Kerameos (2001), pp. 349-353. 
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§ 5.3 Observations and Conclusions 
The recognition of diplomas is the third modality of the free movement of lawyers. 
This modality leads to the full integration of lawyers into the legal profession of the 
host Member State. Recently, the rules regarding diploma recognition were con-
solidated and codified in a new Directive 2005/36/EC which replaces, among other 
instruments, Directive 89/48/EEC (which was reviewed in the previous chapter). 
It was established that Directive 2005/36/EC can apply to professionals who exer-
cise legal activities in Member States with a lesser degree of regulation if they seek 
to integrate themselves into the legal professions of those Member States which 
reserve such activity for lawyers. They can rely on the Directive if they fulfil the 
criteria of Article 13 of Directive 2005/36EC, and if substantial differences between 
home and host qualifications are established, the integration will depend on the 
successful completion of an aptitude test. In theory such a test would cover entrance 
to the legal profession of the host Member State, but, according to the European 
Court of Justice in the Caminos case, the extent of the test (and of the integration 
therefore) can be limited upon request of the candidate. In theory this could lead to 
new professions in the host Member State, e.g. where a Dutch juridisch adviseur 
(which is not a regulated activity) integrates into the French profession but only for 
the provision of legal advice: He will enter the profession of the avocat but his 
activities will be limited to the provision of legal advice. In this way, the abolished 
profession of conseil juridique would effectively be revived. 
In the previous chapter it was established that Directive 2005/36/EC did not 
bring about changes to the system of diploma recognition for lawyers. This also 
meant that it was unlikely that Member States would change their implementation 
mechanisms that were already in place after the implementation of Directive 89/ 
48/EEC. Therefore, this review has been limited to these mechanisms. No major 
violations were established. In the previous paragraph it was established that the 
result of this modality was that integration into the legal profession of the host Member 
State could also be achieved through application for establishment under home 
country professional title. Integration into the host Member State’s legal profession 
can be achieved without undertaking the aptitude test, and as was established in the 
previous part, this leaves discretionary room for the host Member State and can be 
a demanding hurdle for the candidate involved.1392 For these reasons, it was estab-
lished that integration through this modality will be residual and will only be inter-
esting for those candidates who can establish early integration (earlier than the three 
years prescribed in Directive 98/5/EC) and can evade the aptitude test (largely or 
completely) because they have already gained sufficient knowledge of the host 
Member State’s profession.1393  
 
 
                                                  
1392  Although the ECJ in Commission v. Italy implicated that it cannot be more demanding. 
1393  It is often forgotten, not least by competent authorities, that application of an aptitude test is 
secondary to an assessment of the candidate’s knowledge. Only where substantial differences are 
established should compensatory measures be imposed in order to cover the lacunae established. 
Application of the aptitude test is therefore by no means automatic, but more a custom-made 
solution for individual candidates. 
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§ 6. Third-Country Nationals 
The last category of lawyers included in the model presented at the end of the pre-
vious chapter, are the third-country national lawyers who seek to exercise their free 
movement rights. Graphically their situation can be represented as follows: 
 
Figure 11: Third Country Nationals 
 
 
 
It was established that these individuals have only a very weak position, which 
nonetheless deserves closer scrutiny in this chapter. Additionally, there are a set of 
rules on the international plane that might be beneficial for this category of lawyers, 
namely the rules laid down in GATS. Although an extensive review of the GATS 
rules would fall outside the scope of this book, some space must be devoted to a 
short characterisation of these rules and to the questions of ‘if’ and ‘how’ these rules 
interconnect with the European rules forming the central issue of this book. In 
addition, it must be mentioned that individual Member States have their own rules 
in connection with third-country nationals and their access to the legal profession, 
and recognition of their qualifications, in the sphere of legal professions. Due to 
their very detailed nature, and their lack of coherence, these rules warrant a book of 
their own. Therefore, these rules will not be reviewed here, apart from one system 
which will be used as an example. 
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Only family 
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23/24 of Dir. 
2004/38/EC and 
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§ 6.1 European Rules Applicable to Third-Country Nationals 
The European rules protecting the exercise of free movement rights of third-country 
nationals were meagre at best. Before 2003, only family members of EU citizens 
who exercised their free movement rights could, through the application of Article 
11 of Regulation 1612/68 (nowadays replaced by article 23 and 24 of Directive 
2004/38/EC), rely on equal treatment in the application of the rules regarding the 
free movement of lawyers, or at least diploma recognition.1394 Since 2003, this equal 
treatment provision has been extended to all third-country nationals who gain the 
status of Long Term Resident (LTR) on the basis of Directive 2003/109/EC.1395 
Article 11(1c) of that Directive states that third-country nationals who gained LTR 
status (on the basis of Article 7 of Directive 2003/109/EC) have the right to equal 
treatment in terms of recognition of professional qualifications according to the 
national rules of the Member State in question. In order to apply European rules to 
this case one must assume that the national rules incorporate the implementation of 
the Directives. 
In the previous part it was established that a view which assumed that equal 
treatment would lead to direct application of the Directives was too short-sighted. 
It was established that for the Diploma Directive to apply, both nationality and a 
European qualification were needed. With regard to the Services and Establishment 
Directives, both nationality and full qualification in one of the professions listed in 
the Directives was necessary for application. It may be clear that the equal treatment 
provision of Article 11(1c) of Directive 2003/109/EC only removes discrimination 
in connection to nationality. Application of the Diploma Directive can, therefore, 
only occur when the third-country national with LTR status has a professional qual-
ification that was obtained in a Member State of the European Union. From the 
wording of Article 11(1c) of Directive 2003/109/EC it is by no means certain that 
the provision extends to the Services Directive and the Establishment Directive, but 
even if it would, the Directives would only apply where the third-country national 
is fully qualified in one of the professions mentioned in the Directives. In addition 
to this, the third-country national with LTR status must establish a cross-border 
element, and the Member State where he obtains LTR status is regarded as his home 
Member State. This means that problems of diploma recognition in the Member 
State where the third-country national has obtained his LTR status must be estab-
lished as a wholly internal situation, which falls outside the scope of European free 
movement rules altogether. 
This leads to the conclusion that protection awarded to third-country nationals 
under European law, even in cases where they have gained the LTR status, is close 
to non-existent. Where third-country nationals with LTR status fall within the scope 
of the free movement protection, they are most likely to do so in a situation that 
was observed for EU nationals with third-country qualifications. This situation, as 
such, does not fall under the Directives but is awarded some protection under the case 
                                                  
1394  Case 131/85, Emir Gül v. Regierungspräsident Düsseldorf, [1986] ECR 1573. 
1395  Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country 
nationals who are long-term residents, [2003] OJ L 016. 
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law of the European Court of Justice. Graphically this situation can be represented 
as follows: 
 
Figure 12: Third-country diplomas 
 
 
 
Application of this model to third-country nationals with LTR status leads to the 
conclusion that the third-country national has at least been awarded the right to 
have his qualifications reviewed, which may later lead to a decision to apply com-
pensatory measures with regard to full integration into the legal profession of another 
Member State other than the one in which the third-country national has obtained 
his LTR status. By no means does this system award the third-country national, with 
LTR status or not, rights to provide legal services or establish himself under home 
country professional title. Whether this would be possible in the event that a third-
country national with LTR status, who is fully qualified as a lawyer in one of the 
Member States of the European Union, would seek to provide services or establish 
himself in another Member State is also questionable, since both the Lawyers Services 
Directive and the Lawyers Establishment Directive also require nationality and Article 
11 of the LTR Directive does not cover these situations.  
Compared with the elaborate system devised for EU nationals it can be con-
cluded that the protection of third-country nationals under European rules is next 
to non-existent. Therefore, it must be assessed whether the rules under the GATS 
offer more protection to this category of lawyers. 
§ 6.2 The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
In 1995 a new international organisation was founded, the World Trade Organisa-
tion (WTO).1396 This new international organisation was founded on the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947) which was meant to be one of the 
substantive legal instruments to be used by the International Trade Organisation 
(ITO).1397 The establishment of the WTO as an international organisation also saw 
the introduction of new substantive agreements, i.e., agreements containing sub-
stantive rules on international trade annexed to the WTO Agreement, among them 
                                                  
1396  The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation. The European Commu-
nity, as an International Organisation, is a member of the WTO, and the WTO Agreement (and 
its annexes) therefore form an integral part of primary EC law.  
1397  Van den Bossche (2005), pp. 78-85.  
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the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).1398 The General Agreement 
on Trade in Services is a unique mechanism for establishing liberalisation of the trade 
in services between the Members of the WTO. It allows States, largely on a volun-
tary basis, to negotiate on further liberalisation of services.1399 In order to achieve 
this liberalisation, three different mechanisms can be distinguished. First of all, there 
are generally applicable rules for all WTO Members with regard to measures 
affecting trade in services, with possible exceptions1400 laid down in Part II of the 
GATS. Secondly, there are the specific commitments to which a State is bound 
when that State has made such commitments and with them has laid down no 
limitations, conditions or qualifications (laid down in Part III of the GATS). Thirdly, 
there is the built-in agenda for further negotiations in order to secure a continuous 
development of liberalisation (laid down in Part IV of the GATS).1401  
Article I GATS states that it will apply to State measures affecting services. 
Although the term ‘services’ is not defined as such, Article I.2 GATS lays down the 
different modes in which ‘services’ can be supplied.1402 The first mode is the cross-
border mode, in which there is no movement of natural or legal persons, only the 
service itself crosses the border (e.g., telecommunications or internet service pro-
vision).1403 The second mode of supply provided for in Article I.2 GATS is the so-
called ‘consumption abroad’. In this mode, it is the consumer who travels from one 
Member to another in order to receive a service.1404 The third mode, ‘commercial 
presence’, is very broad and focuses on the presence of legal persons of one Member 
in the territory of another Member. Any type of business or professional establish-
ment in the territory of another Member may de deemed to constitute commercial 
presence.1405 The fourth mode of supply is the presence of natural persons in the 
territory of other Members. This was deemed so potentially problematic that it also 
became the subject of a separate annex to the GATS.1406 From the GATS (includ-
ing the annex), it becomes clear that it does not cover (among other things) ‘measures 
regarding citizenship, residence, or employment on a permanent basis’.1407 The 
fourth mode, therefore, relates to services supplied on a temporary basis. Measures are 
State measures including regulatory powers exercised by non-State entities.1408 
Article I:3(a)(ii) GATS states that non-governmental bodies can also exercise activities 
that can be classified as ‘measures’ when they exercise powers that have been delegated 
by a central, regional or local government. The definition of Article I GATS also 
requires the measure to ‘affect’ trade in services. In case law of the Appellate Body,1409 
this requirement was given a broad meaning, so that the rules in GATS have a 
                                                  
1398  For a full list of the annexes, see Van den Bossche (2005), p. 45. 
1399  See Footer & George (2005), p. 821. 
1400  The exceptions of Article XIV also apply to the obligations under Articles XVI and XVII, 
which are laid down in Part III of the GATS. 
1401  See Footer & George (2005), p. 821. 
1402  Ibid. 
1403  Ibid., p. 823. 
1404  Ibid., p. 824. 
1405  Ibid., p. 825. 
1406  GATS annex on Movement of Natural Persons. 
1407  Footer & George (2005), p. 826 
1408  Van den Bossche (2005), p. 320. 
1409  Appellate Body Report, EC-Bananas III.  
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broad scope.1410 Legal services, as such, are included in a list which enumerates the 
different services falling under the scope of the GATS, the so-called W/120 list.1411 
This list uses a system of classification that is based on the United Nations system of 
the classification of services.1412 Although no further mention is made of this fact on 
the W/120 list, the United Nations classification system provides for a subdivision 
of legal services, which, as will be seen below, are used by members wholly or in 
part, including by States in the European Community.1413 This classification and 
sub-classification has not been without criticism. The Secretariat1414 has issued a 
background note on legal services in which it states that the reality of trade in legal 
services, and the perception of that trade by Members, is not reflected by the 
classification system used in the W/120 list.1415 
The most important general obligation in the GATS is the Most Favoured 
Nation (MFN) rule laid down in Article II GATS.1416 In essence, the MFN rule 
comes down to a non-discrimination provision that has both internal and external 
effect, i.e., a member cannot treat a non-member more beneficially than members, 
and a member cannot treat a member more beneficially than other members. The 
MFN rule extends to both direct and indirect discrimination.1417 Article II:2 GATS 
provides the possibility for Members, before the GATS entered into force, to list 
exemptions to the MFN treatment principle. None of the countries reviewed in 
this book have made MFN exemptions in connection to legal services, so it is not 
necessary to explore these exemptions any further.1418 An important exemption to 
the MFN rule is laid down in Article V GATS. It allows countries that are involved in 
economic integration efforts which promote intensive liberalisation of trade in services 
to be exempt from the MFN treatment rule and other GATS obligations. Clearly the 
European Community does constitute such an economic integration effort.1419 This 
                                                  
1410  Van den Bossche (2005), p.323. 
1411  MTN.GNS/W/120, 10 July 1991. Legal services are number 861. 
1412  Terry (2002), p. 6. 
1413  Sub-divisions are:  
- Legal advisory and representation services concerning criminal law (86111). 
- Legal advisory and representation services in judicial procedures concerning other fields of 
law (86119). 
- Legal advisory and representation services in statutory procedures of quasi-judicial tribunals, 
boards, etc. (86120) 
- Legal documentation and certification services (86130) 
- Other legal information and advisory information (8619) 
- Arbitration and conciliation services. 
 See Terry (2002), p.6. For a detailed overview of the sub-divisions see WTO (1998). 
1414 For a review of institutional arrangements in GATS, see Footer & George, pp. 865–873. 
1415  WTO (1998), p. 5. See also: Terry (2002), p. 7. 
1416  ‘With respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, each Member shall accord imme-
diately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any member treatment no less 
favourable than that it accords to like services and service suppliers of any other country.’ 
1417  Both the Panel (Panel Report on EC-Bananas III § 7.286) and the Appellate Body (Appellate 
Body Report EC-Bananas III § 220) reached this conclusion, albeit on different grounds. See 
also: Van den Bossche (2005), p. 319.  
1418  Terry (2002), p. 14. The IBA handbook is based on: Terry (2001-2002), pp. 1387 ff. 
1419  The EC Treaty and subsequent enlargements were notified to the Council for Trade in Services 
as an economic integration effort in the light of Article V GATS. See; European Commission, 
EC Regional Trade Agreements, via <ec.europa.eu/trade>, last accessed 22 January 2007. 
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means that through the application of Article V GATS, the internal rules on the 
free movement of lawyers in the EU do not fall under GATS obligations. 
With regard to other general obligations, mention must be made of Article VI 
GATS. Although an extensive review of Article VI GATS goes beyond the scope 
of this book, it suffices to state at this point that its general aim is to overcome 
unnecessarily burdensome requirements (in domestic regulation) that create barriers 
to trade in services.1420 To that end it facilitates the creation of ‘disciplines’, which 
in essence means that Article VI(4) GATS asks Members to come up with common 
standards for future domestic regulation of a certain service. The application of that 
common standard, or discipline, would then lead to domestic regulation that is 
‘friendly’ for the international trade in services.1421 In order to achieve this objective, 
in 1995 the Ministerial Conference created the Working Party on Professional 
Services (WPPS). Although disciplines in the accountancy sector may, at first sight, 
not be relevant for legal services, they are in fact of great relevance because the 
WTO has sought to apply these disciplines in a broader sense.1422 In 1999 the 
Working Party on Domestic Regulation (WPDR) was created in order to replace 
the WPPS. The WPDR has a much broader goal and seeks to achieve disciplines 
that are horizontally applicable,1423 i.e. on all services covered by the GATS.1424 In 
its work up until now, the WPDR has focussed on four major issues; necessity, 
transparency, equivalence and international standards.1425 These four major issues of 
interest to the WPDR do not simply come from nowhere. They are also the central 
issues of the Disciplines for Domestic Regulation for the Accountancy Sector. The 
Accountancy Disciplines are an example of very general and straightforward disci-
plines.1426 The Disciplines require Members to undertake a necessity test with regard 
to new domestic regulation.1427 This necessity test prescribes that domestic regula-
tion may not pose a barrier to international trade in a way that is more than what is 
necessary in the pursuit of a legitimate objective.1428 To a lawyer trained in European 
law this must sound familiar. The necessity test in the Accountancy Disciplines 
bears a striking resemblance to the objective justification test as it was laid down by 
the European Court of Justice in the Cassis de Dijon case1429 for the free movement 
                                                  
1420  Footer & George, p. 836. 
1421  It must be kept in mind that the disciplines do only apply to domestic regulation, and they, 
therefore, do not influence the Schedule of Specific Commitments. See Terry (2002), p. 34. 
1422  Or as Footer and George put it: ‘It is important to note that[…] the Accountancy Disciplines 
are very general in scope and almost certainly could be applied, at least in part, across a wider 
range of other services’. See Footer & George (2005), p. 942. 
1423  This action might be comparable with the change witnessed in diploma recognition in Euro-
pean law in the 1980s where the European Commission changed from a vertical, profession-
specific approach to a horizontal approach that ultimately resulted in Directive 89/48/EEC.  
1424  Footer & George (2005), p. 943. 
1425  Ibid. p. 945. See also: See Terry (2002), pp. 37-38. 
1426  Footer & George (2005), p. 943. 
1427  § 2 of the Accountancy Disciplines. 
1428  Footer & George (2005), p. 943. Legitimate objectives are; protection of consumers, the 
quality of the service, professional competence and the integrity of the profession. 
1429  Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, [1979] ECR 649. 
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of goods, and after a number of cases1430 laid down in the Gebhard case1431 for all 
the four freedoms. 
In addition to the necessity test, there is also one other element that bears resem-
blance to the European system. The Accountancy Disciplines prescribe that, in the 
matter of qualification requirements, account shall be taken of qualifications earned 
abroad based on equivalence.1432 Although the resemblance is not as striking as in 
the case of the necessity requirement, this part of the Disciplines shares the same 
atmosphere that can also be found in cases like Vlassopoulou1433 and Morgenbesser1434 
and in secondary legislation such as Directive 2005/36/EC1435 and its predecessor 
Directive 89/48/EEC.1436 Further elements of the Disciplines contain rules on the 
transparency of domestic regulations, and rules to simplify licensing procedures and 
to lessen licensing requirements.1437 It is the idea that the Accountancy Disciplines 
become binding upon Members. The Accountancy Disciplines and other ensuing 
disciplines (of which there are none presently) will be incorporated into the new 
version of the GATS that is to emerge from the Doha Rounds. At this moment, 
members are under a standstill provision which requires them not to engage in do-
mestic regulation in the accountancy sector that would violate the Disciplines.1438 
As was indicated above, one of the main objectives of the WPDR is to inves-
tigate whether the Accountancy Disciplines can be applied horizontally, i.e., for all 
services caught under the GATS. In the world of lawyers the question of whether 
the Accountancy Disciplines should be applied to the legal profession, or, better 
put, domestic regulation influencing the trade in legal services, has been the subject 
of heated debate.1439 In general, it was the belief of many Bar Associations that the 
WPPS would soon come to apply to lawyers after they had finished work on the 
Accountancy Disciplines. Official WTO documents at the time corroborated that 
belief.1440 However, as indicated above, a culture change occurred, the WPPS was 
disbanded and the new WPDR created the belief that there should be one 
horizontal discipline for all services caught under the GATS. It is not the intention 
of this paragraph to give a detailed review of the standpoint of all the members, 
                                                  
1430  Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid, [1974] 
ECR 1299; Case 279/80, Criminal Proceedings against Webb [1981] ECR 3305. For similar 
(preceding) cases see Joined Cases 110-111/78, Ministère public and Chambre syndicale des agents 
artistiques et impresarii de Belgique ASBL v. Willy van Wesemael and others, [1979] ECR 32; Case 
C-76/90, Manfred Säger v. Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd, [1991] ECR I-4421; See also: Case C-275/92, 
Her Majesty's Customs and Excise v. Gerhart Schindler and Jörg Schindler, [1994] ECR I-1039. 
1431  Case C55/94, Reinhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocatie e Procuratori di Milano, [1995] 
ECR 4165. 
1432  Footer & George (2005), p. 943. 
1433  Case 340/89, Vlassopoulou v. Ministerium für Justiz, Bundes- und Europaangelegenheiten Baden-
Württemberg, [1991] ECR 2357. 
1434  Case C-313/01, Christine Morgenbesser v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli avvocati di Genova, [2003] 
ECR I-13467.  
1435 Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 7 September 2005 on 
the recognition of professional qualifications, OJ L 255/022-142. 
1436  Directive 89/48/EEC, [1989] OJ L 19/16. 
1437  Footer & George (2005), p. 943. 
1438  Ibid. p. 944 and Terry (2002), p. 34. 
1439  Terry (2002), pp. 35, 38-43. See also: Terry (2004), pp. 695ff and Hopkins (2004), pp. 427ff. 
1440  Terry (2002), p. 35. 
272 
and/or Bar Associations involved. At this point it suffices to say that, in general, Bar 
Associations are at least wary about applying the Accountancy Disciplines to the 
legal profession.1441 Predicting how this discussion will end is anybody’s guess.  
The third part of the GATS accounts for its largely voluntary nature, as was 
signalled above. This is reflected in the fact that a Member is not bound to the rules 
laid down in Part III of the GATS unless that State has, for market access (Article 
XVI GATS) and national treatment (Article XVII GATS), for mode of supply and 
for specific service sectors, committed itself to upholding these rules in the Member’s 
Schedule of Specific Commitments (Schedule).1442 The general application is that 
none of the Members are bound to the rules laid down in that part of the GATS. 
Members can then choose to list a specific service sector1443 on its Schedule. If a 
Member merely lists the service sector in its schedule this means that the Member 
then commits itself to upholding all the rules in Part III of the GATS without further 
reservations. A Member may also choose to specify its commitment with regard to 
market access and national treatment along the lines of the abovementioned four 
different modes of supply, and choose a commitment for a specific mode, for a 
specific rule. Commitments can range from ‘NONE’ which means that the market 
access or national treatment obligations apply without reservation, to ‘UNBOUND’ 
which indicates that a Member does not commit itself to any market access or 
national treatment. This system has been referred to as hybrid, combining a  ‘bottom 
up’ and a ‘top down’ approach.1444 
The first rule that Members can specifically commit themselves to is found in 
Article XVI GATS, and is commonly referred to as the Market Access rule.1445 
From this Article it becomes clear that where a Member chooses to enter into market 
access obligations it must, with regard to that market access, give other Members 
treatment that is no less favourable than the treatment it gives to its national service 
suppliers. As is the case with so many terms in the GATS, the term ‘market access’ 
is not specifically defined, and the meaning of market access must therefore be 
distilled from a list of measures that are prohibited when a Member commits1446 
itself to Article XVI GATS for a given service sector. These measures are listed in 
                                                  
1441  Ibid. pp. 38-43. Generally, the Bar Association’s criticism comes down to the conclusion that 
the legal profession is unique, has its own issues that are distinguishable from the accountancy 
profession and therefore ‘deserves’ separate Disciplines. It will be no surprise that similar beliefs are 
held by members of other professions. A good example of this view is the position of the CCBE, 
the Council of European Bar Associations, which states: ‘The paper recommends that lawyers 
should not be subject to the Accountancy Disciplines with a few phrases added on for lawyers, 
but that the changes require an entirely separate set of disciplines for lawyers (albeit that there will 
be substantial overlap in content with the Accountancy Disciplines)’; CCBE (2003), p. 2. 
1442  Ibid. 
1443  Service sectors are specified in the so-called W/120 list: MTN.GNS/W/120, 10 July 1991, 
see Footer & George (2005), pp. 913 ff. 
1444  That means that a Member actually starts with a clean slate. The approach is ‘top down’ in the 
sense that where a Member does schedule a service sector, it must completely liberalise this 
sector unless it has scheduled specific limitations. See Footer & George (2005), p. 821. 
1445 Article XVI (1) reads as follows: ‘With respect to market access through the modes of supply 
identified in Article I, each Member shall accord services and service suppliers of any other 
Member treatment no less favourable than that provided for under the terms, limitations and 
conditions agreed and specified in its Schedule.’ 
1446  Given that no further reservations have been made by that Member State in its Schedule. 
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paragraph 2 of Article XVI GATS.1447 The second rule contained in Part III of the 
GATS is the so-called ‘national treatment’ rule, laid down in Article XVII GATS.1448 
Unlike Article XVI, on market access, the national treatment rule of Article XVII 
GATS does not contain a list of measures that would constitute a violation of this 
rule.1449 In essence the national treatment rule, just like the MFN treatment rule, is 
a non-discrimination rule.  
With regard to the Schedule it must be mentioned that there is only one Schedule 
of Specific Commitments for all the Member States of the European Community.1450 
What has become problematic is that more States have joined the European Union 
since the Schedule of Specific Commitment entered into force. Within the scope 
of this book, that holds true for Austria, Finland and Sweden. They are now an 
integral part of the European Union yet differences in drafting of the Schedule 
result in a situation were they are more often mentioned than other Member States 
in the remainder of this paragraph. In general, a Schedule consists of two different 
parts.1451 First, there is the horizontal part which lists exceptions that are applicable 
to all services contained in the Schedule. Secondly, there are the sector-specific com-
mitments which list the legal regime for that specific sector. With regard to the Euro-
pean Union it is worth mentioning that all fifteen Member States reviewed in this 
book have scheduled legal services on their Schedule, and all Member States to a 
greater or lesser extent have therefore entered into legal obligations with regard to 
international trade in legal services. 
As was indicated earlier, the GATS does not contain any definition whatsoever 
for ‘legal services’. It is therefore paramount to determine the scope Member States 
have given to the legal services they have scheduled. From the Schedule of the Euro-
pean Community, it immediately becomes clear that only a very limited scope has 
been given to the legal services scheduled. The European Community commits 
itself to services consisting of legal advice on home country law and public inter-
                                                  
1447  Footer & George (2005), p. 846. Prohibited measures are laid down in paragraph 2 of Article 
XVI GATS and read as follows: 
- Limitations on number of suppliers. 
- Limitations on total value of service transactions or assets. 
- Limitations on operations or total quantity of service output. 
- Limitations on value of transaction 
- Measures which restrict the type of legal entity through which services may be supplied. 
- Limitation on the participation of foreign capital or investment. 
1448 Article XVII (1) GATS states: ‘In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any 
conditions and qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and service 
suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treat-
ment no less favourable than that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers’. 
1449  Although limitations of the national treatment rule often contain the following aspects: 
- Nationality or residence requirements for executives. 
- Requirements to invest a certain amount of assets in local currency. 
- Restrictions on the purchase of land by foreign service suppliers. 
- Special subsidy or tax privileges granted to domestic suppliers. 
- Differential capital requirements and special operational limits applying only to operations 
of foreign suppliers. 
 See Van den Bossche (2005), p. 365. 
1450  Adamson (1998), p. 184. 
1451  See very extensively on Scheduling: Footer & George (2005), pp. 845-865. 
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national law (excluding EC law).1452 There are a few elements that need further 
elaboration.1453 First of all, the commitments scheduled only relate to legal advice, 
not (as a most striking difference) to the representation of a client in legal proceedings 
or before a court, nor the drafting of certain documents. Since legal advice is only 
part of the lawyers’ professional monopoly in some Member States, this commit-
ment seems to be rather insignificant. With regard to all other activities normally 
part of the professional activities of a lawyer, no legal commitments under Part III of 
the GATS exist, since they are not scheduled. Secondly, although not specifically 
mentioned, it must be assumed that ‘home country law’ refers to the ‘home country’ 
of the service provider who enters the territory of one of the Member States of the 
European Union.1454 It must now be examined, to what extent this already very 
limited commitment is further limited by specific commitments made in the re-
mainder of the Schedule.  
With regard to market access some specific commitments have been made by 
the European Community and its Member States. With regard to the first mode of 
supply, i.e., the cross-border provision of services (where neither the provider nor 
the recipient of the service crosses a border) the European Community has made 
no specific reservations, except for France and Portugal which remain unbound for 
the drafting of legal documents.1455 Austria, Finland and Sweden also make no further 
exemptions, except for Sweden which states that lawyers providing services in 
Sweden may not use the Swedish professional title. With regard to the second mode 
of supply, none of the Member States concerned have entered specific exemptions 
to their Schedule, so they all remain fully bound to allow the consumption of legal 
services abroad. With regard to the third mode of supply,1456 i.e., the commercial 
presence of legal entities from other Members (not being EU Member States) on 
the territory of the Member States of the European Union there are some specific 
exemptions. Both France and Germany only allow commercial presence in specific 
legal forms, which are indicated on the Schedule. Moreover, Germany requires 
membership of a Bar Association under the requirements laid down in the Federal 
                                                  
1452  EC Schedule. Austria and Sweden have committed themselves to a similar commitment 
although they have not specified ‘international law’ (i.e., private or public) and Sweden has not 
excluded EC law from ‘international law’. Finland has not specified ‘legal advice’ but merely 
states ‘international and home country law’. It must be assumed however, that bringing other 
activities than legal advice into the realm of ‘international and home country law’ is a merely 
academic exercise. 
1453  The Horizontal Part mentions that a ‘glossary’ is attached to the Schedule. From that ‘glossary’ 
it becomes clear that Italy has not included legal services in the definition of ‘services’ as such. 
See Adamson (1998), p. 185. I am of the opinion that such an action does not exonerate Italy 
from commitments in this sector, since any exemption should appear on the Schedule itself. 
Italy will therefore be treated similar to the other Member States. 
1454  Here the Damocles’ Sword regarding ‘likeness’ comes into play. To what extent can legal 
advice on two different legal systems be seen as ‘like’ services in the sense of Article II and 
XVII GATS? 
1455  In my opinion it is doubtful whether drafting of legal documents even forms part of legal advice, 
but the two Member States concerned seem to create some extra certainty and explicitly 
exempt it from their commitment. 
1456  There are very detailed provisions in the horizontal section of the Schedules which go beyond 
the scope of this chapter to review in detail, but which considerably limit possibilities under 
this mode of supply.  
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Lawyers Act. Austria remains completely unbound to this commitment. Finland 
requires citizenship and residence when services are provided by a individual as a 
member of the General Bar Association. Sweden once again reserves its professional 
title for those persons who are members of the Swedish Bar Organisation. 1457 With 
regard to the fourth mode of supply, the presence of natural persons in the territory 
of the European Union, the Member States remain generally unbound except for 
what is set out in the horizontal part of the Schedule. The horizontal part of the 
Schedule commits to very little, and at first sight it does not commit to allowing 
natural persons who come to provide legal services (except perhaps combined with 
the third mode of supply). In addition to that general commitment, there are also 
additional exemptions for specific Member States. Greece adds conditions of nation-
ality to the conditions set out in the horizontal part of the Schedule, Luxembourg 
remains completely unbound to the fourth mode of supply, and France excludes the 
activities scheduled for persons who are not members of the French legal profession. 
Austria only allows service providers in its territory at the request of a consumer in 
order to supply a specific service. Finland and Sweden remain unbound to the fourth 
mode of supply except for what is indicated in the horizontal part of their Schedule, 
which are largely identical to the horizontal parts of the Schedule of the European 
Community. 
With regard to the National Treatment rule, there are some specific limitations 
laid down in the Schedule of Specific Commitments. All Member States commit 
themselves to adhere to the National Treatment rule with respect to the first mode 
of supply, except for France, Portugal and Denmark. France and Portugal have listed a 
similar exemption to National Treatment as they had with regard to Market Access: 
they remain unbound for the drafting of legal documents. With regard to Denmark, 
the exemption is more significant. Denmark lists in the National Treatment column 
in connection to mode one, that the marketing of legal advice activities is restricted 
to lawyers with a Danish licence to practise and to law firms registered in Denmark. 
This exemption seems to put any ‘foreign’ (not including lawyers from EU Member 
States) lawyer at a great competitive disadvantage. Austria states that foreign legal 
advisors must be a member of their national Bar Association1458 and they may use 
their professional title only in combination with a reference to the place of registra-
tion in their home country.1459 Finland has made no exemptions to the first mode 
of supply, while Sweden states that in order to use the Swedish professional title the 
person concerned needs to be a member of the Swedish Bar Association.1460 Similarly, 
to the Market Access provision, no further exemptions were made with regard to 
the second mode of supply, which indicates that members are fully committed to 
awarding national treatment to consumption of legal services abroad. Since this 
                                                  
1457  Finland and Germany and Sweden seem to misunderstand the third mode of supply since it 
does not cover natural persons. To the best of the author’s knowledge, law-firms cannot be 
members of a Bar Association. 
1458  Which might be problematic for countries that have not regulated the provision of legal advice, 
like the Netherlands, or countries that make it possible to practice as a lawyer without being a 
member of the Bar, like in Finland. 
1459  Which is comparable to the rules under Directive 98/5/EC. 
1460  Which requires education, passing examinations, citizenship and residence. 
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seems to have no impact on the free movement of lawyers as such, Member States 
seem to have little or no problems awarding national treatment.  
The Member States of the European Union that were included in the EC Schedule 
also make no exemptions with regard to the third mode of supply,1461 apart from 
Denmark which reiterates that marketing of legal advice activities is restricted to law 
firms registered in Denmark. Denmark then states that only lawyers with a Danish 
licence to practise may own shares in a Danish law firm. Only lawyers with a 
Danish licence to practise may sit on the Board, or be part of the management, of a 
Danish law firm. Austria remains unbound to the third mode of supply with respect 
to National Treatment. Finland has made no exceptions, whereas Sweden has entered 
the same exception in order to protect the national professional title.  
With regard to the fourth mode of supply, presence of natural persons, the 
European Union remains unbound except for what is listed in the horizontal section 
of the Schedule. The horizontal section of the Schedule states, among other things, 
that the European Union remains unbound to the fourth mode of supply except 
for the categories of persons mentioned under mode four with regard to Market 
Access.1462 In addition to that, the Schedule mentions further that European rules 
on diploma recognition do not apply to lawyers originating from other countries, 
except where Community law provides otherwise. In addition to the horizontal 
exemptions, Denmark has once more reiterated that marketing of legal advice 
activities is restricted to lawyers with a Danish licence to practise. In addition, it is 
mentioned that taking a Danish legal examination is necessary in order to obtain 
such a licence. Austria remains unbound to this mode of supply, except for the 
temporary presence of natural persons at the request of a consumer in order to 
provide a specific service. Such a natural person must also be a member of the 
national Bar Association and he must use his home country professional title as well 
as a reference to the place of registration in the home country. Finland has made no 
exceptions to the fourth mode of supply, but it must be assumed that National 
Treatment is only available to those who are allowed to enter under the Market Access 
provisions, where Finland remains largely unbound.1463 Sweden remains unbound 
except to the provisions listed in the horizontal section of the Schedule, which states 
that Sweden remains unbound, except for those natural persons who are allowed to 
enter the market on the basis of the Market Access provision. In addition to that, 
Sweden has again included a provision that is intended to protect the Swedish pro-
fessional title. In conclusion, it is important to mention once again that with regard 
to National Treatment, and comparably to Market Access, an already very limited 
commitment is limited even further by extensive exemptions made by Member 
States.1464 
                                                  
1461  Similarly to the Market Access provision, there are some very detailed and far reaching 
exemptions in the horizontal section of the Schedules that significantly limit possibilities under 
this mode of supply. 
1462  Where doubts were already raised whether or not a lawyer would fit this description. 
1463 Although not specifically mentioned in the National Treatment column for legal services, 
Finland states in its horizontal commitments that National Treatment provisions are only 
available to those who are allowed access under Market Access provisions. 
1464  Two members have scheduled additional commitments. Both France and Luxembourg have 
scheduled that host country law and international law (including European law) is available to 
lawyers who are entitled to practice as a member of the legal profession of France and Luxem-
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After taking a detailed look at the Schedule of Specific Commitment of the Euro-
pean Union, it becomes clear that the commitments made by the Union can in no 
way be compared with the system of the free movement of lawyers which has been 
developed within the framework of the European Union. Compared with the 
European system, the commitments made under the GATS are not even compar-
able to what is laid down in the Lawyers Services Directive (Directive 77/249/EEC) 
alone, which allows the provision of legal services on a temporary basis in another 
Member State of the European Union.  
The last part of the GATS (Article XIX GATS) requires Members to enter into 
in successive rounds of negotiations no later than five years after the coming into 
force of the WTO agreement in order to achieve even more liberalisation in the field 
of international trade in services.1465 This built-in agenda is referred to as GATS 
2000.1466 These negotiations began in 2000 and were continued as part of the Doha 
Development Round negotiations. The Doha Development Round was supposed 
to be concluded by 1 January 2005 but was subsequently extended. Since July 2006, 
the Round has been indefinitely suspended. It is important to understand that the 
Doha Rounds covers GATS in its entirety and attempts to extend it beyond legal 
services. It might even be concluded that legal services receive only limited attention 
in the Doha Rounds.1467 Some nine countries have submitted negotiation proposals 
that either directly or indirectly address the situation regarding trade in legal services.1468 
It was already established above that the classification system used in the GATS, the 
so-called W/120 list based on the UN Classification System, was unsatisfactory for 
legal services, since a clear definition of legal services could not be given. Many of 
the proposals given for GATS 2000 therefore address the absence of a definition 
and various different classification systems have been proposed.1469 It seems that 
none of these have been successful up until now, since the conditional revised offer of 
the European Union1470 still uses the classification system based on the W/120 list. 
After having established that the scope of the GATS rules falls far below that 
what is achieved under the freedom of movement of lawyers in Europe, it must 
now be questioned whether third-country nationals can invoke these meagre rights 
when seeking to exercise legal activities in a Member State of the European Union. 
                                                  
bourg respectively. It is unclear to the author why France and Luxembourg have found it 
necessary to schedule these commitments, since they actually fall outside the scope of the 
general commitment, which only commits to advice on home country law and international 
law excluding European Community law. For the purposes of the Schedule, France and 
Luxembourg, and all the other Member States for that matter, are free to impose rules on all 
other services falling outside the commitment. 
1465  Footer & George (2005), p. 854. 
1466  Terry (2002), p. 45. 
1467  See also: Cone III (2003), pp. 29-47. 
1468  Terry (2002), p.46.  
1469  Terry (2002), pp.46-47. See also: Cone III (2003), pp. 29-47. 
1470  Via <europa.eu.>, last accessed 1 May 2006. 
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§ 6.3  Applicability of GATS Rules for Third-Country 
Nationals 
At the beginning of this paragraph it was established that third-country nationals 
could only in certain restrictive circumstances rely on the European rules for the 
free movement of lawyers. In the previous subparagraph, it was established that the 
GATS offers (albeit severely limited) rights for lawyers from WTO Members, not 
being EU Member States, to exercise their profession within the territory of the 
European Union. The question remains whether third-country nationals can actually 
rely on these rights before a national court at times when a Member State of the 
EU denies them the enjoyment of these rights. That is where an insurmountable 
hindrance occurs. In the case law of the European Court of Justice it is a well estab-
lished principle that the WTO agreement and other additional agreements (GATT; 
GATS, TRIPS and DSU) have no direct effect and therefore cannot be relied on 
directly by individuals.1471, 1472 That means that the rules laid down in GATS remain 
on the international plane and only affect the Members of the WTO rather than 
their citizens. This is reinforced by the fact that the dispute settlement system under 
the WTO is only accessible for Members. Individuals have no standing in the dis-
pute settlement system of the WTO itself, and although de facto possible, it would be 
highly unlikely that two Members of the WTO would initiate proceedings under 
the DSU against each other based on the sole fact that an individual lawyer could 
not exercise the rights guaranteed to him by the GATS.  
The harsh conclusion of the GATS is that it is useless for third-country nationals 
who seek to exercise legal activity in a Member State of the European Union. In a 
review of the rules in force in Member States it is shown that there is at least the 
possibility for a considerable softening of this conclusion. 
§ 6.4 Establishment Rights for Third-Country Nationals: 
The German Example 
It would go far beyond the scope of this book to give a full overview of the 
position of third- country national lawyers in all the Member States reviewed. The 
                                                  
1471  Cases C-149/96, Portugal v. Council [1999] ECR I-8395; C-307/99, OGT Fruchthandelsgesell-
schaft mbH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen [2001] ECR I-3159; C-27/00 and C-122/00, 
The Queen v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, ex parte Omega Air 
Ltd (C-27/00) and Omega Air Ltd, Aero Engines Ireland Ltd and Omega Aviation Services Ltd v. 
Irish Aviation Authority (C-122/00) [2002] ECR I-2569; C-76/00, Petrotub SA and Republica 
SA v. Council of the European Union [2003] ECR I-79; C-93/02 Biret International SA v. Council 
of the European Union [2003] ECR I-10497 and C-377/02 Léon Van Parys NV v. Belgisch 
Interventie- en Restitutiebureau (BIRB) [2005] ECR I-1465. In earlier case law, which seems to 
have been overturned by the cases mentioned above, the ECJ had accepted a very limited 
direct effect for the GATT 1947. See cases: Case 70/87, Fediol v. European Commission, [1989] 
ECR 1781; Case C-69/89, Nakajima v. Council, [1991] ECR I-02069. See also: Hartley (2004), 
pp. 243-251. 
1472  So even a lawyer who is a third-country national (e.g., a US national) and who suffers from a 
GATS violation by the EU or one of its Member States cannot rely on the rules of GATS in a 
procedure before a national court or the ECJ. 
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treatment of third-country national lawyers lacks coherence and warrants a complete 
study on its own. In the review of the different Directives it has been observed, for 
example, that Member States offer more extensive rights in the form of easier inte-
gration to lawyers from former colonies. One practice created specifically for third-
country nationals must not be ignored. This is the case since the approach is not 
country specific in the sense that it does not depend on historical ties between 
certain countries and is complete in its coverage. Therefore, it could serve as a ‘best 
practice’ example in dealing with third-country national lawyers. This example is 
that of Germany. Germany allows lawyers from all other WTO Members (and even 
non-Members in certain circumstances) to establish themselves under their home 
country professional title. When established they may employ activities in the law 
of their home State and with regard to international law. Although this is not as far 
reaching as the establishment under home title for European lawyers, it does how-
ever go far beyond the rights for lawyers that can be established under the GATS, 
as WTO lawyers may not occupy themselves with German law, European law or 
the representation of clients in court. 
The ‘best practice’ in this sense is that Germany sends out a strong signal of 
mutual recognition, even to lawyers from outside the European Union, and allows 
for their establishment (rather than services) on a permanent basis in Germany, albeit 
with considerable restriction on the professional activities they may exercise. This 
provides third-country nationals with even greater rights than those which can be 
guaranteed on the basis of European rules applicable to third-country nationals. 
Limited integration into the host country can lead to situations where the lawyers 
over this period of time actually gain certain knowledge of the legal system of the 
host Member State (where he lives and works) and thus prepares for a review of his 
professional qualifications under the Haim and Hocsman cases (observed above). In 
this sense, Germany could serve as an example for other States and, perhaps for a 
future European regime (in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) in the field of 
free movement of third-country lawyers. 
§ 6.5 Observations and Conclusions 
It has been observed that the protection offered to third-country nationals under the 
regime of the free movement of lawyers falls considerably short of the protection of 
awarded to European lawyers. Only in two distinct situations, as family members of 
European citizens who exercise their free movement rights, or as the holder of LTR 
status on the basis of Directive 2003/109/EC, can third- country nationals establish 
a right to non-discrimination with regard to the recognition of professional quali-
fications. This does not mean, however, that the Directives are directly applicable. 
Only in cases where the third-country national lawyer is a fully qualified lawyer in 
the sense of the Services or the Establishment Directive, or if the third-country 
national has qualifications that allow him to exercise a regulated profession in a Mem-
ber State can he rely on the Directives. Otherwise he will be dealt with according to 
the rules laid down for European Union citizens with third-country qualifications. 
That the GATS lays down rules on the trade in legal services is, unfortunately, 
of no avail for third-country national lawyers. It has been established that the rules 
laid down in GATS fall short even of the acquis of the Services Directive, the least 
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intensive mode of free movement of lawyers in Europe. In addition, and more im-
portantly, the European Court of Justice denies direct effect to WTO rules, which 
leaves those rules firmly on the international inter-State plane, and therefore without 
use for individuals seeking to rely on these rules. 
This does not mean that third-country national lawyers are without rights in the 
different Member States. There are rules in force, however patchy and incoherent they 
may be. A number of States, for example, offer extensive rights to lawyers coming 
from ex-colonies. Germany has another, more coherent system in which it gives 
limited establishment rights to lawyers from other WTO Members (and even non-
Members). This system has been put forward as a ‘best practice’ and can serve as a 
base for other states or for a European mechanism awarding more substantial rights 
to third- country national lawyers. 
 
 
§ 7. Observations and Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to give an overview of the actual implementation of the 
model that was established in the previous chapter. It was established that only in 
that way could an answer be provided on how the system actually works, rather than 
remaining on a level of assessing how the system ought to work. To this end, the 
fifteen Member States have implemented the three main modalities; the freedom to 
provide services, the establishment under home title, and the full integration into 
the profession of the host State, on the basis of the Diploma Directive. Unlike the 
previous chapter, in which these modalities were presented in chronological order, 
here they were dealt with according to the degree of integration offered into the 
host Member State. 
Application of two of the three modalities was seen to be dependent on the 
beneficiary being fully qualified as a lawyer in one of the Member States. This re-
quirement called for a closer look at the different professions of the lawyer in the 
different Member States. It was established that the different professions differ con-
siderably, and a broad threefold division was established on the basis of professional 
activities that are legally reserved for lawyers in that specific Member State. A number 
of northern Member States, namely Sweden and Finland have no legal monopoly 
for lawyers. That means that activities in connection to the representation of clients 
and the giving of legal advice can be exercised by non-lawyers freely. A second 
group, consisting of the United Kingdom, Ireland, the Netherlands and Belgium, 
with Denmark as a borderline case, reserve the representation of clients in court for 
lawyers but do not restrict activities in connection with legal advice. The largest group 
(Denmark, Luxembourg, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Germany, Austria and Greece) 
reserves both activities for lawyers. This threefold division was shown to indicate 
something very intresting, namely that in the countries with a low or intermediate 
level of regulation there is a ‘hidden’ group of professionals who legitimately exer-
cise legal activities in their home Member State but who are ‘invisible’ on a Euro-
pean level, because they cannot benefit from direct application of the Directives. 
Recent developments have, however, improved their situation. 
With regard to the freedom to provide services and the recognition of professional 
qualifications, it has been observed that the new Diploma Directive 2005/36/EC 
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covers the situation of those legal professionals who exercise activities in Member 
States with a low or intermediate degree of regulation , but who are not lawyers. 
According to the Directive, Member States (with a high degree of regulation) may 
not impose restrictions on professional qualifications on these people if they can 
prove that they have exercised their profession for at least two years in the previous 
ten years in the home Member State. Other restrictions fall under the scheme of case 
law where restrictions have to be objectively justified. After 2009, other restrictions 
will fall under the Directive on Services in the Internal Market, Directive 2006/123/ 
EC. Persons previously exercising legal activities in countries with low or intermediate 
degrees of regulation can integrate into the profession of Member States with a high 
degree of regulation if certain criteria are fulfilled. Member States may in this case 
impose an aptitude test which would principally cover the entire legal profession of 
the host Member State. Based on recent case law, however, these professionals can 
request a limited entry, and therefore a limited aptitude test, in the profession of the 
host Member State. With regard to the establishment under home country professional 
title, it was observed that there are no rules in secondary legislation which cover 
the establishment of non-lawyers under their home country professional title in 
other Member States. The only rules that are available to them are the general rules 
laid down in case law such as Vlassopoulou and Gebhard. It has been observed that 
this situation is akin to the situation lawyers like Gebhard found themselves in 
before adoption of the Establishment Directive, and in the future a new version of 
the installation limitée might well emerge for this category of non-lawyers. 
With respect to fully qualified lawyers it must be observed that the adoption 
and implementation of the Establishment Directive, Directive 98/5/EC, has funda-
mentally changed the face of the system of the free movement of lawyers. Not only 
has the Establishment Directive taken its place in the system of the free movement 
of lawyers, it has also taken over functions that were previously covered by the 
other two Directives reviewed. With regard to the Services Directive it must be 
observed that the Establishment Directive has taken over the function of the 
Services Directive that was dubbed as installation limitée. This is not surprising since 
installation limitée was an extension of the scope of the Services Directive over the 
material scope of application of what would later become the Establishment Directive. 
Installation limtée has become superfluous after the implementation of the Establish-
ment Directive (at least with regard to fully qualified lawyers). The effect the Establish-
ment Directive had on the other side of the spectrum, i.e., the full integration into 
the profession of the host Member State, is more substantial. It was observed that 
the Establishment Directive offers a method of integration into the host Member 
State’s profession, essentially through the mere passage of time whereby the dreaded 
aptitude test that was maintained in the new Diploma Directive 2005/36/EC can 
be avoided. This leads to a situation in which the Diploma Directive has only residual 
importance for the free movement of lawyers, and the integration into the host 
Member State function is thus primarily covered by the Establishment Directive. 
The integration into the profession of the host Member State on the basis of the 
Diploma Directive is only relevant for those lawyers who have enough previous 
knowledge of the legal system of the host Member State to circumvent the aptitude 
test or to successfully finish the aptitude test (including preparation) in a period shorter 
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than three years (the time it takes to integrate into the legal profession of the host 
Member State through the Establishment Directive).  
With regard to the implementation of the Establishment Directive, it was estab-
lished that the Directive has been implemented in the fifteen Member States without 
any major defects. Only in the Netherlands was it observed that integration into 
the Dutch legal profession through the Establishment Directive does not lead to full 
integration and thus the Establishment Directive is denied effet utile. This situation 
will be solved automatically by the abolition of the profession of the procureur in 
2008. Minor defects in implementations were observed, mainly with regard to regis-
tration and the exercise of professional activities. One defect was prevalent in almost 
all Member States – the qualified application of host Member State professional 
rules with regard to joint practice (only when objectively justified) which has been 
reduced consistently to a national treatment clause, i.e. application of host Member 
State rules per se. In the previous part it was established that the rules with regard to 
joint practice that finally ended up in the Establishment Directive were already 
considerably weaker than the ‘evangelistic’ rules proposed by the CCBE in its draft 
(where lawyers could bring their home Member State rules with regard to joint 
practice, and could therefore lead the spreading of relaxed rules with regard to joint 
practice throughout Europe). The actual implementation of the rules on joint prac-
tice has led to an even weaker system whereby the lawyer who establishes himself 
falls prey to the professional rules of the host Member State on joint practice. 
This observation, taken together with the observation that a lawyer who is estab-
lished under his home country professional title basically exercises the professional 
activity of the host Member State under the professional rules of the host Member 
State, forces one to consider which profession a 98/5/EC lawyer is actually exer-
cising. In the nullity case brought before it by Luxembourg, the European Court of 
Justice ruled that 98/5/EC lawyers were not a part of the host Member State’s pro-
fession, and the fact that they used a different professional title and the fact that they 
could not independently represent clients in court distinguished their profession 
from the host Member State’s legal profession. On the other hand, a 98/5/EC 
lawyer is also not exercising his home Member State profession (as his professional 
title might suggest) since he is exercising host Member State activities under host 
country professional rules. Actually, the use of professional title and the limitation 
on representing clients in court without the assistance of a domestic lawyer are the 
only things that distinguish a 98/5/EC lawyer from a host Member State lawyer. 
This leads to the conclusion that there is full mutual recognition of legal professions 
in Europe in all but name and with very limited restrictions on professional activity. 
Moreover, these last hurdles are taken away after little more than the passage of 
three years (even more so, since no integration requests on the basis of Article 10 
Directive 98/5/EC have been denied1473).1474 It must therefore be concluded that 
the current system for the free movement of lawyers, but mainly the provisions under 
the Establishment Directive, leads to an almost full mutual recognition of the lawyer’s 
                                                  
1473  Personal communication: email from CCBE to the author dated 25 September 2006. 
1474  Accepting this conclusion also means that the ECJ should have ruled that the host Member 
State profession was affected by 98/5/EC and should subsequently have annulled the Directive 
on the basis of violation of an essential procedural requirement (i.e., wrong voting procedure 
in the Council).  
283 
profession in Europe. It must also be concluded that this feat has been achieved 
without the difficult discussions that characterised the vertical system directives.  
An important defect in the system lies in the treatment of third-country nationals. 
It has been observed that the system of European rules offers only very limited 
possibilities in limited circumstances, i.e., only where the third-country national is a 
family member of an EU citizen exercising his right of freedeom of movement or 
where the third-country national has gained LTR status. In those circumstances 
application of the model described above is still an exception, since the Services 
Directive and the Establishment Directive only apply to those who are fully qualified 
as lawyers in one of the EU Member States and the Diploma Directive only applies 
to qualifications obtained in the European Union. Third-country nationals are there-
fore likely to end up in a situation that is merely covered by case law. The inter-
national rules on the trade in legal services, laid down in the GATS, are of no avail 
to third-country nationals because the substantive rights of the GATS fall short of 
even the least intrusive modality in European law, the free movement of services. 
More importantly, individuals cannot rely on the GATS rules since they have been 
consistently denied direct effect. Individual Member States have systems in place to 
deal with third-country national lawyers. In this respect the German rules have 
been put forward as ‘best practice’ since they allow third-country nationals beyond 
the GATS and also beyond the European rules on establishment under home title 
in order to deal with their home country rules and international law, thus providing 
such lawyers with a possibility to prepare themselves for recognition and integration 
at a later stage (on the basis of European rules). 
In conclusion it must be observed that with regard to fully qualified lawyers, a 
system of rules has been put into place that covers in entirety all the modalities of 
the free movement of these lawyers, and this has been done to such an extent that 
it warrants the observation that a true mutual recognition of the legal professions in 
Europe has been put in place. To a lesser extent that is also true for professionals 
who exercise legal professional activities in Member States with a lower degree of 
regulation and who seek to exercise that activity in a Member State with a higher 
degree of regulation. The position of third-country nationals is still (too) weak, and 
this category could benefit from an extension of the German approach towards their 
situation. An overall observation that must be made is that the system applies to fully 
qualified lawyers. It is easy to forget that it takes years to qualify as a lawyer in a 
Member State and it takes additional years to re-qualify as a lawyer in another Member 
State, so that it might take well over a decade from the point that a prospective 
lawyer starts his university education in a Member State to the point he can integrate 
into the profession of another Member State (either through an aptitude test or through 
integration after establishment under home country professional title). It might there-
fore be interesting to research whether an even more effective free movement of 
lawyers can be realised through the creation of free movement rights before a lawyer 
is fully qualified, i.e. during the qualification process. These, relatively uncharted, 
possibilities will be researched in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
Free Movement of Persons Seeking to 
Qualify as a Lawyer 
§ 1. Introduction 
As was concluded in the previous chapter, the system of free movement that now 
prevails in Europe depends on qualification as a lawyer in one of the Member States. 
The Services Directive and the Establishment Directive apply exclusively to those 
persons who are fully qualified as lawyers in at least one of the Member States of 
the European Union. The secondary legislation on the model of free movement of 
lawyers, as described above, does not cover the preparatory stages of entrance into 
one of the professions.1 In the previous chapters it was observed that certain case 
law in the model does apply to those who are in the process of becoming a lawyer. 
The intention of this chapter is, firstly, to assess, more or less separately from the 
model described above, the rules applicable to those who are in the process of 
qualifying for the legal profession, and how their position relates to the case law 
that was described earlier. On the basis of that assessment recommendations will be 
made for an extension of the above model to include the qualification process. 
 
 
§ 2. Qualifying as a Lawyer: Points of Entry and the 
Problem of National Law  
As was established in the previous chapter, the qualification processes in the Member 
States reviewed are quite similar to one another. Apart from Spain, every Member 
State reviewed has a two-tier qualification process. The first phase of the qualification 
process is fulfilled by obtaining a university degree in law (except in the UK, where 
this is not compulsory, and the candidate can compensate for the absence by other 
means). The second phase (except in Spain, although de facto many lawyers follow 
the same route) is the following of a professional education, commonly consisting of 
a theoretical part, organised by the relevant competent authority (Bar Associations), 
and an in-house practical training under the supervision of a qualified lawyer. The 
theoretical part is concluded by a Bar exam. The theoretical part and the practical 
part may be separated (as was the case in France) or they may coincide (as is the 
case in the Netherlands).  
This twofold division of the qualification track also provides for two distinct 
entry points for European Union nationals who seek to embark on the qualification 
process (and therewith seek to enter the legal profession) of another Member State. 
The first point of entry is after a candidate has finished secondary education and is 
                                                  
1  That is even true for the Diploma Directive 2005/36/EC as was illustrated in Case C-313/01, 
Christine Morgenbesser v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli avvocati di Genova, [2003] ECR I-13467. 
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due to commence university education. In this case, a prospective candidate can 
move to another Member State and start his or her university education in that State 
in order to obtain a law degree there. Students who are European Union nationals 
have a (conditional) right to free movement on the basis of Directive 2004/38/EC2 
so that they are entitled to enter and reside in other Member States in order to under-
take their studies there. In addition, students will need to have their secondary 
education qualifications recognised. There are no European Union rules on the 
recognition of secondary education qualifications for the benefit of access to univer-
sity education, so from a European Union point of view this competence remains 
with the Member States. The Member States, at least the fifteen Member States 
reviewed, committed themselves at a very early stage to facilitate entry of each other’s 
nationals into their universities. In 1953 a Council of Europe Convention was 
concluded which stated in a very concise manner that members shall recognise the 
equivalence of qualifications that give access to university education.3 This has 
come to be known as the Paris Equivalence Convention, and has now been largely 
replaced by the Lisbon Recognition Convention (discussed below), but the latter 
has not been ratified by a number of the Member States reviewed. As a result, the 
Paris Equivalence Convention is still relevant for those Member States who have 
not ratified the Lisbon Recognition Convention (also in relation to States that have 
ratified the Lisbon Recognition Convention themselves). Recognition on the basis 
of the Paris Equivalence Convention is unconditional and does not provide for 
exceptions on difference in content. The only negative factor concerning entrance 
at this point is the fact that prospective candidates are mostly still quite young. It is 
doubtful that many candidates, who are just on the verge of adulthood, would be 
ready to make the decision to move away from home to another Member State in 
order to start a legal career there. 
How the assessment of equivalence takes place is up to the Member States, and it 
falls outside the scope of this book to review all the mechanisms in place. It suffices 
to state at this point that the Dutch agency Nuffic has gained a reputation in Europe 
for, among other things, the assessment of equivalence of secondary education quali-
fications. On its website is a database which contains a wealth of information on this 
subject.4 
The second point of entry for prospective lawyers is after the completion of 
university education. Candidates may ask for entry into the qualification track based 
upon the university education they completed in their home Member State. Once 
again, there is no European Union legislation that directly covers the situation of 
(prospective) lawyers in this respect. As will be assessed below, the Lisbon Recognition 
Convention covers this matter, but integration at this point will be far more difficult 
                                                  
2  Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 9 April 2004 on the 
right of citizens of the European Union and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L 158/77. For students specifically, see 
Article 7(1c) Directive 2004/38/EC.  
3  European Convention on the Equivalence of Diplomas leading to Admission to Universities, 
Paris 11-12-1953, CETS no. 015. The same subject matter is also covered by the Lisbon Recog-
nition Convention (CETS no. 165) which will be addressed below, but which is not ratified 
by a number of Member States. 
4  <www.nuffic.net/diplomawaardering/extranet/kenmerken.html>, last accessed 28 April 2008. 
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than at the first stage. Generally, as was indicated above, the competent authorities 
require a law degree from a domestic university. Sometimes requirements are even 
laid down by law, as is the case in countries such as Germany and the Netherlands. 
Access at this level is difficult because the national law degrees concentrate primarily 
on national law. While substantial differences existing at secondary school level do 
not cause great concern (explaining the more or less automatic recognition under the 
Paris Equivalence Convention), it becomes more difficult to disregard these differ-
ences for prospective lawyers after their university studies. It is for this reason that 
the Lisbon Recognition Convention also takes into account the possibility that there 
may be substantial differences between the degrees in cases where recognition is 
requested. On the other hand, candidates are older at this point, and are more able 
to make a conscious decision as to where they want to exercise their profession.  
In the introduction of this book it was stated that the main problem in connection 
with the free movement of lawyers is the fact that Member States have different 
legal systems and that lawyers are predominantly educated in the legal system of 
their home Member State. This problem first becomes apparent during university 
studies because law degree programmes are almost exclusively directed towards the 
study of the national law. Free movement before this problem arises (i.e., before a 
candidate starts his or her university studies) is not a realistic option due to the age 
of the persons involved. So the origin of the problem with respect to the free move-
ment of lawyers lies in the qualification track, more specifically during university 
studies, where students, through qualifying themselves as experts of the national 
law, more or less disqualify themselves from free movement.  
 
 
§ 3. European Union Rules Affecting the Qualification 
Track for Lawyers  
As stated above, there are no legislative measures for the integration or recognition 
of the qualification track for lawyers; there are no measures of secondary legislation 
that cover this matter. The main reason for this absence is a result of Article 149 of 
the EC Treaty. This Article was introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht, and governs 
the precarious relationship between the Member States and the European Commu-
nity with respect to matters concerning education. Although the Article recognises 
that the Community and the Member States have a shared competence in the area 
of education, the Article very clearly prohibits harmonisation in the field of higher 
education.5 This means that any initiative on the part of the Union is limited and 
falls short of actual harmonisation measures. According to Article 149 of the Treaty, 
the European Union’s actions are limited to supporting and supplementing the 
actions of the Member States, with full respect for the responsibility of the Member 
States to manage their own education systems. In Section 4 of the Article, it is 
explicitly mentioned that harmonisation measures are excluded from the possible 
actions the European Union is to adopt in this context.  
                                                  
5  Lenaerts (1994), pp. 7-41. See also: Lenaerts & Van Nuffel (2005), pp. 306-308; Shaw (1992); 
Verbruggen (2003) and De Witte (1989). 
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This harsh conclusion does not mean, however, that there has been no activity 
in the field of education, but rather that that activity has been limited to the free 
movement of students in a technical sense. This free movement has seen a consid-
erable development throughout the process of European integration.6 Initially, rights 
in connection with education were only available for workers (albeit in a limited 
manner) and those who additionally benefited from workers’ rights. No separate free 
movement of students was available within the framework of the European Com-
munity. That right of free movement, as was and is the case with so many devel-
opments in the European Union, was initially recognised and developed by the 
European Court of Justice in cases like Forcheri,7 Gravier,8 and Raulin.9 It was not 
until the 1990s that a separate right of free movement of students was recognised in 
secondary legislation.10 In Directive 93/9611 a right of residence was granted to 
students from other Member States who could prove that they were enrolled in a 
recognised educational establishment in the host Member State,12 that they had 
enough financial resources to avoid becoming a burden on the social security 
system of the host Member State and were fully covered by medical insurance.13 It 
is striking to see that the Directive required complete financial independence from 
students, and that it was even explicitly stated that the Member States are in no way 
obliged to financially support students who reside in their territory on the basis of 
the Directive.14, 15 As of 1 May 2006, the free movement of students is governed 
by Directive 2004/38/EC.16 The rules in connection with the free movement of 
students are now laid down in Article 7(1c) of Directive 2004/38 but do not differ 
from the regime that was laid down in Directive 93/96. Subsequently Directives 
were adopted to regulate the free movement of students who are third-country 
                                                  
6  For a detailed overview of the development of the free movement of students, together with 
extensive references, see Van der Mei (2001), pp. 393-472 and Craig & de Burca (2007), 
pp. 862-866. 
7  Case 152/83, [1983] ECR I-02323. 
8  Case 293/83, [1985] ECR I-00593. 
9  Case C-375/89, [1992] ECR I-01027. 
10  First in Directive 90/366, and after that directive was nullified by the European Court of 
Justice because of an incorrect legal basis, in Directive 93/96, which was a duplicate of the earlier 
Directive. Nowadays the right to free movement of students is laid down in Directive 2004/38/EC. 
11  Council Directive of 29 October 1993 on the right of residence for students (93/96/EEC), OJ 
1993, L 317/59. 
12  The Directive did not, however, contain provisions on how such a student would become 
enrolled in such an institution. 
13  Article 1 Directive 93/96/EEC. 
14  Article 3 Directive 93/96/EEC. 
15  The European Court of Justice, however, decided in the Grzelczyk case (Case C-184/99, 
Rudy Grzelczyk v. Centre Public d’Aide Sociale d’Ottignes-Louvain-la-Neuve CPAS, [2001] ECR 
I-6193) that under certain circumstances a person residing in a Member State under the regime of 
Directive 93/96/EEC may rely on social assistance benefits based on the non-discrimination 
provision derived from European citizenship. See, in this respect also, the Bidar case (Case C-
209/03, The Queen ex parte Danny Bidar v. London Borough of Ealing, Secretary of State for Education 
and Skills, [2005] ECR I-02119), where the European Court of Justice relies on European 
citizenship in order to create a right for a foreign student to a maintenance grant.  
16  Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
the right of citizens of the European Union and their family members to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States, OJ 2004, L 158/77. 
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nationals17 and to liberalise the mobility of third-country national researchers.18 From 
a technical perspective, these measures only apply to students, so that candidates 
seeking to move in order to make use of the second point of entry are not even 
covered by the rules on the free movement of students, and it could even be doubted 
whether these people have a right to free movement to begin with. Luckily, this 
potential bomb was defused by the European Court of Justice in the Kranemann 
case,19 when it ruled that a trainee lawyer could benefit from the free movement of 
workers. 
Even though there is such limited jurisdiction for the Institutions of the Euro-
pean Union, the subject of education became of major importance to the Union 
when the European Council set a strategic goal to become the most competitive 
knowledge-based economy in the world.20 This so-called Lisbon Strategy has gen-
erated a considerable amount of policy papers and other ‘soft law’ that is intended, in 
the wording of Article 149 of the EC Treaty, to supplement and support national 
policies in this field.21 This complemented policies already in place to promote 
mobility of students through programmes such as Socrates and the Leonardo da Vinci 
subsidy programmes.22 It is by no means the intention of this paragraph to give an 
extensive overview of the actions of the European Union in the field of education. 
The soft law will not be reviewed.23 
None of these developments actually addresses the mutual recognition of univer-
sity diplomas and diplomas giving access to university since this is deemed to reside 
under the Member States sovereignty under Article 149 of the EC Treaty.24 As was 
shown in Chapter 2 of this book, it is clear that the European Court of Justice does 
not necessarily keep to this strict division of power. Chapter 2 indicated that the 
European Court of Justice encroached upon the rules of academic recognition in force 
in the recent cases of Morgenbesser, Commission v. Austria and Commission v. Belgium. 
                                                  
17  Council Directive 2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004 on the conditions of admission of 
third-country nationals for the purposes of study, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or 
voluntary services, OJ (2004) L 375/12. 
18  Council Directive 2005/71/EC of 12 October 2005 on a specific procedure for admitting 
third-country nationals for the purposes of scientific research, OJ (2005) L 289/15. 
19  Case C-109/04, Karl Robert Kranemann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, [2005] ECR I-02421. 
20  Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council 23/24 March 2000, § 5. <ue.eu.int/ue 
Docs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00100-r1.en0.htm>, last accessed 23 February 2006. 
21  For example: Report from the Education Council to the European Council adopted by the 
Education Council on 12 February 2001; Working Programme Education and Training 2001, 
[2002] OJ C 142; ‘Mobilising the Brainpower of Europe: enabling universities to make their 
full contribution to the Lisbon Strategy’, COM (2005) 152 final; ‘The role of universities in 
the Europe of knowledge’, COM (2003) 58 final; and ‘Working together for growth and jobs: 
a new start for the Lisbon Strategy’, COM (2005) 24.  
22  See Van der Mei (2001), pp. 408-409. 
23  As was already indicated in Schneider & Claessens (2005), p. 164, the European Union lacks a 
holistic approach in these cases. The clear link between professional recognition and academic 
recognition is ignored completely in the policy documents regarding education, whereas in the 
context of free movement the European Court of Justice really encroaches on this matter. A 
detailed review of the soft law concerning education therefore falls outside the scope of this book. 
24  Although encouraging the mutual recognition of academic diplomas is mentioned as a goal of 
Community action in § 149(2), close reading of § 149(1) leads to the conclusion that Member 
States’ sovereignty is not affected. 
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In order to clearly assess the impact of these cases on the rules of recognition in 
force, it must first be established which of the rules are applicable in this situation. In 
recent years, the Member States have decided to standardise these rules in a process 
that takes place outside the realm of the European Union, the so-called ‘Bologna 
Process’. 
 
 
§ 4. Creating an Area for Higher Education in Europe: 
The ‘Bologna Process’ 
The most remarkable development with respect to higher education in Europe has 
taken place over the last few years completely outside the framework of the Euro-
pean Union. This development is often referred to as the ‘Bologna Process’.25 It 
will not be the purpose of this paragraph to ponder over, or to criticise this process, 
but rather to assess its impact on the free movement of lawyers, whether it be 
positive or negative.26  
As said above, competence in the area of educational systems remains firmly in 
the hands of Member States, and the European Union has no power as such to create 
secondary legislation for these subjects. It is therefore even more remarkable that 
those same Member States, who have always defended, and continue to defend, 
their own interests in educational systems in what has been described as a jealous 
manner,27 have decided to actively create a European Area of Higher Education 
which completely reforms the structure of higher education in Europe.28 
The process of reforming higher education in Europe through the ‘Bologna 
Process’ was initiated in France in 1998 with the so-called ‘Sorbonne Joint Decla-
ration’.29 In that declaration, the Education Ministers of France, Germany, Italy and 
the United Kingdom stated their intention to create a uniform system of two cycles 
(an undergraduate and a graduate cycle) in order to make it easier for students to 
study abroad and to switch within, or between, cycles offered in different countries.30 
This initiative was taken over by many more countries in the so-called ‘Bologna 
Declaration’.31 In that declaration the then 29 signatory states agreed that they 
would reform their higher education systems in such a way that would facilitate the 
achievement of six goals that were defined in the Bologna Declaration. These goals 
were the following: adopt a system of easily understandable and comparable degrees; 
adopt a system of two main cycles (undergraduate/graduate); establish a system of 
                                                  
25  On the Bologna Process in general see extensively: Terry (2008). 
26  For a healthy dose of scepticism see Schneider & Claessens (2005), pp. 123-166 and Garben 
(2008). 
27  Ibid. 
28  For an extensive review see Terry (2008); Verbruggen (2003) and Witte (2006). For more 
specific issues, see Bell (s.d.); Breilat (2005); Lonbay (2001) B; Posch (2005) B; Terry (2006) 
and Terry (2007). 
29  Sorbonne Joint Declaration, Paris 25 May 1998, via <www.bologna-bergen2005.no>, last 
accessed 21 March 2006. 
30  There are other, less invasive, innovations, such as the introduction of the European Credit 
Transfer System (ECTS) credit system, which will not be discussed. 
31  The Bologna Declaration of 19 June 1999, Joint Declaration of the European Ministers of 
Education, via <www.bologna-bergen2005.no>, last accessed 21 March 2006. 
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credits (such as ECTS); promote mobility by overcoming obstacles; promote Euro-
pean cooperation in quality assurance; and promote the European dimensions in 
higher education.32 These six objectives were a considerable broadening and refine-
ment of the goals compared with the Sorbonne Joint Declaration that had the reform 
of the European Higher Education systems into two-cycle systems as its focal point.33 
Although the Bologna Declaration remains the most important document in 
the process of (re)forming the European Higher Education Area, some other docu-
ments require review in this context. In the Bologna Declaration, the signatories 
recognised the importance of ongoing supervision and support for the implemen-
tation of the system as it was proposed in the Declaration, and in consequence they 
decided to meet two years after the signing of the Declaration.34  
The follow-up meeting took place in Prague in 2001, and resulted in a com-
muniqué that was titled: ‘Towards the European Higher Education Area’.35 In that 
document the then 32 signatories of the Bologna Declaration reaffirmed their in-
tention to reach the goals laid down in the Bologna Declaration. In addition to 
welcoming the active support of the European University Association, the National 
Unions of Students in Europe and the European Commission, the Ministers also 
furthered the six objectives of the Bologna Declaration with three more important 
elements, therewith enlarging the ‘Bologna Process’ from six to nine goals. The 
three new objectives were: emphasis on life-long learning, which was recognised as 
an essential element of the European Higher Education Area;36 emphasis on the in-
volvement of students, and (perhaps more importantly) other higher education in-
stitutions other than universities;37 and lastly, emphasis on the promotion of the 
attractiveness and competitiveness of the European Higher Education Area to students 
from Europe and from other parts of the world.38 Again, the decision was taken to 
organise a follow-up meeting which was to take place two years after the Prague 
meeting, and in Berlin in 2003.39 
The ministerial meeting in Berlin in 2003 resulted in yet another communiqué, 
this time titled: ‘Realising the European Higher Education Area’.40 In this commu-
niqué, the now 33 signatories follow the same structure as they had done in the 
Prague communiqué, i.e., to report on the existing goals and to create new objec-
tives for the European Higher Education Area. In addition to this process, the Berlin 
                                                  
32  See Basic Information (January 2004) The ‘Bologna Process’ – Towards the European Higher 
Education Area, <www.bologna-bergen2005.no/EN/Basic/Pros-descr.htm>, last accessed 7 
April 2006. 
33  Ibid. 
34  Ibid. 
35  ‘Towards the European Higher Education Area’, Communiqué of the meeting of European 
Ministers in charge of Higher Education in Prague on 19 May 2001, <www.bologna-bergen 
2005.no>, last accessed 7 April 2006.  
36  Ibid. 
37  Ibid. 
38  Ibid. 
39  See Basic Information (January 2004) The ‘Bologna Process’ – Towards the European Higher 
Education Area’, <www.bologna-bergen2005.no/EN/Basic/Pros-descr.htm>, last accessed 7 
April 2006. 
40  ‘Realising the European Higher Education Area’, Communiqué of the Conference of Minis-
ters responsible for Higher Education in Berlin on 19 September 2003. <www.bologna-bergen 
2005.no>, last accessed 7 April 2006. 
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communiqué also features two new elements. In the ‘preamble’ of the commu-
niqué, the Ministers reaffirm the importance of the social aspect of the European 
Higher Education Area, i.e., to strengthen social cohesion and reduce social and gender 
inequalities both at national and European level. The Ministers state explicitly that 
the social dimension of the European Higher Education Area must not be over-
shadowed by the need to increase competitiveness.41 A second new feature in the 
Berlin communiqué is the fact that for the first time in the process of creating the 
European Higher Education Area there is an urge among the participating Ministers 
to prioritise. The communiqué states explicitly that in the coming years the emphasis 
of the participating countries should lie with quality assurance, implementation of 
the two-cycle system and the recognition of degrees and periods of study.42 It might 
not be a surprise that these three points of emphasis also coincide with the original 
goals of the Sorbonne Joint Declaration. It is also the first time that the signatories 
commit themselves to concrete goals, stating that they will initiate actual imple-
mentation in the three areas identified in the Berlin communiqué.43 
As stated above, the Berlin communiqué also added a new, tenth, initiative to 
the already existing initiatives from Prague and Bologna. In the communiqué, the 
Ministers of the signatory states refer to the adding of a third cycle to the already 
existing initiative of creating a two-cycle system. In the communiqué, the Ministers 
state that in order to strengthen the ties between the European Higher Education 
Area and the European Research Area, the doctoral level of studies must be in-
cluded as a third cycle in the ‘Bologna Process’.44 It is noteworthy to mention that 
the doctoral level was also included in the two-cycle system that was proposed by 
the Sorbonne Joint Declaration. For that matter, the inclusion of the doctoral level 
in the Berlin communiqué was not a complete novelty but more of a reappraisal of 
the Sorbonne Declaration, which was also the case with the abovementioned priori-
tising in the existing focal points of the Bologna Declaration. With regard to follow 
up, the Ministers accepted a number of new signatories to the ‘Bologna Process’ 
which brought the number of signatories up to 40.45 It was also decided in the 
communiqué that the next ministerial conference would take place in Bergen in 
Norway in 2005. Together with the ministerial conference in Bergen it was also 
decided that a mid-term stocktaking should take place. This stocktaking exercise 
would then be presented at the meeting of the Ministers of the signatory states. 
As was the case with the two previous summits, the summit in Bergen in 2005 
did not result in a new Declaration, but again in a communiqué, this time titled ‘The 
                                                  
41  Ibid. The Ministers even provide for a rule of thumb: in international academic cooperation 
and exchanges academic values should prevail. 
42  See Basic Information (January 2004) The ‘Bologna Process’ – Towards the European Higher 
Education Area, <www.bologna-bergen2005.no/EN/Basic/Pros-descr.htm>, last accessed 7 
April 2006. 
43  ‘Realising the European Higher Education Area’, Communiqué of the Conference of Minis-
ters responsible for Higher Education in Berlin on 19 September 2003. <www.bologna-bergen 
2005.no>, last accessed 7 April 2006. 
44  Ibid. 
45  Ibid. 
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European Higher Education Area – Achieving the Goals’.46 The Bergen communi-
qué was almost completely concerned with the stocktaking report that was prepared 
by the so-called Follow-up Group for the summit in Bergen. It was also the first 
communiqué that did not add new initiatives to the ‘Bologna Process’ but only 
looked at how the existing initiatives could be implemented. Because of the fact 
that the communiqué relied heavily on the stocktaking report, this report will be 
looked at first. After that, how the results of the stocktaking report were imple-
mented in the Bergen communiqué will be assessed.  
The stocktaking report was prepared by a working group that was appointed by 
the Bologna Process Follow-up Group in order to take stock of the progress made 
on the three initiatives prioritised by the Berlin communiqué.47 The report looks 
into the three areas prioritised by the Berlin communiqué, i.e., quality assurance, 
two-cycle degree systems and recognition of degrees and study periods. The working 
group developed a score card on the basis of which it can assess whether or not a 
signatory state lives up to the standards required in the ‘Bologna Process’. Infor-
mation is gathered from the signatory states by means of a national report which 
they prepare on the basis of a template provided by the working group. The national 
reports were not checked.48 The stocktaking report is rather optimistic with regard 
to the progress made in the ‘Bologna Process’: 
  
‘This report concludes that there is good news for the countries involved in the 
‘Bologna Process’: the collective and voluntary inter-governmental process is a 
success. Common goals are being pursued and targets are being met by the great 
majority of countries. There is also good news for the higher education institutions, 
who are working hard to implement the Bologna actions, and who can now see their 
achievements being made visible. Finally, there is good news for students, because 
the ‘Bologna Process’ is creating a better and more open world of learning, with 
enhanced mobility, transparency, transfer and recognition of qualifications.’49  
 
This optimistic tone is maintained throughout the report, and it is therefore no great 
surprise that the report does not entail revolutionary recommendations, other than 
perhaps the recommendation to utilise in full the Lisbon Recognition Convention50 
when it comes to recognition of degrees and study time. 
As stated above, the Bergen communiqué relies heavily on the stocktaking report, 
and the recommendations in the communiqué therefore largely coincide with the 
recommendations in the stocktaking report, with its most eye-catching element being 
the referral to the Lisbon Recognition Convention for the initiative regarding the 
recognition of degrees and study time. In addition, the Ministers also seek to imple-
ment an overarching framework for qualifications that must ensure smooth access to 
                                                  
46  ‘The European Higher Education Area – Achieving the Goals’, Communiqué of the Con-
ference of European Ministers Responsible for Higher Education, Bergen 19-20 May 2005, 
<www.bologna-bergen2005.no>, last accessed 7 April 2006. 
47  ‘Bologna Process’ Stocktaking, Report from a Working Group appointed by the Bologna 
Follow-up Group to the Conference of European Ministers Responsible for Higher Edu-
cation, Bergen 19-20 May 2005, <www.bologna-bergen2005.no>, last accessed 7 April 2006. 
48  Ibid. p. 11. 
49  Ibid. p. 5. 
50  CETS no. 165. 
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the three-cycle degree system and also provide for a smooth transition between two 
cycles. The Bergen communiqué concludes with the adoption of new signatory 
states, which brings the total of participating countries to 45, and the notification 
that the next ministerial conference will be held in London in 2007. 
The London communiqué, ‘Towards the European Higher Education Area: 
Responding to challenges in a globalised world’, issued on 18 May 2007 brings 
little new to light.51 The focus remains on the development of the three-cycle system 
with emphasis on the third, i.e. doctoral, cycle. In that sense the Ministers call for a 
curriculum reform in order to further facilitate the streamlining of the three-cycle 
system. The call for reform is not accompanied by any concrete measures to facilitate 
or stimulate such reform. The Ministers further call for ratification of the Lisbon 
Recognition Convention, which will be dealt with below. Further emphasis is placed 
on mobility, the social dimension, data collection and employability. In addition, 
one of the targets for 2009 is the focus on the rest of the world, i.e., applying the 
principles of the Bologna system to diplomas from the rest of the world. The next 
conference, as at the time of writing, will take place in Louvain in 2009. In addition 
to the communiqué, the London conference also led to the adoption of a second 
stocktaking report.52 The second stocktaking report built on the previous report 
and focused on quality assurance, degree systems and recognition. The report offered 
no surprising new developments, which is reflected by its conclusions.53 More 
specifically, with regard to the degree system and recognition, which are of primary 
interest for this study, the report stated that most countries have implemented a two-
cycle degree system and that many countries are introducing a third cycle to the 
system. With regard to recognition, there is only need to mention the development 
in the ECTS system. In its outlook for 2010, the writers of the stocktaking report 
put their finger on the sore spot when they stated that one of the challenges for 
2010 is that, by then, ‘learners’[sic] may expect that: ‘higher education qualifications 
that are awarded in all participating countries are recognised in all other countries 
for access to employment, education and research opportunities’.54 The reason why 
this is considered a sore point will be explained below. 
At first glance, and viewed from the perspective of its creators, as was the case 
above, the ‘Bologna Process’ might appear to be an enormous achievement. More 
than 40 states have apparently been successful in achieving, in under ten years, a 
complete reformation of their higher education systems in order to safeguard the 
mobility of students, by providing for similar degree cycles so that students can easily 
change between taking one cycle in one state and another cycle in the other, and, 
lastly, these states have successfully created a system that provides for recognition of 
                                                  
51 <www.dfes.gov.uk/bologna/uploads/documents/LondonCommuniquefinalwithLondon 
logo.pdf>, last accessed 12 June 2007. 
52  <www.dfes.gov.uk/bologna/uploads/documents/6909-BolognaProcessST.pdf>, last accessed 
12 June 2007. 
53  ‘There are three main conclusions that can be drawn from the 2007 stocktaking. 
1.  There has been good progress in the ‘Bologna Process’ since Bergen. 
2.  The outlook for achieving the goals of the ‘Bologna Process’ by 2010 is good, but there are 
still some challenges to be faced. 
3.  Stocktaking works well as an integral part of the ‘Bologna Process’ strategy.’ 
54  <www.dfes.gov.uk/bologna/uploads/documents/6909-BolognaProcessST.pdf>, last accessed 
12 June 2007. 
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degrees and study periods, so that problems of having one’s years of hard labour 
recognised in another country are a thing of the past. Moreover, all this has been 
achieved in an intergovernmental fashion, without the need for cumbersome supra-
national mechanisms.55 When assessing the ‘Bologna Process’ in a more objective 
manner, a few, very important characteristics of this process must be borne in mind. 
First, there is of course the legal status of the ‘Bologna Process’. As is indicated 
in the main conclusion of the stocktaking report, the ‘Bologna Process’ is founded 
on nothing more than the good will of the participating states. The Bologna Decla-
ration, or the Sorbonne Joint Declaration, or any of the communiqués described 
above for that matter, have no legally binding nature whatsoever, and can only be 
classified as ‘soft law’. There is no legal obligation resulting from any International 
Organisation to take part in the ‘Bologna Process’, nor is there any legal obligation 
to adhere to the principles laid down in the Bologna Declaration or any of the sub-
sequent documents described above. If pursued further, the only part of the ‘Bologna 
Process’ that could be deemed legally binding is the part on degree recognition. 
That is the case only because the signatory states (at least those that have ratified the 
Convention) seem to incorporate the system of degree recognition as laid down in 
the Lisbon Recognition Convention. The legally binding nature of that part of the 
‘Bologna Process’ must be sought therefore, in the binding nature of the Lisbon 
Recognition Convention (that derives its binding nature from general international 
law in connection to treaties) rather than in any binding nature of the ‘Bologna 
Process’ itself. The binding force of the ‘Bologna Process’ must therefore be sought 
in the political sphere, with all the uncertainties that are normal in that field.56 
An additional problem of this so-called ‘soft-law’ nature of the ‘Bologna Process’ 
lies in its conception. The ministers responsible for the ‘Bologna Process’ are capable 
of creating this process on their own, without any national (or supranational for 
that matter) parliament being involved in their decisions. Their conduct is not con-
trolled by an independent court, national or international. From my perspective, 
this is undesirable. In important issues like these, i.e., the reform of higher education 
policy, it seems paramount that such far-reaching processes are subjected to demo-
cratic legitimisation.57 None of this is true for the ‘Bologna Process’. 
It is also very important to look at the actual results of the process. The stock-
taking report cries victory and states, in so many words, that it has become much 
easier for students to study in other jurisdictions. Is this really the case? If judged on 
its merits, the ‘Bologna Process’ , and I will focus on the two-cycle (or three-cycle) 
system here for a moment, is nothing more than a procedural process. It only pre-
scribes that higher education in the signatory states should consist of two (or three) 
                                                  
55  The main conclusion of the stocktaking report is illustrative. It seems to the author that the 
referral to the intergovernmental nature of the ‘Bologna Process’ was included for apparent 
reasons. 
56  For it even to be politically binding might be problematic for some of the signatory states, 
since some of the ministers who signed the Bologna Declaration did not have any power in 
that field. See Schneider & Claessens (2005), p. 161. 
57  It must be considered, of course, that any implementation of the ‘Bologna Process’ in the sig-
natory states may be expected to be carried out under the normal safeguards of the rule of law. 
It might however occur that a minister presents the ‘Bologna Process’ to parliament as a fait 
accompli and the implementation of the ‘Bologna Process’ therefore becomes a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.  
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separate cycles.58 Nowhere in the entire ‘Bologna Process’, at least not until the 
2007 London Summit, is the content or duration of an actual cycle deemed to be 
of any importance. There was not a single mention of the need to talk about curricula 
and to create similar curricula for similar studies.59 Viewed from the perspective of 
this book, for the lawyers, this is vital. A system of bachelor’s and master’s degrees 
will be useless for lawyers if the options for master’s degrees (apart from those 
focusing on international topics) require the knowledge gained in corresponding 
bachelor’s degrees from that state (which is more often than not the case in master’s 
degrees focusing on the national law of that specific state).60 In that respect, the 
‘Bologna Process’ is not helpful in promoting the free movement of lawyers.  
Moreover, the ‘Bologna Process’ in no way guarantees the free movement of 
students. Students from European Union Member States rely on European law for 
their rights of free movement, whilst nationals from other signatories to the ‘Bologna 
Process’ could be subject to extremely severe conditions for entering and remaining 
in the territory of that state. This can be seen in countries like the Netherlands.  
Thus, if the ‘Bologna Process’ is looked at in a more objective manner, it seems 
that, first and foremost, this is a technical exercise that provides for the same ter-
minology in the signatory states (with regard to degree cycles, quality assurance and 
crediting systems) but that it provides little or no concrete added value. The only 
part of the ‘Bologna Process’ that could lead to concrete results is the system of 
degree recognition, which is only the case because the majority of the signatory states 
also committed themselves to a convention that had the same matter as its subject. I 
therefore would be hesitant to use the same jubilant language as the stocktaking 
report, because it might give too much credit to an operation that leads merely to 
the use of the same terminology. Behind the terminology is where the real problems 
lie, and if everybody is using the same terms, it might be even harder to identify 
and tackle these problems. 
At this point it might be beneficial to have a closer look at the only part of the 
‘Bologna Process’ that has a legally binding effect. This legally binding effect is not 
by virtue of the process itself, since it has been explained that the ‘Bologna Process’ 
is completely devoid of any legally binding force, but by virtue of the fact that the 
part of the ‘Bologna Process’ that concentrates on diploma recognition is covered 
by the Lisbon Recognition Convention, a Treaty conceived in the framework of 
the Council of Europe. 
                                                  
58  For example, in The Netherlands the ‘old’ four-year course of study in law that led to the degree 
of ‘meester in de rechten’ has been replaced by a three-year bachelor’s and a one-year master’s 
degree. See also: Bruinsma (2000), pp. 1371-1374. 
59  Outside the Bologna Process such discussions were ongoing. See Reich (2002). 
60  And that is for the states that adopt the two-cycle system for legal studies. Germany, as a large 
player in the ‘Bologna Process’, still exempts a number of studies, among them law, from the 
two-cycle system. ‘Bologna Process’ Stocktaking, Report from a working group appointed by 
the Bologna Follow-up Group to the Conference of European Ministers Responsible for 
Higher Education, Bergen 19-20 May 2005, <www.bologna-bergen2005.no>, last accessed 7 
April 2006, p. 34. 
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§ 5. The Lisbon Recognition Convention61 and the Effect 
of Recent Case Law of the European Court of Justice  
As described at the beginning of this chapter, the European Community does not 
have any legislative power when it comes to education. Recognition of academic 
qualifications was, as described above, also outside the jurisdiction of the legislative 
institutions of the European Community, and therefore, also largely outside of the 
hands of the European Court of Justice. It was not until five years ago that the 
European Court of Justice has ruled a case, the above-cited case of Morgenbesser, in 
which it encroached upon the subject of the recognition of academic qualifications. 
The future must determine how this line of case law will develop further. The fact 
that the subject of recognition of academic qualifications did not fall within the 
competences of the European Community did not mean that there were no other 
international, intergovernmental organisations that dealt with this matter. Both the 
Council of Europe and UNESCO were, throughout recent history, rather active in 
this field.62 This activity, which for the Council of Europe mainly took place in the 
1950s and 1960s, and for UNESCO in the 1970s, culminated in a joint Convention 
on the recognition of qualifications concerning higher education in the European 
region.63 
The Convention covers both the recognition of qualifications giving access to 
higher education and the recognition of qualifications that are awarded after a period 
of higher education. The purpose of this paragraph will be to give a general over-
view of the workings of the Convention, with the main emphasis being placed on 
the second part of the Convention, i.e., the recognition of qualifications that are 
awarded after a period of study. The Lisbon Recognition Convention does this by 
declaring that everybody is entitled to an assessment of an application for recognition 
of qualifications solely on the basis of the knowledge and skills achieved.64 In a very 
general fashion, it can be said that the signatories to the Lisbon Recognition Con-
vention commit themselves to recognising higher education diplomas from other 
Member States.65 This recognition may be withheld if there are substantial differ-
ences between the qualifications where recognition is sought and the qualification 
obtained. Apparently, although this does not become clear from the Convention 
itself, it is the national recognition authority that decides whether substantial differ-
ences exist.66 Alternatively, states that do not have recognition mechanisms in place 
also fulfil the obligations of the Lisbon Recognition Convention if they provide for 
an assessment of the recognition concerned.67 
                                                  
61  CETS no. 165. 
62  Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher Education in the Euro-
pean Region, CETS no. 165, explanatory report, <conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/reports/html/ 
165.htm>, last accessed 11 April 2006. 
63  CETS no. 165. 
64  Article III.1(2) Lisbon Recognition Convention, CETS no. 165. 
65  Article VI.1 Lisbon Recognition Convention, CETS no. 165. 
66  Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher Education in the Euro-
pean Region, CETS no. 165, explanatory report, <conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/ reports/html/ 
165.htm>, last accessed 11 April 2006. 
67  Article VI.2 Lisbon Recognition Convention, CETS no. 165. 
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At first sight, the essential elements of the Lisbon Recognition Convention entail 
nothing more than a very broad rule to recognise higher education qualifications 
accompanied by the possibility to exempt, which is nearly as broad. Given the fact 
that this is an intergovernmental Convention this should come as no surprise. States 
are not willing to concede decision-making power to a supranational organisation, 
or to have their ability to take decisions limited by detailed treaty obligations, which 
is also apparent from their reluctance to cooperate on education in the framework 
of the European Community, or even the European Union.68  
Although it is by no means my intention to deliver a judgment with regard to 
the Lisbon Recognition Convention for all matters concerned, because that would 
go far beyond the scope of this book, I do want to devote some space to an assess-
ment of the use of the Lisbon Recognition Convention for those who aspire to 
become lawyers. It is likely that the Lisbon Recognition Convention is of little use 
to those who seek to become a lawyer in another Member State of the European 
Union after they finish their higher education. As stated above, it is possible under 
the Lisbon Recognition Convention to withhold recognition if there are substan-
tial differences between the qualifications of the person seeking recognition and the 
qualifications awarded in the Member State. It has been established in the previous 
part of this book that, generally speaking, the first step to becoming a lawyer in a 
Member State of the European Union is to study law at a university of that State. It 
can also be said that the curricula of Law Faculties focus strongly on the national law 
of the respective State. It can therefore also be concluded that where a prospective 
lawyer seeks to have his or her law degree recognised under the Lisbon Recognition 
Convention, he or she will almost always encounter the problem of substantial dif-
ferences, and is therefore in no way assured of recognition. Moreover, to add to 
the misery, the explanatory report to the Lisbon Recognition Convention states 
that in cases of regulated professions, which the profession of lawyer is in all Member 
States reviewed, the competent bodies governing those professions may ask for 
additional requirements.69  
Lastly, and as a coup de grâce, the European Court of Justice decided in the 
Commission v. Austria case70 that, in the event of conflict, European Community law 
prevails over other international agreements such as the Lisbon Recognition Con-
vention. In intra-Community situations, therefore, the application of the Lisbon 
Recognition Convention shall always be subject to European law. Moreover, the 
Court decided in the same case that recognition of academic diplomas falls under 
access to higher education, which is subject to EC law.  
It seems, therefore, that the Lisbon Recognition Convention is of no help for a 
prospective lawyer. A prospective lawyer in fact finds more protection in the case 
law of the European Court of Justice. As stated above, in Morgenbesser,71 the Euro-
                                                  
68  Schneider & Claessens (2005), pp. 161-162. 
69  Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher Education in the Euro-
pean Region, CETS no. 165, explanatory report, <conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/reports/html/ 
165.htm>, last accessed 11 April 2006. 
70  Case C-147/03, [2005] ECR I 5969. 
71  Case C-313/01, Christine Morgenbesser v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli avvocati di Genova, [2003] 
ECR I-13467. 
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pean Court of Justice has extrapolated its ruling in Vlassopoulou,72 so that it also 
applies to candidates from a regulated profession who cannot yet be considered as a 
produit fini, i.e., that they are fully qualified in a regulated profession in another 
Member State. The ruling in Vlassopoulou, and in Morgenbesser for that matter, entails 
that the candidate is entitled to a fair assessment of his or her qualifications, taking 
into account all the relevant knowledge and experience obtained by that candidate 
(also by means of courses and other, practical, experience). After such a comparison 
has been conducted, the national authority will then make a decision on what the 
candidate still has to do in order to obtain recognition.73  
Compared with the system of the Lisbon Recognition Convention, application 
of the Morgenbesser ruling seems to have more effect for the prospective lawyer, 
since it leads, or must lead, to a decision of a national authority stating what the 
candidate must do in order to achieve access to the profession of the lawyer, or to 
one of its preparatory stages. The Lisbon Recognition Convention, on the other 
hand, states that recognition can be withheld in cases where substantial differences 
exist. This leads to the belief that a prospective lawyer can end up with a negative 
answer74 without clarity on what needs to be done in order to obtain the recogni-
tion sought (as is the case with the application of the Vlassopoulou formula). 
In addition, it must also be mentioned that the application of both systems, at 
least in the case of prospective lawyers from EU Member States, is not necessarily 
contradictory. It might even be construed in such a fashion that the general rule in 
the Lisbon Convention Recognition, i.e., the incentive to recognise each other’s 
higher education qualifications unless substantial differences exist, can be further 
elaborated on by the case law of the European Court of Justice in connection with 
persons who are in the process of qualifying for a regulated profession, i.e., that all 
relevant knowledge and experience must be taken into account when making a 
decision on the equality of certain professional qualifications. 
A last point of criticism with regard to the Lisbon Recognition Convention 
must be made. As stated above, the recognition of study periods and degrees is one 
of the ten focal points of the ‘Bologna Process’. Moreover, it is one of the three 
points that had been given special priority in the Berlin communiqué. In essence, the 
actual application of this part of the ‘Bologna Process’ comes down to the ratification 
                                                  
72  Case C-340/89, Vlassopoulou v Ministerium für Justiz, Bundes- und Europaangelegenheiten 
Baden-Württemberg, [1991] ECR 2357. 
73  It must be noted at this point that application of the Vlassopoulou formula in cases like 
Morgenbesser does not lead to academic recognition per se, or in the sense of the Lisbon Recog-
nition Convention. The candidate will not receive a certificate of recognition, but the effect is 
similar. Ms. Morgenbesser wanted to be registered as a practicanti in Italy, but according to the 
rules in force in Italy one could only be admitted to that register if one had a diploma con-
ferred (or recognised) by an Italian university. Application of the Vlassopoulou formula in her case 
led to the same effect as a recognition of her French law degree, namely being accepted in the 
register of practicanti. That is also why it must be maintained that although the European Court 
of Justice has encroached upon academic recognition, because the effect in the Morgenbesser 
case is similar, it still does not exercise academic recognition as such. Morgenbesser had applied 
for recognition of her maîtrise but she was denied such recognition by an Italian university. 
The university concerned did inform her of what she needed to do in order to qualify for 
recognition, which basically added up to a full bachelor’s degree in Italian law. 
74  I.e., ‘No, your diploma will not be recognised.’  
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and application of a treaty, in this case the Lisbon Recognition Convention which 
was constructed outside the framework of the ‘Bologna Process’ (and existed already 
before the ‘Bologna Process’ had been initiated). Although different communiqués 
in the ‘Bologna Process’ urge all participants in the Process to ratify the Lisbon 
Recognition Convention, a number of states have not done so. It is even more note-
worthy that a large part this concerns Member States of the European Union that 
are considered in this book. Belgium, Greece, Italy and Spain have not ratified the 
Lisbon Recognition Convention.75 Apart from the problems already mentioned in 
the rest of this paragraph, this leaves a significant break in the application of the Lisbon 
Recognition Convention in Europe. 
In conclusion, it can be said that because the Lisbon Recognition Convention 
still leaves enormous discretionary powers for national recognition authorities, it 
also contains the possibility that a candidate requesting recognition is confronted 
with a negative decision on recognition without any further directions as to how to 
obtain recognition. Furthermore, a great deal of the potential benefit that has been 
sought throughout the ‘Bologna Process’ is decimated by the fact that the Lisbon 
Recognition Convention has not been ratified by a substantial number of Member 
States of the European Union. In addition, and more importantly for the scope of 
this book, general criticism left aside, the Lisbon Recognition Convention is not a 
helpful tool in furthering the free movement of lawyers in Europe since the prospec-
tive lawyers who seek to have their law degrees recognised in other (member) states 
will almost always encounter a negative decision from the recognition authorities 
because of the fact that law degrees still very much focus on the national law of a 
state, and therefore substantial differences between law degrees will always exist. 
On top of that, the Lisbon Recognition Convention also provides for additional 
criteria to be imposed by national authorities governing regulated professions.76 
 
 
§ 6. The Position of Those Seeking to Qualify for the 
Profession of Lawyer in the European Union 
The description and assessment of the EC rules and the rules ensuing from the 
‘Bologna Process’, including the Lisbon Recognition Convention, have led to the 
conclusion that, when push comes to shove, it is the rules laid down by the Euro-
pean Court of Justice in Morgenbesser and Commission v. Austria that apply to the 
situation of a European Union citizen who seeks to enter the qualification process 
for a legal profession at one of the points of entry identified above. That statement 
warrants a closer look at the judgments. 
                                                  
75  Apart from these states, Monaco, San Marino, Canada, Tajikistan and the United States also 
have not ratified the Lisbon Recognition Convention. See <www.coe.int>, last accessed 16 
October 2008. 
76  At this point it must be mentioned that the Council of Europe has also issued a recommen-
dation on the freedom to exercise the profession of lawyer. This Recommendation 
(Rec(2000)21, via <www.coe.int>, last accessed 11 April 2006), entails nothing that concerns 
the cross-border migration of lawyers but it does contain safeguards for the freedom to exercise 
the profession of lawyer within one Member State. Because of this fact, the recommendation 
is of little use to the thesis put forward in this book. 
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In Commission v. Austria the European Court of Justice addressed the problem 
of equality of secondary education qualifications that give access to university 
education. Projected onto the situation of (prospective) lawyers, this would concern 
the first point of entry, i.e., European Union nationals moving to start university 
education in a law degree course in another Member State. This situation, according 
to the European Court of Justice, may not lead to discrimination between a national 
of a Member State where entrance is sought and the candidate in question. For 
those countries applying the Paris Equivalence Convention this poses no problems, 
since recognition is more or less automatic. For those countries applying the Lisbon 
Recognition Convention it might be more complicated, since the Lisbon Conven-
tion allows for non-recognition of secondary education in situations where a sub-
stantial difference is established.77 For Member States of the European Union this 
rule can no longer be applied, and should be replaced by the rule that flows from 
the Commission v. Austria case; namely that access to university education may not 
be subject to discrimination unless such discrimination can be objectively justified. 
As was stated above, reliance on the Lisbon Recognition Convention cannot serve 
as objective justification. In my opinion, entrance on the first modality for law 
students should not lead to major problems, and there is no evidence that Member 
States seek to keep other EU nationals out of their law studies (as was the case with 
medicine studies in Austria). 
It is more interesting to assess whether the Commission v. Austria case also applies 
to the situation at the second point of entry, i.e. entry into the professional education 
part of the qualification track after having obtained a law degree in another Member 
State. There is nothing in the case that seems to exclude this situation from its scope, 
even more so because the case explicitly refers to the academic recognition of 
diplomas. It is, however, at this stage that the possibility of objective justification 
becomes more important. It can hardly be expected that Member States will auto-
matically recognise each others law degrees, more specifically because these law 
degrees focus on the national law of the Member State concerned and therefore 
offer little added value for the Member State in which the candidate seeks to enter 
the qualification track. In this light it must be stated that recent case law has shown 
that the possibility of objective justification is a realistic option.78  
Seen in the light of Morgenbesser, the extent of possible objective justification 
(both in cases built upon Articles 12 and 149 as Commission v. Austria and Lyyski, 
and in cases built on Articles 39 and 43 and secondary legislation, as was the case in 
Morgenbesser) seems to be that nobody may be denied access for the reason that he 
does not have a certain diploma (i.e., in this case, a law degree from the Member State 
where he seeks to enter the qualification track).79 This candidate is entitled to an 
individual review of his qualifications, taking into account all the knowledge that 
the candidate has obtained. On the basis of that assessment, the national authority 
may take a decision on what measures (compensation) are necessary to award equiva-
lence to the law degree already achieved by the candidate. In Chapter 2 it was 
established that this protection was still too meagre, and that further jurisprudence 
                                                  
77  Article IV(1) Lisbon Recognition Convention, CETS no. 165. 
78  Case C-40/05, Kaj Lyyski v.Umeå universitet [2007] ECR I-99. See Reich (2006). 
79  This outer limit was established in Case 71/76, Thieffry v. Conseil de l’Ordre des Avocats à la Cour 
de Paris [1977] ECR 756. 
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would be welcome, preferably bringing the situation of people seeking access at the 
second point in the qualification track within the material scope of application of 
the Diploma Directive. It was also established that the Morgenbesser ruling has seen 
little application in the Member States up to this point, however, Germany had sought 
to implement the ruling in the law allowing access to the qualification track for the 
profession of the Rechtsanwalt. 
This § 112a of the Deutschen Richtergesetz allows access to the qualification track 
of the profession of the Rechtsanwalt to those who can show that they have quali-
fications that are equivalent to the requirements for the First German State Exam. 
This seems to be completely consistent with the Morgenbesser ruling. However, the 
paragraph contains an additional requirement stating that assessment of equivalence 
is open to those who are eligible to enter the qualification track in their home Member 
State. This leads to the conclusion that the German implementation still goes beyond 
the limits set in the case law, since it makes the availability of the assessment of 
equivalence dependent on possession of a qualification. This is especially so if one 
considers the case of Ms. Morgenbesser, who was not qualified to enter the qualifi-
cation track proper in France, since she had not passed the entrance exam to the 
CRFPA, but she was still allowed the enjoyment of the assessment of equivalence in 
Italy. If the German rule had been applied to her situation, she would not have been 
allowed an assessment of equivalence since she did not qualify for entrance into the 
qualification track proper in her home Member State. In my opinion that still goes 
beyond the limits set by the European Court of Justice in Morgenbesser and Thieffry. 
The problem with the application of the ‘Bologna Process’ and the rules of the 
European Court of Justice is that they lack an approach on content. In the ‘Bologna 
Process’ this may be due to lack of will among its Member States. In the European 
Union it is clearly due to lack of competence. On the other hand, the European Court 
of Justice is trying to make the rules of mutual recognition so strict that Member 
States are more or less forced to address the content of law studies, because that is 
where, at least in my opinion, the answer to this problem is to be found. 
 
 
§ 7. Furthering the Free Movement of Lawyers: 
the Content of Law Studies 
The preceding paragraphs were not without criticism towards the ‘Bologna Process’, 
its specific elements such as the Lisbon Recognition Convention and the applicable 
rules of the European Court of Justice. It has been established that the ‘Bologna 
Process’, as it stands at this moment, does not add anything to benefit further the 
free movement of lawyers in the European Union. Two out of the three focal points 
that were prioritised in the Berlin communiqué could potentially add directly to 
the furthering of the free movement of lawyers in the European Union.80 With 
regard to the two-cycle (or three-cycle) degree system, it has been observed that 
the conversion operation into a two- or three- cycle system has been most notably 
a conversion of terminology. There are no safeguards in the ‘Bologna Process’ itself 
                                                  
80  Quality Assurance, as a third point, has more of an internal effect, on the basis of which 
universities can be compared on an equal basis. 
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that assure that cycles also have corresponding content.81 It has also been observed 
that this is certainly a problem for prospective lawyers, since law studies in the 
different Member States observed first and foremost focus on national law, therefore 
it might be hard for law students (from a free movement of lawyers perspective) to 
find master’s programmes that make it easier for them to become lawyers in 
another Member State. 
Criticism has also been uttered in connection with the system of degree recog-
nition. Application of the Lisbon Recognition Convention has been the preferred 
method of fulfilling the second focal point in the ‘Bologna Process’. It has been 
observed that this convention is, to this date, still not ratified by a substantial number 
of Member States of the European Union. In addition, it is of little use to prospec-
tive lawyers since recognition can be declined due to the existence of substantial 
differences, which are very likely to occur between law degrees from two different 
states. Rules with regard to recognition in force in the European Union give less 
leeway to Member States but still lack substantive rules on content.  
The question remains as to whether anything can be done to make the best use 
of the ‘Bologna Process’ , i.e., can a solution be found in which the free movement 
of lawyers can be furthered within the existing framework of the ‘Bologna Process’? I 
firmly believe that the answer to this question is, and must be, yes. Although the 
‘Bologna Process’ has a number of significant shortcomings, both in its structure (soft 
law) and in its application, it is undeniably a part of the policies in the participating 
states and, as the stocktaking report rightly assumes, many states have taken legis-
lative action in order to implement (parts of) the ‘Bologna Process’. It would there-
fore be naïve to assume that the ‘Bologna Process’ should be replaced with a more 
effective system for assuring complementary systems of higher education in Europe. 
There is no real alternative. The European Community Treaty still includes the grim 
prohibition on harmonisation in the field of education and there is no prospect of 
this changing anytime in the near future.82 
The key to making the best of the ‘Bologna Process’ as it stands today with 
respect to the furthering of the free movement of lawyers in Europe, lies, in my 
view, in the contents of the different educational programmes in the different Member 
States.83 Traditionally, the study of law (and the degree that follows it) focuses very 
much on the national law of the state in which it is taught. Room for specialisation 
or internationalisation often only occurs in the final part of the study, which, in 
many cases, is now part of the master’s part of the two-cycle system.84 Generally Bar 
                                                  
81  This is similar to the view of the CCBE on potential ‘harmonisation’ of professional education, 
where the emphasis lies on quality rather than on content: CCBE (s.d.) A. See also: Lonbay 
(2001) A. 
82  Van der Mei (2001), pp. 409-410. 
83  This is also the view of the European Law Faculties Association (ELFA) which, immediately 
after the adoption of the Bologna Declaration, started discussions on the reform of legal education 
in Europe. See ELFA (1999); ELFA (2007) A; ELFA (2007) B; ELFA (2008); Pichonnaz & 
Hirte (2006); Posch (2005) A; Reich (2002) and Steger (s.d.). 
84  This is actually the system that ELFA proposes, see ELFA (1999) and Reich (2002). Remark-
ably ELFA proposes direct access to the professional training of the legal profession after 
obtaining a master’s degree in another jurisdiction (where the bachelor’s degree focuses on 
national law of the home member state and the master’s degree on international (European) law) 
without having to resort to the ‘cumbersome and lengthy’ process of Directives 89/48/EEC 
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Associations require a sound knowledge of the national law of the State concerned 
before they allow candidates into the legal profession of that State. This means that, 
in order to avoid aptitude tests and adaptation periods later on in life, students should 
obtain a bachelor’s degree in the Member State where they wish to work. However, 
when students first commence their university studies they are often at an age and a 
stage in their lives when taking a decision to move abroad to study is too great a step.  
It would therefore be better to offer the sound knowledge of the national law 
in the master’s degree phase of the two-cycle degree system.85 Luxembourg has a 
similar system to this, since it had, until recently, no Law Faculty of its own (and it 
was therefore forced to accept students with foreign degrees). Questions remain 
with regard to what needs to be studied during the bachelor’s degree phase. This is 
not an easy question to answer. In the past, when Roman law was studied at the 
different universities in Europe, lawyers who had studied Roman law taught them-
selves, by means of books specially issued for that purpose, the law of the juris-
diction they chose to work in.86 In that sense the reconceived Roman law was a 
true Ius Commune Europæum. Nowadays there is no clear Ius Commune that is the 
basis for all the legal systems in Europe, but there are still ties that bind legal systems 
close together, often closer than is assumed in those legal systems.87 
There are a number of possibilities as to how more ‘internationalisation’ of the 
traditional legal education could be achieved. A number of these possibilities are already 
realised throughout Europe, whereas others could be regarded as more revolutionary. 
The first possibility with regard to achieving a larger degree of ‘internationalisation’ 
in traditional legal education is by so-called joint degrees.88 In joint degrees students 
are offered a degree that is valid in all the participating states. Normally this is 
achieved by requiring students to study for a certain period of time in the countries 
participating in the degree. In a joint German-French law degree, for example, the 
student would be required to study for two years in Germany and two years in France. 
One obvious positive aspect of such a degree is that the student has the guarantee 
that his or her degree will be recognised by the professional organisations of the parti-
cipating states and has guaranteed access to the professional education of the (legal) 
profession in that state. The downside is that these degrees are generally focused on 
two Member States, which would limit the choice of candidates to studying the 
law of those two states.89  
                                                  
and 98/5/EC. In my opinion this is not a realistic option due to the value that Bar Associations 
give to the knowledge of national law, where this system would provide access to the legal 
profession without any knowledge of the national law of the host member state. 
85  Dubbed by ELFA as the ‘upside-down system’, see ELFA (1999), and Reich (2002), where it 
is concluded that this system is ‘premature on a general scale’ mainly due to the absence of 
adequate teaching materials. The main advantage of this approach in my opinion is the fact 
that the knowledge of national law that the student obtains is in the field of the national law of 
the host member state in which he or she seeks to enter the legal profession. 
86  Lokin & Zwalve (2001), pp. 110-120. For a very detailed overview of the reception of Roman 
Law in Europe, see Mather (2001), pp. 323-362. 
87  Van Gerven (2001), pp. 485-503. 
88 <www.ond.vlaanderen.be/hogeronderwijs/bologna/actionlines/joint_degrees.htm> last accessed 
on 18 September 2008. 
89  On joint degrees, see Finocchietti & Sticchi Damiani (2002); Guinchard (2007); Pelissier 
(2007) and Tauch & Rauhvargers (2002). 
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Another possibility would be that a course of study (as a single or joint degree) 
would focus more on the common ground among the major legal systems in Europe, 
while on the other hand ensuring the recognition of the professional authority in 
the state where the programme is located in order to guarantee unfettered access to 
the (legal) profession in that state. An example of this type of degree is the Euro-
pean Law School that was developed at the Law Faculty of Maastricht University. 
In 1995, the Law Faculty created a new curriculum called the European Law School.90 
The purpose of this curriculum was to provide students with a sound foundation in 
Dutch law, good knowledge of the surrounding legal systems (i.e., France, Germany 
and the United Kingdom) and the law of the European Union in order to prepare 
students for a career in law (predominantly in law firms that operate internationally) 
without sacrificing the civiel effect which qualifies students with a law degree to enter 
the training stage of the Dutch Bar Association in order to qualify as an advocaat. 
This curriculum has proven to be attractive for both students and employers and is 
now a well established course of study offered by the Law Faculty. Compared with 
the joint degree, however, this degree only guarantees access to the qualification 
track of one legal profession (the Netherlands), and therefore it does not have the 
added value of having at least two countries where the degree is recognised. In the 
light of ‘hard guarantees’, the European Law School offers little more than a con-
ventional Law degree completely focused at the national law, namely ensuring access 
to the professional education in that specific country. This course thus prepares for 
further internationalisation, but it does not really facilitate it. Additionally, with 
tuition in the first two years being in Dutch, the European Law School programme 
did not really attract any foreign students. Maastricht University has, however, taken 
steps to address this. 
Because of its geographical location, Maastricht has close ties with the surrounding 
regions in Belgium and Germany. Maastricht University has a very good reputation 
in these countries and other faculties of the university, which prepare students for 
non-regulated professions, have always greatly benefited from a considerable student 
influx from Belgium and Germany. Although the Law Faculty has a considerable 
number of Belgian students, these students are always faced with the extra hurdle of 
having to apply for recognition of their Dutch degree in Belgium. Close cooperation 
between Belgian and Dutch authorities91 now ensures that this process is smooth. 
Differences between the Dutch and German legal systems, and educational systems 
for that matter, prove to be too great to overcome, however, so very few German 
students traditionally enrolled in the Law Faculty in Maastricht.  
Recently, the Law Faculty created a course (a new version of the European Law 
School) which will lead to a bachelor’s degree that is also appealing for students who 
do not seek to obtain a title that gives them the opportunity to become an advocaat 
in the Netherlands.92 This new curriculum includes two years of courses taught in 
English (focused on comparative law and international and European law) and a third 
year that is much more focused on national law. In this final year, students have an 
option to follow a track based on Dutch law or a more general track. The national 
track is designed to, combined with a Dutch master’s degree, ensure access to the 
                                                  
90  Heringa (2002), pp. 3-15. See also: De Groot (1992). 
91  See Bologna Stocktaking Report. 
92  The civiel effect requires curricula to include certain compulsory subjects in Dutch law. 
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qualification track for the legal profession in the Netherlands. It is envisaged that 
many of the German students in this new course will seek to follow the Dutch track 
to qualify for access in the Netherlands, in order to benefit from §112a of the Deutschen 
Richtergesetz, the attempted implementation of the Morgenbesser rule in Germany.  
This new variant of the European Law School has some revolutionary potential. 
By offering the national law component at the end of the studies (and I will limit 
myself to the situation where a student would seek to enter professional education for 
the legal profession) the possibility for further differentiation is easily imaginable. It 
would be possible to set up networks with other universities in Belgium and Ger-
many, for example, where students could focus in their third year on the national 
law of that state, thereby working towards, or even assuring, access to the legal pro-
fession in that state. For Belgium I see such a development as viable, but the problem 
lies with Germany. As explained above, § 112a of the Deutschen Richtergesetz requires 
students to have access to the professional education in their home Member State 
before they are even eligible for taking the aptitude test provided for in § 112a. That 
leads to the conclusion that German students who took the European Law School 
degree course would need Dutch civiel effect in order to ensure their access to an 
aptitude test in order to circumvent the First State Examination. A potential German 
track would therefore put German students in a worse position (since they would 
obtain no civiel effect in the Netherlands, and would therefore disqualify themselves 
from the test of § 112a). In order for this new course to reach its full potential a lot 
will need to change (mainly with regard to the rules providing access to the 
professional training for the legal professions in the surrounding countries). But I 
firmly believe that the new variant European Law School at Maastricht University 
breathes the atmosphere of the future. By reversing the order of national law and 
comparative/international and European law in the approach of the curriculum, a 
large potential for flexibility is achieved. When rules in different Member States are 
adapted, it will be possible to achieve a result that resembles the free movement of 
lawyers in the Middle Ages as described in the introduction of this book.  
Such an approach, where the emphasis of the studies does not necessarily lie with 
the national law of the state where the degree is obtained, could also be combined 
with an approach that is, for example, practised in the United Kingdom. As described 
above, in the United Kingdom it is not necessary to have a degree in law. Non-
Law graduates can access the profession by passing a Graduate Diploma in Law, or 
Common Professional Examination.93 These are two-year courses that allow a per-
son with a degree other than a Law degree to enter the professional education stage 
of the qualification process. These ‘conversion courses’, as they are commonly known, 
can also be used by foreigners with a foreign law degree who have to take the con-
version course, or part of it, in order to qualify for access to the professional education. 
Such a conversion course, which is in essence the same as the so-called Luxembourg 
approach, could also be combined with a university degree that is more focused on 
the general concepts of law rather than a specific legal system. Moreover, as is the 
case in the United Kingdom, offering these conversion courses could be an inter-
esting investment for universities and/or professional organisations. A system where-
by all Member States have developed a one- or two-year conversion course that is 
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accessible at least for any Law graduate from any other Member State and guar-
anteeing access to the professional education phase of the legal profession is easily 
imaginable. Such a system would really complete the free movement of lawyers in 
Europe.  
The whole concept of abandoning national law as a starting point for legal edu-
cation warrants some further elaboration.94 In that sense a number of other initiatives 
will be looked at,95 and a short excursion to the United States will be made. Although 
Maastricht University has been used as an example, it is not the only example of 
legal education that is more or less detached from the legal system of the state in 
which it is taught. With regard to Europe, these efforts almost all involve Dutch 
Universities. The University of Groningen participates with the University of Bre-
men and the Carl Ossietzky University in Oldenburg in the Hanse Law School.96 
This law school, which offers both a bachelor’s and a master’s degree, focuses mainly 
on Dutch and German law, but also looks at the core of English common law. 
Strategic choice of subjects allows students to qualify for the qualification track of 
the legal profession in either Germany or the Netherlands. Graduates from the Hanse 
Law School cannot become members of the judiciary in Germany.97 The Radboud 
University in Nijmegen has a cooperation structure with both the University of 
Louvain98 and the University of Münster in connection with master’s degrees in 
Belgian and German law, respectively.99 Europe also has a number of cooperation 
initiatives between European universities and universities in the United States of 
America. The University of Paris I, the University of London and the University of 
Frankfurt all have joint degrees with Columbia University in New York that lead 
to double degrees, i.e., an American and respectively French, English or German 
degree.100 Additionally, Bucerius Law School in Hamburg, under its Dean, the 
leading comparative law scholar, Hein D. Kötz, has a programme that is highly inter-
nationalised.101 Lastly, there are some initiatives that are worth mentioning in North 
America. McGill University in Canada102 specialises in trans-systemic degrees, i.e., 
degrees that combine both knowledge of common law and civil law.103 By far the 
most ambitious effort in this field is conducted in the United States of America 
where New York University has created the ‘Hauser Global Law School’.104 This 
law school envisages teaching students law in a global context by comparing the 
major legal systems of the world.105 
                                                  
94  Apart from the absence of practical matters such as teaching materials, as was indicated in ELFA 
(1999) and Reich (2002) 
95  For a very good overview, see Gordley (2000), pp. 1003-1014. 
96  <www.hanse-law-school.de>, last accessed 30 January 2007. 
97  Ibid. 
98  See also: Vanistendael (1999), pp. 457-466. 
99  <www.ru.nl>, last accessed 30 January 2007. 
100 <www.law.columbia.edu/center_program/intl_progs/Double_degrees>, last accessed 31 January 
2007. 
101  <www.law-school.de>, last accessed 31 January 2007. 
102  See also: Valcke (2005), pp. 483-505. 
103  <www.mcgill.ca/law-admissions/undergraduates/programs/>, last accessed 31 January 2007. 
104  <www.nyulawglobal.org/>, last accessed 31 January 2007 
105  See also: Fine (2000), pp. 567-610. See also, although not specifically on the global law school, 
Morris (2005), pp. 53-82 and Tarr (2004), pp. 199-206. 
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Where a university chooses to depart from traditional legal education that is 
strongly based in national law and the national legal system, the question imme-
diately arises as to how such legal education should look. In the literature on this 
subject106 there seems to be a consensus that at least some form of comparison between 
different legal systems, preferably including the home legal system, must be offered. 
As Gordley explains in his piece, this comparison serves two goals. First, and most 
obviously, comparison leads to an awareness and the gaining of some knowledge of 
a legal system other than one’s own. Lawyers with a basic training in legal systems 
other than their own are more capable of entering an international market where 
they are confronted with those legal systems. Secondly, comparison offers another, 
less obvious, but more important advantage. When a student studies law in a compara-
tive context, i.e., studies legal problems and the different solutions to those problems 
in different legal systems, he learns that the solution of his own legal system is a 
choice rather then an empirical truth. Comparative law encourages students to 
think about the rationale of a certain solution, and therefore it leads to a deeper 
knowledge and understanding of the legal systems studied, including one’s own. 
Comparative law therefore also leads to better national lawyers. The debate in the 
literature, as Gordley portrays it, centres on the question of what place the national 
legal system should take in this approach. There is an opinion voiced by scholars 
like Pound and Reimann107 that such a comparison should be made while studying 
the national law, in other words, the national law should form the basis of the 
comparison that takes place in a later phase of legal studies.108 On the other hand, 
Gordley presents a number of writers – Kötz, Flessner, Coing, Sacco and de 
Groot109 – who state that legal studies should begin with a comparison of basic 
themes in law and that focus on national law should only take place at a later stage.  
With the two versions of the European Law School that the University of 
Maastricht offers, both variants are included. The original European Law School, 
which commenced in 1995, begins with offering a solid foundation in Dutch law. 
After the first one and a half years, which is basically shared with Dutch law students 
(and which is taught in Dutch), the European Law School students change course 
and take an English-language programme that focuses on comparative law and the 
law of the European Union. The ‘new’ European Law School, which started in 
2006, follows the second method since it offers a programme where the first two 
years (completely taught in English) focus on comparative law and the law of the 
European Union. In the final year of the bachelor’s (and in ensuing master’s 
degrees) students can take different tracks, which focus on the Dutch legal system 
or take a more general track (which does not have civiel effect or lead to entry into 
the qualification track for the legal profession of other countries). Maastricht there-
fore does not take a stand in the discussion displayed above. From the perspective 
of the free movement of lawyers, the choice between the two models offered by 
the University of Maastricht is clear. Aside from the doctrinal issue, which takes centre-
stage in the discussion described above, there is a practical issue which leads to the 
conclusion that the ‘traditional’ European Law School, or any other programme 
                                                  
106  For an excellent overview, see Gordley (2000), pp. 1003-1014. 
107  Ibid., p. 1005. 
108  Which is also the general view held by ELFA. See ELFA (1999) and Reich (2002). 
109  See Gordley (2000). 
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that is strongly based in a national legal system, is less beneficial for the furthering of 
the free movement of lawyers in Europe. These systems are of limited interest to 
foreign students, particularly as they are offered in countries whose language is not 
a world language, such as Dutch. Such programmes would mainly attract ‘home’ 
students. Only the second variant, which is more detached from the legal system of 
the country in which it is taught, is interesting for foreign students, and is capable 
of initiating a cross-border movement of law students.  
When these general undergraduate degree systems become more prevalent, in 
which comparison between the major legal systems in Europe (France, Germany 
and the United Kingdom) and the law of the European Union serve as a true Ius 
Commune Europæum,110 education in national law and knowledge of national law 
can be reserved for master’s programmes, professional education, or, as in the United 
States, left to the workings of the free market.  
 
 
§ 8. A Possible Result? The United States of America 
As was illustrated above, on many occasions Europe and its lawyers still suffer from 
a protectionist stance from the different Bar Associations, which still emphasises the 
importance of possessing knowledge of the national law of the system in which the 
lawyer practises. This general suspicion of foreign lawyers might be largely un-
founded, and this can be illustrated by a short description of another jurisdiction 
where a large number of lawyers practise in different jurisdictions: the United States 
of America. When comparing Europe with the United States it must of course be 
borne in mind that the European Union and the USA are two completely different 
entities, the latter is a federal nation state whereas the former is an international 
organisation with considerable supranational powers. There are, however, similarities. 
The USA is composed of 50 states all of which have considerable autonomy in the 
field of law and even use different systems (Louisiana’s legal system is largely based 
on civil law whereas the rest of the USA follows the common law system).  
As was established above, qualification as a lawyer in Europe is generally the 
same throughout the Member States (at least the Member States observed in the 
context of this book): after university education in law, prospective lawyers start 
their professional education (which involves practical training under the direction 
of a qualified lawyer) concluded with a Bar Exam which leads to the right to practise 
as a lawyer. The only exception is Spain, since the Spanish system lacks the professional 
education and lawyers may obtain a practising license directly after their legal edu-
cation. Qualification as a lawyer in the United States of America is substantially 
different from qualification in Europe, although it starts in a similar fashion.  
Traditionally, lawyers in the United States would qualify by taking a Bar Exam 
after completing practical training delivered by another lawyer.111 This method of 
                                                  
110  Or as Flessner put it (translated by Gordley): ‘Legal instruction which already treats the basics 
of law in Europe as a unified system in which national legal systems resonate like variations of a 
general theme’. See Gordley (2000), p. 1005; Flessner (1996). The French delegation to the 
CCBE was of the opinion in the 1990s that European law was integrated so much that it 
could serve as a Ius Commune. See Hagan (2003), pp. 149-172. 
111  Costonis (1993), pp. 157-197. 
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qualification was referred to as ‘reading law’ and it is still a manner in which one can 
qualify for the Bar Exam in seven states, although it is seldom used.112 In the nine-
teenth century, qualification through reading law gradually lost ground to a new 
feature, the law school, i.e., legal education that took place at universities.113 This 
occurred since the quality of the education in law offices varied largely in quality, and 
more often than not, led to the exploitation of the prospective lawyers.114 This 
immediately illustrates the place of the Law School in the present US system as a 
graduate school, whereas legal education at the European universities is normally 
started at undergraduate level (although it can be continued on to graduate level). 
This is a result of the US Law Schools replacing the professional training rather than 
the (preceding) university (college) education.  
The qualification process in the United States takes place almost entirely at 
university. Prospective lawyers need to complete (or largely complete) a college edu-
cation before they can go to Law School. Once they graduate from the Law School 
(obtaining the degree of Juris Doctor (JD) rather than Bachelor of Laws (LLB))115 
they subsequently take the Bar Exam in the state where they choose to practise. 
The form and content of the Bar Exam are decided on a state level.116 Curricula of 
Law Schools are basically decided by the universities themselves. University autono-
my with regard to curricula does not mean that there is no quality control for Law 
Schools, however. The American Bar Association,117 which is a voluntary organisa-
tion,118 provides for Law School accreditation. This accreditation has become of 
major importance since 18 states (and three overseas territories) require candidates 
to have a JD from an ABA-accredited Law School before they even qualify to take 
the Bar Exam.119 In the remainder of the states it is possible to take the Bar Exam 
with a JD from a non-accredited Law School, but many states impose additional 
criteria so that it is easier to have a JD from an ABA-accredited Law School.120 
Accreditation is dependent on a number of criteria of which the curriculum is only 
one.121 When one reviews the accreditation standards in connection with curricu-
um, it becomes immediately apparent that there is no reference to state law.122 This 
is corroborated by the fact that states open their Bar Exam to graduates from any 
ABA-approved Law School no matter in which state the School is located.123  
The next step in the qualification process is the Bar Exam. These Bar Exams fall 
within the prerogative of the separate states, more specifically the state Supreme Courts. 
                                                  
112  Ibid. See also: National Conference of Bar Examiners (2007). 
113  Costonis (1993), pp. 157-197. 
114  See Costonis (1993), pp. 157-197. See also: Jarvis (1995), pp. 359-412. 
115  See Jarvis (1995), pp. 359-412. 
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117  <www.abanet.org>, last accessed 2 February 2007. 
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education in the United States, it is never about lack of knowledge of state law. See, for 
example, Edwards (1992), pp. 34-78. 
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Some states have laid down rules of admission in their statutes.124 There is some 
standardisation with regard to these Bar Exams, however. Since 1931, there has 
been a National Conference of Bar Examiners (NCBE) which allows bar examiners 
to cooperate with one another, with law schools and with the legal profession.125 
On a yearly basis, the NCBE issues a guide on Bar Admission criteria, which clearly 
lists, for all 50 states and a number of overseas territories, the rules that lead to 
admission to the Bar in any given state.126 Generally, there are two distinct require-
ments in any given state to be admitted to the Bar. First, one must be of sufficient 
moral character and fitness.127 This criterion leads to the result that people who 
have been convicted of certain crimes or who have become bankrupt may not be 
admitted to the Bar of a certain state.128 Secondly, a law school graduate must pass a 
Bar Exam in order to be admitted to the Bar of any given state.  
As was said above, the Bar Exam is the prerogative of the states, but the NCBE 
has done some work on standardisation of these Bar Exams. First, the NCBE has 
devised a number of standardised tests that can be used in more than one state.129 
The most important of these is the MBE, or the Multi State Bar Exam, that is used 
in almost all states (except Louisiana130 and Washington).131 The MBE does not 
replace, but rather supplements the local Bar Exam.132 The rules of the NCBE 
indicate that a state should avoid questions on local law as much as possible, and 
that the Bar Exam should focus on fundamental principles of law.133 This seems to 
imply that there is very little emphasis on state law in the qualification procedure, 
however, a very short investigation (it is by no means intended to give a detailed 
review of every Bar Exam in the United States) proves that it is more the rule than 
the exception to test local law in the local part of the Bar Exam.134  
Local law is not a subject taught in the Law Schools, which means that pro-
spective lawyers are left to their own devices. In the early days this meant that knowl-
edge of local law had to be gained through self-study or through lectures given by 
local lawyers.135 Nowadays there is a lucrative trade in selling so-called Bar Review 
Courses, commercial training courses to prepare lawyers for Bar Exams.136 
After a short review of how individuals qualify as lawyers in the United States 
of America, it must be questioned how this review could be relevant for the free 
movement of lawyers in Europe. In the previous paragraph, the thesis was put for-
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ward that the free movement of lawyers in Europe could be significantly furthered 
if a new form of legal education were to be created. Such legal education should 
focus on the main features of the legal systems in Europe and on the law of the 
European Union. These new legal studies would then be largely detached from the 
national legal system in which they are taught. This new form of legal education 
can be compared with the legal education in the US Law Schools which focuses on 
general legal concepts rather than on the legal system of the state in which the 
school is located. Graduation from an ABA-approved Law School qualifies the 
prospective lawyer to take a Bar Exam in any US state. The proposed new legal 
education in Europe would ideally lead to a situation where a degree from such a 
general education would offer access to the qualification procedure for the legal 
profession in any Member State of the European Union. Knowledge of national 
law could be obtained through a master’s degree (where the ‘general’ degree would 
be a bachelor’s) or via professional education (the ‘Luxembourg model’). The ex-
pectation that such ‘general’ education, detached from the legal system in which it 
is taught, would work in the European Union is corroborated by the fact that the 
rules regarding the free movement of fully qualified lawyers in the European Union 
are far more advanced than the rules regarding the free movement of lawyers in the 
United States. 
As was stated above in connection with the Bar Exam, the regulation of the 
legal profession in the United States of America is left exclusively to the states.137 
That also means that there is no regulation of the legal profession, or the free move-
ment of lawyers, on a federal level.138 The only protection on a federal level is a 
number of rulings of the Supreme Court which prohibit measures that are clearly dis-
criminatory (residence requirements, higher fees etc.) unless they can be objectively 
justified.139  
It is the intention of this paragraph to give a very general overview of free move-
ment rules so that the reader can form an image of the general tendencies of the 
free movement of lawyers in the United States. It is by no means my intention to 
give a complete and detailed overview of these free movement rights. Similar to 
the division in the European Union, interstate legal practice can be subdivided into 
practice that is more or less temporary in nature (akin to the free provision of services 
in the European Union) and interstate practice which is more permanent (similar 
to establishment in the European context). The general rule regarding all legal pro-
fessional activities in a certain state is that they are reserved for lawyers who have 
been admitted to the Bar in that state.140 Rules regarding temporary practice in the 
US can be sub-divided into practice involving representing clients in court and 
practice involving all other professional legal activities.  
Lawyers from other states can obtain permission to represent a client in a court 
of another state. This exemption (to the general rule that professional legal activity 
is reserved for lawyers admitted to the Bar of that state) is granted by the court 
concerned only for the purposes of that case. Such an exemption is called a pro hac 
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vice appearance.141 This is by no means a right of the lawyer concerned but rather a 
favour from the court. Requests for pro hac vice are usually granted but can on occa-
sions be denied.142 A refusal of a pro hac vice appearance led to the abovementioned 
ruling of the Supreme Court in Leis v. Flynt.143 This issue closely resembles a feature 
of the European rules on the free provision of services; namely the fact that a 
lawyer who is granted a pro hac vice appearance must cooperate with a lawyer who 
is admitted to the Bar in that state.144 Inter-state legal practice that concerns activities 
other than representing a client in court is even less obvious. As was stated above, 
every state reserves the right to engage in professional legal activity to lawyers who 
are admitted in that state (as a general rule, there are exceptions). This leads to the 
consequence that unauthorised practice of law is prohibited and can even lead to 
criminal proceedings.145 It falls outside the scope of this book to give even a general 
overview of the case law on this subject.146 Suffice to say at this point that while 
engaging in the practice of law in another state, a lawyer still runs the risk of en-
gaging in conduct that is classified as an unauthorised practice of law.147 With 
regard to inter-state legal practice of a more permanent nature, and therefore more 
akin to the freedom of establishment in the European Union, the basic rule is clear 
and sound: A lawyer who seeks to practise permanently in a state other than that in 
which he passed his Bar Exam may only do so if he is admitted to the Bar where 
he seeks to practise.148 In about half of the states in the US, this means that the 
lawyer concerned must take the Bar Exam of the state where he seeks to practise.149 
In the other half of the states, the requirement for taking a Bar Exam can be waived 
(based on reciprocity)150 when a lawyer has a number of years of practice, some-
times accompanied by rules regarding practising full-time (or having an office) in 
the receiving state.151 Such admission is called an admission on motion.152 
In conclusion to this very concise overview of the free movement rights in the 
USA, it can be deduced that they fall considerably short of the free movement 
rights for lawyers in the European Union. The purpose of this subparagraph was to 
investigate whether lessons could be learned from the system of qualification for the 
legal professions in the United States of America for furthering the free movement 
of lawyers in Europe. It has been established that the qualification of lawyers in the 
USA differs considerably from that in Europe. The professional education that is 
commonplace in Europe is replaced in the US by much more academic education 
in the Law Schools. It has been observed that admission to the legal profession in 
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the different states of the US is managed by the Bar Exam. Anyone who has gra-
duated from an ABA-approved Law School may apply for a state Bar Exam. The 
knowledge of state law that is examined in the local part of the Bar Exam is gained 
through a revision course. In essence, a prospective lawyer is left to his own devices 
when studying the law of the state in which he chooses to practise. It has also been 
established that the free movement rights of US lawyers are considerably less than 
those of their European colleagues. From the US the lesson that might be learned is 
that a focus on national law in the legal education of the Member States of the Euro-
pean Union is not necessary anymore since in the US (which also knows different 
legal systems) a more restrictive system is employed without any emphasis on state 
law in the legal education. The method proposed in the previous paragraph, com-
bining a more general undergraduate education with the possibilities of specialising 
in different ‘tracks’ later on (with guaranteed access to the professional education 
phase of the legal profession in that specific Member State) or by combining such 
an approach with a system of conversion courses, would encroach upon the way 
the qualification of lawyers is realised in the United States. 
 
 
§ 9. Realising New Law School Education: Who Should 
Take Charge? 
Having established that the adoption of a new approach to law studies, based on 
the general characteristics of the main legal systems in Europe and European Union 
law as a new Ius Commune, could benefit the furtherance of the free movement of 
lawyers in Europe either on its own or combined with a conversion course, and 
after having established that such a system actually works in the United States of 
America, partnered with much less advanced free movement rights, I will consider 
who has the power to actually realise this feat. A number of candidates must be 
reviewed in this respect. 
The first possible candidate for realising new law studies which are less focused 
on national law is obviously the legislative institutions of the European Community. 
Harmonising the content of legal education by means of a legislative instrument 
would provide a solid guarantee that legal studies will be reformed. However, this 
approach is only possible if the European Community has the power to act in this 
field, and that is exactly where the problem lies. At first sight, the European Com-
munity lacks such competence due to Articles 149 and 150 of the EC Treaty, which 
expressly prohibit harmonisation measures in the field of education. Worse still, both 
Articles do not even address the fact that the Community has power to busy itself 
with the content of education (even in measures falling short of harmonisation). 
These circumstances seem to warrant the powerful conclusion that the Community 
does not have the power to achieve such goals, even if it should have the ambition 
to do so. In my opinion this is not completely true. An argument could be con-
structed to support Article 47 of the EC Treaty, which covers the mutual recog-
nition of diplomas, to serve as a sufficient legal base for European rules governing 
the actual content of curricula at law faculties throughout Europe. This case is 
illustrated by the efforts made in the ‘Vertical Approach’ of the 1970s, which were 
reviewed in Chapter 2 and which are nowadays laid down in Directive 2005/36/EC 
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(accounting for most of its rather bulky size).153 If a clear link can be established 
between university education and the regulated profession to which such education 
should lead, it should not be an unsurpassable hurdle to justify such a piece of legis-
lation on the basis of Article 47 of the EC Treaty. The question remains as to whether 
such an exercise is desirable. I strongly believe that it is not. One of the reasons for 
abandoning the ‘Vertical Approach’ in the mid 1980s was because it proved that 
the harmonisation of educational requirements was a very difficult, if not an im-
possible, task. Even when it proved possible, harmonising legal education to such 
an extent would lead to the awareness of the existence of potential problems and 
would thus provoke Member States to lay down detailed rules on this matter. A 
larger degree of flexibility is warranted. 
The next possible candidates would be the Member States themselves, in view 
of the ‘Bologna Process’. In this chapter, the ‘Bologna Process’ was reviewed and it 
was concluded that, to a large extent, it is a procedural exercise. Only now, almost 
ten years after its conception, is the subject of curriculum reform being touched upon, 
and I believe that the goal set for 2010 is far too optimistic. Moreover, and perhaps 
more importantly, the Member States keep emphasising in the Stocktaking Reports 
how happy they are that achievements are being made in an intergovernmental 
manner and that there is no central body imposing rules upon them. Additionally, 
and as a last example of scepticism, is the fact that an exercise leading to common 
standards for a legal curriculum in the context of the ‘Bologna Process’ would 
involve more than 40 Member States instead of the 27 involved in such an exercise 
in the context of the European Union. In my opinion it is therefore very unlikely 
that such an exercise would ever take place in the context of the ‘Bologna Process’. 
A third potential candidate to initiate the process of creating a common standard 
for legal curricula in Europe would be the European Court of Justice. Naturally, it is 
not realistic to think that the European Court of Justice would actually lay down the 
substantive content on such a common standard. That would never happen. The 
European Court of Justice can, however, manoeuvre Member States in a way that 
encourages them to address the only possibility that remains for them, which is 
actually to start addressing the substantive content that must lead to the solution for the 
problem. The European Court of Justice has already shown in Commission v. Austria 
that it is willing to go to such lengths, and that it will not be stopped even by pro-
hibitions in the Treaty for positive integration (harmonisation) in the field of edu-
cation. The problem that the European Court of Justice has left Austria with, i.e. 
the fact that no discrimination may take place in admitting students of different 
Member States, can only really be solved by talking to other countries in order to 
achieve a common standard for access to higher education (in this case, the study of 
medicine). Such a scenario, where the European Court of Justice would use a case 
as a ‘crowbar’ in order to force Member State action, is not at all unthinkable in 
the field of trainee lawyers. The only thing it would take is for the European Court 
of Justice to rule that the difference in content (with regard to national law) does 
not justify a rule of a Member State requiring a national diploma for entry into the 
qualification track of a national legal profession. It has been shown above that if 
Commission v. Austria, Morgenbesser and Thieffry are read together, then the case law is 
                                                  
153  The Directive comprises 121 pages, to be exact. 
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already there. The only thing that is lacking is judicial precedent, the European 
Court of Justice has never ruled in such a case specifically on lawyers. If the Euro-
pean Court of Justice were to rule in such a case, Member States would be more or 
less forced to start discussing common standards. Apart from establishing this tech-
nical possibility, whether such a move is desirable or not also comes into play. In 
my view, it would be undesirable to base such an exercise on a ruling imposed by 
the European Court of Justice. Member States would attempt to find the least in-
trusive way out of the difficult situation imposed upon them by the European Court 
of Justice. 
The next candidates for creating a common standard for a new legal curriculum 
are obviously the universities themselves. It has been shown above that universities 
are already (and have been for a while) busy with creating such curricula. Universities 
are, in some ways, the best candidates since they obviously know best in determining 
what is feasible with regard to the creation of such curricula, and they would also 
be able to find, or hire, the necessary experts to create such a curriculum. The recent 
creation of the English-language variant of the European Law School at the Faculty 
of Law at Maastricht University is but one example demonstrating that such curricula 
can be created. However, it also shows the potential danger of leaving the initiative 
to universities. This danger lies in the fact that, generally speaking, universities do 
not make the rules that determine which degrees are accepted as qualifications for 
the legal profession. These are, in the best situation, determined by respective Bar 
Associations, and in some Member States (as has been described in Chapter 2) they 
are laid down in national law. This leads to the situation where graduates of such a 
curriculum could find themselves in a vacuum if Bar Associations refuse, or are forced 
to refuse, to accept such a degree as sufficient entry to the qualification track. With 
regard to the new variant European Law School of Maastricht University, agree-
ments have been made between the university and the Dutch Bar Association to 
give the curriculum civiel effect, i.e., that it qualifies graduates for the professional 
training that leads to the profession of the advocaat. As a result of the interpretation 
of the Morgenbesser judgment in § 112a of the Deutschen Richtergesetz, German gra-
duates of the Maastricht European Law School are forced to obtain Dutch civiel 
effect in order even to be allowed an assessment of their professional qualifications. 
Although universities are technically the best candidates to create these new curricula, 
such expertise is useless if there is no acceptance of such degrees on the level of the 
authorities that decide whether such a degree may lead to entrance to the qualifica-
tion track of the legal profession. This means that these authorities will have to be 
involved. 
Fortunately, European law provides the possibility for their involvement, while 
still guaranteeing the flexibility that was deemed necessary earlier in this paragraph. 
That flexibility can be found in Article 15 of Directive 2005/36/EC, which provides 
a new form of governance hitherto unknown in the realm of the free movement of 
professionals, and more specifically lawyers. The Article provides for the possibility 
for Member States or professional organisations to communicate common plat-
forms to the Commission. These common platforms are defined as a set of criteria 
for professional qualifications suitable for compensating substantial differences (which 
must be identified by at least two-thirds of the Member States including all those 
who regulate the profession) between the professional qualifications for the regulated 
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profession (or the entry to the qualification track thereto) in the different Member 
States. If such a common platform is then presented to the Commission, it may 
adopt this common platform as an implementing decision through the comitology 
procedure provided for in Article 58(2) of Directive 2005/36/EC. This new form 
of governance has considerable advantages over the harmonisation of legal education 
(if at all legally possible) through the classic Community Method (creating secondary 
legislation) described earlier in this paragraph. First of all, the prime candidate for 
preparing such a common platform, the CCBE,154 would be the most important 
player in this process rather than the mere consultant it would be in the Commu-
nity Method. Secondly, the stakes would be less high compared with the traditional 
method, since politics would only be involved at a later stage, when preparation of 
the common platform is already completed. On the other hand, an approved and 
implemented common platform would have the same legal consequences as harmo-
nisation of legal education in the classic sense, namely the fact that recognition 
would be automatic and not dependent on compensatory measures that must be 
fulfilled by the candidate.  
It must be borne in mind that a common platform in this sense would be much 
broader than the legal education in the Member States alone. It would affect the 
legal profession as a whole and would guarantee the automatic entrance of the 
candidate into the legal profession of a Member State. It is unlikely that a common 
platform will be adopted for the legal profession at short notice, and in all honesty 
it is doubtful whether such a common platform would ever emerge. Developing a 
legal curriculum that would facilitate a candidate’s move to another Member State 
mid-qualification under the direction of the CCBE would at least be the first step 
towards such a common platform. 
 
 
§ 10. Observations and Conclusions 
At the end of the previous chapter it was concluded that the free movement of 
lawyers has seen a tremendous development over the last thirty years, to a point 
where it is now safe to conclude that there is almost full mutual recognition of the 
legal professions in Europe. On the other hand it has also been concluded that most 
of the benefits of the system of free movement for lawyers are only available to 
those that are fully qualified as a lawyer in at least one of the Member States. This 
means that a prospective lawyer must go through the entire qualification process in 
becoming a lawyer in one Member State before he even eligible to apply to enter the 
legal profession of another Member State. It has been concluded that it might take 
well over a decade before a candidate is fully qualified in another Member State. 
The purpose of this chapter was to review whether there are possibilities to further 
                                                  
154  The CCBE is already brainstorming about this possibility, as can be seen from the materials of 
its annual conference, held on 25-27 October 2007, which was completely dedicated to legal 
training. See <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 8 December 2007. See more specifically the con-
tributions made on that conference: Bühler (2007); Eisenbrükova (2007); Guinchard (2007); 
Kilger (2007); Lafont (2007); Latrup-Petersen (2007); Lonbay (2007); Otterlo (2007); Pelissier 
(2007); Petzel (2007); Slazak (2007); Steger (2007) and Thielen (2007). 
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the system of free movement for lawyers so as to facilitate their transition into 
another Member State’s legal profession with greater ease. 
It was observed that, generally speaking, the qualification track leading to a legal 
profession in the Member States concerned consists of two distinct elements; namely 
a law degree and professional education. This two-fold division also provides for 
two distinct points of entry into the qualification track: before and after obtaining a 
law degree. Graphically this could be depicted as follows: 
 
Figure 13: Entry points in the qualification track 
 
 
With regard to the first point of entry, it was observed that this would pose few 
problems since at this point in the qualification track there is as yet no need for 
specific knowledge of the legal system of the host Member State. The drawback to 
this point of entry is that usually at this stage the potential candidate is too young to 
make the decision to work outside the home Member State, and in which State to 
be based as a lawyer. At the second point of entry the problem of national law comes 
into play. Entry into the qualification track at this point presumes knowledge of the 
national law of the legal system into which the candidate seeks to enter as a lawyer, 
and more often than not the law degree obtained in the home Member State will 
have given no education about the legal system of the host Member State.  
The observation has been made that there are no rules laid down in secondary 
European legislation that cover the possibility of entrance into any of the entry 
points described above. On the basis of Article 149 of the EC Treaty it is clear that 
the European Union has no legislative competence to issue rules that would cover, 
for example, mutual recognition of secondary education credentials or law degrees. 
It is for this reason that many Member States require a national law degree for en-
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trance into the professional education that leads to qualification as a lawyer. With 
the legislative competence for mutual recognition of academic diplomas firmly set 
within the sovereignty of the Member States, it was also observed that, outside the 
realm of European law, there is an ongoing (intergovernmental) process that has as 
its goal the creation of a European Higher Education Area, the so-called ‘Bologna 
Process’. 
On the basis of two declarations and three ministerial communiqués, which are 
in no way legally binding and can be fully characterised as ‘soft law’, 45 states 
throughout geographical Europe have decided to largely adapt their higher education 
systems in order to create a European Area of Higher Education outside the frame-
work of the European Union. This is even more remarkable since it has been estab-
lished that the Member States of the European Union are fierce defenders of their 
sovereignty in the field of education. Throughout the integration process the Euro-
pean Community has been involved in education in a supporting manner but it 
lacked, and still lacks, the legislative power to introduce harmonisation measures in 
this field. The ‘Bologna Process’ has been characterised as ‘soft law’. Critical remarks 
have been made with regard to the lack of effective democratic and judicial control 
in the development of the ‘Bologna Process’. Since it entails no legal obligations 
these control mechanisms are not in place. Although it has no legally binding effect, 
states participating in the Process have been particularly eager to implement the 
Bologna Declaration and its ensuing ministerial communiqués. Many, if not most, 
of the Member States have adapted their laws on higher education in order to 
facilitate or implement the ‘Bologna Process’. 
From a content perspective, the Bologna Declaration and the ministerial com-
muniqués seek to establish ten different goals which were identified above. In the 
Berlin communiqué, three of these objectives were spear-pointed: the creation of a 
two- (or even three-) cycle degree system; a system for the recognition of degrees and 
periods spent studying; and the implementation of a system of Quality Assurance. 
Most attention has been given to the first two objectives. It has been observed that the 
creation of a two-cycle degree system has been mainly a question of terminology. 
Participating states have chosen to pour their existing, very diverse degrees and diplo-
mas, into the bachelor/master mould that is prescribed by the ‘Bologna Process’. Of 
the Member States reviewed in this book, Germany is the only country that has, to 
this date, excluded legal studies from the ‘Bologna Process’. It has also been ob-
served that since the ‘Bologna Process’ does not prescribe anything on curricula, or 
even the duration of the different cycles,155 the diversification in the participating 
states remains, and rather than solving this diversification, the introduction of com-
mon terms for degree cycles may instead camouflage or cloak such diversification, 
making the matter even more complex rather than simpler. 
Similar critical remarks were made in connection to the issue of degree recog-
nition. In this field participating countries in the ‘Bologna Process’ have chosen not 
to develop new criteria but to incorporate into the process an existing Council of 
Europe/UNESCO Convention (which was created before the ‘Bologna Process’) 
with respect to the recognition of degrees and study periods, the so-called Lisbon 
Recognition Convention. This Convention was assessed and it was found to be of 
                                                  
155  Contrary to popular belief, at least in the Netherlands. 
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little or no help to further the free movement of lawyers, since it allows for the 
denial of recognition in cases where substantial differences exist between the degrees; 
which is more often than not the case for Law degrees. Moreover, the Convention 
allows for even stricter rules to be created for regulated professions, and a consider-
able number of Member States reviewed in this book have not ratified the Lisbon 
Recognition Convention. Lastly, the European Court of Justice decided in Commission 
v. Austria that the Lisbon Recognition Convention does not apply when in conflict 
with European Community law. 
The Commission v. Austria case, read together with Morgenbesser, limits the possi-
bilities of the Member States of the European Union even more when it comes to 
the recognition of academic degrees. Apparently, the European Court of Justice is 
not intimidated by the lack of legislative competence in the field of academic 
recognition, as a result of Article 149 of the EC Treaty. It has been established that, 
according to the case law of the European Court of Justice, Member States of the 
European Union may not discriminate on the basis of nationality. With regard to 
the second point of entry, that must be read together with the already infamous 
Morgenbesser judgment which allows candidates an individual review of qualifica-
tions and knowledge they have already obtained. Candidates may never be denied 
on the basis that they do not have the correct qualification. Therefore the diagram 
presented above must be qualified as follows: 
 
Figure 14: Entry points in the qualification track revisited 
 
 
As a last, more general point of criticism, it has been observed that the ‘Bologna 
Process’ lacks certain obvious subjects. Lack of coordination of content was already 
identified, but the lack of coordination of access for students (although mobility of 
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students is one of the ten objectives of the ‘Bologna Process’) is a more difficult 
problem. In this case, students from the European Union must rely on the rights of 
free movement conferred to them within the framework of the European Union, 
and in the future even third-country nationals may rely on Community legislation 
to gain access to EU Member States to study, but for the time being nationals from 
non-EU Member States are subject to national immigration policies. 
Lastly, how the existing ‘Bologna Process’ could be used to further the free 
movement of lawyers in Europe has also been researched. It has been identified that 
the main course of action lies in the coordination of the content of legal education. 
If a major culture change can be achieved, and if legal education on a bachelor’s 
degree level can be created that does not (or in a lesser manner) focus on national law 
but rather on the common ground between two or more legal systems, these broadly 
educated students can then choose master’s programmes that focus on the national 
law of the Member State of their choice. This would then provide them with access 
to the professional training for the legal profession in that State. Maastricht Unive-
rsity in the Netherlands has recently introduced such a non-legal-system specific 
bachelor’s degree education. A short excursion to the system of the United States 
of America has taught us that a system of qualifying for the legal profession can exist 
without legal education that is strongly focused on gaining knowledge in national 
(state) law. 
Establishing such a culture change is not only practically difficult, there are also 
legal problems to be encountered since it is not all together clear who would have 
the competence to initiate such an exercise. In that sense it has been concluded that 
after reviewing a number of potential initiators, including the Community Insti-
tutions, the Member States and the universities, the best body for coordination the 
development of these common standards for law degrees is the CCBE. This would 
take place in preparation for, or in the course of, creating a common platform (as 
provided in Article 15 of Directive 2005/36/EC) that would lead to automatic 
recognition of the legal profession in all the Member States. 
It must be concluded, therefore, that the system of free movement for candidate 
lawyers is by no means as sophisticated as the system for the free movement of 
fully-qualified lawyers. The major reason for this is the lack of competence of the 
European Union to engage in educational matters (at least in a legally binding fash-
ion). Any developments for the creation of such a free movement of prospective 
lawyers must therefore be seen in light of the ‘Bologna Process’. Although there is 
a lot of valid criticism of the ‘Bologna Process’, it could serve as a useful framework 
in order to facilitate the free movement of (prospective) lawyers. In order to fulfil 
that function, attention must be given to curriculum content (which is not part of 
the ‘Bologna Process’ as such, but is in the hand of the universities, albeit in close 
cooperation with the competent authorities governing the legal professions in differ-
ent Member States, as was established above). Moreover, as far as EU citizens are 
concerned, reliance on acquis communautaire for free movement rights, and with regard 
to the recent developments in connection with the recognition of professional quali-
fications for persons who are not considered to be a produit fini, is still absolutely 
necessary in the absence of such integration efforts with regard to curriculum content. 
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Chapter 5 
Observations, Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
§ 1. Introduction 
In the first chapter of this study I indicated that I would be posing three questions: 
First, I would assess whether a model for the free movement of lawyers could be 
distilled. Secondly, I would research how that model, distilled from the evolution 
of the free movement of lawyers, is implemented in the fifteen selected Member 
States. Lastly, I would consider how the model could be further extended in order 
to include a future free movement in the qualification track for the legal profession 
in the different Member States. 
This chapter will offer a summary of the conclusions that were reached in the 
preceding chapters and will present them in a systematic fashion. After the over-
view of the conclusions, it is possible to make recommendations for a further refine-
ment and completion of the free movement of lawyers. 
 
 
§ 2. Observations and Conclusions with regard to 
Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 established that the developments within the field of the free movement 
of lawyers have always along two different lines, with different speeds, and, 
occasionally, with different results. These two tiers are represented by on the one 
hand, the different rulings of the European Court of Justice, while on the other hand 
there is a development by means of secondary legislation. These two distinct tiers 
make it hard to give a comprehensive overview of the rules applicable to lawyers. 
In Chapter 2 I presented such an overview by combining a chronological approach 
with a more thematic approach. In that sense, it was established that in the first 
generation of case law it was the European Court of Justice that revived the free 
movement of lawyers. 
 
First-Generation Case Law 
That first-generation case law was characterised by the creation of rights that 
enabled lawyers to enjoy their rights of free movement guaranteed by the EC 
Treaty. This development started with Reyners case, in which the European Court 
of Justice ruled that Member States could no longer apply the public service excep-
tion for lawyers, and that, in lieu of secondary legislation, Article 43 of the EC 
Treaty would have direct effect. A similar ruling with regard to Article 49 of the 
EC Treaty was then given in Van Binsbergen. The contested measures in both Reyners 
and Van Binsbergen can be classed as distinctly applicable, or directly discriminatory. 
324 
The European Court of Justice continued to follow this line of thought and initiated 
the development of recognition of diplomas (a field that is strongly tied to the free 
movement of lawyers) and removed discriminatory barriers in this field through 
cases like Thieffry and Heylens. Gradually, however, more and more situations were 
addressed that could not be classed as discriminatory. The question was therefore 
whether the European Court of Justice was also willing to address non-discriminatory 
restrictions, i.e., restrictions that apply to both domestic and foreign lawyers. In 
these cases, the European Court of Justice concluded that these situations did 
indeed constitute a hindrance to the free movement of persons and in such cases 
would require objective justification. In Klopp, for example, the Court held that 
the French rule of unicité du cabinet could not be reconciled with the freedom of 
establishment. Also, in cases like Kraus and Säger indistinctly applicable rules were 
addressed. The case of Vlassopoulou is the seminal case in this respect. Here, the Court 
decided that a person who seeks entrance into a regulated profession has a right to 
have his qualifications and experience checked individually in order to assess whether 
the qualifications and experience are sufficient for access to be granted to the regu-
lated profession in question. This case became of the utmost importance for the 
development of the recognition of diplomas even beyond the scope of later secon-
dary legislation.  
This case law eventually culminated in the Gebhard case in 1995. In this case, 
the European Court of Justice extrapolated the famous rule of reason to all the four 
freedoms laid down in the European Community Treaty. Originally laid down in 
the Cassis de Dijon case for the free movement of goods, the application of the rule 
of reason for the other freedoms did not come out of the blue. Cases like Kraus, 
Säger and even as far back as Van Binsbergen saw early applications of the rule of rea-
son. In essence, the rule of reason states that any measure that is capable of hindering 
any one of the four freedoms must be objectively justified using the four-stage test 
laid down in the Cassis de Dijon case.  
Although the situations covered in cases like Vlassopoulou and Gebhard are now-
adays covered by secondary legislation, the principles laid down in these cases are 
still of the utmost importance in connection with situations that are not covered by 
secondary legislation. 
 
Secondary Legislation 
While all the above was taking place, the legislative institutions of the European 
Community started work on what was going to influence the second tier of the 
development of the free movement of lawyers. In the mid 1970s, the legislative 
institutions of the European Community initiated efforts to harmonise the liberal 
professions in Europe. This was achieved by creating two directives per profession. 
One directive provided minimum harmonisation for the professional education 
leading up to qualification for that profession, whilst the second directive guaranteed 
mutual recognition of those professional qualifications. These vertical, or sectoral, 
directives proved successful in the medical professions. Although successful, however, 
it proved to be a difficult and time-consuming process. Outside the medical pro-
fessions, there was much less success. The profession of the architect was tackled, but 
with considerable difficulty and without a harmonising directive on professional 
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qualifications. The institutions were unable to implement the vertical approach for 
the profession of the engineer, and most importantly, for lawyers. Although the 
sectoral approach was not applied to the profession of the lawyer, the institutions 
did adopt a piece of secondary legislation, the so-called Lawyers’ Services Directive 
77/249/EEC. This Directive allowed lawyers to provide services in another Member 
State, on a temporary basis. There is no limitation on the professional activities that 
may be pursued, however, in situations involving the representation of clients in 
court the lawyer providing services on a temporary basis is required to cooperate 
with a locally established lawyer.  
At first sight, this Directive was revolutionary. It circumvented the difficult 
harmonisation issues that were encountered in the sectoral approach. The Directive 
was straightforward, concise and firmly based in the then-newly established principle 
of mutual recognition. It provided lawyers from other Member States with the 
possibility to become fully engaged in the professional activities of the legal profes-
sion of the host Member State (albeit in some instances with obligatory cooperation 
with a host Member State lawyer). Moreover, the rights guaranteed in Directive 
77/249/EEC provided lawyers who sought a more permanent form of establish-
ment in another Member State with a loophole in the system. The exact difference 
between services and establishment was for a long time shrouded in a thick fog. 
Lawyers who sought a more permanent form of establishment could insist that they 
were providing services when they were actually established under their home title. 
This modality was dubbed installation limitée in the literature. It was not until the 
judgment of the European Court of Justice in the Gebhard case that this modality 
was terminated through the Court’s clearly-defined clarification of the differences 
between the two modalities. I have concluded (see below) that the phenomenon of 
installation limitée may become relevant again for a different category of professionals.  
With regard to the Services Directive only two cases are worth mentioning. In 
the 1980s the Court ruled on the extent of the obligation to cooperate with a 
domestic lawyer laid down in Directive 77/249/EEC. This was the Commission v. 
Germany case, in which the Court ruled that such obligatory cooperation may only 
be imposed in situations where representation by a lawyer is obligatory in that spe-
cific procedure and that it may not go beyond technical cooperation. This case is 
also of importance for the Establishment Directive, since that Directive contains a 
similar possibility for Member States to impose cooperation. The second case also 
deals with the obligatory cooperation. In the AMOK case the Court decided that 
rules imposed by a Member State which are not dealt with in the Directive (in this 
case, a rule that the costs of the cooperating lawyer could not be reimbursed) are 
illegal per se if they preclude the full effect of the Directive. This case is also of im-
portance for the Establishment Directive, as will be discussed below. 
The sectoral approach of the legislative institutions of the European Com-
munity came to a grinding halt after the medical professions were harmonised. The 
difficulties encountered in harmonising these professions proved enough for the 
Institutions to change course with regard to the recognition of professional qualifica-
tions and therewith to the access to regulated professions. At the European Council 
of Fontainebleu in 1984, it was decided that the European Commission was to 
investigate a horizontal approach towards the recognition of diplomas. That system 
was ultimately laid down in Directive 89/48/EEC, which provided for a system for 
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the recognition of diplomas. The general rule laid down in the Directive is based 
on mutual recognition. This means that recognition of professional qualifications 
obtained in other Member States lies at the core of the Directive. Only when certain 
substantial differences between the two professional qualifications are established 
may the host Member State require certain compensatory measures, and only after 
it has also been established that there is no additional experience gained by the 
candidate that might compensate for the substantial differences. This is essentially 
the rule laid down by the European Court of Justice in the Vlassopoulou case.  
These compensatory measures may take the form of an adaptation period or an 
aptitude test. The Directive prescribes that the choice of compensatory measure 
essentially lies with the candidate who seeks integration into the regulated profession 
of the host Member State. There is however one important exception to this 
principle of free choice, namely professions that require a precise knowledge of the 
national law of the host Member State. In that situation the host Member State 
may prescribe the form of compensatory measure. All the Member States reviewed 
have chosen an obligatory aptitude test. For the lawyer, this meant that a hurdle 
was created which overshadowed the principle of mutual recognition underlying 
the Directive. Substantial differences are, of course, almost always present between 
lawyers educated in different legal systems. Therefore, automatic recognition of pro-
fessional qualifications will only take place in situations where the candidate has 
aggregated enough additional experience and knowledge in order to be exempted 
from the compensatory measures (the application of the Vlassopoulou ruling in its 
most extreme consequence). If an exemption cannot be granted, the candidate in 
question has to subject himself to an aptitude test (which generally consists of a 
written and an oral part), conducted in the language of the host Member State. It 
might speak for itself that this is not an easy step to take. More importantly, the 
Directive does not state anything about the severity of the aptitude test. Member 
States essentially obtain a carte blanche (within the limits of the principle of pro-
portionality) with respect to the size and contents of the aptitude test. With regard 
to the Diploma Directive there has only been one case that specifically dealt with 
the aptitude test for lawyers. In Commission v. Italy the Court ruled that an aptitude 
test may not be more demanding than the qualification track for domestic lawyers, 
thereby minimising the worst severity of the aptitude test. Moreover, the Court 
ruled in Peros and Aslanidou that in cases where there has been a wrong imple-
mentation of the Diploma Directive, Member States may not rely on the system of 
compensatory measures laid down in the Directive. Unfortunately, these cases did 
not address lawyers. 
Directive 89/48/EEC was a step forward for the developments of the free 
movement of lawyers. Now for the first time candidates from other Member States 
were guaranteed a possibility, albeit not an easy one, to enter into the legal profes-
sion of the host Member State. This option was open to them if they themselves 
were qualified to exercise the corresponding regulated profession in their home 
Member State. This meant that lawyers who integrated into the legal profession of 
another Member State became dually qualified. Normally, before the adoption of 
Directive 89/48/EEC, lawyers could only integrate into the legal profession of the 
host Member State if they followed the normal route for qualification for the legal 
profession in that country, via the education system. In 2005, Directive 89/48/EEC 
327 
was replaced by Directive 2005/36/EC, the transposition period of which ended 
on 20 October 2007. It was also established that the new Directive did not change 
anything with regard to the system of diploma recognition that was observed under 
Directive 89/48/EEC, in spite of earlier attempts in the decision-making process to 
abolish the aptitude test for lawyers and replace it with the method of integration 
provided in Directive 98/5/EC. 
The most significant development in the 30 years of the free movement of 
lawyers in the framework of the European Community stands at the focal point of 
this book as Directive 98/5/EC. This Directive was adopted to facilitate the per-
manent establishment and the exercise of professional activities by lawyers who had 
obtained their professional qualifications in a Member State other than the Member 
State in which they are established. The Directive can be traced back to 1975 when 
the European Commission asked the CCBE to consider a way to realise the free 
movement of lawyers. It was not until 1992 that the CCBE presented its draft to 
the European Commission. This early request may also explain why there was a 
Directive for a specific profession at a time that the European Community had 
changed its policy to favour a more horizontal approach. The Draft of the CCBE 
provided for a permanent right of establishment under home country professional 
title. The European Commission Draft that ensued from this proposal had a com-
pletely different character. It provided for a five-year right to practise under home 
title after which integration into the legal profession of the host Member State 
should follow. This approach was heavily criticised by other legislative institutions, 
Member States and scholars. Eventually the European Commission abandoned the 
approach of establishment under home title as preparation for the integration into 
the legal profession of the host Member State, and Directive 98/5/EC was adopted 
more along the lines of the original CCBE Draft. 
The principle underlying Directive 98/5/EC, similar to Directives 77/249/ 
EEC and 89/48/EEC, is the principle of mutual recognition. Unlike the Diploma 
Directive, it is not based on the mutual recognition of professional qualifications (in 
order to enter the corresponding profession in the host Member State) but is rather 
more akin to the Services Directive, in which there is a mutual recognition of the 
profession itself. The Establishment Directive allows lawyers who qualify for the 
legal profession in one of the Member States to exercise professional activities in 
any other Member State under their home country professional title. While estab-
lished in the host Member State, the lawyer established under his home country 
title may exercise all professional activities that a lawyer established under the pro-
fessional title of the host Member State may exercise, except for situations which 
involve the representation of clients in court, where, similar to the Services Direc-
tive, obligatory cooperation with a host country lawyer may be imposed. While 
established in the host State, the lawyer concerned is subject to the professional 
conduct rules of that State. In essence, (except for representation) the lawyer estab-
lished under his home country title does not therefore exercise his home country 
profession in another Member State, but he exercises the profession of the host 
country under his home country professional title.  
The Directive essentially lays down the mutual recognition of the legal pro-
fessions in all but name. Apart from the right to be permanently established in the 
host Member State, Directive 98/5/EC has two important additional features that 
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have an impact on the free movement of lawyers. Firstly, this is the link with the 
integration in the profession of the host Member State. After a lawyer who is estab-
lished under his home country title has been active in the law of the host Member 
State (including European Community law) he may integrate into the legal pro-
fession of the host Member State without any further testing of his capabilities. This 
means that a lawyer in such a situation can integrate into the legal profession of the 
host Member State without having to take an aptitude test. Together with the right 
to be established under home country title, this is the most important feature of the 
Directive.  
Another important feature of the Directive was the effort to liberalise rules on 
practice in association, and, to a lesser extent, multi-disciplinary partnerships. Al-
though some countries have a tradition of accommodating large law firms, in the 
majority of the Member States there is a tradition of single-lawyer practice. The 
articles in the Directive pertaining to practice in association do not entail a direct 
application of the host country rules (as is the case with disciplinary rules and salaried 
practice) but only provide for the application of host country rules after it has been 
established that home and host country rules are incompatible and application of 
the host country rules can be objectively justified. With regard to multi-disciplinary 
partnerships, the Directive provides for an elective application of host Member 
State rules, which is, in most cases, a blatant prohibition of multi-disciplinary partner-
ships. Unfortunately, this nuance has been largely disregarded in the implementa-
tions reviewed in this book, which has led to the confirmation of the status quo of 
rules on practice in association. In recent case law, dealt with below, the European 
Court of Justice decided that Articles 3 and 5 of the Directive lead to complete har-
monisation in the scope of the application of those articles. It has been put forward 
in this book that these rulings can be extended to the entire Directive and that the 
Directive therefore leads to a complete mutual recognition of the legal profession 
in Europe in all but name.  
The Establishment Directive has been involved in a variety of legal proceedings 
over its ten-year existence. The first case was a nullity claim by Luxembourg based 
on Article 230 EC. In Luxembourg v. European Parliament and Council the Court con-
sistently dismissed Luxembourg’s claims for nullity, thereby saving the Establishment 
Directive. This case is doctrinally important since it established the tripartite division 
of categories of lawyers who make use of their free movement rights; lawyers who 
provide services, lawyers who are established under their home country title, and 
lawyers who seek to integrate completely into the legal profession of the host Mem-
ber State. Two other cases, also involving Luxembourg, Commission v. Luxembourg 
and Wilson, are very important because in them the Court ruled that Articles 3 and 5 
of the Directive lead to complete harmonisation of their subject matter (registration 
of lawyers under their home title and professional activities respectively). This is 
important, because if one reads these cases together with AMOK and Gebhard, they 
form the outlines of a system of possible restrictions that will be discussed in the 
next chapter. 
 
329 
New Generation Case Law 
After the completion of the secondary legislation in the field of lawyers, the 
establishment of the tripartite system that was confirmed in Luxembourg v. European 
Parliament and Council, and the application of that system in the case law, questions 
remained in connection with the relevance of the first-generation case law. The 
Court ruled on the relevance of this system in a number of cases. In these cases the 
Court has consistently ruled (in Burbaud, Aranitis and Fernandez de Bobadilla) that 
where situations fell (partly) outside the material scope of the application of the 
Directives, Union nationals could rely on the first-generation case law, more specif-
ically on the Vlassopoulou ruling. The most important case for lawyers in this respect 
was Morgenbesser, where the Court confirmed this line of case law for trainee law-
yers. This case has enormous potential for trainee lawyers because it guarantees them 
a right to move between qualification tracks even before they are considered a produit 
fini in their home Member State. This situation was addressed further in Chapter 4. 
Another, perhaps unintended, effect of Morgenbesser was that the Court applied the 
Vlassopoulou doctrine in such a way that Ms. Morgenbesser obtained more (regis-
tration as a trainee lawyer in Italy) than she had in the first place (since she did not 
qualify as a trainee lawyer in France). Member States have been struggling with the 
interpretation in the Morgenbesser case, and it was concluded that the German inter-
pretation at least is not in line with what the Court ruled in that case. It was also 
concluded that more case law on this subject would be welcome. 
 
The Outside World 
With regard to the rest of the world, two distinct situations can be identified. First 
of all, one must consider the position of European Union nationals with third-
country diplomas. It was established that the system of the Diploma Directive will 
apply to them. In cases which touch upon professions that used to fall under the sec-
toral Directives, the Court ruled in Haim and Hocsman that Union nationals with 
third-country diplomas would benefit not from the Directives but from the Vlasso-
poulou ruling. There are no rulings in connection to the Services Directive and the 
Establishment Directive. The other problem concerns those third-country nationals 
who have either European Union or third-country qualifications. These third-
country nationals, according to the Court in Gül, could, in very specific situations, 
rely on the Diploma Directive. This also holds true for third-country nationals who 
have obtained Long-Term Resident status under the LTR Directive.  
 
Conclusion 
Thirty years of development in the realm of free movement of lawyers has led to a 
model which can be applied in all cases related to the free movement of lawyers. 
The core of the model is the tripartite system of free movement of fully-qualified 
lawyers who are Union citizens and who are fully qualified as lawyers in on of the 
Member States of the European Union. These lawyers benefit from the freedom to 
provide services on the basis of Directive 77/249/EEC, the right to establish them-
selves under their home country title on the basis of Directive 98/5/EC, and the 
right to fully integrate into the legal profession either by taking an aptitude on the 
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basis of Directive 89/48/EEC (2005/36/EC) or by integrating on the basis of 
Directive 98/5/EC. Surrounding that core there are European Union citizens with 
third-country diplomas, third-country nationals and trainee lawyers who cannot 
benefit from the Directives but who can benefit from the first-generation case law 
laid down by the European Court of Justice. A graphical model was presented at 
the end of Chapter 2. 
 
 
§ 3. Observations and Conclusions with regard to 
Chapter 3 
Creating a model on the basis of the rules is only the first step. The model distilled in 
Chapter 2 only describes how the free movement of lawyers ought to look. A deeper 
answer to the question of where the free movement of lawyers stands in Europe 
can only be given after a review of the implementation of the model in the Member 
States. This was the purpose of the third chapter. I selected 15 Member States in 
order to review their implementation of the directives concerned. The core of the 
implementation research was the tripartite system established in the previous chapter. 
The tripartite system is based on the fact that the beneficiaries are fully qualified 
lawyers (expressly in Directives 77/249/EEC and 98/5/EC and implied (as a produit 
fini) in Directive 89/48/EEC (2005/36/EC)). This warranted a closer look at the 
various legal professions in the selected Member States. It was established that the 
legal profession does not have the same characteristics in each of the different Mem-
ber States. After a review of the different legal professions in the Member States, 
which focused on the qualification track and the extent of professional monopolies 
awarded to lawyers, I established on the latter criterion that there are roughly three 
categories of legal professions in the 15 Member States selected. Two of the Member 
States have legal professions that enjoy no professional monopoly at all. A second 
group only gives a professional monopoly to lawyers with respect to representing 
clients in court, while the majority offer a professional monopoly for representation 
and legal advice. This threefold division leads to the conclusion that in countries 
with a low and intermediate level of regulation, there is a category of professionals 
who engage in professional legal activities but are not fully qualified lawyers. These 
professionals would undoubtedly run into trouble when they seek to exercise their 
profession in a Member State with a high degree of regulation, since this ‘hidden’ 
category of professionals falls outside the scope of the core of the model described 
above. This category was specifically addressed in the research regarding each specific 
modality. 
 
The Free Provision of Services 
A review of the implementation of the Services Directive did not bring major defects 
to light. With regard to the category of professionals who engage in professional 
legal activities in Member States that have a low or an intermediate degree of regu-
lation, it was established that this category is covered by Directive 2005/36/EC 
which states that, for the provision of services, the host Member State may not 
impose restrictions that have to do with the professional qualifications that a service 
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provider needs to have. That means that after 20 October 2007 (the end of the trans-
position period of Directive 2005/36/EC) this ‘hidden’ category of professionals 
can provide services in other Member States, or at least may not be refused on the 
grounds that they do not have certain professional qualifications. Other restrictions 
fall under the first-generation case law, most notably the Gebhard case, and in 2009 
this will be covered by the Directive on Services in the internal market, Directive 
2006/123/EC. 
 
Establishment under Home Title 
The primary part of Chapter 3 was devoted to a detailed review of the imple-
mentation of Directive 98/5/EC in the selected Member States. Two main forms 
of implementation were observed. A number of Member States chose a completely 
new legislative instrument that, more often than not, included other modalities of 
the free movement of lawyers, while other Member States merely chose to adapt 
their existing legislation. The chosen form of implementation did not seem to have 
influenced the result to the extent that it could be said that implementations by one 
method are preferable to, or better than, implementations by the other method. 
Apart from the situation addressed below, no major defects regarding its implemen-
tation were discovered. On the basis of case law described above, however, a four-
layer system of restrictions applicable to the Directive was established. Firstly, there 
had been some violations that were addressed in Commission v. Luxembourg and 
Wilson. In these cases it was established that Articles 3 and 5 of Directive 98/5/EC 
lead to complete harmonisation. I have proposed that this ruling could be applied 
to the majority of the articles in the Directive. The result was that if Member States 
created or contradicted substantial provisions laid down in these articles then this 
would be illegal per se, with no possible justification. Violations which were similar 
the ones dealt with in the cases were observed in a number of Member States. A 
second category of violations can be found in the application of the AMOK case. 
In that case, the Court ruled that national rules on a subject matter that fell outside 
a directive, but precluded the full working of the directive, would be illegal per se 
without possible justification. Although decided on the basis of Directive 77/249/ 
EEC, it has been put forward that through analogous interpretation the case can 
also be applied to Directive 98/5/EC. In the case of the Netherlands, a rule stating 
that a 98/5/EC lawyer could not gain access to the profession of the procureur was 
classed as falling into this category. The situation in the Netherlands will resolve itself 
since the profession of the procureur will be abolished and completely merged with 
the profession of the advocaat in 2008. A hypothetical third category of restrictions 
are those that fall outside the scope of the Directive, but that would not preclude 
the full working of the Directive. Based on first-generation case law, these restric-
tions fall under the regime of Gebhard and are prohibited unless they are objectively 
justified. A fourth and final category of restrictions is actually caused by the 
Directive itself, and must be classed as permissible. The clearest example of this 
fourth category is that lawyers must be registered in their home Member State 
before they can register in another Member State. Most likely this means that lawyers 
will have to pay two membership fees, a situation that must be classed as a restriction 
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but that flows directly from the Directive. Rules with regard to permanent education 
could also be problematic in this respect. 
There is one thing that needs to be addressed with respect to the implementation 
of Article 11 of Directive 98/5/EC. The majority of Member States have ignored 
the reference to objective justification in applying host Member State professional 
rules with regard to joint practice and have reduced this rule to a mere national 
treatment rule. This is something the European Commission should address in its 
review of the implementation of the Directive, which is due to be conducted in 
2008. That observation, taken together with the other national treatment rules and 
the considerable ease (certainly if compared with the aptitude test under the system 
of the Diploma Directive) with which lawyers can integrate into the host Member 
State legal profession, leads to the conclusion that Directive 98/5/EC leads to full 
mutual recognition of the legal professions in Europe in all but name.  
The situation of the ‘hidden’ category of professionals is much less rosy in this 
modality. It has been established that no secondary legislation applies to their situa-
tion and the Gebhard rule is the only safety this category can rely on when seeking 
establishment rights in other Member States. It has been observed that it might well 
be that a new installation limitée might emerge for this category of professionals since 
the rules on the free provision of services give more rights to this category than the 
rules relating to establishment. However, this would be an unwelcome situation. 
 
Recognition of Diplomas 
For the mutual recognition of lawyer’s diplomas, no major defects were established. 
In terms of what was established for the ‘hidden’ category of professionals, it was 
found that they can request an aptitude test in order to integrate into the legal pro-
fession of the host Member State. The problem is that the profession in the host 
Member State is the profession of the lawyer, a profession with a much wider scope 
than the professional activities the individual was exercising in his home Member 
State. Recent case law of the European Court of Justice, more specifically the Caminos 
case, allowed candidates to limit their integration into a regulated profession to a cer-
tain level. This case law could prove useful for this category of professionals. 
 
Third-Country Nationals 
With regard to third-country nationals, the research in the third chapter took a 
different approach. It was established in Chapter 2 that only very meagre protection 
was available for third- country nationals in the model distilled. Therefore this study 
has examined whether the rules of the WTO, or more specifically of the GATS, 
could offer more protection for third-country nationals who seek to engage in legal 
professional activities in the European Union. It was concluded that this was not 
the case for two specific reasons. First, in a concise review of the GATS rules appli-
cable to legal services, it was established that the guarantees offered by GATS fall 
short of the most limited category of the free movement of lawyers in Europe, the 
free provision of services. New negotiations would include guaranteeing more 
substantial rights to lawyers seeking free movement, but since July 2006 negotiations 
in the so-called Doha round have been suspended, so that there is no date in sight 
when these new developments can be expected. Secondly, and perhaps more im-
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portantly, it is generally assumed (and for the European level confirmed by the 
European Court of Justice) that WTO (GATS) rules do not have direct effect in 
courts. This means that individual lawyers cannot rely on these provisions in pro-
ceedings against a state or a Bar Association. Member States taking over complaints 
and starting inter-state proceedings in the context of the WTO dispute settlement 
system seems unlikely. 
The paragraph on third-country nationals in this book stopped short of review-
ing national rules in the Member States that govern third-country national lawyers. 
However, it was established that the rules in Member States are patchy and lack 
coherence. In a number of instances, in some Member States, lawyers from former 
colonies have more rights than other third-country nationals (which against the 
letter of the GATS rules). The rules in Germany have been put forward as a ‘best 
practice’. Germany allows lawyers from all WTO members to establish themselves 
under their home country professional title (which is much more than what is 
required under GATS) and allows them to pursue activities in relation to their 
home-country law and international law. I believe that all Member States should 
implement this system. 
 
Conclusion 
Overseeing the implementation of the model that was distilled in Chapter 2, it 
must be concluded that Directive 98/5/EC is not only the latest addition to the 
system of free movement of lawyers from a secondary legislation perspective, but 
also it is the most important element of the model. This is the case for a number of 
specific reasons. Firstly, the Directive caters for the third category of lawyers who, 
until 1998, had to rely on the so-called installation limitée on the basis of Directive 
77/249/EEC. The Establishment Directive now gives them the right, on the basis 
of rules firmly based on the principle of mutual recognition, to establish themselves 
in another Member State and to exercise professional activities of the legal profession 
of that Member State under the professional rules in force there. This is more than 
a lawyer relying on installation limitée could ever have hoped for. But there is more. 
Not only does Directive 98/5/EC cater for the category of lawyers that was before 
its adoption orphaned, but it also enters the territory of the other two Directives. 
For 77/249/EEC this means that the overextended use of that Directive, known as 
installation limitée, has become superfluous. For the Diploma Directive the changes 
are more fundamental. Not only does Directive 98/5/EC allow lawyers to establish 
themselves under their home country professional title, it also provides for a pos-
sibility to integrate into the host country legal profession after a period of three years, 
without any further compensatory measures (such as an aptitude test) being imposed. 
In my view that must lead to the conclusion that the role of the Diploma Directive 
in the system of free movement of lawyers is being reduced to a residual one. 
Imposing an aptitude test will only be warranted in isolated situations (involving 
prior knowledge of the candidate, for example, but not enough prior knowledge to 
escape an aptitude test) but the majority of lawyers will integrate through the system 
of Directive 98/5/EC. This leads to the conclusion that the influence of Member 
States on the establishment of foreign lawyers is reduced from a carte blanche after the 
implementation of the Diploma Directive, to next to no influence after the Estab-
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lishment Directive. This is an evolution that cannot be underestimated, and that, it 
seems to me, has not sunk in with the Member States. 
This last remark, read in conjunction with the national treatment rules in the 
Establishment Directive and the wrong implementation of Article 11 of the Estab-
lishment Directive, leads to the conclusion that, for fully-qualified lawyers who are 
European Union citizens, the implementation of the model distilled in Chapter 2 
leads to full mutual recognition of the legal professions in Europe. In that bold 
statement its major weakness is also enshrined. The system only operates fully for 
fully-qualified lawyers. In order to benefit from the system, one must spend years 
qualifying as a lawyer in one Member State and then more years in another Member 
State integrating into its legal profession. Therefore I researched what rules applied 
to the system of qualification as a lawyer, and how this system could be adapted in 
order to further refine the free movement of lawyers in Europe.  
 
 
§ 4. Observations and Conclusions with regard to 
Chapter 4 
On the basis of the review of the qualification tracks in the different Member 
States, it is clear that in general the qualification track used for becoming a lawyer 
in a Member State consists of two distinct elements; a law degree and professional 
education. That dichotomy also provides for two distinct entry points for people 
wanting to enter that qualification track: one before the law degree and one before 
the professional education. I have concluded that although the European Union has 
made rules covering the free movement of students, Article 149 of the EC Treaty 
precludes the legislative institutions to make rules in connection with the mutual 
recognition of qualifications needed to enter the qualification track on these specific 
points of entry. Entry to these tracks is governed by two Council of Europe Con-
ventions which form an integral part of the ‘Bologna Process’. 
The Member States have started to create their own European Area of Higher 
Education on the basis of the so-called ‘Bologna Process’. This is a soft-law process 
in which Ministers responsible for education of the participating states develop, on 
an intergovernmental and voluntary basis, close cooperation in the field of higher 
education. It must be kept in mind that the creation of the European Area of Higher 
Education is in no way especially focused on legal education or the free movement 
of lawyers. After a careful examination of the developments occurring within the 
‘Bologna Process’, and mainly two of the three developments spear-pointed by the 
Ministers in the ‘Bologna Process’ (the creation of a two- or three-cycle system, 
and the recognition of higher education qualifications), it appears that the ‘Bologna 
Process’, as it stands today, does not add much to the free movement of lawyers in 
a material sense.  
I have also concluded that Member States of the European Union are consider-
ably restricted in the application of the two Council of Europe Conventions on the 
basis of two decisions of the European Court of Justice. It was established, on the 
basis of the cases of Commission v. Austria and Morgenbesser, that the Court not only 
showed that it was not intimidated by the prohibition laid down in Article 149 of 
the EC Treaty but that it would also not allow Member States to discriminate on 
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the basis of an individual possessing a certain diploma. In other words, Member 
States may not make access to the qualification track (at either of the two entry 
points) dependent on possession of a national diploma. With regard to access on 
the level of professional education, the Morgenbesser case even requires the applica-
tion of the Vlassopoulou rule.  
Next, I examined how the ‘Bologna Process’ could be used to further develop 
the free movement of lawyers. I concluded that changing national legal curricula 
could achieve a further free movement of lawyers. Curricula should focus more on 
general principles rather than on the particularities of national law. In this manner, 
the free movement in the qualification track would become easier, since the treat-
ment of national law would be reserved for the master’s level or even for professional 
education. A short review of the system in the United States of America showed 
that such an approach is possible, even more so since there are considerably less 
rights of free movement for lawyers in the USA than in Europe. In Europe itself, 
Luxembourg could serve as an example because, until recently, it was forced to 
accept exclusively candidates with foreign law degrees since Luxembourg had no 
Law Faculty of its own. The same goes for the conversion courses used in the United 
Kingdom. It is clear that such an adaptation of legal curricula requires a major cul-
tural change that will not be easily achieved. Having said this, at present there are 
numerous experiments in Europe that are attempting to create such a curriculum. 
In addition to the culture change, there are other additional legal problems. Having 
reviewed possible ways to achieve such a curriculum change, I concluded that it can 
best be achieved in the context of a new mode of governance provided in Article 
15 of Directive 2005/36/EC, the so-called common platform, and that the CCBE 
should at least take a coordinating role in the development of such a platform. 
Until this is achieved, prospective lawyers in Europe only have the European 
Court of Justice as the guardian of their rights, and effectuating those rights will 
remain a struggle which will, more often than not, involve litigation. 
 
 
§ 5. Recommendations: The Future 
Directive 98/5/EC represented an enormous step forward in the cumulative pro-
tection of the free movement of lawyers. Before the implementation of Directive 
98/5 /EC, lawyers were subject to an aptitude test in order to integrate into the 
profession of the host Member State. They were, at best, allowed to engage in pro-
fessional activities under their home country professional title where this professional 
activity was not part of the legal monopoly of the host Member State. After the 
implementation of Directive 98/5/EC, lawyers became more secure through regis-
tration under their home country professional title and were permitted access to 
almost all the professional activities reserved for the host country profession. More-
over, the lawyer who is established under his home country professional title may 
fully integrate into the legal profession of the host Member State after a period of 
three years without having to take an aptitude test. In my view, this leads to full 
mutual recognition of the legal professions in Europe. 
With regard to future perspectives, the Directive itself does not provide for many 
interesting developments for the future. According to Article 15 of the Directive, 
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the European Commission will issue a report in 2008 on possible amendments to 
the system. Based on the review of implementation given above, only the system of 
joint practice could be a potential candidate for review. This is a part of the Directive 
that was misunderstood by the majority of implementing countries. Based on the 
rest of the Directive that leads to the firm embedding of the lawyer in the pro-
fessional rules of the host Member State, it might be more logical to apply the rules 
of the host Member State to joint practices rather than the complicated system of 
objective justification that is laid down in Article 11 of the Directive.  
 
Recommendation 1 
It is recommended that the system of Article 11 of Directive 98/5/EC should be 
changed to a national treatment clause in order to bring it into conformity with the 
majority of implementation mechanisms. 
 
It was observed that the real prospects for the future of the free movement of 
lawyers lie outside the scope of the Directive, in the field of prospective lawyers. 
Until recently, the free movement of lawyers could only be enjoyed by those who 
had actually fully qualified as a lawyer in one of the Member States. The Services 
Directive (77/249/EEC), the Diploma Directive (89/48/EEC; now 2005/36/EC) 
and the Establishment Directive (98/5/EC) are only applicable to lawyers who are 
fully qualified in their home Member State. The Directives do not lay down rules 
for those who cannot be regarded as a produit fini. Persons who were in the process 
of qualifying for a legal profession were, until recently, surrendered to the mercy of 
the Member States. Recognition of university diplomas, or even secondary educa-
tion, used to fall under the prohibition on harmonisation laid down in Article 149 
of the EC Treaty. It was for the Member States alone to decide whether such diplo-
mas should be recognised. Dependent on the regime in force in the Member State 
in question recognition would be subject to the rules of the Member State itself, or 
the rules laid down in the Lisbon Recognition Convention.  
All this changed with the ruling of the European Court of Justice in the 
Morgenbesser case. This case opened up the possibility for prospective lawyers to hop 
qualification-tracks and to benefit from the guarantees laid down in the case law 
(more specifically Vlassopoulou) before they gained the status of produit fini. Although 
the ECJ did not address this specifically in the Morgenbesser case, it must be men-
tioned that the ruling encroaches on the recognition of academic diplomas which, 
according to Article 149 EC Treaty, falls under the sovereignty of the Member 
States. In two other recent cases, Commission v. Belgium and Commission v. Austria, 
the ECJ gave rulings that could also be potentially revolutionary for the system of 
recognition of secondary education qualifications (as the ECJ has ruled that these 
fall under the scope of the EC Treaty). Application of these rulings could lead to an 
enormous diversity of possibilities for students and prospective lawyers. If the recog-
nition of academic and secondary education diplomas is taken from the Member 
States and brought under the case law that was developed for the produits fini, then 
it is clear that all prospective lawyers have a right to an individual assessment of 
their qualifications. Such a system would provide relatively easy access to education 
and vocational training in other Member States. On the other hand, it must be 
mentioned that the result from these three recent cases is far from clear. With regard 
to Morgenbesser, a matter of fact rendered the ECJ unable to bring the case under 
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the ambit of ‘regulated professional activities’ which are covered by the Diploma 
Directive. Further development of this line of case law  is strongly desired.  
Application of the Diploma Directive would lead to even more legal certainty 
for prospective lawyers. That statement has even more importance for recognition of 
secondary education qualifications. The rulings in the two cases described above lead 
to a very crude result which seems to come down to the automatic recognition of 
secondary education qualifications. In light of the case law on diplomas, and the 
Morgenbesser case, and reminded of the fact that the recognition of academic quali-
fications is actually in the hands of the Member States on the basis of Article 149 EC 
Treaty, it seems unimaginable that no system of compensation would be developed 
for secondary education qualifications. In my opinion, it is self-evident that refine-
ment of this case law is required, even more so because the European Court of 
Justice has ruled in the cases that the existing system for recognition of such qualifica-
tions, the Lisbon Recognition Convention, cannot serve as a justification. Therefore, 
it would be no more than logical to bring the recognition of secondary education 
qualifications also under the system of Vlassopoulou, so that one system exists for all 
possible stages of qualification. The legal reform in Germany in connection to the 
Deutschen Richtergesetz also seems to give preference to the system of Vlassopoulou 
over the Lisbon Recognition Convention (which has not been ratified by Germany). 
 
Recommendation 2 
It is recommended that the rules, laid down in case law, for those persons who are 
not fully qualified as lawyers should be refined. The Diploma Directive should be 
applied to those seeking entrance in professional education and the Vlassopoulou 
doctrine applied to the recognition of secondary education diplomas. 
 
If this were to be realised then an enormous palette of choices would become 
available to the prospective lawyer. From the point of view of recognition, a full free 
movement would then be realised. Such a system of free movement would be of 
little use if the qualification tracks for lawyers were to remain focused on the national 
law of the Member States. Differences between the qualification tracks would then 
remain as substantial. These substantial differences lead Member States to require 
compensatory measures. So although the system of recognition of diplomas moves 
towards a more complete facilitation of free movement of (prospective) lawyers, such 
facilitation is next to useless if nothing changes in the qualification tracks themselves. 
In addition to the facilitation of the previous paragraph, facilitation of stream-
lining higher education has also taken place through the ‘Bologna Process’. The 
‘Bologna Process’ mainly leads to facilitation in terminology, i.e., participating 
countries use the same terminology and credit system in order to facilitate the free 
movement of students between the higher education institutions. With regard to 
recognition of qualifications, it is noteworthy that the ‘Bologna Process’ has relied 
heavily on the Lisbon Recognition Convention. Some elaborate criticism has been 
voiced on this Convention. In addition, the European Court of Justice rendered 
the Lisbon Recognition Convention inapplicable at times when it conflicts with 
European law. Therefore, it must be expected that, at least for the Member States 
of the European Union, the recognition system of higher education diplomas and 
diplomas that give access to higher education will be governed by a system developed 
by the European Court of Justice rather than by the Lisbon Recognition Conven-
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tion that is envisioned by the ‘Bologna Process’. Similar to the free movement 
system developed by the European Court of Justice, the ‘Bologna Process’ mainly 
facilitates the procedure. It will be up to the universities to create programmes 
directed to free movement which make the best use of the possibilities offered by 
the system laid down by the ECJ and the ‘Bologna Process’. It will then be up to 
the competent authorities of the legal professions to create a system that accepts this 
curriculum, as described above. 
 
Recommendation 3 
It is recommended that special curricula should be devised by universities and 
accepted by professional organisations in order to further the free movement of 
(prospective) lawyers. 
 
In my opinion creating the curricula is best done by creating legal education that is 
primarily detached from the national legal system. Universities should create curricula 
that are tailor-made for prospective free movement purposes (either in place of, or 
in addition to, ‘traditional’ curricula). In the Middle Ages, law students used to study 
the Ius Commune at a university of their choice, and would then teach themselves 
the law of the jurisdiction in which they chose to work, based on their knowledge 
of the Ius Commune. Such a construction could be repeated in the present day. Ob-
viously, Roman law cannot serve as an Ius Commune as such anymore, but a strong 
common ground can be found in European Community law and comparative law. 
In the later stages of studies, a specialisation can be taken in national law. Specific 
national knowledge can further be gained in master’s programmes and, as was 
described above, a vocational training that is directed towards national law. Luxem-
bourg offers an example of this, since Luxembourg was devoid of a Law Faculty 
until recently. Focus towards a national legal system should be gradually built over 
the years of study. 
The University of Maastricht started such a bachelor’s degree programme in 
2006. The European Law School (English Track) provides for an English-language 
curriculum that is strongly based on comparative law and European Community 
law. In the third year of the bachelor’s degree programme a choice is offered to 
students to take different tracks that are either focused on Dutch law, or a more 
general track (which excludes the possibility of becoming a lawyer in the Nether-
lands). The idea behind this system is that the final year of the bachelor’s degree 
programme would prepare students for a master’s programme (and perhaps a career 
in a legal profession) in one of the Member States of their choice. This curriculum 
is still very young and only the future will tell how its alumni are received by the 
profession, even more so since the acceptance of these types of curricula by the 
professional authorities has not been assured. It is, however, my firm belief that 
these curricula are the way forward. This is the way to create a true European law-
yer, who can move freely throughout the European Union and who is capable of 
acquiring knowledge of national legal systems based on the strong basis of a new Ius 
Commune acquired in undergraduate legal studies. 
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Recommendation 4 
It is recommended that these special curricula should focus in the bachelor’s phase on 
a new Ius Commune rather than on national law. Precise knowledge of national law 
should be reserved for the master’s phase, specially designed conversion courses or 
even professional education. 
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Epilogue 
One of the consequences of conducting PhD research, or writing a book in 
general, is that the author must, at a given point, decide where to draw the line. In 
the introduction of this book a justification of limitations in the research was given. 
However at this point, in October 2008, there are two issues that warrant at least 
some attention. These issues concern the ‘new’ Member States and a possible nega-
tive effect of the Bologna Process for law students, especially in the Netherlands. 
The New Member States 
In the introduction of this book it was set out that at the beginning of my research 
in 2001 I had the idea to incorporate all the Member States of the European Union 
in this book. When the 10+2 enlargement round took effect in May 2004 (and was 
completed in January 2007) it became rapidly clear that this was a goal that could 
no longer be upheld. Not only had the research in the fifteen pre-2004 Member 
States led to a consistent outcome with regards to the research questions posed with 
regard to the implementation of Directive 98/5/EC, but language and availability 
problems stood in the way of including the new Member States in the review of 
free movement possibilities that are addressed in the book. These two issues com-
bined have led to the decision not to include the new Member States in the research. 
Now in October 2008 these considerations are still valid. The CCBE has, how-
ever, collected English translations1 of the legal instruments that implement at least 
Directive 98/5/EC in the new Member States. These unofficial translations cannot 
serve as a base for a detailed incorporation of the new Member States in the main 
part of the research, but they do offer the possibility to have a quick look at the 
implementation mechanisms in those Member States that have offered English 
translations to the CCBE.  
Out of the twelve new Member States, nine have provided information to the 
CCBE. The Member States that joined the EU in 2007, Bulgaria and Romania have 
not provided information so they will not be included in the following overview. 
The same goes for Latvia that joined in 2004. Out of the other nine, Hungary and 
Slovakia have only provided information in their own language, so these Member 
States will also not be addressed.2 The remaining seven states have offered a trans-
lation of their implementation mechanism to the CCBE. In the following overview 
I will deal with these eight states in alphabetical order. I will only give very general 
comments with regard to the implementation and only anomalies (where and if 
they should occur) will be dealt with in greater detail.  
In Cyprus Directive 98/5/EC has been implemented by the 2002 Lawyers 
(Amending) (No 2) that, as its title would suggests, amends the existing lawyers act 
                                                  
1  See <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 26 September 2008. 
2  The CCBE website mentions an English version of the Slovak implementation, but the 
hyperlink seems corrupted. 
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in Cyprus.3 In a short amending act both Directive 77/249/EEC and Directive 
98/5/EC are, on first sight, correctly implemented in the Cyprus Lawyers Act. 
What is noteworthy with regard to the implementation in Cyprus (in the light of 
the implementation research in the fifteen pre-2004 Member States) is that Cyprus 
states in the implementation mechanism that a fee is payable after a lawyer has 
registered himself under his home country professional title. With regard to inte-
gration in the legal profession of the host Member State it must be mentioned that 
Cyprus is among the minority of states that does explicitly include the referral to 
activities in Community law as counting for the three years regular practice in the 
law of the host Member State. In the area of joint practice the Amendment Act is 
completely silent on the subject of multi disciplinary partnerships (MDPs) indicating 
that these are not allowed in Cyprus and indicating that the Cypriot authorities have 
opted to treat this part of Article 11 of Directive 98/5/EC as a national treatment 
clause. 
The Czech Republic has also opted for an amendment to the existing law on 
Advocacy.4 In this amendment it attempts to implement Directive 77/249/EEC; 
Directive 89/48/EEC (now replaced by Directive 2005/36/EC) and Directive 98/ 
5/EC. What is remarkable with regard to the Czech implementation is that, similar 
to Cyprus, reference is made of a fee that is payable upon registration as a lawyer 
under home country professional title. What is also noteworthy is that the Czech 
implementation has the most elaborate implementation of the requirement that a 
lawyer established under his home country professional title must work in conjunc-
tion with a domestic lawyer when represented in court observed until now. Although 
elaborate, the implementation is completely in line with the case law of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice on this matter. With regard to integration in the host country 
legal profession the implementation mechanism mentions that the lawyer concerned 
must have been active mainly in Czech law which is an unorthodox, and poten-
tially infringing manner of dealing with the ‘...including Community Law...’ phrase 
in Article 10 of Directive 98/5/EC. With regard to MDPs there are no specific 
provisions other than the prohibition in the Advocacy Act. 
The Bar Association Act of Estonia also includes Estonia’s implementation of 
Directive 77/249/EEC and Directive 98/5/EC.5 Lawyers who are established under 
their home country professional title are called ‘Associate members of the Bar Asso-
ciation’ whereas lawyers providing services are dubbed ‘Advocates of foreign states’. 
Again, the implementation is rather uneventful staying very close to the wording of 
the Directive. What is potentially problematic is that integration into the Estonian 
legal profession is obtained through three years’ activity in Estonian law, without 
mention being made of the ‘...including Community Law...’ phrase of Article 10 of 
Directive 98/5/EC. This is potentially infringing the Directive it turns out that the 
                                                  
3  The Lawyers (Amending) (No2) Act of 2002, no. 180(1) of 2002, via <www.ccbe.org>, last 
accessed 26 September 2008. 
4  Act No. 85/1996 Coll., on Advocacy as amended by Act No. 210/1999 Coll., 120/2001 Coll., 
6/2002 Coll. And 228/2002 Coll., via <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 26 September 2008. 
5  Bar Association Act, passed 21 March 2001 (RT I 2001, 36, 201) entered into force 19 April 
2001, amended by the following Acts: 18.12.2002 entered into force 23.01.2003 – RT I 2003, 4, 
22; 16.06.2002 entered into force 01.08.2002 – RT I 2002, 57, 357; 19.12.2001 entered into 
force 10.01.2002 – RT I 2002, 102, 676, via <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 26 September 2008. 
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Estonian authorities do not take into account any experience in European Law. MDPs 
are prohibited in Estonia for domestic lawyers; therefore lawyers established under 
their home country professional title are also not allowed to be active in an MDP. 
Also Lithuania has opted for an amendment of the existing Law on the Bar in 
order to implement Directive 98/5/EC.6 This implementation is also uneventful 
and completely in line with what has been observed in the research of the fifteen 
Member States that are included in the book. There is only a reference to Lithuanian 
law in the provision governing entrance into the Lithuanian legal profession so 
whatever has been said with regard to the Czech Republic and Estonia is also true 
for Lithuania. There is one remarkable reference in the implementation mechanism 
that governs activities of a lawyer established under his home country professional 
title in Lithuania. There is a provision that reads: ‘The lawyer of a EU member state 
shall render legal assistance in the Republic of Lithuania within the limits of the 
professional qualifications granted to him by a competent institution of the member 
state of the European Union.’ If this provision where to mean that a lawyer estab-
lished under his home country professional title can only give advice on his home 
country law and not on Lithuanian law than that is obviously in violation of the 
Directive. 
In good common law tradition (at least compared to the common law juris-
dictions that were reviewed in the book) the implementation mechanism in Malta 
has taken the form of a Regulation.7 The text of the Regulation stays very close to 
the text of the Directive and therefore this implementation can also be deemed as 
uneventful. In line with many of the states reviewed in this epilogue the Maltese im-
plementation leaves out the phrase ‘...including Community Law...’ that is included 
in Article 10 of Directive 98/5/EC. This could be a potential infringement of the 
Directive. Furthermore it is noteworthy that the Maltese implementation makes 
completely no mention of joint practice, therewith implying that joint practice 
does not occur in Malta. 
Out of the Member States included in this review, Poland is the only Member 
State that has created a separate law that deals with the exercise of professional activi-
ties in Poland by lawyers from other Member States, and even other non-Member 
States.8 Because of the fact that Poland has tried to encompass every form of exer-
cise of legal activity in Poland by lawyers from outside Poland, the structure of the 
Directive is less recognisable in the implementation mechanism. A quick overview 
of the implementation mechanism reveals no major irregularities. Poland even men-
tions relevant experience in Community Law in the implementation of Article 10 
of Directive 98/5/EC. With regard to practice in MDPs no mention is made beyond 
the remark that a partnership of which a lawyer is a partner may only have as its 
objective the provision of legal services, therewith implying that MDPs are not 
allowed in Poland. 
                                                  
6  Law on supplementing Articles 7 and 18 of the Law on the Bar and supplementing the Law 
with new Chapter 10, 6 December 2001, No IX-630 (Official Gazette 1998, No. 64-1840; 
1999, No. 19-508, No. 57-1830) via <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 26 September 2008. 
7  Subsidiary Legislation 12.17 Mutual Recognition of Qualifications of Legal Profession Regu-
lations, Legal Notice 273 of 2002, via <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 26 September 2008. 
8  Act of 5 July 2002 on the provision by foreign lawyers of legal assistance in the Republic of 
Poland, via <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 26 September 2008. 
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The last Member State in this review is Slovenia. Unlike Poland Slovenia has 
opted for introducing a separate chapter to the existing Bar Act in order to regulate 
the free movement of European lawyers.9 What is remarkable with regard to the 
Slovenian implementation of Directive 98/5/EC is that irregularities with regard to 
the exercise of professional activity do occur. These irregularities, that lawyers estab-
lished under their home country professional title are not allowed to train prospective 
Slovenian lawyers and are not allowed to take part in a legal aid scheme are iden-
tical to the irregularities observed in Austria. This implies that there must have been 
some dialog between Austrian and Slovenian authorities in the implementation 
process in Slovenia. With regard to assessing these irregularities the same conclusion 
must be reached that was reached with regard to Austria, namely the fact that these 
irregularities are infringements of the Directive. There is no mention of division be-
tween Slovenian and Community law with regard to the implementation of Article 
10 of the Directive and MDPs are not allowed in Slovenia. 
After a very general overview of seven out of the twelve new Member States it 
can be concluded that he conclusions reached after chapter three in the book are 
not altered by the implementation of the Directive in the new Member States. The 
new Member States offer the same picture as the fifteen pre 2004 Member States, 
namely implementation that lies relatively close to the text of the Directive, lack of 
clarity with regard to the amount of pure Community Law that might be included 
in the process of integrating in the host country legal profession and structural prob-
lems with the implementation of Article 11 of the Directive with regard to joint 
practice. That means that the recommendations based on the conclusions that were 
presented in Chapter 5 of the book can remain in force. 
Negative Impact of the Bologna Process on the 
Recognition of Academic Diplomas 
Chapter 4 of this book was devoted to researching whether the free movement of 
lawyers could be effectively furthered by creating free movement possibilities in the 
qualification track for lawyers, since the free movement system that was completed 
by Directive 98/5/EC is exclusively applicable to lawyers who are fully qualified to 
exercise that profession it at least one member state. It was concluded that the 
development of such possibilities was desirable and it was also concluded that this 
could be achieved trough reforming existing legal education more towards a more 
general (less focussed on national law) curriculum that, at later stages can be com-
pleted with knowledge in the national law of a legal system. It was also included 
that the existing ‘Bologna Process' did not do much for the realisation of such free 
movement possibilities. But it might be even worse than that. Preliminary obser-
vations in the Netherlands show that professional authorities have a peculiar response 
to the streamlining of university education in a Bachelor-Master system: they dig 
their trenches even deeper. Professional authorities are becoming more and more 
aware of the fact that whatever lies behind one bachelor title may be completely 
different than what lies beyond another bachelor title. This is exactly the effect that 
                                                  
9  Bar Act (unofficial restated wording), via <www.ccbe.org>, last accessed 26 September 2008. 
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was predicted in chapter 4 of the book when it was concluded that giving essen-
tially different things the same name that leads to confusion. Professional authorities 
react, understandably, with caution to this uncertainty. This leads, in my view, to 
the unlikely observation made with regard to German students in the Maastricht 
ELS-ELT track that they would be worse of in Germany when they would do a 
hypothetical minor in German law as opposed to a minor in Dutch law because of 
§ 112a of the Deutschen Richtergesetz. While the extent of this effect must be re-
searched in much more detail in the future it is all the more clear that the attention 
should be shifted from the names of the different curricula to the content of those 
curricula in order to avoid that the motto of the Bologna Process has to be 
‘Diversity through Unity’.  
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Samenvatting 
Inleiding 
Bijna 35 jaar geleden wees het Europese Hof van Justitie de arresten Reyners en 
Van Binsbergen. Met deze arresten begon het Hof met de ontwikkeling van een 
hernieuwd vrij verkeer van advocaten. Van oudsher konden advocaten zich vrij door 
Europa bewegen maar door de ontwikkeling van de rechtssystemen in de ver-
schillende Europese landen in de 19e eeuw was de uitoefening van het beroep van 
advocaat sindsdien verbonden met het land waarin een dergelijke advocaat zijn 
beroepskwalificaties had verworven. Naast de eis om in die Lidstaat gekwalificeerd 
te zijn uitte zich dit in de meeste Lidstaten door het handhaven van een nationali-
teitsvereiste voor het beroep van advocaat. In het arrest Reyners maakte het Hof een 
einde aan deze praktijk. In het arrest Van Binsbergen bepaalde het Hof dat ook het 
handhaven van een woonplaatsvereiste voor een dienstverlenende advocaat niet 
langer was toegestaan. 
In de jaren na Reyners is er zowel van de kant van het Europese Hof van Justitie, 
als van de kant van de wetgevende instellingen van de Europese Unie (de Europese 
Commissie, de Raad van Ministers en het Europees Parlement) veel activiteit geweest 
op het gebied van het vrij verkeer van advocaten zodat nu, in 2008, met recht 
gezegd kan worden dat er een sluitend systeem is waarbinnen advocaten rechten 
kunnen genieten die hun vrij verkeer garanderen. 
Het doel van deze studie naar het vrij verkeer van advocaten is drieledig. In de 
eerste plaats moet onderzocht worden hoe dat sluitende systeem van vrij verkeer 
van advocaten er precies uit ziet. Juist door de combinatie van aan de ene kant 
activiteit van de wetgevende instellingen in de vorm van richtlijnen en aan de andere 
kant de arresten van het Europese Hof van Justitie zijn de omvang en de precieze 
implicaties van dat systeem niet meteen duidelijk. Nadat de precieze omvang van 
het vrij verkeer van advocaten bepaald is, dringt zich meteen de vraag op of die 
regels ook volledig worden nageleefd in de Lidstaten. Ten slotte kan de vraag gesteld 
worden of, en zo ja, in hoeverre, het vrij verkeer van advocaten verder ontwikkeld 
en verfijnd kan worden. 
Ontwikkeling van een model van het vrij verkeer van 
advocaten 
Om tot een afdoende beantwoording van de eerste vraag te komen is het nodig 
om zowel de gebeurtenissen met betrekking tot de jurisprudentie van het Hof van 
Justitie als de activiteiten van wetgevende instellingen van de Europese Unie te ver-
werken in een model dat niet alleen de uitkomsten van beide trajecten weergeeft 
maar ook de onderlinge verhouding tussen die twee trajecten.  
Het was het Europees Hof van Justitie dat in eerste instantie door zijn juris-
prudentie het vrij verkeer van advocaten in de Europese Gemeenschap in principe 
mogelijk maakte. Deze zogenoemde eerste generatie jurisprudentie wordt gekarak-
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teriseerd door arresten waarin het Europees Hof van Justitie het Verdrag op zo een 
manier interpreteert dat advocaten hun rechten op vrij verkeer kunnen uitoefenen. 
De eerste zaken in deze lijn van jurisprudentie waren de zaken Reyners en Van Bins-
bergen waarin het Hof verklaarde dat artikelen 43 en 49 EG-Verdrag directe werking 
hebben, en dat (destijds) bij gebrek aan secundaire wetgeving advocaten een direct 
beroep op deze artikelen kunnen doen om hun rechten te effectueren. Het Hof zette 
deze lijn door in zaken als Thieffry; Klopp; Vlassopoulou. Met name deze laatste zaak, 
waarin het Hof bepaalde dat een persoon die toegang zoekt tot een gereguleerd 
beroep recht heeft op een individuele vergelijking tussen zijn kennis en ervaring en 
de voor het beroep noodzakelijke kwalificaties, is nog altijd van het grootste belang. 
Het Hof ontwikkelde zijn jurisprudentie verder in het arrest Kraus zodat ook non-
discriminatoire belemmeringen in principe verboden zijn. Die laatste ontwikkeling 
vond zijn sluitstuk in het Gebhard arrest waarin het Hof de befaamde formule uit 
Cassis de Dijon van toepassing verklaarde op alle vier de vrijheden.  
Toen het Hof bezig was met de ontwikkeling van dit complex van rechten voor 
(onder meer) advocaten, waren de Europese wetgevende instellingen druk bezig met 
het ontwikkelen van een systeem van richtlijnen dat op de zogenaamde vrije be-
roepen (waaronder het beroep van advocaat) van toepassing is. In de jaren zeventig 
werd, onder aanvoering van de Europese Commissie, getracht alle vrije beroepen 
één voor één te harmoniseren. Deze zogenaamde sectorale aanpak voorzag in het 
creëren van twee richtlijnen per beroep. In de ene richtlijn werden minimum-
vereisten voor de opleiding tot dat beroep neergelegd, terwijl de tweede richtlijn 
voorzag in wederzijdse erkenning van de beroepsvereisten in de verschillende Lid-
staten. Deze aanpak werkte met name in de medische sector en zodoende werden 
de beroepen van dokter, tandarts, dierenarts, verpleger en vroedvrouw op deze manier 
geharmoniseerd. Toch bleek deze sectorale aanpak te traag. De onderhandelingen 
over met name de minimumvereisten voor de opleidingen in de diverse medische 
beroepen verliepen vaak moeizaam. Buiten de medische sector was de toepassing 
van het sectorale systeem nog moeilijker. Voor het beroep van architect werd met 
moeite een erkenningsrichtlijn opgesteld, maar een richtlijn met minimumvereisten 
is er nooit gekomen. Voor het beroep van ingenieur bleek het überhaupt onmogelijk 
om tot een richtlijn te komen.  
Voor het beroep van advocaat werd er niet eens een poging ondernomen om 
het beroep door middel van de sectorale aanpak te harmoniseren. Toch werd er voor 
dit beroep in 1977 een richtlijn aangenomen die het in ieder geval mogelijk maakte 
voor advocaten om in een andere Lidstaat diensten te verrichten. Deze richtlijn 
77/249/EEG werd gebaseerd op het principe van wederzijdse erkenning. Advocaten 
zijn op basis van deze richtlijn gerechtigd om de activiteiten van het beroep in de 
Lidstaat van ontvangst uit te oefenen met als enige restrictie dat de Lidstaat van ont-
vangst de samenwerking met een in die Lidstaat gekwalificeerde advocaat voor mag 
schrijven in het geval van vertegenwoordiging van een cliënt voor een rechter. 
Deze activiteit moet echter wel tijdelijk zijn (omdat het om dienstverlening en niet 
om vestiging ging). Blijkbaar was die concessie genoeg voor de Lidstaten om de 
moeizame en tijdrovende constructies zoals die in het sectorale systeem plaats-
vonden niet ook bij deze richtlijn toe te passen. Zodoende blinkt de richtlijn uit in 
eenvoud en transparantie. Bovendien was het tot midden jaren negentig (totdat het 
Gebhard-arrest gewezen werd) onduidelijk wat nu de precieze afbakening tussen 
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vestiging en dienstverlening was, zodat veel advocaten een erg rekkelijke opvatting 
van tijdelijke dienstverlening hadden en in feite in een andere Lidstaat gevestigd 
waren (de zogenaamde installation limitée). 
Na de moeizame harmonisatie van de medische beroepen en de mislukkingen 
in de architecten- en ingenieurssector werd in 1984 in Fontainebleu voor een andere 
koers gekozen. Er zou een horizontaal systeem van erkenning van beroepsvereisten 
moeten komen dat van toepassing zou zijn op alle beroepskwalificaties waar op zijn 
minst een driejarige opleiding in het hoger onderwijs voor vereist was. Dit hori-
zontale systeem zag op het einde van de jaren tachtig het levenslicht in richtlijn 
89/48/EEG (de zogenaamde Diplomarichtlijn). Het systeem van de richtlijn gaat 
uit van wederzijdse erkenning, maar laat de mogelijkheid open voor Lidstaten om 
compenserende maatregelen te eisen als er substantiële verschillen zijn tussen de op-
leiding in de Lidstaat van herkomst en de Lidstaat van ontvangst. De compenserende 
maatregelen kunnen bestaan uit een aanpassingstage of een proeve van bekwaam-
heid. In principe heeft een kandidaat die zijn kwalificaties erkend wil zien en wil 
integreren in het beroep van de Lidstaat van ontvangst de keuze tussen deze maat-
regelen. Deze keuze wordt de kandidaat alleen ontnomen als het gaat om een 
beroep dat precieze kennis van het nationale recht vereist (zoals – uiteraard – bij 
het beroep van advocaat). In deze gevallen mag de Lidstaat een dwingende keuze op-
leggen. Het zal geen verbazing wekken dat alle Lidstaten gekozen hebben voor de 
zwaardere (althans vergeleken met de aanpassingstage) proeve van bekwaamheid.  
In de praktijk doet deze opgelegde proeve van bekwaamheid het onderliggende 
principe van wederzijdse erkenning voor een deel teniet. De Lidstaten hebben name-
lijk voor een deel (binnen de grenzen van de proportionaliteitseis) de vrije hand in 
het bepalen van de omvang en zwaarte van de proeve. De weinige jurisprudentie 
(zeker vergeleken met andere beroepen) over de proeve bij het beroep van advocaat 
geeft als absolute grens een discriminatieverbod met de nationale opleiding. De 
proeve mag dus niet zwaarder zijn dan het kwalificatietraject in de Lidstaat van 
ontvangst, maar – blijkbaar wel (wederom binnen de grenzen van de proportio-
naliteitseis) – even zwaar.  
Door de jaren heen werd richtlijn 89/48/EEG vergezeld van twee richtlijnen 
die een algemeen systeem voor erkenning creëerden voor lagere opleidingen (richt-
lijn 92/51/EEG en richtlijn 99/42/EG). Na een aantal wijzigingen werden deze 
drie richtlijnen, samen met de richtlijnen die werden aangenomen in het kader van 
de sectorale aanpak, opnieuw gecodificeerd in richtlijn 2005/36/EG. Deze nieuwe 
richtlijn verandert echter niets aan het systeem van erkenning van beroepskwalificaties 
van advocaten.  
Met deze twee systemen, de dienstenrichtlijn en de diplomarichtlijn, waren twee 
modaliteiten van het vrij verkeer van advocaten gedekt, namelijk de advocaten die 
slechts tijdelijk diensten verlenen in een andere Lidstaat en de advocaten die volledig 
willen integreren in de Lidstaat van ontvangst. De derde modaliteit, advocaten die 
zich wel willen vestigen in een andere Lidstaat maar niet volledig willen integreren 
in de Lidstaat van ontvangst, en hun beroep willen uitoefenen onder eigen beroeps-
titel, was vooralsnog niet afgedekt (behalve door een te rekkelijke uitleg van richt-
lijn 77/249/EEG). Bescherming voor deze groep, en daarmee het sluitstuk voor 
het vrij verkeer van advocaten, kwam in de gedaante van richtlijn 98/5/EG. Deze 
richtlijn voorziet in het faciliteren van de vestiging van advocaten in een andere Lid-
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staat onder hun eigen beroepstitel. De oorsprong van deze richtlijn ligt in 1975 toen de 
Europese Commissie de Europese Organisatie van Advocatenordes (de CCBE) vroeg 
om na te denken over het realiseren van een vrij verkeer van advocaten. In 1992(!) 
bood de CCBE haar voorstel voor een richtlijn aan, aan de Europese Commissie. 
In dat licht kan richtlijn 98/5/EG gezien worden als een ‘verlate’ sectorale richtlijn. 
Net zoals de richtlijnen 77/249/EEG en 2005/36/EG is richtlijn 98/5/EG 
gebaseerd op het beginsel van wederzijdse erkenning. Richtlijn 98/5/EG heeft 
grote overeenkomsten met richtlijn 77/249/EEG en leidt eigenlijk tot wederzijdse 
erkenning van het beroep zelf (en niet zozeer tot wederzijdse erkenning van de 
beroepskwalificaties zoals in richtlijn 2005/36/EG). Een advocaat die volledig ge-
kwalificeerd is in een Lidstaat mag het beroep van advocaat, zij het onder zijn eigen 
beroepstitel, in alle andere Lidstaten uitoefenen. Daarbij mogen slechts marginale 
beperkingen worden opgelegd wat betreft de uitoefening van beroepsactiviteit. De 
zwaarste van deze beperkingen is een identieke samenwerkingsbepaling zoals die 
ook in richtlijn 77/249/EEG voorkomt in het geval van vertegenwoordiging van 
een cliënt voor een rechter.  
Naast de erkenning van het recht om het beroep van advocaat permanent onder 
eigen beroepstitel uit te oefenen in een andere Lidstaat draagt richtlijn 98/5/EG 
nog twee belangrijke elementen in zich. In de eerste plaats is er de mogelijkheid, 
neergelegd in artikel 10 van de richtlijn, om volledig in het beroep van de lidstaat 
van ontvangst te integreren zonder dat daartoe de door richtlijn 2005/36/EG voor-
geschreven proeve van bekwaamheid moet worden afgelegd. Deze mogelijkheid 
komt de advocaat toe als hij kan bewijzen dat hij zich gedurende tenminste drie 
jaar effectief en regelmatig heeft beziggehouden met het recht van de Lidstaat van 
ontvangst, met inbegrip van het Europees Gemeenschapsrecht. Daarnaast probeert 
de richtlijn de problematiek omtrent het uitoefenen van het beroep van advocaat in 
groepsverband, en dan met name in zogenaamde multi-disciplinaire partnerschappen 
te regelen. Helaas is deze poging in het wetgevingsproces grotendeels verwaterd, en 
de kleine nuance over de toepassing van de beroepsregels van de Lidstaat van ont-
vangst die overbleef, is in de implementatie door de Lidstaten structureel genegeerd.  
Nu, na de voltooiing van het systeem van secundaire wetgeving, dringt zich de 
vraag op of het systeem dat door het Hof van Justitie ontwikkeld werd, en vooral 
zijn weerslag vindt in de arresten Vlassopoulou en Gebhard, voor advocaten nog 
relevant is. Uit jurisprudentie over gevallen die geheel of gedeeltelijk buiten het 
toepassingsbereik van met name de Diplomarichtlijnen vielen is af te leiden dat het 
Hof in die gevallen consistent het in de jurisprudentie neergelegde model toepast 
en dan met name de Vlassopoulou-formule die leidt tot een direct individueel ver-
gelijk tussen de gevraagde competenties en de competenties die de kandidaat heeft 
opgedaan. Een zaak moet hierbij specifiek onder de aandacht worden gebracht. In 
de zaak Morgenbesser heeft het Hof de Vlassopoulou formule toegepast op advocaat-
stagiaires, i.e. op personen die nog niet volledig gekwalificeerd zijn voor een beroep 
(waar dat in eerdere gevallen wel het geval was, maar het beroep zelf geheel of 
gedeeltelijk buiten de richtlijnen viel). Dit is een revolutionaire zaak voor de verdere 
ontwikkeling van het vrij verkeer van advocaten omdat het Hof nu erkent dat ook 
personen tijdens hun kwalificatietraject bescherming verdienen. Duitsland is voorals-
nog de enige Lidstaat die heeft geprobeerd om de regel uit Morgenbesser te vertalen 
in nationale wetgeving (§ 112a van het Deutschen Richtergesetz).  
351 
In het laatste deel van Hoofdstuk 2 van het boek, waar de ontwikkeling van dit 
model uiteengezet is, werd kort aandacht besteed aan de positie van zogenoemde 
derdelanders, en werd geconcludeerd dat hun bescherming zwaar tekort schiet ver-
geleken met de advocaten die wel de nationaliteit van een van de Lidstaten bezitten.  
Toepassing van het model in de Lidstaten 
De tweede vraag die in dit onderzoek werd gesteld was hoe de regels, en dan met 
name de regels die zijn neergelegd in de desbetreffende richtlijnen, omtrent het vrij 
verkeer van advocaten daadwerkelijk in de Lidstaten zijn geïmplementeerd. Daarvoor 
was het allereerst noodzakelijk een overzicht te geven van het beroep van advocaat 
in de vijftien geselecteerde Lidstaten. Op basis van die vergelijking is duidelijk dat 
de verschillende gedaantes van het beroep van advocaat in de verschillende Lidstaten 
met name met betrekking tot de wettelijke bescherming van beroepsactiviteit nogal 
van elkaar verschillen.  
Grofweg is er een drievoudig onderscheid te maken. Aan het ene – extreme – 
uiteinde staan de Lidstaten waarin het beroep van advocaat geen enkel wettelijk 
monopolie geniet (Finland en Zweden). Alle activiteiten die een advocaat normaal 
uitoefent, mogen in die Lidstaten ook door niet-advocaten uitgeoefend worden. 
Aan de andere kant van het spectrum staan die Lidstaten waarbij zowel de ver-
tegenwoordiging (in de breedste zin van het woord) van cliënten als het geven van 
juridisch advies op basis van een wettelijk monopolie aan advocaten zijn voor-
behouden (Luxemburg; Frankrijk; Italië; Spanje; Portugal; Duitsland; Oostenrijk en 
Griekenland). Daartussen bevinden zich een aantal Lidstaten die wel de processuele 
vertegenwoordiging van cliënten door advocaten wettelijk beschermen, maar het 
geven van bijvoorbeeld juridisch advies niet (Verenigd Koninkrijk; Ierland; België; 
Nederland en in zekere mate Denemarken).  
Deze driedeling leidt al meteen tot een complicatie met betrekking tot het 
toepassen van het model zoals dat eerder beschreven werd. Bij het afleiden daarvan 
werd vastgesteld dat de kern gevormd werd door de drie richtlijnen (77/249/EEG, 
98/5/EG en 2005/36/EG) die op advocaten van toepassing zijn. De complicatie 
ligt in het feit dat de richtlijnen uitsluitend van toepassing zijn op gekwalificeerde 
advocaten, i.e. op mensen die gerechtigd zijn om in de Lidstaat van herkomst de 
titel ‘advocaat’ te voeren. Zowel in de Lidstaten die geen wettelijk monopolie heb-
ben op de beroepsactiviteiten van advocaten, als in de Lidstaten waar een dergelijk 
monopolie alleen bestaat voor de processuele vertegenwoordiging van cliënten, zijn 
er dus beroepsuitoefenaars die beroepsactiviteit uitoefenen die in landen met een 
uitgebreid monopolie onder de beroepsactiviteit van advocaten valt. Deze personen 
hebben in hun eigen Lidstaat niet het recht de titel van advocaat te voeren. Deze 
beroepsuitoefenaars vallen zodoende in ieder geval buiten de toepassingssfeer van 
de diensten- en vestigingsrichtlijn (77/249/EEG en 98/5/EG). De problematiek van 
deze categorie is expliciet aan de orde gekomen tijdens het implementatieonder-
zoek in de verschillende Lidstaten. 
Met betrekking tot de implementatie van richtlijn 77/249/EEG werden geen 
grote onregelmatigheden geconstateerd. De categorie van beroepsuitoefenaars uit 
landen met geen of weinig wettelijke bescherming voor beroepsactiviteiten die door 
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advocaten worden uitgeoefend kunnen geen direct beroep doen op de bepalingen 
van richtlijn 77/249/EEG (of de regelgeving die het resultaat is van de imple-
mentatie daarvan). Sinds het verstrijken van de implementatietermijn van richtlijn 
2005/36/EG op 20 oktober 2007 is deze categorie wel beschermd op basis van 
deze richtlijn. Op basis van deze richtlijn mogen Lidstaten geen restricties opleggen 
die te maken hebben met de beroepskwalificaties van de dienstverlener. Andere 
restricties vallen onder de eerste generatie jurisprudentie, en dan met name onder 
het Gebhard-arrest. Na 2009 vallen andere restricties onder de nieuwe diensten-
richtlijn 2006/123/EG (die 77/249/EEG onaangetast laat). 
Het grootste gedeelte van Hoofdstuk 3 van het boek is gewijd aan het imple-
mentatieonderzoek van richtlijn 98/5/EG. Uit het implementatieonderzoek blijkt 
dat er twee varianten van implementatie voorkomen in de geselecteerde Lidstaten. 
Aan de ene kant zijn er Lidstaten die implementatie aangrijpen om een compleet 
nieuwe wet te maken die dan vaak ook nog de twee andere modaliteiten van vrij 
verkeer van advocaten omvat, terwijl er aan de andere kant Lidstaten zijn die ‘slechts’ 
reeds bestaande wetgeving aanpassen. Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat de manier van 
implementeren geen invloed heeft op het resultaat.  
Met betrekking tot de implementatie van richtlijn 98/5/EG kunnen vier ver-
schillende soorten restricties, mogelijke inbreuken van deze richtlijn, geïdentificeerd 
worden. In de eerste plaats zijn er restricties van de richtlijn die door het Europees 
Hof van Justitie (in Wilson en Commissie v. Luxemburg) werden beoordeeld en ge-
classificeerd worden als per se onverenigbaar met het Gemeenschapsrecht. Ook Lid-
staten die in die zaken geen partij waren, maar die soortgelijke restricties opleggen, 
overtreden daarmee het Europese recht. Een tweede categorie van restricties wordt 
geconstrueerd op basis van de AMOK zaak waarin het Hof besliste dat restricties 
die buiten het toepassingsbereik van de richtlijn vallen, maar die de volle werking 
van de richtlijn verhinderen ook per se niet verenigbaar zijn met het Gemeen-
schapsrecht. Alhoewel de AMOK zaak gewezen werd met betrekking tot richtlijn 
77/249/EEG werd betoogd dat deze redenering ook op richtlijn 98/5/EG van 
toepassing zou kunnen zijn. Een derde categorie van restricties zijn belemmeringen 
die buiten het toepassingsbereik van de richtlijn vallen en ook de volle werking van 
de richtlijn niet verhinderen. Deze restricties moeten worden beoordeeld op basis 
van het algemene systeem zoals neergelegd in Vlassopoulou en Gebhard en zijn dus 
verboden, tenzij ze objectief worden gerechtvaardigd. Een vierde en laatste cate-
gorie van restricties wordt veroorzaakt door richtlijn 98/5/EG zelf (bijvoorbeeld 
het handhaven van een dubbele inschrijving). Deze restricties moeten, als uitvloeisel 
van de richtlijn zelf, en zolang niet is vastgesteld dat de richtlijn strijdig is met het 
primaire Gemeenschapsrecht, als toelaatbaar worden bestempeld. 
Afgezien van de situatie van procureurs in Nederland, die door de afschaffing 
van het procuraat opgelost is, en een massaal negeren van een bepaling in artikel 11 
van de richtlijn door de Lidstaten zijn er geen grote defecten aangetroffen in de 
implementatie van richtlijn 98/5/EG zodat het gerechtigd is om te zeggen dat de 
uitoefening van het beroep van advocaat in Europa in alles behalve naam gehar-
moniseerd is. 
De situatie van beroepsuitoefenaars uit Lidstaten waar weinig wettelijke bescher-
ming is voor het beroep van advocaat die hun beroep zouden willen uitoefenen in 
een Lidstaat waar die bescherming meeromvattend is, ziet er veel minder roos-
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kleurig uit. Deze groep kan slechts een beroep doen op de regels zoals verwoord 
door het Hof in Gebhard. Het is zelfs denkbaar dat, omdat richtlijn 2005/36/EG 
meer bescherming biedt op dit punt voor dienstverlenende beroepsuitoefenaars die 
geen advocaat zijn, er een nieuwe installation limitée zou kunnen ontstaan. Dat zou 
een onwelkome situatie zijn. 
Met betrekking tot de erkenning van diploma’s en de volledige integratie van 
een kandidaat in het beroep van de Lidstaat van ontvangst werden geen onregel-
matigheden vastgesteld. Met betrekking tot de niet-advocaten uit jurisdicties met 
weinig bescherming werd vastgesteld dat deze personen een beroep kunnen doen 
op richtlijn 2005/36/EG met een eventueel beroep op de Caminos zaak om de 
omvang van de integratie op eigen verzoek te beperken tot de omvang van hun 
beroep in de Lidstaat van ontvangst. 
Aan het einde van Hoofdstuk 3 werd kort aandacht besteed aan de positie van 
derdelanders. Bekeken werd of de regels van het GATS in het kader van de WTO 
bescherming bieden voor een derdelander die juridische beroepsactiviteit wil uit-
oefenen in de Europese Unie. Na een kort overzicht van de regels van het GATS 
betreffende de juridische beroepen werd geconcludeerd dat de regels van het GATS 
geen bescherming bieden aan deze advocaten omdat deze inhoudelijk tekort schieten 
(vergeleken met EU regels). Bovendien zijn de GATS-regels niet direct inroepbaar 
voor individuen. Er werd vastgesteld dat in Duitsland advocaten uit WTO landen 
zich onder hun eigen beroepstitel mogen vestigen en activiteit mogen verrichten 
met betrekking tot het recht van hun eigen land en het internationaal recht. Dit 
gaat veel verder dan wat het GATS eist, maar zou door meer landen overwogen 
moeten worden. 
Verdere ontwikkeling en verfijning van het vrij verkeer 
van advocaten 
Wat duidelijk wordt uit hoofdstukken 2 en 3 is dat het vrij verkeer van volledig 
gekwalificeerde advocaten zo goed als uitgekristalliseerd is. Binnen het model liggen 
er alleen nog mogelijkheden voor kleine aanpassingen en aanpassingen voor personen 
die wel juridische beroepsactiviteiten uitoefenen maar geen volledig gekwalificeerd 
advocaat zijn. De meeste potentie voor een verdere verfijning van het systeem ligt 
echter bij de groep personen die nog bezig zijn om zich tot advocaat te kwalifi-
ceren. Uit het overzicht van de verschillende beroepen in de verschillende Lidstaten 
werd duidelijk dat, hoe verschillend de nationale opleidingen ook zijn, het kwali-
ficatietraject in die Lidstaten (behalve Spanje) uit twee verschillende fases bestaat. In 
de eerste plaats is er de universitaire fase, die wordt afgesloten met een diploma in 
de rechten. Daarna begint de tweede fase die door middel van de beroepsopleiding 
uiteindelijk leidt tot de volledige kwalificatie als advocaat. Die tweedeling geeft ook 
twee duidelijke punten waar een kandidaat-advocaat zou kunnen instappen in het 
kwalificatietraject in een andere Lidstaat, namelijk aan het begin van de universitaire 
opleiding of aan het begin van de beroepsopleiding. 
Het probleem met het creëren van regels over een dergelijke overstap binnen 
de Europese Unie, ligt in het feit dat de Europese Unie op basis van artikel 149 EG 
Verdrag de bevoegdheid ontbeert om op het gebied van onderwijs regelgevend te 
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kunnen optreden. Er werd vastgesteld dat de toegang tot deze twee ‘instappunten’ 
werd geregeld door twee Verdragen van de Raad van Europa (het Equivalentie-
verdrag van Parijs en het Erkenningsverdrag van Lissabon) die een integraal deel 
van het ‘Bologna Proces’ uitmaken.  
Dit ‘Bologna Proces’ is een intergouvernementeel ‘soft law’ proces dat erop 
gericht is om een Europese Ruimte van Hoger Onderwijs te creëren. Het moet in 
dezen worden opgemerkt dat het ‘Bologna Proces’ op geen enkele manier speciaal 
aandacht besteedt aan de juridische opleidingen en de juridische beroepen in de 
deelnemende landen. Een onderzoek van het ‘Bologna Proces’, en dan met name 
gericht op de twee speerpunten met betrekking tot het creëren van een drievoudige 
cyclus van diploma’s (bachelor-master-doctor) en de erkenning van diploma’s, wijst 
uit dat het ‘Bologna Proces’ op zich niets toevoegt aan de verdere verfijning van 
het vrij verkeer van advocaten in Europa. Er werd ook geconcludeerd dat de Lid-
staten van de Europese Unie die participeren in het ‘Bologna Proces’ in grote mate 
worden gelimiteerd in het toepassen van de twee erkenningsverdragen van de Raad 
van Europa. Dit is met name het geval door wat het Hof heeft bepaald in de zaken 
Commissie v Oostenrijk (zaak C-147/03) en Morgenbesser. In die laatste zaak bepaalde 
het Hof dat de toegang tot een kwalificatietraject niet afhankelijk gemaakt mag 
worden van het bezit van een nationaal diploma. Met betrekking tot de toelating 
tot de beroepsopleiding vereist Morgenbesser zelfs de toepassing van de Vlassopoulou 
doctrine. 
Vervolgens werd onderzocht of en in hoeverre het ‘Bologna Proces’ gebruikt 
zou kunnen worden om het vrij verkeer van kandidaat-advocaten te verfijnen. Na 
onderzoek werd geconcludeerd dat dit het geval zou kunnen zijn als Lidstaten 
bachelorcurricula ontwikkelen die minder specifiek ingaan op het eigen rechts-
systeem maar meer op de algemene trekken van de belangrijkste systemen in Europa. 
Dergelijke curricula zouden het makkelijker maken voor studenten om zich vrij te 
bewegen door Europa, omdat de bestudering van het nationale recht gereserveerd 
zou blijven tot de masterfase of zelfs de beroepsopleiding. Een kort overzicht van 
het kwalificatietraject in de Verenigde Staten geeft aan dat dit mogelijk moet zijn 
omdat een dergelijk systeem daar bestaat naast veel meer gelimiteerde regels wat 
betreft vrij verkeer. In de Europese Unie zelf zou Luxemburg als voorbeeld kunnen 
dienen omdat die Lidstaat tot voor kort geen eigen rechtenfaculteit had en dus 
gedwongen was om personen met een buitenlands diploma te accepteren die zich 
dan in Luxemburg het Luxemburgse recht eigen moesten maken.  
De cultuuromslag die nodig is om een dergelijk systeem op te zetten is niet te 
onderschatten, maar tegelijkertijd zijn er binnen de Europese Unie talloze experi-
menten met curricula die in deze richting wijzen. Meer en meer komen er ook 
curricula die tot een dubbele kwalificatie leiden. De CCBE zou betrokken moeten 
worden bij de ontwikkeling van dergelijke curricula om zo de acceptatie van der-
gelijke curricula door de verschillende beroepsorganisaties meer aannemelijk te maken. 
van het daadwerkelijk creëren van een dergelijk systeem zou in de handen van de 
CCBE moeten liggen op Een dergelijke betrokkenheid zou gebaseerd kunnen 
worden op de gemeenschappelijke platforms waarin is voorzien in artikel 15 richt-
lijn 2005/36/EG. Deze platforms voorzien in een zelfregulering van een bepaald 
gereguleerd beroep.  
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Aanbevelingen voor de toekomst 
Als laatste werden in het boek vier aanbevelingen gedaan voor de toekomst. De 
eerste aanbeveling betreft de implementatie van artikel 11 richtlijn 98/5/EG. Uit 
het implementatieonderzoek bleek dat het grootste gedeelte van de onderzochte 
Lidstaten de ingewikkelde procedure omtrent de toepasbaarheid van de beroeps-
regels van de Lidstaat van ontvangst genegeerd hebben. Dat negeren is niet geheel 
onterecht nu de tekst van artikel 11 het resultaat is van een aantal politieke com-
promissen en niet uitblinkt in helderheid en makkelijke toepasbaarheid. Daarom 
wordt aanbevolen de tekst van artikel 11 te veranderen zodat er een regel ontstaat 
die voorziet in de directe toepasbaarheid van de beroepsregels van de Lidstaat van 
ontvangst, om zo de richtlijn in overeenstemming te brengen met het merendeel 
van de implementaties. 
Een tweede aanbeveling betreft de bescherming van de positie van diegenen die 
nog niet volledig gekwalificeerd zijn als advocaat. Het wordt aanbevolen dat op 
deze personen de Diplomarichtlijn van toepassing wordt en dat de Vlassopoulou 
doctrine wordt toegepast op diegenen die toegang zoeken tot het hoger onderwijs 
in een andere lidstaat. Bovendien, en dat is de derde aanbeveling, zouden er nieuwe 
curricula gemaakt moeten worden (door universiteiten, maar geaccepteerd door de 
beroepsorganisaties) die het vrij verkeer van kandidaat advocaten verder zouden 
moeten bevorderen. 
De laatste aanbeveling betrof de inhoud van deze nieuwe curricula. Deze curricula 
zouden, althans in de bachelorfase niet zozeer gebaseerd moeten zijn op nationaal 
recht (dat zou gereserveerd moeten worden tot de masterfase) maar meer op wat 
de grote rechtssystemen in Europa gemeen hebben, een nieuw Ius Commune. 
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